Northrop Grumman,
Numerous media reports, today, focus on a single sentence in the 67-page GAO analysis reached yesterday supporting its decision to sustain the Boeing tanker protest. “But for these errors,” the GAO stated, “we believe Boeing would have had a substantial chance of being selected for award.”
What readers should note is that the suggestion that the procedural errors it found might have led to a different result is the standard language included in any sustained protest.
The GAO also said its analysis does not “reflect a view as to the merits of the firm's respective aircraft.” And, on the merits, the data provided in the GAO report clearly shows that the KC-45, which has been built, flown and tested, is superior to the Boeing airplane which, at this time, is only a design on paper.
As important as it is to understand the procedural flaws that led the GAO to sustain the protest, it is just as important to consider what the GAO analysis did not find. Out of 111 separate Boeing complaints, the GAO accepted only 8. The GAO found nothing that contradicts the initial Air Force conclusion – that the Northrop Grumman KC-45 was the winner in four out of the five major selection criteria established by the Air Force, and tied on the fifth.
In Mission Capability, the GAO did not say the Air Force was wrong. The GAO criticized the wording of the RFP but did not object to the Air Force's conclusion that the KC-45 outperformed the KC-767 in almost all areas.
In Proposal Risk, the GAO did not dispute the Air Force finding that both offerings had equal risk.
In Past Performance, the GAO took no issue with the Air Force finding that Northrop Grumman had better past performance. Note that while much of the GAO report on this point is redacted, there is no question about Boeing's delivery record. Its Japanese tanker – delivered one year late – is still not ready for service. Its tanker for Italy – now three years late – has not even been delivered.
In Cost/Price, the GAO stated that greater specificity was needed in some areas, but “Most Probable Life Cycle Cost” remains a dead heat. Further, the underpinning of the Air Force decision on cost was risk, and the GAO had no objection to the Air Force conclusion that the KC-767 remains a higher risk.
Finally, in its Integrated Fleet Aerial Refueling Assessment (IFARA), a real world simulation of how the competing tankers would operate in a combat situation, the GAO had no objection to the manner in which the Air Force conducted the simulation and the Air Force conclusion that the KC-45 provided better combat capability.
The Air Force needs a new tanker now and with a plane and a boom that have been built, flown and tested, the Northrop Grumman KC-45 is ready now to fulfill the Air Force need.
