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The best strategy to defending Singapore Island

Discussion in 'Strategy & Tactics' started by Twister, Dec 31, 2008.

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  1. OPSSG

    OPSSG Super Moderator Staff Member

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    Post 1 of 2: Points to support Ananda’s Posts
    Thank you all for the replies to point out the problems. Let me share my 12 supporting points.
    One, Singapore aligns our interests with that of Australia, France, Germany, US, NZ and so on. Indonesia, as a G20 member, and the most populous country in ASEAN, is the leader of ASEAN. While the rotating ASEAN chair controls the agenda, Indonesia's leadership will affect ASEAN's effectiveness.
    Two, the fight alone scenario to defend Singapore from a full on invasion by the TNI by 2030 is very unrealistic (partly because the TNI does not have the logistics for an invasion nor the desire to do so). IMHO, attacking Singapore with 1 to 2 divisions in high intensity warfare may lead to at best a stalemate (and external intervention by the US, Australia, NZ and UK) or a loss for the aggressor.
    Three, any attack in 2030 under Ahmad‘s proposed scenario without first sinking the very capable Singapore Navy and our 4 Type 218SG submarines, is doomed to failure. Further, the SAF with 1 to 2 divisions in defence will outnumber a division of attackers as they attempt to land; and we will be able to counter attack to their depth with our other forces not used for defence. IMO it’s always possible to kill some Singaporeans, while we prepare for our counter attack. But our counter attack to the depth of the aggressor, is designed to break the will of the aggressor.
    Four, while it is not possible for Singapore to defend against 1,000 cruise missiles, it is also not likely that Indonesia will build or buy 1,000 cruise missiles. But we have the naval capability defend against a limited number of cruise missiles and I would like to point out that:
    • By 2030, the Singapore Navy would operate 4x 2,200 ton Invincible Class submarines (Type 218SG), 6x 3,200 ton Formidable Class frigates (equipped with up to 24 Harpoon missiles, and 32 Aster missiles, each), and 8x 1,200 ton Independence Class LMVs (equipped with 12 MICA VL each); and started the ship building program for the 5,000 ton MRCVs — which can attack land targets (using Harpoon missiles) or conduct a limited defence against cruise missiles (using Aster and MICA missiles), should the need arise. The 130m x 18m MRCV will be armed with a 76/62 mm naval gun, a vertical launch system (rendering shows up to 38 cells), two-30 mm remotely controlled and two-12.7 mm guns, surface-to-surface missile launchers, two-chaff decoy launchers and two-anti torpedo decoy launchers, as well as space for a 15-ton helicopter and unmanned surface and air systems capabilities.
    • Hostilities between Indonesia and Singapore is unlikely, as the TNI and the SAF train together and have a record of working together. For example, the SAF’s UAV command deployed the Scout RPV to provide intelligence to the TNI to resolve the Mapenduma hostage crisis in 1996. Further, Singapore also provides a submarine rescue service for the Indonesian Navy, and it also provides the Indonesian Navy with the Surpic II information sharing portal, a sea surveillance system, set up since 2005, to provide maritime awareness of the Singapore Strait. Under a Defence Cooperation Agreement, Singapore provides training assistance to the TNI, including G-Tolerance trainer and Super Puma simulator trainer, and professional courses like the Combined Fighter Weapons Instructor Course. To date, hundreds of TNI-AU pilots have undergone simulator training in Singapore, and 10 TNI-AU instructors have graduated from the Combined Fighter Weapons Instructor Course. Marking five decades of bilateral defence relations, the RSAF and TNI-AU executed a combined 20 F-16 flypast on 7 Sep 2017, over Singapore.
    • IMO, there is no need for Indonesia to buy 1,000 cruise missiles for Singapore to take the TNI-AU seriously — both countries can grow stronger together. The SAF gains tremendously by training with the TNI, as we have a conscript army, whereas, the TNI is a professional army. We also share a maritime border with Indonesia and we need your help to patrol these waters together. Having a stronger naval presence for Indonesia (well within your country's capability with the current size of Indonesia's economy), is key to ensuring that your country is less affected by China’s 9-dash line claims in West Natuna.
    • And as a leader of ASEAN, a strong Indonesia can serve to mediate between hostile parties (be it intra-ASEAN hostility or with China or Taiwan) over disputes in the South China Sea. Like China, Vietnam is also keen to push back against other claimants.
    Five, the SAF regularly trains to kill rocket systems, with a C4ISR system that features real-time updates of the ground situation picture by integrating the Heron 1 video feeds into an augmented reality display. Using advanced graphics rendering technology, static geographical data (e.g. landmarks, road names, building types, vegetation) are overlaid on top of the real-time video captured by the UAV. Multiple moving enemy targets, such as tanks and multiple launch rocket systems, employing “shoot and scoot” tactics can be destroyed in a single pass by fighters, AH-64D attack helicopters, or by our HIMARS batteries. We have 6 divisions (2Pdf, 3rd, 6th, 9th Divisions and AOR in 21st and 25th Divisions) and in many war scenarios, we only need 1 to 2 divisions to defend Singapore, leaving 4 divisions for rotational deployment for a forward defence scenario.
    • Invading Singapore means an aggressor has to have the logistics ability bring more than 4 combined arms divisions for the main effort; and a marine division for the minor effort. The aggressor will need the logistics ability to deliver 200 to 280 MBTS, in face of determined opposition by the SAF, to fight the SAF in echelon, for their main invasion effort (and the aggressor will also have to deploy 10 to 14 fighter squadrons as a tertiary air force), if they hope to have a chance to win. It’s logistics that is killer, just to keep these number of people supplied in high intensity warfare.
    • But the issue is not just logistics but the time and space required to deploy such a large number of troops — which will trigger intelligence alarm bells by all major powers. The political condition or behavior favored by many ASEAN members is a balance of power with the +8 powers, and the avoidance of armed conflict with each other and/or the +8 (because ASEAN members, like Indonesia and Singapore are not strong military powers, when compared to North East Asian Powers).
     
    Last edited: Aug 3, 2019
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  2. OPSSG

    OPSSG Super Moderator Staff Member

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    Post 2 of 2: Spending for deterrence
    Six, without air superiority, no competent general will try to conduct an amphibious landing via the Singapore Straits as a main effort (as the ammo usage rate, the death rate and WIA rate for an aggressor would overwhelm their css and medical support). It will be a turkey shoot of the aggressors (for the SAF as defenders); and we have some limited but additional capability in this area. The lack of realism for military aspect of invading Singapore from Batam is covered by my prior 2 posts.
    Seven, we are agreed. The Israelis also sell their EW solutions, as this video below shows.

    Eight, agreed, except that we are not as capable: (1) in defence science as France, Germany, Israel or the US; and (2) our EW and ISR capabilities for attack are much less than Australia’s substantial capabilities with their Growlers, P8As, Wedge-tail, JORN, their G550 EW aircraft and so on.
    Nine, agreed and details of EW, intelligence and air power concepts can be found in AirPower 101.
    Ten, Singapore used to spend up to 5% of our GDP on defence in the early days. Today, we spend about 3% — because the capability gap viz-a-viz hostile parties like Malaysia is growing wider, each year (to my surprise). In fact, the SAF does not want to appear too capable. We just need to show enough to deter Malaysia (who are likely to be hostile for the next 3 years with Dr M as PM). Good intelligence enabled Singapore to slow down our replacement rate for cutting-edge equipment.
     
    Last edited: Jul 31, 2019
  3. Todjaeger

    Todjaeger Potstirrer

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    There are two other important considerations regarding the defence of Singapore (and in reality apply anywhere) the first of these is the depth of defence available. Due to the size and nature of the geography in and around Singapore, there really is no depth available for defence within Singapore, which in turn forces defence planning to anticipate engaging hostile forces either immediately upon entry to Singaporean territory, or preferably engage in a forward defence with hostiles being engaged before they are within Singapore's airspace, home waters, or on Singapore's soil.

    The other important consideration has to do with the changing face of warfare itself, and that is the importance of gaining and maintaining information superiority. Of the ASEAN member-nations, Singapore appears to have invested the most resources as well as devoted the most effort into developing C4ISR capabilities which could achieve and maintain information superiority
     
  4. OPSSG

    OPSSG Super Moderator Staff Member

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    Post 1 of 2: The Big Picture

    Thanks for sharing your views. Let me add a few more points below to add context on how threats to Singapore’s interests are being mitigated:
    One, as WWII has shown, a good defence plan for Malaya (against the then external Japanese invasion from the north) from should start at the appropriate geographical choke point in Thai territory (see Appendix 2 for Map of the opening blows in the Pointer Monograph on page 64). The Imperial Japanese Army landed in Thai territory and proceed to march south. There is also a Pointer Monograph on the mistakes in the Malayan Campaign, including a chapter on operational art shortcomings.
    Two, on 15 February 1942, the British Imperial garrison of Singapore, surrendered to a numerically smaller Japanese assault force. The British military intelligence officer Hughes-Wilson attributes the intelligence effort at Singapore as having four fatal flaws as follows:

    (i) underestimation of the enemy;

    (ii) fragmentation of effort;

    (iii) lack of resources; and

    (iv) no influence at the highest levels of command and control.​

    Learning from the above past mistakes, Singapore understands that to be fore-warned is to be fore-armed. Good intelligence is of crucial importance to threat mitigation. For example, the uncovering of the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in 2001 was triggered by a tip-off from a concerned member of public. Security agencies also gather intelligence by intercepting the communications of terrorists. However, terrorists are constantly adapting their tactics to evade detection and this includes the use of encrypted messaging applications such as Telegram. Collectively, we need to step up our intelligence efforts as the centre of gravity of global terrorism shifts away from the Middle East and moves to other regions of the world, including this region, which have been susceptible to radical ideologies. For example, experts believe that most of the weapons used by militants during the recent conflict in Marawi came across the sea. Other ISIS-linked terrorists like the Abu Sayaff Group also continue to threaten the safety of seafarers in the Sulu-Celebes Sea and the waters off East Sabah by abducting the crew of trade-transiting ships in exchange for ransom. The suicide attacks in Surabaya in May 2018, and the June 2016 Puchong nightclub attacks in Malaysia, are grave warnings that terrorism can become endemic in this region.

    Three in 2016, a terrorist plot from Batam, Indonesia was thwarted by the authorities through intelligence sharing. The 6 suspects, who were members of an ISIS -linked cell, had planned to attack Marina Bay from Batam. Beyond terrorists from Malaysia and Indonesia, ISIS is trying establish their Caliphate in the Philippines. ASPI has a report, The Marawi crisis—urban conflict and information operations, that examines both the capability aspects of kinetic hard power and the lessons from soft-power information operations.
    • The 2017 Battle of Marawi also demonstrated that it takes night fighting equipment, a high standard of C3, combat trauma management and interoperability with supporting arms (such as, precise joint fires and armoured engineers) to fight and win in the urban environment — sadly things which are lacking for the AFP.
    • One Company from the AFP’s 2nd Infantry Division employed over 10,000 mortar rounds in 3 months. Offensive support came primarily in the form of Close Air Support, intimate support from mortars, and employing 105mm guns in a direct fire role. Despite the extraordinary firepower was employed to enable the seizure of Marawi City, the AFP failed to dominate the avenues of approach (resulting in trapped or isolated initial forces). ‘Murder holes’ were also utilised in stairwells. Knowing the AFP would have to make entry to clear the building, the ISIS snipers would cut a hole through the stair well and sit off some distance. Once the AFP made entry the ISIS sniper would have a clear line of sight of the door way and stairwell entry allowing him to score a centre of mass hit.
    • ISIS laid siege to Marawi City on 23 May 2017, lasting 153 days and becoming the longest urban war in Philippine history. It took the Philippines at least twice as long as comparable urban battles and attributable to capability shortfalls, and training, which the AFP acknowledged. To make matters worse, AFP platoons had not conducted extensive training in combat trauma management, and their Role 2 and Role 3 equivalent medical facilities were not accustomed to the very high volume of casualties which can be expected during urban fighting—a significant number of which were non-battle injuries.
    • It took the Philippines at least twice as long as comparable urban battles and attributable to capability shortfalls, and training, which the AFP acknowledged. In the Battle of Marawi, they ran out of certain types of ammunition and was fortunate that the US was willing to resupply them at short notice. The AFP also have very limited access to military grade UAVs, encrypted communications and most crucially, night fighting equipment (NFE); indeed, the only forces well equipped with NFE were those from Philippine SOCOMD and MARSOG. This meant the majority of forces were static at night. Lack of proper equipment slowed operational tempo and also resulted in 53 unnecessary AFP deaths in the Battle of Marawi. There were instances where their initial reinforcements were trapped for up to 5 days. With the help of outside partners such as Australia, Singapore and the US, the AFP sought to address their short comings. SAF's assistance included sending a C-130H to transport humanitarian supplies, use of the SAF's urban training villages for AFP troops, and a detachment of UAVs to enhance the AFP's intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities.
    • The resulting tendency for outside observers to understand the Marawi operation through a lens of AFP training shortfalls discounts some AFP strengths and experience and also risks underestimating both inherent and emerging challenges. This Australian documentary below explains the Australian train and assist program and why this remains a breeding ground for ISIS. Official death toll for the battle in Marawi stood at 1,131 (919 terrorists and 165 soldiers and policemen) with over 1000 injured and also took the lives of 47 civilians.
    • Given the complexity of the region, it is accurate to say that the security problems faced by Singapore go beyond the traditional need for intelligence on state actors from the past. Let me quote from Secretary Robert Gates, who was the Secretary of Defense for the US. Gates said in 2011: “And I must tell you, when it comes to predicting the nature and location of our military engagements, since Vietnam, our record has been perfect. We have never once gotten it right... – we had no idea a year before any of these missions that we would be so engaged.” Secretary Gates was honest and spoke the truth, which is no one knows, for sure. Likewise, we cannot predict the deployments the SAF is required to undertake.
    • If you told a Singaporean conscript in 1989, that 1,500 SAF personnel (both regulars and conscripts) would as ‘a fist of fury, reach out as a hand of hope’ to help Aceh after the 2004 Boxing Day Tsunami, or that another 1,500 have operated under CTF 151 as part of the counter-piracy effort in the Gulf of Aden, or that more would deploy to combat theatres in Afghanistan (492), and Iraq (998), or that Singapore would offer assistance to counter terrorists in the Philippines, he would think you are crazy.
    Four in 2018, Singapore’s information fusion centre (IFC) tracked a fishing boat and worked with the TNI to facilitate her capture in the waters off Batam, and a tonne of crystal methamphetamine was discovered on board. Today's threats faced are multi-faceted, trans-national and complex. Singapore understands the need to have the ability to gather information to conduct counter-terrorism operations against both state and non-state actors. Singapore is not shy about working with or learning from others. The SAF engages in intelligence-sharing with many ADMM Plus countries, including Indonesia, the United States, and Australia.
     
    Last edited: Aug 7, 2019
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  5. OPSSG

    OPSSG Super Moderator Staff Member

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    Post 2 of 2: Details Matter
    Five, piracy is a threat although the number of incidents have dropped, with a 92% decrease in piracy incidents in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore in 2015-2018, according to the Information Fusion Centre. Recently shipping companies have been advised to implement Security Level 3 — the highest state of alertness under the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code — effective from 2200hrs local time 2 July 2019 by Beijing, to increase the security level on ships transiting the Strait of Malacca.
    • While Beijing did not specify the reasons for the increased alert level, an internal email alert suggested the threat was from Indonesian parties.
    • On 22 Jul 2019 morning, seven pirates boarded a Korean flagged ship, the CK Bluebell and made off with US$13,000 (S$17,700) and belongings including mobile phones, clothes and shoes from the 22-strong crew, South Korea's Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries said (Read more at Pirates attack South Korean cargo ship in South China Sea).
    • Working with other countries and agencies will enable us to provide early warning for threats to Singapore and the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, allowing authorities to promptly apprehend criminals, pirates or terrorist suspects.
    Six, agreed on the importance of C4ISR. The Information Fusion Centre, based in Singapore is an example of such investment.

    Seven, beyond forward defence, investing in C4ISR and good intelligence, Singapore also invests in defence science to mitigate risk. The DSO National Laboratories (DSO) is the national defense research agency set up in 1972. Originally named the Electronics Test Centre, it was renamed in 1977 to the Defence Science Organization. Besides setting up DSO, Defence Science and Technology Agency (DSTA), and various local companies to harnesses and exploits science and technology, we have adopted a systems engineering approach. For example, DSTA undertakes design, development, acquisition and systems integration responsibilities, as well as operations and support management. These span the entire spectrum of capability planning, development, and sustainment of weapon systems throughout their life cycle to ensure that the SAF continue to be a formidable fighting force.


    Eight, the Next Generation SAF, for it to be a potent and credible force, must harness all of its assets, its manpower as well as technology. By 2030, slightly more than a decade to come, there will be a third reduction in NS recruits. A 33% reduction — that is disruptive change. In addition, when we built ships or procured platforms, they must be able to be operated with a lean force. Other navies operate frigates with crews of between 140 to 180 men. Our frigates which are just as potent operate with half to a third less, a 70 men crew. This is only possible because it was designed that way. For many years now, the SAF has already started to address this disruptive change, through the radical change in its approach to the organisational structure and manpower requirements of SAF systems.

    • A key project for the future SAF posture, is the next generation Armoured Fighting Vehicle (NG AFV). Built by ST Kinetics, the new tracked AFV will be able to accommodate three crew as well as up to eight fully-equipped troops. The vehicle weighs 29 tons and will reach maximum speeds of 70 kilometres-per-hour (43.5 miles-per-hour/mph) with a range of 500 kilometres/km (310.8 miles). The NG AFV is equipped with a remote weapons station and will replace the ageing M-113A2 Ultra tracked armoured personnel carriers. Some of these NG AFVs are equipped with a 30 mm remote weapon station (RWS). The dual-axis gyro-stabilised, dual-sight RWS can engage armoured vehicles 2 km away. According to Rafael, the RWS can carry up to 230 rounds of 30mm ammunition and 500 rounds for the co-axial machine gun. A highlight of the RWS is the ATGM launcher that can be installed on its left side, which is positioned horizontally and retracted under armour protection during travel and raised when preparing to fire its two ATGMs.

    These NG AFVs variants are scheduled to enter service in 2019 with the Armoured Infantry battalions and supported by the Bronco. The AFVs in use with 4th, 8th, 54th and 56th Singapore Armoured Brigades are the Bionix I, Bionix II and the NG AFVs.

    • Earlier in November 2016, the Singapore Army inducted the Belrex Protected Combat Support Vehicle (PCSV) to support the Terrex motorised infantry battalions. Based on the Marauder mine-resistant, ambush protected vehicle, the four-wheel drive Belrex PCSV vehicle measures has a gross weight of 20 tons. It accommodates two crew members, up to eight troops at the rear or 4,000 kg of equipment.


    Nine, we have grown our defence companies and engineering ecology from 1,000 scientists and engineers to about 5,000 today. And it’s a generational effort to invest, with a steady drum beat of new equipment (or contracts with 3rd parties, like Oman, Thailand, UAE and UK) to feed the defence ecology with work.
    • In 2019, delivery of the Hunter AFV for the SAF and in 2018, the unveiling of the Bronco 3. On 26 January 2019, ST Marine launched the 8th LMV, RSS Fearless for the Singapore Navy. On 18 August 2018 and 24 March 2018, ST Marine launched the 7th (RSS Dauntless) and 6th (RSS Fortitude) LMVs.
    • On 23 September 2017 and 18 March 2017, St Marine launched the 5th (RSS Indomitable) and 4th (RSS Justice) LMVs.
    • In June 2016, ST Marine supplied the fourth Al-Ofouq class vessel (Khassab) for the Royal Navy of Oman. On 16 April 2016 and 13 October 2016, ST Marine launched the 3rd (RSS Unity) and 2nd (RSS Sovereignty) LMVs.
    • On 3 July 2015, ST Marine launched the 1st LMV (RSS Independence). The unveiling in the same year of the Terrex 2 and 3, for the US Marines and Australian Army supply competitions that ST Kinetics ultimately lost later. In November 2015, the Marine Corps chose SAIC (working with ST Kinetics) to build competing prototypes for the Amphibious Combat Vehicle. SAIC, offered a variant of the Singaporean Terrex, in a developmental contract worth US$121.5 million.
    • On 17 September 2014 (Sadh), 14 June 2014 (Al-Shinas), and 29 January 2014 (Al-Seeb), ST Marine launched 3 of the 4 Al-Ofouq class vessels for the Oman Navy.
    • In 2012 ST Marine delivered H.T.M.A.S. Ang-Thong to the Thai Navy and also secured in April a contract worth €534.8m (about S$880m) to design and build four 75m patrol vessels for the Oman Navy.
    • In 2010, the second gen light strike vehicle. In 2009, ST Kinetics started delivery of (i) 100 Warthog ATVs to the British Army for use in Afghanistan, and (ii) the Terrex for the SAF.
    • In November 2008, ST Marine secured a contract worth about S$200m to build an Endurance class LPD for Thailand. The UAE bought 46 Agrabs in a 2007 contract, then worth 390 million Dirham (US$ 106m). The 3-man operated 10-ton Agrab vehicle carries the Singapore made 120mm SRAMS, and 58 mortar rounds.
    • In 2005, ST Kinetics commenced the delivery of the Bionix II, and the Trailblazer; and in 2004, the Primus and Bronco, all for the SAF.
    Ten, the selection, motivation and retention of future leaders matter — so we can meet our objectives or do routine things well. Like LTC Cai Dexian, as an army officer. He was an SAF Scholar in 2003, who was deployed to Afghanistan in 2012, where he was XO to the ISAF’s Director of Operations, and after the tour he was awarded a US Bronze star for his contributions to operations. Other examples of routine work or course attendance include:

    (i) Mr Tan Bing Wen, a DSTA scholar, who helped put into place Singapore’s air defence system. It is because we have an air defence system that we can scramble fighters in to time intercept stray civilian aircraft, who intend to enter our airspace without a flight plan; or

    (ii) Ms Julianna Low, a Defence Merit Scholar, who helped design a system for our National Servicemen (NS) to indicate their interest for NS vocations before they enlist. Giving NS men choice affects their motivation; or

    (iii) Senior LTC Wong Foo Chan, Deputy Commander NDU, who topped the US Navy SEAL Course in 1999 and won the best trainee award in the Green Beret Course in 2001, completing the Special Forces course with a broken rib and a broken ankle due to a hard landing during a parachute jump, two weeks before the end of the course; or

    (iv) Maj Sam Tan, a naval officer and SAF Merit Scholar, sent to study in the United States Naval Academy, who emerged as top graduate in his 2012 batch of 1,099 American and foreign cadets.

    These are not gargantuan tasks, for a country at peace. But there are small routine tasks that each in the SAF and it’s defence science community must do well to keep the SAF humming, as a vibrant and responsive organisation.
     
    Last edited: Aug 7, 2019
  6. Ewok

    Ewok New Member

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    It will be really difficult, close to impossible. Land mass is just too tiny. The best defense for Singapore are good ties with more powerful nations who have invested in her
     
  7. ngatimozart

    ngatimozart Super Moderator Staff Member Verified Defense Pro

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    @OPSSG, I was reading recently that during the second half 1941 Australian Army Gen Thomas Blamey was in Singapore on his way either to the Middle East or back to Australia when he assessed the defences of Singapore and Malaya. He was appalled by what he saw in that the British officers in Singapore and Malaya responsible for the defence were on a peace time routine and paid scant attention to the defence and collection of intelligence about the Japanese. The impression I got was that Blamey thought that they considered them inferior in all aspects and hadn't bothered about air defence or other such matters and that they were playing the 19th Century Raj. No wonder they were beaten by a vastly inferior force in numbers but superior in quality. The reference is: JEFFREY, G. 2008. A Military History Of Australia, Port Melbourne, Victoria, Australia, Cambridge University Press.
     
  8. OPSSG

    OPSSG Super Moderator Staff Member

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    What nonsense. You are posting without reading.

    Do you have any idea about the most densely defended country in South East Asia and the size of our armoured forces available for forward defence?


    With a defence budget of S$15.5 billion for FY2019 (up from S$14.8 billion for FY2018), Singapore is the most densely defended country in Southeast Asia. IMHO, the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) has the fastest sensor shooter cycle in Southeast Asia. It is a known fact that the SAF has: (1) one of the largest fleet of armoured fighting vehicles in Southeast Asia; (2) the heaviest concentration of 155 mm artillery (with the longest ranged precision rocket artillery with its HIMARS batteries); (3) the region's highest density of SAMs and a Short-Range Anti-Munition Capability (operationalised within a networked system); and (4) the biggest number of combat engineer bridging rafts, the largest fleet of fast landing craft and more combat warplanes than any immediate neighbour. Educate yourself, and watch the above 2019 video of the men and machines on parade, please.


    History has taught Singapore not to rely on others for our defence. From August 1967 onwards, Singaporeans assumed and acquired the capability to defend ourselves. In the 2nd video, the Minister of Defence spoke on the spate of training deaths that occurred recently. This capability to defend Singapore is written in blood by 3 generations of Singaporeans.

    If you can’t read, at least watch the videos linked in this thread.
    Agreed. Thanks for sharing.

    For context, I note that this Japanese campaign began on 8 December 1941 (in Asian time zones, but is often referred to as starting on 7 December, as that was the date in American time zone, for the attack on Pearl Harbor), when Japanese forces landed in Singora and Patani in southern Thailand, and Kota Bharu in northern Malaya. The Japanese preparation for the invasion of Malaya and Singapore began in 1941. The Doro Nawa or Taiwan Army Research Department took charge of researching and planning Japanese military strategy in Asia. Masanobu Tsuji was the officer-in-charge of operations and planning in the Malayan sector and the mastermind of the Malayan Campaign. Japanese troops were trained to fight in tropical conditions on Hainan Island in China. They also carried out reconnaissance work in Malaya as part of their preparations.

    Ninety minutes before the attack on Pearl Harbor, Japanese battalions began landing at Kota Bharu in north-eastern Malaya. British and Australian aircraft, although outnumbered, engaged the invading force but were little match for the Japanese who retained air superiority throughout the campaign. More Australians died in the fighting for Malaya and Singapore than in any other Australian campaign in WW II (except for Papua from Jul 1942 to Jan 1943). More Australians were captured in this loss than in all the other campaigns in Australian military history combined. More than one third of the men and women captured would die in imprisonment.

    In contrast to Japanese efforts, the British effort was inadequate and Winston Churchill was appalled by the lack of effort with regard to northward facing defences. On 15 January 1942, Churchill wrote to General Wavell, about Singapore. On 16 January, Wavell wrote him a most disturbing reply: “I discussed the defence of island when recently at Singapore, and have asked for detailed plans. Until quite recently all plans were based on repulsing seaborne attacks on island and holding land attack in Johore [located in the southern portion of the Malay Peninsula] or farther north, and little or nothing was done to construct defences on north side of the island to prevent crossing Johore Straits, though arrangements have been made to blow up the causeway.” Wavell went on to say: “The fortress cannon of heaviest nature have all-round traverse, but their flat trajectory makes them unsuitable for counter-battery work. Could certainly not guarantee to dominate enemy siege batteries with them.”

    Churchill was clearly astounded, and greatly troubled, by Wavell’s message. He responded: “It was with feelings of painful surprise that I read this message on the morning of the 19th. So there were no permanent fortifications covering the landward side of the naval base and of the city! Moreover, even more astounding, no measures worth speaking of had been taken by any of the commanders since the war began, and more especially since the Japanese had established themselves in Indo-China, to construct field defences” (see: Churchill and the Fall of Singapore - The International Churchill Society).
    If you are visiting Singapore, there is 75-minute tour at Fort Canning, titled The Battlebox Tour: A Story Of Strategy And Surrender, details the primary reasons for Malaya and Singapore's fall to the Japanese, as well as the roles and functions the various key rooms in the Battlebox played in the war.

    LTG Arthur Percival’s (who surrendered Singapore to the Japanese) son, himself a retired brigadier, James Percival, returned to visit the Battlebox in Feb 2019.
     
    Last edited: Jul 31, 2019
  9. ASSAIL

    ASSAIL Defense Professional Verified Defense Pro

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    In March 1968 I had the honour to begin my training with the first four Midshipmen of the newly created SAF naval arm, my roommate Phillip Cheong was one of them. Last year we held our 50 year reunion in Brisbane and one of them, Tan Peng Yong attended. He had a long and distinguished career in the SAF.
    I’ve watched the growth and development of the SAF with great interest and I believe you have an institution that is mature, highly professional and superbly equipped, BZ
     
  10. OPSSG

    OPSSG Super Moderator Staff Member

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    Singapore
    Evolving the SAF’s Force Structure to meet new threats — from deployable, to special, to cyber

    1. Singapore’s military modernisation reflects the SAF’s mission: to enhance Singapore's peace and security through deterrence and diplomacy, and should these fail, to secure a swift and decisive victory over the aggressor. The SAF aims to upgrade its network-centric warfare capabilities for joint operations, with corresponding changes in the organisational force structures and operational conduct to strengthen overall military effectiveness. Its force transformation trajectory can be viewed as a 3 phased approach. The SAF:

    (i) introduces progressively more capable systems coupled with the establishment of new units;

    (ii) establishes new operational commands and focuses on widening its operational flexibility and responsiveness; and

    (iii) enhances its capability through selection, training and education of capable and committed personnel.​

    As the threat scenario changes, Singapore has had to evolve — to augment the conscript model, and had to professionalise a part of the Army. For example, the Army Deployment Force (ADF) was inaugurated on 12 Jul 2016, as a battalion-sized force of army regulars with niche capabilities to respond to threats in both urban and non-urban settings. Equipped with the Peacekeeper protected response vehicle, the Protected Light Utility Vehicle (an armoured Ford Everest ops utility vehicle) and other classified capabilities, "the basic task for the ADF is to act as a rapid response element because speed is important in counter-terrorism (CT)," said Defence Minister Dr Ng Eng Hen in his 2016 Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) Day interview. "It's not quite like conventional missions where you have time. This time, you have to respond in minutes." "The ability to swiftly deploy a sizeable force to counter threats and assist civil authorities continues to be the ADF's raison d'etre," said its Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Ivan Du. "As ISIS continues to be weakened in Iraq and Syria, we see increased activities of the returning fighters in our region. More important than ever, the unit stands ready to respond if terror strikes our shores." In CT scenarios, the ADF works with the Island Defence Task Force, Special Operations Task Force (SOTF) and Home Team agencies as protectors to guard the nation against terror threats. It can also be activated to play a peacekeeper role in Peace Support Operations (in Afghanistan or such other conflict zones) overseas. Another role of the ADF is that of a preserver to ensure safety and provide aid during disaster relief missions.

    2. The ADF (as part of the 7th Singapore Infantry Brigade) augments the capabilities of SOCC, and the ADF Guardsmen have to train to meet mission requirements. The Guards' spectrum of operations as part of the 7th Singapore Infantry Brigade has been extended to include Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) and Peace Support Operations, as was apparent during the 2004 tsunami or the 2011 earthquake relief operations in Christchurch. Notable Guardsmen include Speaker of Parliament, Tan Chuan-Jin, who was then a Colonel and commander of the SAF's Humanitarian Assistance Task force in Meulaboh following the 2004 tsunami.

    Before troopers can don the ADF patch, they have to make it through a 21-week Combat Qualification Course (CQC) — see 1st video on CQC. Every new evolution gets tougher than the last, with a short water break and temperature check between each. Trainees grit their teeth as they carry a 20kg weight up and down a flight of stairs. They then proceed for more physical training drills. The course is designed to test the physical and mental readiness of trainees before they are posted to the ADF's operational companies. Upon completion of CQC, ADF’s companies are sent for overseas training, with foreign forces, such as, with the Australian Army or the US Marines. The 2nd video explains the role and training of these army professionals.

    The ADF’s overseas live-fire training include the 22nd edition of the annual bilateral Exercise Valiant Mark, which ran from 25 August to 12 September 2018.

    3. In addition, Singapore will set up a new Special Operations Command Centre (SOCC) (Fact Sheet: Enhancing the SAF's Counter-Terrorism Capabilities) as part of a wide-ranging effort to enhance the ability of the SOTF and the ADF to conduct counter-terrorism operations, Defence Minister Ng Eng Hen announced during a media briefing on 28 June 2019. According to the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF), the SOCC will function as a hub for planning, monitoring, and managing military responses to concurrent terrorist and homeland contingencies. The centre will be situated in the eastern Hendon Camp and is expected to be commissioned by the end of the year. It will also work closely with other agencies when required. The centre will be equipped with organic command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) systems to support operational planning, co-ordination, and to sense-make acquired data. Efforts to improve the capabilities of Singapore’s SOTF is similar in some aspects to Australia’s parallel A$500 million (over the next 4 years alone) effort in project GREYFIN (see: Backing Australian special forces with cutting edge equipment | Prime Minister of Australia).

    4. The special operations community and our regular forces maintain especially close ties with their counterparts in both the America and Australia, where a lot of overseas training is conducted. Under the Australia-Singapore Military Training Initiative (ASMTI), Singapore will invest approximately AUD 2 billion to acquire, design, develop and construct military training areas through expanding the existing Shoalwater Bay Training Area (SWBTA) and establishing a new training area in North Queensland. When the Initiative reaches maturity, up to 14,000 Singaporeans will conduct training in Central and North Queensland over 18 weeks a year for 25 years. The SAF is immensely grateful to the Americans for training Singaporeans in their various naval and army schools. I also note that Singapore has operators embedded in US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) in Tampa, Florida. Recently, GEN Clarke of USSOCOM was in Singapore for a working visit from 3 to 5 June 2019. Further, in 2018, the SAF deployed combat engineer trainers and tactical trainers to support the evolving operational needs of the coalition forces in Iraq. The team sent to Iraq comprise of combat engineer trainers specialising in counter-IED tactics, weapons and combat tactics trainers, and a medical team of a medical officer and a medic.


    5. “In (an age of) cyber attacks and biological pandemics, ground zero can arise anywhere and spread far very quickly,” Dr Ng Eng Hen, Singapore’s minister of defence said. The SAF sees cyber attacks as a serious trend, as an open economy connected to the rest of the world, Singapore is particularly susceptible to such threats, Dr Ng added. The SAF will invest “substantially” to train more cyber defence personnel, doubling the manpower of its Cyber Defence Operations Hub by 2020.
    6. Thank you for your kind words. We owe a lot to Australia in helping Singapore develop specific capabilities for our armed forces and in particular the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) at numerous instances. To list merely one of many examples, on 29 January 1983, the then Lieutenant Geoff Ledger, of the RAN conducted the riskiest rescue during the Sentosa cable car disaster after an oil rig snagged the cable system (Read more at PM Lee honours Australian rescuer in 1983 Sentosa cable car disaster). Commodore Ledger was serving with the Republic of Singapore Air Force instructing basic and advanced students on Iroquois and Squirrel helicopters at that time. He received a Silver Commendation Medal from the Singapore Government and made headlines when he put his flying skills to the test leading a rescue operation to save 13 people during the Sentosa Cable Car disaster.
     
    Last edited: Aug 17, 2019 at 6:36 PM
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