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The best strategy to defending Singapore Island

Discussion in 'Strategy & Tactics' started by Twister, Dec 31, 2008.

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  1. Redlands18

    Redlands18 Active Member

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    So what you are saying that if someone deployed an Army with 2-3 Hundred Tousand Troops, a couple of thousand Armoured Vehicles just across the Malaysian Border, Singapore would not notice. The 1st thing they would do is make that Causeway unpassable. Singapore is the largest most important Port in Asia if not the World. Every country in Asia understands this and if Singapore decided to invade Malaysia to take out that Army a number of Countries would not only support that decision but may even join in.
    100 US Personnel is not a deterent they are backed up by 1.5 million personnel and that is a deterent, only maniacs p*** of the Americans ask Saddam Hussain and Osama Bin Ladin.
    There is a huge difference between 1942 and today, the Militaries in SE Asia are fully independent, unlikely to be fighting a war in Europe and the Japanese had complete Air and Sea superiority in 1942. Singapore was doomed in 1942 but today it has one of the most powerful Militaries in SE Asia and a number of Allies that would step up to defend it.
    Using Australia as an example, 90% of our trade comes through the Port of Singapore cut that lifeline and you stuff Australia big time. Australia and Singapore have a close relationship and so does the US, we are very happy with the current Political set up in Singapore and we will oppose any change to a more hostile Regime, it is simply too Strategically important to Australia for us not to oppose any changes.
     
  2. Dook

    Dook New Member

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    You think they would deploy those troops on the border first so Singapore would have time to react? PT-91 tanks can drive 37 mph. If Malaysia attacked, they would probably have to sneak the tanks closer at night the day before, camouflage them, refuel them, then go the next night. Helicopters will be on target in half an hour, jets will be there in minutes. This is why I said that they have to know an attack is coming.

    The first thing Singapore would do is make the causeway impassable? Good. They should already have massive dragons teeth installed in the road that they can raise quickly if necessary. Do they have those? I didn't see any on satellite view. And the causeway is just one way, then there is the bridge and the narrow strait that any amphibious vehicle can get across easily.

    Singapore is the most important port in Asia? For countries that need Singapore to refine their oil for them but if Malaysia invades and reduces the price of refining oil then I'm not sure other countries would complain very much.

    Other countries would join in if Singapore attacked another country? I don't think we are even close to that point yet. Things have to get a lot worse before countries gang up on one in that area of the world.

    The US personel are in Singapore are backed up by 1.5 million US military? The US personel would likely not be harmed by any invading country. They would be free to go.

    There is a huge difference between 1942 and today? Right, weapons are more powerful.

    Allies would step in to defend Singapore? If they can hold out then allies would very likely assist. If they are completely overtaken quickly, like Kuwait, then we would probably go through another Persian Gulf War scenario with the UN resolutions and months of waiting until the aggressor leaves or is forced out.

    Australia depends on the port of Singapore? Whoever invades wouldn't close the port, they would keep it open and steal the profits.

    Who says the new regime would be hostile?
     
  3. Preceptor

    Preceptor Super Moderator Staff Member

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    Indeed, your stay was rather short as your apparent inability to behave has demonstrated that this forum isn't the place for you.
    -Preceptor
     
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  4. Todjaeger

    Todjaeger Potstirrer

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    Perhaps it is just me, but I do not know of any home garage that has the facilities to lift and drop a ~16 ton turret like is found on the Leopard 2a4 into a tank hull.

    There would also be the issue of how long it would take a facility to build ~180 Leo 2 tanks if it was individually assembling each of them by hand.

    To provide some comparison, it took the former ADI (now part of Thales Australia) facility in Bendigo about two years from being awarded the Bushmaster IMV contract to deliver the first 300 Bushmaster IMV's to the Australian Army. Granted, some of that time would be taken up awaiting deliveries for long-lead items, but at the same time, a 15 tonne Bushmaster IMV would be much easier to handle than the turret of a Leo 2, never mind a completed Leo 2. That works out to ~2.5 days per Bushmaster, and in a dedicated large scale production facility.

    A belief that a facility like a home garage could do more than perhaps assemble components of a one-off tank is unrealistic IMO. Heck, home garages (in the US at least) have largely lost the ability to carry out major maintenance and repairs on civilian automobiles, simply due to the on-board computer and electronics and the fact that virtually all home garages lack the interfaces needed. A modern MBT has electronics at least as complicated with NVS, laser rangefinders, navigation and target acquisition systems, radios, etc.

    A WWII-era tank could possibly be built in a garage assuming the proper lifts and hoists or cranes were available, but such a tank would not be particularly useful on a modern battlefield.
     
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  5. OPSSG

    OPSSG Super Moderator Staff Member

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    Singapore is highly urbanised and as such, I would not assume that the MAF would be so predictable in an armed conflict - of trying to drive a few tanks across the causeway on a one-way suicide mission - as a particular type of risk to mitigate. Tanks will need substantial infantry support once they cross the causeway. Which is why Dook’s premise is problematic. Let me share 3 points below to inform on how the risk matrix is mitigated:

    1. With a defence budget of S$15.5 billion for FY2019 (up from S$14.8 billion for FY2018), Singapore is the most densely defended country in Southeast Asia — a force designed for over match. The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) has the fastest sensor shooter cycle in Southeast Asia. It is a known fact that the SAF has: (1) one of the largest fleet of armoured fighting vehicles in Southeast Asia; (2) the heaviest concentration of 155 mm artillery (with the longest ranged precision rocket artillery with its HIMARS batteries); (3) the region's highest density of SAMs and a Short-Range Anti-Munition Capability (operationalised within a networked system); and (4) the biggest number of combat engineer bridging rafts, the largest fleet of fast landing craft and more combat warplanes than any immediate neighbour.

    2. We train hard (with unrivalled military training arrangements globally) and work well with others. Let me share details on past deployments by the SAF:-

    (i) over 1,500 Singaporeans have operated under CTF 151 as part of the counter-piracy effort in the Gulf of Aden. Singaporean boarding teams operating off our LPDs and frigates have faced off with pirates and sank their attack skiffs in Operation Blue Sapphire; our maritime patrol aircraft have deployed to provide intelligence and surveillance to the task force; and our command teams have taken rotational command of CTF-151 multiple times;


    (ii) since November 2014, the SAF has deployed planners, liaison officers, intelligence fusion officers, medical teams, trainers, imagery analysis teams, and KC-135Rs for use against the terror group, Islamic State (IS) alongside Australian and NZ forces (in support of the American led coalition for Operation Gallant Phoenix);

    (iii) 492 Singaporeans have served in Afghanistan in Operation Blue Ridge. In recognition of the work done from 2007 to 2013, a number of SAF officers have been awarded US military decorations for their meritorious service in Afghanistan. These include: LTC Mohd Fahmi Bin Aliman (US Joint Service Commendation Medal - 2013), and MAJ Cai Dexian (US Army Bronze Star - 2012). The four officers were awarded US Army Commendation Medal were as follows: LTC Lock Wai Leck, Willy (2012), LTC Chan Ming Hoe (2012), MAJ Wong Wei Han, Gareth (2011), and MAJ Lim Kian Peng, Adrian (2011). Not to forget, Col. Mike Tan (US Army Meritorious Service Medal), who served as a Strategic Planner in the J5 Directorate of the US Central Command where he participated in planning in Operation Enduring Freedom, many years ago;


    (iv) the air force’s UAV command deployed a team using the Scout RPV to provide intelligence to the TNI to resolve the Mapenduma hostage crisis in 1996 (and for their action the unit was awarded a combat streamer);

    (v) over 1,200 reservists, NSFs and regulars were deployed to provide humanitarian assistance to Meulaboh, Aceh, an area with an active insurgency, in January 2005. In the case of the 2004 Boxing Day Tsunami:-

    (a) Commander 21st Division (a 1 star) and his command staff were deployed to Banda Aceh in support humanitarian operations under Operation Flying Eagle. Within days of the 2004 Boxing Day Tsunami, the 21st Division (Singapore Guards) landed a reinforced battalion size force, in multiple phases - with combat engineers creating beach-heads, clearing roads of debris and providing drinking water; with medical and surgical teams providing care for the injured; with a command team to plan and manage the massive logistics required to help the locals.


    (b) RSS Endurance was the first foreign navy ship to re-establish a life-line to Meulaboh (a coastal town in West Sumatra that was previously completely cut off after the tsunami). Singapore's contributions to Indonesia included the deployment of three Endurance Class LPDs, eight CH-47 Chinooks and four Super Pumas, six C-130s, two F-50s, a mobile air traffic control tower.

    (c) With host nation support in Singapore, US Commands (Commander, Logistics Group Western Pacific and Naval Regional Contracting Center Singapore) worked 24/7 to surge supply capacity in support of the humanitarian effort in Operation Unified Assistance.

    (d) During the conduct of Operation Unified Assistance by US PACOM, two SAF officers proficiently in Bahasa Indonesia, with in-depth knowledge of Indonesian culture, psyche, and sensitivities to the presence of foreign military forces, were posted as Liaison Officers to enable the US to deliver aid to Indonesia with less fiction;​
    and

    (vi) 998 Singaporeans from the army, navy and air force served in Iraq and the Northern Arabian Gulf from 2004 to 2008. The SAF deployments in support of Operation Blue Orchid included:-

    (a) Navy: 5x deployments of Endurance Class LPDs for the seaward defence of Iraq for 300 days against suicide boat attacks - which included NDU boarding teams conducting routine inspection of ships and dhows for explosives and other threats to protect Iraqi's two oil terminals. The Singapore Navy also trained the Iraqi Navy and helped them extend their operating range by refueling their patrols boats at sea.


    (b) Air Force: 1x C-130 deployment for 2 months carrying men, cargo and equipment and performing evasive manoeuvres for about 1/3 of their 29 missions completed in 190 hrs of flight time (in the above video, you can see the force protection team deployed with the C-130); 5x KC-135R deployments for 3 months, each, all facing the danger of short-range SAM attacks with 303 missions completed in 1,800 hrs of flight time.​

    3. We believe in continuous improvement and updating our tactics. In 2017, 2PDF Command set up the Island Defence Training Institute (IDTI) to address all Island Defence training requirements, deepen operational knowledge, improve linkages and interoperability with the Home Team agencies and enhance the effectiveness of training delivered to our Active and National Service (NS) units. From 19 to 20 Feb 2019, the Singapore Police Force (SPF) and the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) will conduct an islandwide counter-terrorism exercise as part of continuous efforts by the Home Team and the SAF to test and validate Singapore’s multi-agency response plan in the event of terrorist attacks. More than 900 personnel from the SPF’s Woodlands Division, Tanglin Division, Jurong Division, Special Operations Command, Gurkha Contingent, and the SAF’s Island Defence Task Force (IDTF), Special Operations Task Force (SOTF), and 38th Battalion, Singapore Combat Engineers (38 SCE), will participate in the exercise.

    Thanks for the reply, to help keep the thread keep on track.

    In addition to what you said, what Dook does not understand is that: At all times, there is a sizeable alert red standby force in Singapore on alert (with tiered readiness of follow on forces at higher echelon). Strategic surprise is not easy to achieve given Singapore’s intelligence capabilities.

    We do not like to reveal the actual response timing of alert and follow on forces but it is faster than he imagines. And not just alert forces for conventional defence either.
     
    Last edited: Sep 23, 2019
  6. Redlands18

    Redlands18 Active Member

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    :D
    What would anyone on here know, we are just Strategy Game playing Coast Guard Cooks‍:D
     
  7. MrConservative

    MrConservative Super Moderator Staff Member

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    he could not even spell his name properly. It is missing an r.
     
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  8. t68

    t68 Well-Known Member

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    Well that was certainty entertaining, I just wish I had some popcorn ready when I read it a moment ago ;);)
     
  9. OPSSG

    OPSSG Super Moderator Staff Member

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    Post 1 of 5: Enhancing deterrence to prevent miscalculation

    1. While I do question if Vivian Balakrishnan is the right man for the job (as Singapore’s Foreign Minister in troubled times), I do agree with him that foreign policy begins at home. As he said: “The strength of Singapore’s diplomacy depends on domestic unity and resilience, and the fact that we cannot be intimidated or bought. This is the foundation for our diplomacy even as we seek good relations with all our friends and neighbours within a rules-based international order. This is why Total Defence and our investment in the SAF are so important. Resilience includes improving our water supply infrastructure, namely NEWater and desalinated water, strengthening our food security by diversifying our food sources, and ensuring that we have a strong, diversified labour market. As a small state with limited resources, the quest for security and resilience has been a constant, relentless imperative for us since independence. It is not something that we look at only in times of unease. I am confident that we can continue to rely on strong bi-partisan support from this House, and the unity of purpose amongst all Singaporeans, as we strive to ensure that Singapore’s independence, territorial sovereignty, safety, security, and prosperity is secured for this generation and those to come.”
    Full Frame: Invincible : Singapore's Type 218SG Submarine

    2. Over a weekend after the tensions between Malaysia and Singapore rose, we mobilised all 5 fighter squadrons, we changed our naval force posture, we made significant announcements in new weapon procurement shortly after (eg. The Type 218SG launch, the F-35 test buy, and the revised plans for the proposed multi role combat vessel), along with the 2019 defence budget increase.

    Singapore to replace Victory-class missile corvettes with Multi-Role Combat Vessels | Jane's 360

    3. The degree of change in specifications for the multi role combat vessel is simply stunning, from my point of view. The radar is much more capable, and the increase in air warfare capability in terms of mission load is a step change from the original.
    4. Singapore is not going to just let KL believe that this act of parking their ship in our port waters is accepted - our Navy is properly resourced to be there everyday and making our presence felt. Singapore also pointed out that these actions threatened the safety of all seagoing vessels in what is a very busy shipping route. There is no acceptence of a fait accompli of Malaysian actions by Singapore.

    M’sian government vessel collides with another ship in S’pore waters

    5. Not only is the ICA ruling on Pedra Branca is in our favour, we are continuing to stick to that ruling because it’s again, a manifestation of the rule of law - like our adherence the water agreements - by continuing to charge the same 1962 rate of RM 0.5 per 1,000 gallon for Johore’s treated water, when it costs Singapore RM2.40 to treat every 1,000 gallons of water. In 1998, Malaysia asked for the price of raw water to be raised to RM 0.60, to which we were agreeable (but they then wanted a higher price than what they asked). In 2002, Malaysia asked for the price of raw water to be raised to RM 6.40 per 1,000 gallon - at which point Singapore walked away. Singapore’s foreign policy was crafted by the elder statesman S Rajaratnam, which remain true today. These are predicated around the following principles:

    (i) the preservation of peace through collective security;
    (ii) the promotion of economic development through mutual aid;
    (iii) the inalienable right of every country to establish forms of government in accordance with the wishes of its own people.
    These principles were formulated in the context of a declining British empire that withdrew its security umbrella from Singapore, as well as the Indonesian Konfrontation, which was a far more serious threat than Malaysia. This wasn’t a “war” in a conventional sense, but fought as commando raids and jungle skirmishes in Borneo, including a number of saboteur bombings in Singapore — which was still a part of Malaysia in the early 1960. Incidents like the naming of the Indonesian ship, KRI Usman Harun, although tarnished Singapore-Indonesian military ties, has brought Singaporeans and the SAF closer. The public are finally aware of the untold stories of the Konforntation and the SAF’s engagements in these conflicts.

    Singapore-Malaysia: Mahathir makes splash over water prices
    Yes, I saw that.

    Indeed.
     
  10. OPSSG

    OPSSG Super Moderator Staff Member

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    Post 2 of 5: Avoiding a vicious cycle and gaining partners in defence
    6. What are you talking about? Deng Xiaoping’s visit to Singapore in 1978 had left an indelible imprint on his mind. That year alone, some 400 delegations from China visited Singapore. Since 1978, Deng and Lee Kuan Yew had a special relationship between the two great men. They admired and respected each other. They established a relationship of mutual trust. Deng said that China should learn from Singapore because, “society in Singapore is quite orderly. They managed things very strictly. We ought to use their experience as a model. And we ought to manage things even better than they do.” Lee met Deng again, in China, in 1980, 1985 and 1988. Deng trusted Lee. Following Deng’s exhortation, hundreds of delegations from China have visited Singapore. They wanted to study every aspect of Singapore’s development.
    • Singapore has responded generously. We have since welcomed tens of thousands of Chinese mayors and other officials to attend customised courses in Singapore. Today, China is the largest recipient (US$105b) of FDI from Singapore, followed by Indonesia (US$62b), and India (US$35b).
    • Singapore and China have also agreed on an updated defence agreement that could see them increase the scale of existing military exercises, with new areas of cooperation between troops. The revised Agreement on Defence Exchanges and Security Cooperation (ADESC) is expected to be signed later in 2019. We are not hostile to China and we are nobody's fool (see paragraphs 12 to 14 below on our defence relationships). Through ADMM-Plus Singapore works with China to boost regional cooperation by stepping up "practical military-to-military cooperation."

    A key factor to enhancing Singapore’s immediate security is avoiding the Thucydides Trap with Malaysia. This trap refers to when a rising power causes fear in an established power which escalates toward war. Thucydides wrote: "What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta." In 2016, IHS said Malaysia was forecast to achieve a per capita GDP of US$20,000 by 2025, with total GDP exceeding US$1 trillion by 2030.
    The structure of Malaysia's economy would continue to shift towards higher value-added manufacturing and services. From my perspective it is only a matter of when Malaysia’s GDP will exceed $1 trillion and at that time, they would have funds to buy plenty of guns and advanced weapons. But it will take the Malaysians decades to catch up, even after they become rich.

    Malaysia and Singapore agree to revert to original port limits

    Edited Transcript of the Media Wrap-Up with Minister for Foreign Affairs Dr Vivian Balakrishnan after the Joint Press Conference in Putrajaya, 14 March 2019

    7. With a nominal GDP of US$361.36 billion (or S$487 billion) in 2018, Singapore shares a moral obligation to steer away from Thucydides's Trap with regard to Malaysia under Dr M, as we watch Malysia’s rise to a US$1 trillion economy in the 2030 period and beyond. We should continue to spend prudently on defence and drag out the timeline required for Malaysia to reach parity with us in capability (well into the 2040s - 2060s), with good planing and execution of the NEXT GEN SAF, whose roll out we witnessed with the launch of the Type-218SG.
    8. Why would you recommend something that is implemented in 1967 but in a less sophisticated manner? National service was introduced in August 1967.
    • From the early days of National Service (NS) under the Enlistment Act effective in Aug 1970 for my uncles, to me (starting from the late ‘80s onwards), and to my kids (starting from 2017 onwards), as the 3rd generation to serve - our family have a role in furthering deterrence, as citizen-soldiers. Every year, 18,000 to 20,000 recruits complete their basic military training and broadly the same number also complete their 22 to 24 months of full time national service - to enter the operationally ready reserves. My older family members (who were Israeli trained) and we all remember with fondness going into our respective 1st In-Camp-Trainings (ICTs). These ICTs now last for 7 to 10 years, after full time service in the Singapore Army.
    • Military spending was kept high right from the start - Singapore's defence budget is the biggest in South-east Asia today - to acquire sophisticated weapons. About 70 tanks were bought in 1969 and when these AMX-13 tanks rolled out for National Day Parade, the region took notice. Newspapers all over Malaysia, carried pictures of Singapore's new armoured firepower. The urgency to build up its own armed forces stemmed from an acute sense of the island's vulnerability. Before Independence, when Singapore was still part of the Malaysian Federation, Indonesian marines acting as war criminals bombed MacDonald House in Orchard Road, killing three people and injuring 33 others. Newly evolving Singapore-style diplomacy faced one of its first geopolitical challenges with the aftermath of that. So occasional tensions with neighbours is the norm.
    9. From August 1967 onwards, we have had deterrence. From 1975-1984 (1st Gen SAF), the SAF was prepared to fight knowing we were not at parity at a doctrinal level, with the Malaysians being stronger. From 1985 to 2004 (2nd Gen), we were prepared to fight at approximate ‘approximate parity’ with Singapore holding an edge in our combined arms doctrine. In 1991, the Malaysians explored options in unconventional warfare against a superior Singapore Army and given that the maritime environment around Singapore faces security challenges such as terrorism, shipping of illegal arms, Weapons of Mass Destruction and persons, as well as piracy, their first act of war may not be a conventional attack. Hybrid warfare or a troubled peace blurs distinctions between periods of peace and war. Hybrid warfare is nothing new; it is the art of moving between conventional and non-conventional modes of warfare while manipulating an opponent’s specific vulnerabilities is used throughout history. Hybrid warfare was not born out of Russian activity on the Crimean Peninsula in 2014. The seaborne terrorist attacks such as the 2008 Mumbai attack, where ten terrorists who arrived via boats killed more than 160 people, demonstrate the real possibility and grave consequences of terrorists infiltrating a country from the sea. By 2005 onwards (3rd Gen), the SAF had clearly superior equipment and doctrine. The goal is to delay a return to ‘approximate parity’ till 2055 to 2061 - towards the end of the water agreements with Malaysia - that we do not intend to renew.

    10. The thaw in Singapore-Malaysia relations (following Lee Hsien Loong’s meeting with Dr M in Putrajaya during the leaders’ retreat on 9 April 2019) has surprised many. This change in tune by the Malaysians comes at a difficult time for the Pakatan Harapan (PH) government with Dr M in an ongoing tussle with the crown prince of Johor that shares deeply-rooted ties with Singapore. This tussle has stolen the limelight from the sudden thaw in bilateral relations and shows how far Dr M will go if he is pushed in a corner. The tit-for-tat responses between the old political fox and the young crown prince Tunku Ismail Sultan Ibrahim may have overshadowed new agreements between Malaysia and Singapore but it is the resolving of conflicts, particularly the bilateral water issue, that will have a deeper impact on Johor. In the ongoing tussle, none of them want to be on the losing side and both the executive and the prince want to have the upper hand in the running of affairs of Malaysia as well as Johor.
     
    Last edited: Aug 8, 2019
  11. OPSSG

    OPSSG Super Moderator Staff Member

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    Post 3 of 5: Defusing tensions while standing our ground and working with partners

    11. With regard to our relations with hostile parties like Malaysia, Singapore’s Defence Minister spoke once and then he refrained from openly making a further public stand. That said, we have to let actions speak for itself rather than issue statements. You should take note of the fact that Singapore's defence budget has increased, in response to an urgent need to recapitalise certain categories of ageing defence assets - such as the retirement or upcoming end of life of the following:

    (a) the retirement of the 11 Fearless Class Patrol Vessels (replaced with 8 LMVs), the pending retirement of the Challenger and Archer classes of submarines (replaced with 4 Type 218SG submarines) and the planned replacement of the 6 Victory Class Corvettes (to be replaced with the 5,000 ton MRCV),
    (b) the retirement of the F-5s (replaced with the acquisition of a 2nd squadron of F-15SGs and 4 F-35s for testing),
    (c) the retirement of the 4 KC-135R (replaced with six A-330 MRTT), and the Searcher UAVs (replaced with the Heron-1 and Hermes 450 UAVs),
    (d) the retirement of the older suite of air defence radars, including the FPS-117A (replaced by the ELM-2084 Multi Mission Radar, the existing Giraffe AMB, the SHIKRA radar and the Ticom 55 aerostat); which will provide a extremely high resolution air picture for Singapore's air defenders,
    (e) the retirement of older ground based air defence missiles, like I-Hawk missiles (replaced with the Spyder air defence missile firing units and the ASTER 30),
    (f) the retirement of the fleet of V-200s (replaced with the Protected Response Vehicle) and the 5 tonners (replaced with the Belrex Protected Combat Support Vehicle to support the Terrex motorised infantry battalions),
    (g) the retirement of old AEVs, ARVs and VLBs like the M728 AEVs (replaced with the AEV, known as the Pionierpanzer 3 Kodiak), the old ARVs (replaced with the Buffel Armoured Recovery Vehicle), and the old M60 based VLBs (replaced with the Biber Armoured Vehicle Launched Bridge),
    (h) the phasing out of old land-rover vehicles (slowly being replaced with the Ford Ops Utility Vehicles, the URO VAMTAC and the Ford 550 ambulances),
    (i) the retirement of older sat com 3 tonner (replaced with the MAN 5 Ton Very Small Aperture SAT Comm),
    (j) the pending retirement of the two Super Puma squadrons (to be replaced with the H225M) and the Chinook squadron’s CH-47D/SDs (to be replaced with the CH-47F model), stating from 2020,
    (k) the retirement of the existing TPQ-36, TPQ-37 and Arthur radar systems, which detect incoming artillery and rocket fire (replaced in Mar 2019 by the AN/TPQ-53 and in Sept 2016 by the SAFARI weapon-locating radars); and
    (l) the Hermes 450 and Heron 1 UAVs will be phased out in favour of new platforms over the next few years.​

    12. While we continue to preserve and even enhance in several ways our defense and security engagements with friendly external powers, including with Australia, US, Germany and even France. Providing military access to foreign powers, buying new weapons besides joint training and exercises, is our way of contributing towards credible, friendly military presence to counter attempts at undermining rule of law by Malaysia or Indonesia.

    • During the 'Konfrontasi', insurgent commandos (with the TNI naming a ship after these 2 criminals) did set off bombs in Orchard Road. Two Indonesian marines were tried convicted and hanged by the courts of Singapore (High Court), Malaysia (Court of Appeal) and England (Judicial Committee of the Privy Council). The final hostile naval action of Confrontation occurred on the morning of 28 June 1966, near the Horsburgh Light at the eastern end of the Singapore Strait, when HMNZS Hickleton intercepted a kumpit [the naval term for a sampan] carrying three, uniformed men and a boatsman.
    • In the 80s to 90s, there were numerous maritime incidents near Pedra Branca, involving non-uniformed armed men, testing the alertness of the Singapore Navy. Further, in 1989 Dr M made an unannounced visit to the vicinity of the island with his boat. This was intercepted by Singapore naval vessels. To avoid an international incident, he directed his boat to leave.
    • Officers of the Indonesian Navy have their hands in numerous businesses, including running a smuggling ring (of duty-unpaid cigarettes) when their naval vessels call on Singapore. The amount of contraband cigarettes seized on 14 December 2008 amounted to 33,614 cartons, weighing 8,456.28 kg. This was one of the largest seizures of contraband cigarettes on record with unpaid customs duties amounting to over S$2.9 million. The Indonesian Navy officers involved in running one of the largest smuggling rings in Singapore, were not punished for their criminal acts.
    13. Apart from Singapore’s close but discreetly managed security relationship with the United States, it has built a network of defence relations with countries as diverse as Australia, France, and Germany. These are but some of the countries that host Singapore defence assets, given Singapore’s space constraints.

    14. Diverse relationships lend diplomatic diversity, if not redundancy, designed to maximise Singapore’s options, thus avoiding the patron-client trap of less proactive small states. The NZ Cabinet documents on the rejection of the proposal to base Singaporean F-15s at Ohakea, demonstrate the importance of building strong and wide ranging defence ties with multiple parties (see: Singapore Proposal to Base F-15 Fighter Jets at Ohakea Base – 2018 Cabinet Documents).

    Singapore and Germany Strengthen Defence Ties through New Agreement on Defence Cooperation

    Singapore and France Reaffirm Strong and Broad-based Bilateral Defence Relations
     
    Last edited: Jul 11, 2019
  12. OPSSG

    OPSSG Super Moderator Staff Member

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    Post 4 of 5: Understanding the history of the Malaysian cycles of greed
    15. History tells us that any water or boundary agreement with Malaysia in April or May 2019, may lead to more tension, later. We in Singapore, who import 40% of our water, can’t afford to be complacent about deterrence. Ironically, tensions rose in 1991 after an agreement was reached on 24 November 1990 between PUB and Johor - a follow-up to the MOU signed on 28 June 1988.

    • Under this agreement, Johor owns the Linggiu Dam, but Singapore, paid more than S$300 million for its construction and operational costs, as well as compensation for the land used for the Linggiu Reservoir - Johor aside about 21,600 ha (216 sq km) of land and Singapore also paid RM320 million, plus RM18,000 per hectare (10,000 sq m) and an annual rent of RM30 for every 1,000 sq ft (per 92.9 sq m) of the land. To date, over a billion Singapore dollars was spent on water projects in Johore.

    • Almost 20 years ago, under LKY’s supervision, the Singapore negotiation team agreed to raise the price of raw water, only to have Dr Mahathir ask for so much more, again and again that talks collapsed. Therefore, it is not a surprise that the 1st water agreement was allowed to end in 2011 and the 2nd and current water agreement that ends in 2061 will not be renewed.

    • From 1981 to 2003, Malaysia-Singapore relations under Dr Mahathir were characterised by “confrontational diplomacy and barbed rhetoric” between both countries, especially over water issues. Other unresolved issues that both countries faced during the 1990s and early 2000s include:
    • The Pedra Branca dispute
    • A deadlock over the implementation of the Malaysia-Singapore Points of Agreement (POA) of 1990
    • Issues concerning the CPF of Malaysians working in Singapore
    • The proposed construction of a “crooked” bridge to replace the existing Woodsland causeway
    Confrontation did not turn into war, due to deterrence and as citizen-soldiers, our family members served in this role. It is important to understand our broader role, through service as commanders of men, in every generation. Having been dealt a geo-strategically disadvantaged hand, at independence, on 9 August 1965, in the mist of tension with its ambitious neighbours, Singapore has had to build military capabilities that it needs for deterrence. Service is always a privilege and not an obligation in many Singaporean families, like mine.

    • Beyond keeping defence expenditure steady and deterrence, the mid-term solution (before 2061) is to further reduce reliance on raw water from Malaysia. To that end, the NewWater plants, plus desalination plants listed below further reduce our reliance on Malaysia:

    (a) In 2005, SingSpring was opened;
    (b) in 2013, Tuaspring was opened;
    (c) in 2018, Tuas was opened; and
    (d) 2 additional plants will be opened at Marina East and Jurong Island in 2020.
    16. Singapore has been making the effort and paying the price to build a ‘next generation’ military. The Singapore Army is perhaps the branch of the Armed forces that has been affected by falling birth rates. According to Richard Bitzinger: “While all three branches of the armed forces are equally important, the Singapore Army is the most politically charged: it is the oldest one, made out mostly of conscripts, and has been a key element of the country’s nation building strategy from the start.”

    17. One year ago today, we wished our Malaysian friends well, as they held their general election that ushered an new government. Instead of the two countries working together, Malaysia’s government under Dr Mahathir, often as a hostile party, sought to start new quarrels or renegotiate every deal made on better terms. We in Singapore can only hope he will step down as PM in favour of Anwar Ibrahim, in 2020 or 2021, before relations can hopefully improve. Earlier, Dr Mahathir agreed to step down after 2 years. Now he is trying to delay it to 3 years. I can only hope that this hostility can be managed for the extra 1 year period.
     
    Last edited: Jul 24, 2019
  13. OPSSG

    OPSSG Super Moderator Staff Member

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    Post 4 of 5: Defending the Lion City’s Interests

    18. Singapore is trying to find new ways to tackle the issue through a digitised army with sophisticated communication systems and with the ability to gather data in real time for quick and efficient decision-making. Singapore’s force modernisation priorities toward the Next-Generation Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) currently follows three lines of effort.
    • First is developing capabilities to counter “hybrid” threats in the information and cyber domains.
    • Second is expanding counter-terrorism capabilities, particularly by strengthening Island Defence and Special Forces.
    • Third, in the long-term, to leverage advanced emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, data analytics, and robotics in nearly all aspects of defence planning and military operations.
    19. Thanks to the bicentennial year of Singapore’s founding, and the 50th anniversary of the SAF armour formation, National Day Parade (NDP 2019) is to be held at the Padang on 9 August. For NDP 2019, Brunei's Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah, Indonesian President Joko Widodo and Malaysian PM Dr M will attend the celebration. As the rehearsals for NDP 2019 shows, Singapore’s force structure (air force, army and navy) shown during NDP 2019 is designed for overmatch against a potential regional aggressor. Therefore, we are not really worried about some of our F-15SGs or F-35s being stationed abroad.
    • In 2019, we only need less than 1/3 of our forward deploy-able forces to present an overmatch against conventional forces in the immediate region - keeping in mind that we have a mainly conscript army but a volunteer air force and navy. This helps with family life of alert forces.
    • The main realistic threat to Singapore is not conventional, it is more likely to be asymmetrical in nature. But I do note that Singapore not self sufficient in food or energy (over the mid-to-long term) and we need trade to ensure that our city does not starve in a naval blockade. It is no good if we can defend Singapore island but cannot import food because of a naval blockage. In fact, just an increase in insurance rates will affect the price of goods imported into Singapore. Being able to defend Singapore island itself is meaningless if we cannot keep our SLOCs open.
    20. Beyond retaining our war-fighting against any existential threat to Singapore, going forward we are far more likely to work in a Coalition with other navies, including in a truly multinational force with a diverse membership, should the need arise to secure our SLOC. This is workable only if the mission does not involve high-intensity operations against competent opponents employing sophisticated weapons offensively. The key for any Singapore led coalition commander (to be deployed on the future 5,000 ton MRCV or the JMMS and it’s escorts) is to get the individual members of the Coalition working together and, as much as possible, as a unified force. The MRCV at 130 metres long x 18 m wide (i.e. ST Marine’s Vanguard 130 design) is bigger than the Formidable Class; can carry two Venus 16 USVs, two Mercury AUVs and two ScanEagle UAVs. It also has a mission bay capable of holding smaller USVs and manned boats. The design reflects the lessons learnt from the crew manning requirements from the Gulf of Aden deployments under CTF-151; and the need to provide berths, a gym and so on for the boarding teams.


    21. At 170 metres in length, the JMMS (i.e. ST Marine’s Endurance 170 design) can act as a logistic support vessel for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) missions and can also be potentially tasked to perform as a coalition command platform. Given that ships are mobile and self-contained, and hence units without appropriate ROE, capabilities or skill sets can to some extent be isolated. This has the potential to reduce the commander’s need to provide a level of supervision that might drag away more capable assets from where they are needed; a particular concern when assets are in short supply. Since 2003 our navy, air force and army have deployed, in a series of low profile missions (in what we try to present as theoretically non-combat roles), to both Iraq and Afghanistan. It is important to remember that Singapore is located in a predominately Muslim populated region and our engagement efforts with US military is not always appreciated by other powers like China. Therefore the various information releases by MINDEF reflect this concern and the desire to downplay any potential shooter role.
     
    Last edited: Sep 11, 2019
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  14. Ahmad

    Ahmad Member

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    In my opinion Indonesia will be able to invade Singapore particularly after the year 2030. All of military hardware that Singapore has only can withstand from Indonesian invasion from now until the next 10 years. If we read Indonesian minimum essential force we know that Indonesia has the ability to make substantial damage to Singapore and have chance to invade it after the year 2030. Of course it is in the assumption that Indonesia will still be able to grow economically 5-6 % until it reach 2030-2035.

    I dont think Indonesia will eventually do the invasion when the situation is in Indonesia advantage but rather saying its capability to do it. after 2030.
     
    Last edited: Jul 4, 2019
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  15. Ananda

    Ananda Well-Known Member

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    @Ahmad, what assets that we have after 2030 that you will think have more than enough 'parity' to 'theoritically' invade Singapore, relative to what Singapore has by then in 2030 ?

    Let's see,
    By 2030, if what the planners plan come to fruition TNI-AU probably have 10 Fighter SQ, 6 medium Transport SQ, 6 Light Transport SQ..which Fighters probably consists more of F-16 including the V and some Flankers.
    That will not be enough to invade Singapore which consists of F-15E, F-16 (that some already upgrade to V standards), and by that time already 1 operational SQ of F-35.

    How about Navy, probably by 2030 we got many LCU, 12-16 LST and 8-12 LPD and if the planner got what they plan 1-2 LHD (that PAL already prepared the design). Seems large enough Amphibious assets to move one division, but as the largest archipelago we always have relative large Amphibious force. How else we move around forces between island.
    However to used that to invade Singapore, we need those amphib to be escort with enough ASW Frigates/Corvettes (say 24) and at least 6 AAW Large Frigates.
    Singapore Navy will at least by that time also build enough Frigates and Corvettes/Litoral forces to handle invasion forces of 6 Large AAW and 24 ASW.
    Those 6 Large AAW and 24 ASW is the most we can have by 2030+, "if" we build enough budget and Industries support.

    Thus by their AF and Navy in 2030, Singapore still maintain enough parity to their neighbors to make it hard any regional powers (and that Includes Australia or India) to launch invading forces.

    Singapore knows their livelihood depends on trade and that means they have to make anyone think twice to invade them.
    Something that even Soekarno, did not plan to do. Despite some historian says Soekarno have Territory ambition on 'Konfrontasi', I have seen enough documents that saying otherwise.
    Soekarno did not have plan to Invade Malayan peninsula or Singapore. He wants British and Australian forces preoccupied defending Malaya and Singapore, while he can support 'leftist' North Borneo forces to control Sabah and Sarawak to create their own 'revolutionary' state independent from British influenced.

    I put it in here, cause even at that time Soekarno know that it need large 'Global power' to invade Singapore. Japan is large global military power in WW2. Thus in this scenario only China or US that has enough power to send invading forces to Singapore.

    Add:
    Any invasion to Singapore in my opinion need to do what Japanese done in WW2. That's invade Malayan peninsula first. As in WW2 with British make Singapore as 'fortress Singapore', at the moment Singapore also make their defense in sense as 'fortress'. However Singapore seems learned what British failed in WW2. To defence Singapore, you have to be more mobile and do preemptively.

    Let's see why I put even India is not sufficient enough (even in 2030+) to invade Singapore. If by that time (as plan) India will have 3 Aircraft carriers, but their CV is smaller than US CVN. At most Indian CV altogether can only provide 5 SQ of fighters bombers. That only enough to provide air cover for Invasions force.
    Let's see what Japan done when they want to take Fortress Singapore, they done (even with larger CV force than India now or in 2030), by landed in peninsula and work down from there. British force eventough fight on peninsula, but enough of them are stay in Singapore to guard potential invasion from sea (which Japan had not done it because it's much more riskier).

    Thus if a force like India (which is larger than Indonesia now or in 2030+), will have difficulty to launch invading forces from sea as Japan face in WW2. Then they have to land in Peninsula.
    This in sense talking about Indian force has to 'pacified' Malaysian Armed Forces or Malaysian Armed Forces has cooperate with Indian Forces to invade Singapore. In that case Singapore force I bet will not stay waiting in Singapore..but will take preemptively to fight in Peninsula outside Singapore.

    Again I put this 'scenario' just to show unless you (the invading force) are a 'Global' power, Singapore by them selves still have enough power to defend it self.

    All of this off course in scenario where US already completely taking itself from Global power and only stay home. Where everyone else have no 'alliance' left and has to defend it self.
    Even then I do see Singapore' still able to defend it self from other neighbors or regional powers.

    It will be different if we talk about China, with US gone and they manage to completely armed their whole 'man made' island in SCS with 4 CV and 2 CVN as many predicted China will have by 2030+.
     
    Last edited: Jul 5, 2019
  16. Ahmad

    Ahmad Member

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    Indonesia can put many SAM battery in Batam and bombarded the city using Rhan rocket family. Singaporean air force cannot strike Indonesian rocket launch since Batam is protected by SAM system. Large troops have also already arrive in Batam to defense the island and can be used for amphibious landing. Also I predict in 2030 Indonesia may already have mastered cruise missile technology and it can be used to attack any military target in Singapore from Batam. Mass production of Rhan rocket, SAM system, and land attack cruise missile will be a determining factor on the success of invasion. After the bombardment that can take 1 month Singaporean will lose their moral and fighting spirit. Indonesia is also quite upper hand in the sea as Singaporean navy will not be protected by their fighter jet as SAM system put in Batam can cover whole Singapore territory. On the other hand Indonesian cruise missile target Singaporean SAM battery and radar. Any fighter plane that take off from Singapore will become a target. Indonesian cruise missile also will attack all of Singaporean air force asset and infrastructure. The outcome can be different if Singapore also has large land attack cruise missile stock pile.
     
    Last edited: Jul 5, 2019
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  17. ngatimozart

    ngatimozart Super Moderator Staff Member Verified Defense Pro

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    @Ahmad if Indonesia for some reason decided to go to war with Singapore, she would have to very seriously consider the reaction of Australia, New Zealand and the UK. Most likely Japan would not be very happy either. Of those Australia would most likely have the most angry reaction and Indonesia may find itself fighting a war on two fronts. New Zealand would most likely support Singapore and Australia as well, diplomatically and militarily.

    If other countries are drawn in, then a regional wide war could result, meaning the involvement of outside players which would change the region and may result in negative consequences for Indonesia.
     
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  18. Ananda

    Ananda Well-Known Member

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    Ok @Ahmad. Ngati already put diplomatic repurcasion in the Region if we invade Singapore.
    But let's entertain your 'scenario' that this is between Indonesia and Singapore alone, and nobody else involve.

    Let's see on missile. Cruise Missiles ?..do we have cruise missiles program ? We are now only building 122mm unguided rocket, and we are not in the next stage of building guided rockets yet. Where are not having running program yet on guided missile whether it's SSM or SAM.
    How do you so sure by 2030 we already have build our own SSM, SAM, and Cruise Missiles. Because if you want to invade another nation you have to make sure your own industries capable to build their own missiles ? We are not putting much budget on missile R&D..we are only beginning to build capabilities to produce our own propellant..we do not have working guidance system and I really doubt we can have our own cruise missiles at only a decade from now. SSM probably, since it's next stage after guided rockets.
    Unless we spend at least 5% or more of our GDP on missile development like what Iran and North Korea did..which we even not spend 2% of our GDP on military budget..how we are going to spend on missile R&D that much ?
    Cause if you want to build your own missiles, then you have to build your R&D by your own. Look at LAPAN road maps for building satellite launch vehicle. Initially by 2019 (this year) LAPAN should already tested the main rocket..but until know they are only testing RX450 which basically is the booster for that launch vehicle. They are not testing on main rockets because they haven't given enough budget on R&D..thus they have to prioritize their budget and slow down the pace.
    All of this shown, until now we are not investing much on rocket and missile R&D.

    But let's entertaint your scenario again somehow by 2030 we already have enough our own Guided Rocket, SSM, SAM and Cruise Missiles. You say by having enough SAM in Batam island, it will 'pacified' Singapore AF since those SAM can track the Fighter taking off and shoot them down in take off.
    Well..where did I hear that argument ? Oo Right..that the Argument Syria has on having SAM network tracking Israel fighters in their AB. Guess what ..it didn't work like that. Since Israel has air superiority and electronic warfare (EW) superiority.

    Do we have Air Superiority by 2030 against Singapore ? Do we have EW superiority ? Singapore is Israel student, and they have effective EW since the 90's..and we only begin playing with EW. In sense we are behind at least two decades on EW. Is EW Important ? Well look at desert Storm..Saddam SAM system easily destroyed due to superior EW by US.
    Look how Israel EW silence Syrian (recently Iran's in Syria) radar system and their SAM.

    China now put so much missile toward Taiwan..but they also make sure those missiles guarded by the AF that are much larger than Taiwan has..if not..then Taiwan AF can silence them.
    Modern warfare already shown that Air Superiority and EW superiority is the 'key' to win. Especially in early stage of engagement.
    Are we having both Air and Electronics superiority over Singapore by 2030 ? I don't think so..at best we only catching up.

    Singapore has build their force and maintain 'edge' regionally on the matter that Important..Air and Electronics Warfare..
    Incidently seems you forgot that Singapore has build their own anti rocket and missile grid like Iron Dome and their Aster 30 system (which also can target our Fighters that closing in on them).

    That's why I said before only 'Global' power (with have large Air Power with large EW capabilities) that can overwhelmed Singapore defense. None of their neighbors (that's include us or even Australia) or even regional powers like India can sufficiently bring enough Air Power with enough EW capacity to Singapore door step to overwhelmed their defense.

    Off course your scenario at war between us and Singapore alone will not happen in real world. Like Ngati says..it will change balance of power in region..and nobody likes that.

    And last thing..like I said in earlier post..even Soekarno in 'Konfrontasi' era did not have plan to invade Peninsula Malaya and Singapore..it's simply to much effort.
    That's in the era where Indonesia at that time have 'relatively' larger military forced compared to the neighbors.
     
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  19. OPSSG

    OPSSG Super Moderator Staff Member

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    Post 1 of 2: Why Ahmad’s 2 prior posts are not logical.

    I see that certain people are misinformed about the gap in the capabilities of the TNI and the SAF (which cannot be closed by 2030). Ahmad’s 2 prior posts are not logical from a geo-political or a military perspective, for these reasons:

    One, from a geo-political perspective, Singapore would want to avoid war. Currently, our bilateral relations are so good that Indonesia’s President Jokowi is attending our 9 August 2019 National Day celebrations. We have strong people to people ties; and Indonesians can’t arbitrarily decide to attack Singapore, as at any time some important Indonesians are staying here. For example, in June 2019 former first lady Ani Yudhoyono, passed away in Singapore (as she came here for medical treatment), with former president Yudhoyono by her side. Jokowi’s son also studied in Singapore for years and graduated from a prestigious Singapore school in 2014.

    (i) Acting as a friendly power, Singapore had given Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) 19 SF-260s and other equipment; plus we helped train your Leopard 2 tank instructors. After the Dec 2004 Tsunami, the SAF deploying over a 1,500 personnel, was the first on Meulaboh to deliver aid. After Indonesia’s AirAsia plane QZ8501 crashed into the Java Sea on 28 Dec 2014, the Singapore Navy joined the search and found the main fuselage but Indonesian behaviour continues to be problematic (eg. Indonesia is intercepting aircraft – outside their airspace – International Ops 2019 – OPSGROUP). IMHO, Singapore would not be able to play a constructive role in helping the TNI and Indonesia, if we were not capable of defending ourselves. Ironically, Singapore's strength enables us to have the confidence to give the Indonesians help in their time of need and helps build bridges between the two countries.

    (ii) We are also the largest investor in Indonesia. If the largest investor, stops new investments, your Indonesia’s growth will be affected. If the largest investor starts selling Indonesian assets, investor sentiment would change. As such, why would anyone in Indonesia even consider invading Singapore? If there is an attack on Singapore by the TNI, Indonesia’s FDI inflow will dry up within months — this will hurt TNI’s long term funding for its modernisation efforts.

    (iii) The port in Singapore is a global trans-shipment hub, and any attack on Singapore from Batam would hurt trade in Asia and Oceania; and countries such as Australia, China, France, UK, US, India, Japan, and S. Korea will be concerned and would more than likely offer to assist in securing this vital SLOC. The port of Singapore is so important that there are dozens of military liaison officers from many countries stationed at Changi RHCC and Information Fusion Centre, where we can conduct large-scale multinational operations at short notice.​
    Two, you are using the wrong tactics. The TNI is not so stupid to station SAMs in Batam, as Batam is within range of Singapore 155mm artillery and HIMARS batteries, which means we don’t need to use the RSAF to attack your SAM sites in Batam. The newest TNI tri-service base inaugurated in Dec 2018, is in Natuna Besar, over 580 km from Singapore. BTW, Batam is already under a SAM system, as it within the detection range of Singapore’s integrated and networked SAM system. Singapore has 2 radar-equipped aerostats that provide surveillance of air and sea as far as 200 km (125 mi.) away. Each aerostat is operated by just eight people, all on the ground. These investments will ensure continuous and high quality radar coverage even without its G550s taking off.
    Three, R-han’s 122mm range is less than 35km; whereas our 155mm artillery’s range is more than 44km and our HIMARS range is 72km. The Donbass conflict between Ukraine and Russia has shown that artillery is still king on the battlefield. While no Singapore army base is safe from a battery of R-hans firing bomblets, likewise Singapore’s counter artillery strikes are extremely hard to prevent. You should note that within seconds of firing, Singapore’s artillery hunting radars (see: the new Safari radar system) would detect and calculate the origin of these 122mm R-han rockets — to enable accurate and speedy counter battery fire. Our older Arthur artillery hunting radar capability was deployed to Afghanistan (see prior video also on this page).
    • The TNI will not station weapon systems within 72km of Singapore (i.e. within range of our HIMARS rockets), if their goal is to attack Singapore.
    • Each HIMARS can fire 6 M31 unitary rockets simultaneously at multiple targets, including at enemy air defence systems. The SAF’s HIMARS Battery Command Post took ergonomics into consideration to increase crew endurance for sustained operations.
    • Israeli companies, like: (i) Rafael have exported the SPIKE NLOS (30 km range) missile system to South Korea; and (ii) UVision offers Loitering Munitions (LM). The HERO series is comprised of advanced LM systems (Hero-20, Hero-30, Hero-70, Hero-120, Hero-250, Hero-400EC, Hero-900, and Hero-1250), designed for different missions at various ranges using warheads of various types. The Hero 400EC (a 2.1-meter, 40 kg LM with a speed of 50-100 knots that can operate up to 150 km from its launcher), which can be launched from a launcher, a vehicle or a ship. UVision has partnered with Raytheon in order to adapt UVisions' Hero-30 LM for the US. This type of LM has an endurance of 2 hours, and a multi-purpose warhead, and includes concrete piercing, anti-tank, and anti-personnel that handle different types of targets. The Hero-400EC provides for mid-air abort, automatic re-entry into loitering mode, or return to the recovery area using a parachute. While Singapore is not known to officially operate LMs, like the IAI Harop or the Hero 400EC, these were used to kill SAM Systems in Syria.
    • To maximise realism in training, the SAF Wargame Centre also uses battle simulations to create enemy land forces on plasma screens that test how our operations staff cope with challenging scenarios such as having more targets than assets to strike, which forces commanders to prioritise targets, to fully use the integrated strike capability, with our 155mm artillery, HIMARS, fighters and AH-64D Apaches.
    Four, this sort of scenario does not make tactical sense — the distance between Batam and Singapore is less than 30km.
    Five, almost every landing craft the aggressor uses to carry troops to invade Singapore by sailing across the Straits of Singapore will be sunk by our Apache helicopters, our anti-tank missiles or by our tanks. I respect the TNI and we are sure that the TNI knows that such an attack is only possible at a very, very high cost in casualties to Indonesian troops even as they are forming up (less than 30% chance of survival). Beyond the above limitations, you will need to discuss the protection of the logistics lines by sea needed to invade Singapore. To meet the conventional threat presented by Singapore's forces, the TNI will need to meet and exceed both the RSAF and the Singapore Navy operating in the 3 dimensions of air warfare, surface warfare, and underwater warfare before they can move or sustain their invasion forces near the Singapore Straits.

    Six, if you have cruise missiles, they need to be stationed far away and if fired at Singapore, they will be intercepted by our Aster 30 missiles, cued by our integrated and networked air defence system.

    Plus we also have harpoon missiles on our ships and aircraft, like the Fokker 50 MPA, that can be used for land attack of any aggressor cruise missile launch sites.
     
    Last edited: Jul 24, 2019
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  20. OPSSG

    OPSSG Super Moderator Staff Member

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    Post 2 of 2: Educating Ahmad on the RSAF’s baseline capability as a Tertiary Air Force
    Seven, Singapore will not sit back while we are under attack for a month. Do you know how much damage a single 76mm naval gun can do in 1 minute? We have more naval capabilities than you can imagine; and it will be the aggressor’s morale that will be poor from the damage inflicted after a month of hostilities. Beyond the navy, since 1987 the RSAF is the only tertiary air force in Southeast Asia (SEA), which means any SAM system you employ is only a road bump. The RSAF is an air force with the capability to detect, track and engage airborne, naval and ground targets that is a golden mile ahead of any other air force in SEA. Buying more fighters does not mean becoming more capable. By 2030, Singapore’s capability would have grown. At that time, we would be operating 62 F-16Vs, 40 F-15SGs, and a few F-35s (1st order of 4 placed in 2019), plus the following force multipliers:


    (i) The RSAF is the only air force in SEA with an AWAC squadron that can provide coverage (with 4 G550 CAEWs), giving data-linked RSAF pilots situational awareness. Sunho Beck, writing in Aviation Week (1 Oct 2007) said that the G550 CAEW can detect fighter sized targets up to 370 km away and carries unique dual-band, phased-array radar with 2 L-band side antennas and 2 S-band end antennas which are connected to a common radar unit. The system software has been optimised by DSTA and the local defence industry.

    (ii) The RSAF has acquired a squadron of 6 A330MRTT (replacing the older KC-135Rs) and again, it is only the tanker squadron in SEA that have crews that have been deployed in a theatre of war (in support of the American led Operation Enduring Freedom). The RSAF deployed KC-135R tankers (in 5 deployments for 3 month stretches each time) in support of coalition forces in Iraqi, between 2004 and 2008, and offloaded 14 million pounds of fuel.

    (iii) The RSAF is the only air force in SEA capable of conducting Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD) missions and it also has an Electronic Warfare (EW) capability. While it is known that the RSAF takes part in Red Flag but what is lesser known is that the RSAF also takes part in other exercises which is SEAD oriented. Further, the F-15SGs are AESA radar equipped and are known to have internal EW systems. BTW, the RSAF has not fully declassified its SEAD and EW capabilities, that's why this capability is not often described.

    (iv) With detachments based in Australia (basic wings course), France (advanced jet training) and the US (for F-15SG and F-16C/D training), the RSAF's pilots certainly are trained to western standards. Each RSAF squadron has more actual flight hours and simulator hours than any other squadron in any other air force in SEA. I shall not bother to list the countries that RSAF pilots train with and against in Dissimilar Air Combat Training (DACT) in various overseas exercises, as there are too many. IMHO, RSAF pilots have lots of DACT experience that can't be matched by other air forces in SEA.

    (v) The RSAF is also the largest and most advanced UAV operator in SEA. The RSAF is a operator of the Hermes 450 and the Heron 1 (replacing the Searcher IIs). The SAF’s UAVs have gone to war in Afghanistan and in the past also deployed to Indonesia to resolve the Mapenduma hostage crisis in 1996 (at the request of the TNI), making the RSAF the air force with the most operationally experienced UAV teams and with the most advanced ISR capabilities in SEA.

    Eight, since November 2014, the SAF has deployed planners, liaison officers, intelligence fusion officers, medical teams, trainers, imagery analysis teams, and KC-135Rs for use against the terror group, Islamic State (IS) alongside Australian and NZ forces (in support of the American led coalition for Operation Gallant Phoenix). As many in DT may remember, the Singapore Navy deployed our ships to fight pirates under CTF-151 and in other missions in the Northern Arabian Gulf (from 2003 to 2008) to defend the Iraqi oil platforms (which were subject to suicide attacks by dhows in April 2004), as part of a US led coalition. As one American noted:

    "One of the great undiscussed aspects of the coalition of the willing for Iraq has been the steady contribution of Singapore's Navy for security for the Iraqi oil platforms KAAOT and ABOT... specifically providing the Iraqi Navy with a base at sea for training and operations. This isn't a small thing, by using large amphibious ships as forward bases, the Iraqi Navy saves 3 days round trip to and from port for provisions..."​

    I have spoken to ADMk2 on the trends in Australian and Singaporean force development over the last few years. We agree that both countries seem to be developing complementary capabilities and this means different but complementary equipment, for slightly different roles. Both Defence Ministers do consult each other for overseas deployments, engage in burden sharing for operations, and have formalized this as an annual meeting (the relationship has grown by leaps and bounds since East Timor). Case in point, RAAF acquires Growlers and RSAF acquires the F-15SG, giving us complementary aircraft to form a combined strike package and the same or similar logic may apply to the F-35 or the A330 MRTT acquisitions by the two respective air forces. Or the acquisition of the Canberra Class and the future JMMS, LHDs by our two navies, which provide complementary naval capabilities for coalition action for a wider range of contingencies — the interested public in Indonesia should support the TNI to increase interoperability with us and join our coalition to enhance Indonesian security rather than thinking like a fanboy.
    Nine, we have in our inventory air and sea launched Harpoon missiles (over 270 km range), the XM395 by Orbital ATK and a stock pile of glide bombs like:
    • the GBU-39 small diameter bomb (over 70 km range), the GBU-53/B small diameter bombs II (over 110 km range), which are much cheaper than the Harpoon; and the AGM-154 Joint Stand-Off Weapon (over 130 km range), to be used with recon pods, which work together with to kill SAM systems at stand-off ranges, and other classified surface attack capabilities. Land attack generally uses some sort of navigational guidance, like INS, GPS, Terrain Contour Matching, etc to get the missile to the target. GPS in particular will give good accuracy for stationary targets.
    • As Ananda has pointed out, the RSAF’s control of the air, control of the electromagnetic spectrum and effective use of LO platforms sets the stage for additional aerial operations, and it also sets the conditions for the SAF’s naval or ground forces to operate to their full combat potential without substantial interruption of their scheme of maneuver from enemy air attacks or attacks using the electromagnetic spectrum.
    • In 2013, the then Chief of the USAF's Pacific Air Forces Gen. Herbert J. "Hawk" Carlisle, in an interview said: Singapore is doing very innovative things with their F-15s, notably in evolving the capabilities of the aircraft to contribute to maritime defense and security. We are looking very carefully at their innovations and can leverage their approach and thinking as well,” he said. “This will certainly grow as we introduce the fleet of F-35s in the Pacific where cross national collaboration is built in.”

    - One can imagine F-15SGs, using their AESA radars or recon pods (eg. the DB-110 Airborne Reconnaissance System or the RecceLite XR, which enable its users to look at, or scan areas of interest over 140km away) and distributing information over datalinks providing updated, over the horizon targeting information for the Formidable-class frigates.
    - Or working with the Type 218SG submarines in a similar fashion.
    - Or do the same for Australia's Hobart-class Air Warfare destroyers in a future coalition ops scenario.​
    • Due to the RSAF’s advanced strike capabilities, within 1 month of initiation of hostilities by Indonesia, 1/2 of TNI-AL’s more capable warships will be at the bottom of the sea and the majority of the TNI-AU’s fighters will be grounded (due to Singapore’s space based ISR and EW capabilities on air and sea platforms).
     
    Last edited: Aug 6, 2019
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