The best strategy to defending Singapore Island

Gambit79

New Member
It’s been a while but all articles are interesting.
Aside to that, few takes to discuss further.

1)Will it be operationally adequate for the RSN to operate a squadron of four Type 218SG submarines taking into consideration the no of platforms deployed for operations/training/maintenance and stand by?

2)Till now, there have been no information if the tender for the RSN MRCV had kick off.Personally, I’m unsure if the ST Marine Vanguard 130 will meet the MRCV optimum operational requirements as I’ve read an article with the author mentioning that it’s a cramped vessel and the author said that another possible candidate will be Naval Shipyard enhanced Belharra Frigate taking into consideration that they had set up an R&D lab in Singapore.

3)Similar to the MRCV the RSN is still coy about details of this platform except of a Endurance 170LHD as shared by ST Marine as a possible export opportunity.
If we assume that Endurance 170 will be the selected platform for RSN JMMS, will the length of this platform too minimal towards F-35B requirements of 167meters long run way to take off?
Or hypothetically, will the Endurance 170 tailored to extended length for RSN JMMS requirements? E.g extended length of 177.5 meters or 179.5 meters

4)What about the future new four purpose built new vessels to enhance MARSEC assets? Possibly a Fearless 75? Similar to Royal Navy of Oman?

5)Will the RSAF set up another squadron of F-15SG? Possibly an enhanced platform with cue from F-15 EX?

Awaiting opinions from our forum experts on the above,thanks!
 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
It’s been a while but all articles are interesting.
Aside to that, few takes to discuss further.
1. Hope your don/t mind, I have moved your post from the Republic of Singapore Air Force Discussions thread to the general discussion on the SAF thread, instead of the service specific RSN capabilities thread.

2. While this approach enables a complete answer to your questions in one location, it lacks the level of service specific detail provided in the Air Force and Navy threads. I feel this is the best way to keep you happy.
1)Will it be operationally adequate for the RSN to operate a squadron of four Type 218SG submarines taking into consideration the no of platforms deployed for operations/training/maintenance and stand by?
3. Yes, for the amount of money that the Singapore Government is currently willing to spend. Unless the Singapore Navy is better resourced, and given that it is the smallest service (with the Singapore Navy's budget is dwarfed by that of the RSAF), I think it did pretty well in the inter-service budget wars to get 4 new submarines.
2)Till now, there have been no information if the tender for the RSN MRCV had kick off.Personally, I’m unsure if the ST Marine Vanguard 130 will meet the MRCV optimum operational requirements as I’ve read an article with the author mentioning that it’s a cramped vessel and the author said that another possible candidate will be Naval Shipyard enhanced Belharra Frigate taking into consideration that they had set up an R&D lab in Singapore.
5. As opposed to which other design?

6. A ST spokesman mentioned that the Vanguard 130 design is a 5,000 ton class vessel (see this astute blog’s discussion on the Vanguard 130) - it is the Vanguard 130 Multi-role Combatant, the biggest and most capable ship in the series that fits the MRCV description most. At 130 metres it will already be significantly larger than the Formidable-class frigate and it has to be in order to accommodate all those UAVs and USVs, and when required.

7. I would not consider the smallish 122 metre long Belharra Frigate or want to discuss it (as that does not meet Singapore's requirements). There are some fairly nonsensical attempts to discuss 1st Flotilla and 3rd Flotilla fleet design, that contains unrealistic and speculative discussions via featured guest posts and comments, including by Benjamin Ong (who lays the ground work with links to actual speeches) and the rest of the gang, on the blog Submarine Matters:

3)Similar to the MRCV the RSN is still coy about details of this platform except of a Endurance 170LHD as shared by ST Marine as a possible export opportunity.
8. Look at Endurance 160 as the design base for the JMMS concept. It may grow bigger but what I really want is for it to be faster — which means more installed power to exceed the current maximum speed of 22 knots, as currently specified.

9. An effective ASW fleet requires more speed and I would suggest 24 to 26 knots (with an economic cruise speed of above 18 knots as base).
If we assume that Endurance 170 will be the selected platform for RSN JMMS, will the length of this platform too minimal towards F-35B requirements of 167meters long run way to take off?
10. To land in an emergency, more than adequate for the F-35B. To take-off with a meaningful combat load? The answer is no.

Q: Why would Singapore need such a large JMMS?​

11. More importantly, we need a faster JMMS, if it is to be effective as an ASW support platform — take a look at JMSDF ASW operations (as an aspirational example). I would ague this more important to the Singapore Navy. We badly need to grow the Seahawk fleet by another 6 to 9 helicopters in the 2030s — as the 6 MRCVs and the 2 JMMS need Seahawks (which I assume is 2 currently). And unless the NZDF decides on acquiring the Endurance 170, the base design that meets the SAF’s key requirements will reside in the 160 platform.
Or hypothetically, will the Endurance 170 tailored to extended length for RSN JMMS requirements? E.g extended length of 177.5 meters or 179.5 meters
12. Why do we want to increase or concentrate the risk? IMO, the Singapore Navy needs a much better ASW capability (as a risk mitigation measure). If a single Malaysian submarine sinks a large deck JMMS (that can carry significant numbers of F-35Bs), you not only lose the ship, you lose the fighter squadron.
4)What about the future new four purpose built new vessels to enhance MARSEC assets? Possibly a Fearless 75? Similar to Royal Navy of Oman?
13. It is possible that the 4 vessels supplied to the Royal Navy of Oman is a good starting point for discussion. I will return to this point at another time, as lunch beckons.
5)Will the RSAF set up another squadron of F-15SG? Possibly an enhanced platform with cue from F-15 EX?
14. No. I was clear that the F-35B was the much, much preferred choice. The block 4, F-35B to be acquired by Singapore from 2026 onwards, has five basic missions:

(i) air superiority, or offensive and defensive counterair;​

(ii) EW and suppression of enemy air defences (also known as SEAD);​

(iii) close air support;​

(iv) strategic attack against high-value strategic and mobile targets; and​

(v) extended surface warfare for maritime surveillance, identification and targeting.​

My prior response on the slim possibility for another squadron of F-15SG was to address a 0.1% chance specific event that is the subject of another question.
Awaiting opinions from our forum experts on the above,thanks!
15. Thanks for tolerating my incoherent thoughts.
 
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OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
More incoherent thoughts part 2
1. Some have validly speculated that this vessel will be based in the Fearless 75 design (like the four 75m patrol vessels supplied to the Oman Navy, namely RNOV Al-Seeb, RNOV Shinas, RNOV Sadh and RNOV Khassab). From the picture, I suspect it might have the length of the LMVs but the top of the Al-Ofouq class.

2. The Al-Ofouq class is powered by 2 x MTU 20V 8000 M91 and has a top speed of 25 knots. The hull form of the Independence class vessels is powered by 4 × MTU 20V 4000 M93L and has a top speed of 27 knots — a design that is faster than the older, less capable Fearless 75 design, while being more economical to run. Therefore, I would pick the Independence class hull form for this 2nd flotilla vessel — for parts commonality with the existing 8 LMVs.

3. For the Singapore Navy, Maritime security remains crucial, despite pandemic. More details on plans to restructure the Maritime Security Task Force (MSTF) was announced, with assets under the Maritime Security (MARSEC) Command to be reorganized into three flotillas tasked with specialized roles.
4. The 6th flotilla’s USVs will be crucial to the Singapore’s mine counter-measures (with a tested concept of operations using a pair of 16 m Venus USVs as a shallow water mine counter-measure solution) and shallow water ASW capabilities — with the intent that some of these USVs will manned by conscripts and naval reserves.
(a) The VENUS series of Singapore built USVs range from the 5.5 ton VENUS 9 with a payload capacity of 2.5 ton over the 11 ton VENUS 11 with a payload of 4.5 ton, to the 26 ton VENUS 16 with a 10 ton payload capacity.​
(b) The VENUS 16 Mine Countermeasure concept, where one VENUS 16 is fitted with a Towed Synthetic Aperture Sonar (TSAS) to conduct underwater scans to detect and classify mines, while another VENUS 16 embarks the ECA K-STER Expendable Mine Disposal Systems (EMDS) to carry out the mine detection and neutralisation to conduct mine disposals. Both versions feature autonomous collision avoidance and Satcom systems to cancel any blind spots caused by geographical and shipping reasons. This waterjet-propelled USV can attain speeds in excess of 30 kn and has an endurance of up to 36 hours. The craft is controlled by a 2-person crew in a 20 ft TEU container that can be located either ashore or deployed from a ship.​

5. In late 2017, the Singapore Navy concluded a series of shipborne trials for the Schiebel S-100 Camcopter rotor-winged unmanned aerial system (UAS) on one of its LMVs. The trials, which involved a heavy fuel variant of the UAS, took place over several months on the LMV programme’s second-of-class, RSS Sovereignty (16). Among objectives of the Camcopter trials include the establishment of basic rotor-wing UAV operating envelopes and parameters, under various operational scenarios including at varying speed and sea states, for the LMV platform. The S-100 Camcopter has a 6 hour endurance with a small 34 kg (75 lbs) payload.

6. I am just wondering if larger unmanned helicopters like the MQ-8C Firescout would be better operated by the RSAF or by the 6th flotilla. Thus far, Northrop Grumman has delivered 32 of 38 MQ-8Cs to the US Navy —Japan could be the first export customer of the MQ-8C. All of the MQ-8C UAS will be equipped with the AN/ZPY-8 radar with 240-degree field of view and an achieved flight time of 11 hours (with more than an hour of fuel in reserve). The 11 hour flight was part of a series of capability-based tests used by the US Navy to validate their concept of operations and previously tested performance parameters. Having achieved initial operational capability in June 2019, the MQ-8C is scheduled for its first deployment in 2020.
 
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Lone Ranger

Member
2)Till now, there have been no information if the tender for the RSN MRCV had kick off.Personally, I’m unsure if the ST Marine Vanguard 130 will meet the MRCV optimum operational requirements as I’ve read an article with the author mentioning that it’s a cramped vessel and the author said that another possible candidate will be Naval Shipyard enhanced Belharra Frigate taking into consideration that they had set up an R&D lab in Singapore.
Beside ST Engineering Marine's Vanguard-130, there are also talks on offers from Damen (Crossover-131) and Saab-Kockums (stretched version of its Stealth Next Generation Multi-Mission Corvette) to RSN during IMDEX Asia 2019.

On Saab-Kockums' offering, a vessel with the length of 120m, it could be under size for MRCV's requirement. As for Damen's Crossover-131, it has an interesting design. It has 3 variants - XO 131C (combatant), XO 131A (amphibious) and XO 131T (transport). I do hope RSN find them interesting too and explore on their potential for MRCV.

I am just wondering if larger unmanned helicopters like the MQ-8C Firescout would be better operated by the RSAF or by the 6th flotilla.
On the MQ-8C Firescout vs Schiebel S-100 Camcopter, despite MQ-8C has a higher payload, speed and longer endurance compared to S-100 Camcopter, however I do believe Camcopter does has some advantages worth considering, like..
-smaller ship board footprint
-lower operating cost (fuel efficiency due to smaller size)
-Less observable (again due to smaller size)
-2 drones per system (redundancy)
-Lower Capex (full system @ $2million-2005 vs 1 drone @ $10million-2016)

Of course, the above comparison is only valid if a payload of 34-50kg is not a mission constraint.

I cut & paste both spec side by side for easy comparison.
 

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OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
More incoherent thoughts part 3
On the MQ-8C Firescout vs Schiebel S-100 Camcopter, despite MQ-8C has a higher payload, speed and longer endurance compared to S-100 Camcopter, however I do believe Camcopter does has some advantages worth considering, like..
-smaller ship board footprint
-lower operating cost (fuel efficiency due to smaller size)
-Less observable (again due to smaller size)
-2 drones per system (redundancy)
-Lower Capex (full system @ $2million-2005 vs 1 drone @ $10million-2016)

Of course, the above comparison is only valid if a payload of 34-50kg is not a mission constraint.

I cut & paste both spec side by side for easy comparison.
7. Looking at the art of the possible (based on US studies), I believe the Singapore Navy will need to evaluate both types for different mission sets — the concept of operations and safety margins for operating the S-100 Camcopter is being evaluated and developed on the LMVs.
(a) The true competitor to the S-100 on the four LMVs (that do not support helicopter operations) in the 2030s is the future replacement for the Group 2 UAS, RQ-21.​
(b) The other four LMVs that can support helicopter operations are fitted with Aeronautical & General Instruments Limited’s Advanced Stabilised Glide Slope Indicator (ASGSI) at the rear of the ship’s superstructure to assist with helicopter landing operations. According to Lt. Col Chew Chun Chau, head of the LMV project office, in 2017, the Singapore Navy put the LMVs’ helicopter capabilities through trials using the S-70B Seahawk and Super Puma helicopters. These ASGSI equipped LMVs are an ideal lilly pad for a platoon of Group 4 helicopter type UAS (and launched from a mothership like the JMMS) — where the LMVs are used to rearm and refuel them in forward naval and littoral operations.​
8. The US Navy and US Marine Corps operate a fixed-wing RQ-21 Blackjack UAS from ships using a pressurized air catapult and a “Skyhook” recovery system, and they also operate the MQ-8 Fire Scout rotary-wing UAS:
(a) the RQ-21 is a Group 2 UAS (with the current endurance of 16+ hours, depending on payload); and​
(b) the MQ-8 is a Group 4 UAS (with an endurance of 11+ hours is much more costly to operate and currently lack certain mission packages, as the technology needs to be matured over the late 2020s).​

9. A platoon or section of larger as a Group 4 UAS (is a poor man’s helicopter based alternative to an AWAC for a sea base) would be deployed from hangers and UAS control centres on larger vessels like the JMMS or MRCV. In Mar 2020, Deputy Commandant of the US Marine Corps for Aviation Lt. Gen. Steven Rudder told USNI News after a hearing that it became clear as the service moved forward with the program that it couldn’t get the endurance it needed for high-end missions like airborne early warning and communications relay with the kind of air vehicle design that would be able to launch vertically off a ship’s helicopter deck.

10. As for the shipboard variant of the US Marines’ upcoming program, “it’s probably RQ-21-plus or some sort of Group 3 UAS, Group 4 UAS capability, but not a larger (Group 5) air vehicle that does everything,” Lt. Gen. Rudder said.
(a) I think it is worth watching the Group 2 to 4 UAS trials being conducted by the US Marines. Some of these capabilities, when they are matured will need to be adopted by the SAF’s 21st division or the RSAF. I can imagine a block force or a company sized force from 7SIB being resupplied by a Group 4 helicopter based UAS (launched from a Singapore Navy ship, for littoral dominance in a scenario outlined in paragraphs 11 and 12 below). A Group 4 helicopter based UAS can also serve as a forward scout for the Apache providing force protection, in a scenario where ROEs prevent the SAF from shooting unless fired upon.​
(b) In mid-Aug 2020, China has fired an array of missiles near the Paracel Islands, clearly intended to shape the attitudes and actions of the US and ASEAN. China says it doesn’t need to recognize international law — because it doesn’t think it had enough influence in shaping its regional security environment.​
(c) A key geopolitical event, occurred in 1995 from July 21 to 26 — along a long string of seemingly unrelated prior events — the equivalent of a geopolitical earthquake. That 1995 event was not even triggered by China. For the PLA, this was a never again moment, where it was forced to back down.​
(d) Having understood this July 1995 event, Singapore decided to begin building the Formidable Class in 2002. The Next Fighter Replacement competition in 2003-2005 that was won by Boeing’s F-15SG, demonstrated a sense of urgency by MINDEF (that was not generally understood at that time). In fact, the trend line of PRC defence spending was clear even so far back — which will affect the region. It is important to note that Singapore’s capability development is not directed by a China threat. Rather, it is planning to manage a general increase in regional defence spending.​
(e) The US Naval Postgraduate School has released an unclassified wargame, “Crisis in the South Pacific,” which allows a notional Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) commander to design a tailored force and operate in a resource-constrained environment. In contrast to traditional force-on-force wargames, the player’s focus is to improve U.S. perceptions in the host nation while shaping the environment to support a future mission tasking. In this regard, the player has no direct ability to attrite enemy forces and must carefully plan each move, as every action increases the overall force signature and the likelihood that the enemy will target and successfully strike highly-visibility units.​
11. 7SIB and the Army Deployment Force (ADF), will have similar Phase Zero planning concerns.

12. The military term of art for Phase Zero planning consists of those things done (i) to make an intervention unnecessary in the first place or (ii) failing that, to ensure that everything is poised for a successful campaign (Phases One to X) to return the situation to Phase Zero as quickly as possible.

13. In the battlefield or deployment ground of the future (in the late 2030s), nimble and affordable Group 2 to 3 UAS, at a systems level, are intended to draw fire from enemy air defence systems and may be controlled by H225Ms, Apaches, Seahawks or CH-47F Chinooks (depending on mission requirements) that are launched from a Singaporean sea base. We can already see this action-reaction dynamic in Ukraine — where a Russian UAV appearance will mean an artillery barrage in on Ukrainian positions in less than a minute.

14. Singapore’s ADF is an all professional force and it needs to take some risk to fight our way in, as part of a coalition (with like minded countries like Australia, NZ and other ASEAN countries), to deliver aid in troubled peace HADR scenario or to separate warning parties in an enforced peace making missions (due to the partial collapse of any ASEAN nation).
 
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OPSSG

Super Moderator
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In any analysis of Singapore’s defence industrial base’s growth trajectory, asking the correct questions is as important to seeking to answers to questions.
Q1: Why is it important for Singapore to be a booster rocket motor supplier for Blue Spear (the next gen Israeli and Singapore anti-ship missile)?

Ans: Noteworthy that the JV is with ST Land Systems (formerly ST Kinetics). This is likely because the ammunition and missile design and manufacture knowhow is possessed by this division. They have previously licenced produced Spike ATGMs and Igla SAMs. The core technology used to manufacture solid rocket motors in Blue Spear can also be applied to develop anti-tank missiles, short ranged loitering munitions, artillery rockets (replacement HIMARS rockets), medium range surface-to-surface missiles like the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) and even for certain SAM systems. While Singapore will continue to buy from foreign suppliers these systems, having certain core technologies reduces embargo risk.

Q2: Who is the global booster rocket motor supplier for ST Engineering (land systems) to benchmark against?

Ans: Nammo, who designs and manufactures rocket motors in the following programs:
  • AMRAAM (Advanced Medium Range Air to Air Missile)
  • ESSM (Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile) – Raytheon
  • IRIS-T (Air to Air Missile with TVC) – Diehl BGT Defence
  • IRIS-T SL (Surface Lauch IRIS-T with TVC) – Diehl BGT Defence
  • EXOCET MM40 B3 Booster (Anti-Ship Missile with TVC) - MBDA
  • Sidewinder AIM-9L (Air to Air Missile) – Diehl BGT Defence
  • Penguin MK2 Boost & Sustain Motor Anti Ship Missiles) - Kongsberg
  • NSM Booster (Naval Strike Missile) - Kongsberg
  • IDAS (Interactive Defence & Attack for Submarines) – Diehl BGT Defence
  • ARIANE 5 (Separation & Acceleration Boosters) – Airbus DS
  • Hybrid Rocket Motors & Monopropellant Thrusters for Space - ESA
Q3: Is ST Engineering’s goal to be like Nammo?

Ans: No, Singapore should seek to grow specific niches, with export potential, to augment Singapore’s own domestic weapons manufacturing needs.

Q4: Where are some of the testing locations for Singapore made boosters or missiles?

Ans: Australia, South Africa and in 2020 onwards, in India.
(a) On 20 Nov 2019, India’s Minister of Defence Rajnath Singh and his Singapore counterpart Dr Ng Eng Hen witnessed the exchange of the Letter of Intent Letter of Intent to conclude a Memorandum of Understanding to facilitate the use of Chandipur Integrated Test Range by the Singapore defence establishment and both Ministers commended the progress in defence technology collaboration. Rajnath Singh also offered setting up of a Joint Test Facilities under the Defence Testing Infrastructure Scheme of India. Dr Ng agreed to explore opportunities for joint collaboration, including in the two Defence Industrial Corridors (DICs), in Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh. The Ministers also agreed to explore cooperation in the fields of Artificial Intelligence, Geo-Spatial Data Sharing and Cyber Security.​
(b) Likewise Australia and Singapore have signed a range of MOUs to enhance defence cooperation, including on personnel exchanges, military intelligence cooperation and defence science and technology. Under a 10 year MOU valid till 2025, the two countries undertake collaborative research, conduct joint trials, work on systems engineering and integration, exchange equipment and personnel, develop new capabilities and improve methods of operations.​
 
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OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
1. Effective messaging by the Singapore Navy on preparedness through a fleet exercise, comprising of 2 Formidable class frigates, 2 Littoral Mission Vessels (LMVs), a Victory class corvette, a mine countermeasure vessel, a LPD and a submarine with sea-air integration in the exercise.

2. Not only were naval helicopters operating with 1st floatilla frigates to hunt submarines, the Fokker 50 maritime patrol aircraft also provided wide area surveillance and over the horizon targeting, and this naval exercise in the South China Sea was also supported by F-16 fighters to provide air cover. It’s great to see the LMVs of 2nd floatilla employed for sea control missions in this exercise.

3. In comparison, slightly less effective
Singapore Army Facebook propaganda on unit readiness, when CORVID-19 has clearly affected training cycle.

4. Singapore’s forward defence strategy has now shifted focus to the maritime domain, which automatically means a focus on the Singapore Navy’s bilateral working relationships with the Australian navy, the Brunei navy and the TNI AL. The eventual acquisition of up to 12 F-35Bs in around 2026 to 2028 will enable the 21st Division and its 7th Singapore Infantry Brigade (7 SIB), as an infantry formation specializing in heliborne and amphibious operations, supported by the future Joint-Multi-Mission Ship (JMMS) to operate more like a mini Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB) of the US Marines with its aviation combat element. Details of the JMMS are currently sketchy, but they will reportedly have double the capacity of the current Endurance Class vessels. The 7 SIB comprises of the Army Deployment Force, 1st Guards, 3rd Guards Battalions and a specialist C4I battalion.

5. When Singaporean troops from 7SIB are deployed on the Endurance class LPDs or the near future Multi-Role Combat Vessels (MRCV) to conduct a HADR mission (eg. in Cambodia, the Southern Philippines, or Myanmar) or in an INTERFET style Chapter 7 multinational UN peacemaking operations (see: ‘Strength in Diversity: The Combined Naval Role in Operation STABILISE’) in the Southern Philippines (eg. the 2013 Zamboanga City crisis and the 2017 Battle of Marawi) or in Sabah (eg. the 2013 Lahad Datu incursion) — it is possible that there will be an influence battle for host nation stakeholder influence against possible third party hostility (eg. intra-ASEAN or external hostility), to an UN sanctioned intervention.

6. Supported by Singapore Navy ships from the 1st, 2nd and 3rd flotillas — it is likely that troops from 7SIB is the force of choice to be deployed in a coalition with foreign diplomats, a large contingent of policemen from different countries and international aid workers in a complex situation. The only issue is that the all professional side of the SAF is too small, in size, at only one evergreen battalion that is found in the Army Deployment Force.
 
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OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Hint of things to come in 2021 —Part 1

1. I expect that Austin’s statement after talking to Dr Ng will result in further announcements to coincide with next Shangri- La Dialogue on 4–6 June 2021 that will dovetail into Ely Ratner’s work in the US DoD’s China Task Force. China task force in a “sprint” effort dedicated to reviewing Pentagon policy on Beijing, according to the US DoD.
(a) The task force will provide Austin and Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen Hicks its final findings and recommendations in the next four months. It will focus on strategy, operational concepts, technology and force structures, intelligence, strengthening alliances and partnerships in the region, and defense relations with China.​
(b) The dispersal strategy, cooperation with allies and partners, and accelerated missile development will likely make the list — India, Vietnam, Singapore and ASEAN will certainly have a role to play under intelligence sharing and enhanced partnerships for the US Navy.​
(c) On 3 Mar 2021 the White House released the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, which conveys "President Biden's vision for how America will engage with the world.” In the section on US alliances and partnerships in the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, the Biden administration did not mention Thailand or the Philippines despite the two are US treaty allies. Instead, India, NZ, Singapore and Vietnam are mentioned.​

2. Last month, Biden announced the establishment of a China task force, signaling his intent to make countering Beijing’s rise a top priority for the military. Biden gave a speech and also made an announcement at the Pentagon alongside VP Kamala Harris and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin. The move underscored the message that the administration is prepared to counter China on the military front. "It'll require a whole-of-government effort, bipartisan cooperation in Congress, and strong alliances and partnerships," Biden said.

3. Biden and his top security officials have underscored support for allies Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, signalling Washington's rejection of China's disputed territorial claims in those areas. The PLA flew about 380 sorties into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ) in 2020, a defense ministry statement said. Taiwan’s ADIZ is being tested almost on a daily basis with as many as 15 Chinese aircraft in a single day. As China's military power tilts the military balance in the Taiwan Strait toward Beijing, analysts say the near-normalization of the Chinese military’s constant threats are aimed at subduing Taipei through exhaustion.

(a) When Lloyd Austin spoke with Japanese Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi on 23 Jan 2021, he “affirmed that the Senkaku islands are covered by Article V of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, and that the United States remains opposed to any unilateral attempts to change the status quo in the East China Sea.” If even Japanese need American reassurance with their powerful JMSDF, what more Indonesia.​
(b) Former senior State Department official Kurt Campbell will join the Biden administration with the title of "Indo-Pacific coordinator," a job that will give him broad management over the NSC directorates that cover various parts of Asia and China-related issues. Campbell will report directly to National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan. The Biden NSC will have several of these "coordinators," who will have more authority than the "senior directors" below them, according to the newspaper. Reporting to Campbell is Laura Rosenberger, as the senior director for Indo-Pacific policy at the NSC. Reporting to Rosenberger is Rush Doshi, as director at the NSC.​

(c) These appointments, moves and statements at the State Department, NSC, and DoD levels, are calculated to reassure nervous Asian allies that the Biden administration is taking the China challenge seriously.​

4. For context, China's military budget — the second largest in the world after the US — is set to increase by 6.8% in 2021, it’s finance ministry says. Beijing plans to spend 1.36 trillion yuan (US$210 billion) on defence, which is still less than a third of Washington's military budget.
(a) To provide balance against the American announcements to come, I note the PR efforts by the Singapore Navy to show a cooperative face with the PLA(N) — it is in the national interest of Singapore to build relations with China, so that if any shooting starts, we can at least call them on behalf of other ASEAN members. The inaugural ASEAN-China Maritime Exercise, held in Oct 2018 in Zhanjiang, China, also marked an important milestone in Singapore's efforts to advance regional stability.​
(b) Chinese media also said the guided-missile destroyer Guiyang and guided-missile frigate Zaozhuang, part of the 36th Escort Taskforce, participated in the joint maritime exercise on 24 Feb 2021. The Singaporean ships include the Formidable-class stealth frigate, RSS Intrepid, and the Independence-class littoral mission vessel, RSS Sovereignty. And there is real scope for bilateral cooperation with the PLA(N) for joint search and rescue, HADR and NEO scenarios.​

(c) While the Americans are undoubtedly moving into a period of heightened competition with China, it does not mean that China is an enemy. Both Washington and Beijing need to work with one another on a vast array of international problems, and cannot afford to take a zero-sum approach to every issue. More importantly, while competition with China is a priority, it is not the only object of US or even ASEAN foreign policy, even in the security sphere. Care should be taken to ensure that the rhetoric of great power competition does not devour every other aspect of US and ASEAN foreign policy discussions.​
 
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OPSSG

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Hint of things to come in 2021 —Part 2

5. MSRV Sentinel and MSRV Guardian entered into operational service on 26 Jan 2021, while MSRV Protector and MSRV Bastion will be refurbished and operationalised later this year to form the Maritime Security and Response Flotilla. The current defence planning for Singapore seems to be for a troubled peace scenario, where each party tries to have escalation options; in particular, the ability to ram Malaysian vessels if they trespass on Singapore waters again; following from Malaysian government vessels continually encroaching into our territorial waters off Tuas port from Nov 2018 to Apr 2019.

(a) In this respect, proper distancing in great power balancing between the Americans and Chinese can serve to enhance Singapore’s deterrence messaging to Malaysia — while ensuring that we are marching in lockstep with the non-aligned posture of Indonesia (and ASEAN).​

(b) The upcoming moves is part of the IndoPacific Deterrence Initiative and is more than a rhetorical gesture. This is support for the underlying security partnership by working with Austin; and I suspect that will be some sort of enhancement to the 1990 MOU on access to bases (along the lines of the former ‘places not based idea’), but until and unless Indonesia allows for US military access to its facilities, there is a limit to what Singapore can do for the Americans.​

6. By 2030, Vietnam’s 6 Kilo-class submarines and Malaysia’s 2 Scorpène-class submarines will be the hunted by Chinese ASW groups. That’s a scary thought. That is why, 8 years ago, Singapore decided to invest in a new class of regionally superior submarines — to ensure our active armed neutrality to any conflict. In this respect, Singapore’s defence budget will climb 12.7% to S$15.36 billion, compared with FY2020’s S$13.63 billion.

7. With the global pandemic, increasingly, Ex Matilda 2019 is a good template for the SAF’s overseas exercises in Australia; where 40 Recon troopers from 11 C4I Bn joined the 8th/9th Bn, RAR to train at Enoggera Close Training Area, Brisbane; where 40 are quarantined rather than 6,000.

8. To grow the industrial base, ST Engineering has signed MOU to develop a hybrid electric drive (HED) system with Nimr, which is a member of the Abu Dhabi Government owned Emirates Defence Industries Company. Dr Lee Shiang Long, President, Land Systems of ST Engineering, said: “Originally designed for commercial applications, our HED system which we intend to integrate on NIMR’s military vehicle, is testimony to our engineering and design capabilities. This MOU was signed during the 21 Feb 2021 International Defence Exhibition and Conference, has the potential to be installed in Nimr’s Hafeet Mk 2 and Ajban Mk 2 armored vehicles.

9. It was reported on 6 Mar 2021 that an undisclosed country had that 3 squadrons that in the past were only made up of Searcher UAVs has awarded a US$300 million contract to Elbit. One squadron was replaced with IAI Heron UAVs, the 2nd was replaced with Elbit Hermes 450s, and now the 3rd is being replaced with about 12 Elbit Hermes 900s — to better support HQ Sense & Strike (see paragraph 10 below). This country is expected to be Singapore.
 
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OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Hint of things to come in 2021 —Part 3

10. Singapore needs to avoid complacency if the SAF is to remain relevant across the threat spectrum, from high intensity and urban warfare, to cyber, to intelligence and ISR, to military installation security, to counter-terrorism and counter-piracy. Currently, there is a re-organisation of HQ Army Intelligence and HQ Singapore Artillery under the 6 Division to create Headquarters Sense & Strike (Sense & Strike); which can see targets 25km away due to the AMPS™-NG multi-spectral sensor on the Hermes 900. This enhanced HQ Sense & Strike allows the Army to integrate capabilities from both (headquarters) to 'see better' at a much longer range from the UAV and 'shoot faster' with the missiles carried on the UAV, thereby using less manpower to complete the kill chain. In addition, the SAF:
(a) in Feb 2019 introduced the Cyber Military Experts (C4X) scheme for those interested in pursuing a career in cybersecurity, and to slowly grow a small talent pool for cyberwarfare;​
(b) in Mar 2020 restructured its Military Intelligence Organisation (MIO) to better detect, forewarn and respond to terrorist plots, Dr Ng said, highlighting this as a “key deliverable” for intelligence units even as they work with other agencies; this will assist in the early identification and arrest of Singaporeans, like Heikel (49) and Rasidah binte Mazlan (63), who were contact with foreign entities suspected of involvement in terrorism-related activities;​

(c) will ensure that its restructured MIO work with defence technology partners to acquire systems and capabilities that can uncover, investigate and monitor threat concerns, as well as strengthen its research and analysis expertise. The MIO restructure has paid off with the 5 Feb 2021 arrest of 20 year old Amirull Ali, a self-radicalised former NSF, had planned to attack the Maghain Aboth Synagogue in Waterloo Street, Singapore; between 2018 and 2020, Amirull made plans to travel to Gaza and take up arms alongside Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades (AQB), Hamas's military wing; and​
(d) will work with other national agencies and cooperate with foreign military intelligence partners, both on a bilateral and multilateral basis. This includes formalised intelligence sharing with Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand under an intelligence pact launched in 2018 (see: Southeast Asian states launch intelligence pact to counter Islamist threat); under the “Our Eyes” initiative, senior defense officials will meet every two weeks to swap information on militant groups and develop a common database of violent extremists.​
11. MINDEF's response to the heightened contestation is to remain friends with all. The SAF continue to work with like-minded partners to forge a security architecture that is inclusive for big or small countries, and in which disputes are resolved through peaceful means. The government of Singapore announced on 16 Feb a 2021 defence budget of SGD15.36 billion (USD11.56 billion). The new allocation, which amounts to about 15% of total government outlay for the year, is a 12.7% increase over the revised 2020 defence budget of SGD13.63 billion but just a 1.8% increase compared to the original 2020 expenditure of SGD15.08 billion — keep in mind 46 major exercises in 10 countries is cut for FY2020-FY2021.

12. With the supply of manpower projected to see a one-third reduction by 2030, the SAF is acquiring assets that require less manpower to operate, as well as harness a greater use of unmanned technologies. Singapore’s 2nd batch of Hunter IFVs, 60 upgraded F-16Vs, 16 newly acquired H225Ms, 16 newly acquired CH-47Fs, and 4 Type 218SGs are starting delivery in 2021 or 2022. Further, the Singapore Navy’s:

(a) ageing missile corvettes will also be replaced by new Multi-Role Combat Vessels (MRCVs) by 2030. Technologies such as unmanned air and sea drones will allow the MRCVs to extend their reach and flexibility against threats;​

(b) 14 strong Maritime Security and Response Flotilla was also inaugurated, this consists of 8 LMVs, 2 tug boats on long lease; and 4 refurbished patrol vessels (with 4 new purpose-built vessels set to replace them in mid-to-late 2020s); and​

(c) new autonomous USVs are also expected to complete their sea trials in late 2021. Each of these autonomous USVs needs only two crew members and can operate for 36-hour stretches, freeing up 8 littoral mission vessels to be deployed at further ranges.​
 
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OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Hint of things to come in 2021 —Part 4

@OPSSG just a quick question, from this infographic there's mention of Joint Multi Mission Ship. Is this from ST concept of 170m LHD ?
13. The JMMS may not be the Endurance 170 design (as it was developed for a potential foreign customer tender); as the requirements continue to shift in response to the design of the MRCVs. As I understand it, what is required in the 160; but that may change. And the Singapore Navy need not to be locked down on specific specs till much later — when the 6th MRCV is laid down.

14. ST Engineering has 10 vessels to build before the JMMS class is finalised (which gives the Singapore Navy plenty of time before they need to finalise the JMMS specs). I am very interested in final specs for 4 new vessels to replace the Sentinel class which are refurbished Fearless class boats (fitted for ramming and capable of resisting small arms and machine gun fire thanks to defence science’s transparent ceramics and the newly installed armour panels).
(a) Like bulletproof glass, the transparent ceramic used in SAF vehicle widows and vessels from 2016 onwards, is laminated with plastic materials for actual use, but it is much harder than glass and works very differently.​
(b) The ceramic, which is denser than glass, is so strong that it has to be only a tenth the thickness of glass to confer similar protection. With the plastic lamination, the ceramic is about half the weight of bulletproof glass.​
(c) Farther afield, Germany's IBD Deisenroth Engineering developed a similar ceramic in 2014 which it has introduced into armoured vehicles, while US company Surmet has come up with its own version, called Alon, in work funded by the US Department of Defence.​

15. The recent 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War between Azerbaijan and Armenia is an example of complacency. On 27 Sep 2020, Azerbaijan invaded the Armenian controlled region of Nagorno-Karabakh, in an armoured assault that penetrated Armenia’s defensive line and advancing approximately 80km in 29 days.

16. By the time a ceasefire was agreed upon on 10 Nov 20, Armenia had lost control of half of the region including the capital city, Shusha. Its losses totalled at 287 tanks (70% of Armenia’s tank capability), 69 AFVs, 540 trucks and jeeps, 270 Artillery pieces, 60 AD systems, 22 UAVs and 3,360 personnel casualties. By comparison, Azerbaijan lost only 36 tanks, 14 AFVs (31 trucks and jeeps destroyed or captured), as well as 2,800 personnel casualties. Azerbaijan’s campaign was deemed a success.

17. At a moderate cost, Azerbaijan reclaimed huge portions of the territory it lost to Armenia in previous conflicts and secured strategic overland borders to its allies, Iran and Turkey. The operation itself is abundant with contemporary examples of proxy warfare, use of special forces, combined arms teams, cyber warfare and INFOWAR. But a primal factor reported as central to Azerbaijan’s strategy was its unexpected integration of Israeli ‘Harop’ Loitering Missile, and the Turkish designed ‘TB-2’ armed UAVs. These proved equally effective in enabling Azeri offensive manoeuvre and defending against Armenian counter attacks; and it deserves admittance into our discussion on the SAF.

18. Not only is the Singapore Navy better prepared to act on counter terrorism intelligence, it has developed autonomous USVs as a first line of defence before the Sentinel class conducts boarding operations in support of the Maritime Security Task Force.
(a) In particular, the quality of intelligence acquired by the Maritime Security Command located at Changi Naval Base, has increased by huge incremental leaps thanks to a systems of systems approach to gathering big data using sensors like inverse SAR or the AMPS-NG (or advanced multi-sensor payload system) is a multi-spectral sensor with shortwave infrared technology integrated and having the capability to quickly to use AI to analyse and act on target quality data that ensures that the OODA loop is tight.​
(b) In this respect, the F-35B acquisition requires that the SAF grow closer to the US Marines, to learn from them — including using the F-35B to provide targeting data to a HIMARS battery or to an anti-ship missile. As many of you know, Recon Marines have trained with Singapore’s NDU and the Army’s ADF train have trained with US Marines in line-infantry units and have adopted some aspects of American TTPs. The recent Mar 2021 visit by LTG Steven R. Rudder, Commander, US Marine Corps Forces Pacific, underscores the close ties.
 
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CheeZe

Active Member
I think this is the best thread to put this in since the topic isn't related to any single one of the SAF.

Some friends and I were debating the SAF and its future. MinDef keeps harping on about manpower reductions in the future due to a declining birthrate, etc. The idea came up that Israel implements universal conscription of men and women. If having enough personnel is an issue, why doesn't Singapore move to make universal conscription an issue.

My take is that the threat of a future conflict isn't perceived as high enough to warrant the PAP and MinDef changing that law. Such a dramatic change is going to affect Singaporean society and culture in unforeseeable ways. Singapore isn't Israel which in continually under threat and frequently under attack. Singapore only fulfils the former criteria. Nonetheless, I do believe that male-only National Service is a relic and that some sort of change should be made. What it should be changed to is possibly a separate topic so I won't go into my views on that front.

The guys and 1 lady in the group said that the idea of male-only conscription conformed to outdated gender role ideas. That only men are capable of defending the nation, that men are expendable while women must be protected. The other ladies in the group posited the idea that women who want to be involved in national or civil defence can already volunteer to do so. Then the conversation shifted into the questions of why women get a choice while men don't and voting rights vis-a-vis National Service.

So, I thought I would put the topic here for those who are more tuned into such matters. If filling personnel needs is foreseen as a challenge for the SAF, why isn't National Service expanded, fully or partially, to the female half of the population?
 

Lone Ranger

Member
Some friends and I were debating the SAF and its future. MinDef keeps harping on about manpower reductions in the future due to a declining birthrate, etc. The idea came up that Israel implements universal conscription of men and women. If having enough personnel is an issue, why doesn't Singapore move to make universal conscription an issue.
Thanks for bringing up this discussion of "universal conscription". Personally, I think that national security and resilient is more than defense. To be honest, whether there is a decline of manpower in the coming years or not, I am having the view that Mindef will still go with the high tech/ low manpower path as this is the opportunity that brought about by the IR4 and changes of our population made up - more educated, more tech savvy and less labour oriented. Low birth rate just provides one of the best back drop to push for the initiative. Hence, to be honest, I do not think Mindef/ SAF is really crunch for manpower, it is more like a "mechanism" (just like the annual fiscal budget) that pushed the institution to be efficient.

For a gender free universal conscription, I am totally in for this but I would like it to go beyond security, ie education and health care. I agrees that female is less suitable for the roles in the traditional security institutions (SAF, SPF, SCDF) but they can play a meaningful role in our health care and education system. Aren't we faced manpower shortage in healthcare industry? Why can't we mobilize part of our population, just like how we manage our defense, for the healthcare industry? Same can also be done for the education sector, no?

My 2 cents on the topic.
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Thanks for bringing up this discussion of "universal conscription". Personally, I think that national security and resilient is more than defense. To be honest, whether there is a decline of manpower in the coming years or not, I am having the view that Mindef will still go with the high tech/ low manpower path as this is the opportunity that brought about by the IR4 and changes of our population made up - more educated, more tech savvy and less labour oriented. Low birth rate just provides one of the best back drop to push for the initiative. Hence, to be honest, I do not think Mindef/ SAF is really crunch for manpower, it is more like a "mechanism" (just like the annual fiscal budget) that pushed the institution to be efficient.

For a gender free universal conscription, I am totally in for this but I would like it to go beyond security, ie education and health care. I agrees that female is less suitable for the roles in the traditional security institutions (SAF, SPF, SCDF) but they can play a meaningful role in our health care and education system. Aren't we faced manpower shortage in healthcare industry? Why can't we mobilize part of our population, just like how we manage our defense, for the healthcare industry? Same can also be done for the education sector, no?

My 2 cents on the topic.
I served in the NZDF and for the last 30 years we have women who have served in all capacities within NZDF including combat trades. They are just as good as men and I have never had any problems with women in combat or seagoing roles (I served in the RNZAF and RNZN) and always have had the attitude that regardless of who they are I didn't care as long as they could do the job and protected my back as I protected theirs. Sex, colour, creed, sexuality, religion etc., never came into it. It is just the protection thing.

Why are women less capable than men in military combat roles? I don't see any evidence to suggest that except rubbish from males who like to control and belitte women. Such rubbish and bullshit is prevalent amongst groups of US military personnel who, if they got any further backward, would be living in caves and waving clubs around in the air. There are numerous accounts in recorded history of women in combat and they were just as good as, in some cases better than, men and if caught alive were in some cases treated atrociously by the enemy. That says more about the enemy than the women.

Why should some mens insecurity about their own maleness and manliness dictate what women can and cannot do within their Armed Forces? In 1923 at Cambridge when they were debating whether or not to admit women to the University, Lord Rutherford of Nelson* asked "why should we exclude half the population just because they happen to be female?" Eventually Cambridge voted to allow female students.

It's important that we treat our women equally and grant them the equality that they deserve. They are quite capable of performing any tasks asked of them, as long as they have been given exactly the same training as their male colleagues to enable them to perform the required task. Women think differently to men on some subjects, and that is an asset not a hindrance.

*For those who are unfamiliar with Lord Rutherford of Nelson, he was born Ernst Rutherford outside of Nelson, NZ. He did his Degree in Physics at Canterbury College in Christchurch NZ, before going to McGill University in Canada. After some time he left McGill for the Cavendish Laboratory at Cambridge in the UK. Whilst there he was the first to split the atom and was awarded the Nobel Prize in Chemistry for that feat.
 

CheeZe

Active Member
I agrees that female is less suitable for the roles in the traditional security institutions (SAF, SPF, SCDF) but they can play a meaningful role in our health care and education system.
I disagree with this point of view. If we examine historical examples and modern training regimes, I see no reason why women cannot physically perform to the level of men. And in some branches, physical ability is meaningless. Doesn't take much physical ability to drive a Leo2 or a lorry. If you're a SIGINT analyst, how many field exercises are you going to be deployed on? Ergo, I don't see physical ability as a barrier or hurdle.

Going off that, I see no evidence to suggest women are unsuitable for "traditional security institutions" in a cognitive sense either. In truth, I find that it is helpful to have women present when solving complex or team problems as they tend to have different approaches to male thinkers. It seems to be folly to deny the SAF the inherent cognitive capability of the female population, if we were to take your view that women are less suitable.

Aren't we faced manpower shortage in healthcare industry? Why can't we mobilize part of our population, just like how we manage our defense, for the healthcare industry? Same can also be done for the education sector, no?
From my understanding, the shortage was manageable until the pandemic hit. Then it became overwhelming during the early months. Now, it seems to have stabilized back to its pre-Covid shortage. However, healthcare is a specialization that requires quite a lot of work to qualify for. It's not something which can be easily "mobilized" en masse. The same applies to education.

To be an educator or education worker, there must be a desire from the person. You can create an unwilling teacher, but that's just going to harm the students and their learning. I can talk at length about the stresses and requirements of being a teacher or an educator as well as the specific problems I see in the Singaporean education system but they're unrelated to this discussion.

So, yes, I do see your point about education and healthcare being areas of national security. However, I'm not sure Singapore or any other nation has a meaningful way of "mobilizing" for it.

Going back to the topic - MinDef has always had the idea of using force multipliers. The maths show we will always be outnumbered by either Indonesia or Malaysia. However, the argument makes no sense. "We will have fewer personnel in the future so we must invest in new technology." The obvious answer, to me, is broaden National Service to fill that requirement. The whole point of NS at its conception was to have a relatively large and well-trained force with modern equipment. The SAF seems to be moving towards "well-trained" and "modern equipment" and sacrificing the "relatively large." Is Singapore safer with more or fewer of these well-trained, well-equipped citizen-soldiers? I would argue that national security is improved if women were used to fill out the ranks of the SAF.

It would also go a long way to changing the resentment from many men stemming from mandatory NS while women get to move onto whatever professional or academic pursuits.
 

Lone Ranger

Member
Why are women less capable than men in military combat roles? I don't see any evidence to suggest that except rubbish from males who like to control and belitte women. Such rubbish and bullshit is prevalent amongst groups of US military personnel who, if they got any further backward, would be living in caves and waving clubs around in the air. There are numerous accounts in recorded history of women in combat and they were just as good as, in some cases better than, men and if caught alive were in some cases treated atrociously by the enemy. That says more about the enemy than the women.
My comment isn't meant to discriminate female in any way and I am not against female joining the service voluntary. I have seem many servicewomen in the SAF doing well. However from my experience, I have to acknowledge there is a different between a 100% voluntary army and a conscript army. In a universal conscript army, like Singapore, legally the institutions have to absorpt all male population of that particular age group irregardless of "quality" and their level of motivation. They (SAF) do not have the ability to choose. This create some sort of liability for the institution. I have seem how unit commanders have to spend additional time and resources to deal with those unmotivated personnel. This is counter productive. Moreover, as said earlier, current SAF orbat is healthy, in fact much better than 20 years ago where many units were under manned, from what I am aware of. In fact, SAF orbat is expanding (sound strange?) in recent time despite our declining birth rate post 2000.

The question is, do we have the need to expand the conscription population and accept the trade off. My take is no.

I see no reason why women cannot physically perform to the level of men. And in some branches, physical ability is meaningless. Doesn't take much physical ability to drive a Leo2 or a lorry. If you're a SIGINT analyst, how many field exercises are you going to be deployed on? Ergo, I don't see physical ability as a barrier or hurdle.
I have no issue on having female volunteers in the army and I see many motivated service women in the forces. Let me clarify, I was referring to conscript female for the army. Conscripting a whole gender group into the army will be a whole different story. Everything comes with a cost and in this case I see that the cost out weight the benefit.

From my understanding, the shortage was manageable until the pandemic hit. Then it became overwhelming during the early months. Now, it seems to have stabilized back to its pre-Covid shortage.
The shortage is a structural issue and it has been exist for many years. The current solution is to employ from oversea, especially nurses from Philippines and some doctors from India, in addition to gov's initiative of mid career switch for the local population. Our shortage is so serious that nurses from the restructure (public/gov) hospital are now paid better than executives and those in the private hospital, in order to attract people to join the industry. This is totally different situation compared to 20yrs ago.

So, yes, I do see your point about education and healthcare being areas of national security. However, I'm not sure Singapore or any other nation has a meaningful way of "mobilizing" for it.
The reasons I suggested these two industries,
1) There is a real need for manpower. They are expanding their operation.
2) The industry/sector is big enough to absorpt an annual population of 20k.
3) Ministry of Health and Education has the resources (budget) to manage it, 3rd and 2nd place respectively, just behind the defense budget.

It would also go a long way to changing the resentment from many men stemming from mandatory NS while women get to move onto whatever professional or academic pursuits.
This is part of the reason I supported NS for girl, another is for national education. Nothing is better than committing 2 yrs for public service.

Beside, in time of war, there will be an increasing need for health care specialists and this pool of people will be very valuable.

Edit to add: There is an important perspective not discuss - economy, which is dear to the government. Every resource taken out of the economic activities, will have one way or another impact/ slow the economy, especially when Singapore's is at the mature state. 40k (20k x 2yrs) drawn from active labors at any one time is a significant impact to Singapore's economy. This can be one of the reasons for Singapore's gov not to have the female serving NS, even when our law allows.
 
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0bserver

New Member
One of the old reasons of why women are frowned upon in front line roles is that in a genocidal or racial war, one common goal of the enemy is to corrupt the 'purity' of the target's gene pool, which was a very likely scenario in the older days if our neighbours made Singapore a race issue. In short, one of the goals would be mass rapes and bastardizing the population. Women on the frontline would be the equivalent of putting your HVT with your escorts, it would make your enemy's job a lot easier. If you want women on the front line, you got to be prepared for gang rape cases. It's bound to happen sooner or later.
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
One of the old reasons of why women are frowned upon in front line roles is that in a genocidal or racial war, one common goal of the enemy is to corrupt the 'purity' of the target's gene pool, which was a very likely scenario in the older days if our neighbours made Singapore a race issue. In short, one of the goals would be mass rapes and bastardizing the population. Women on the frontline would be the equivalent of putting your HVT with your escorts, it would make your enemy's job a lot easier. If you want women on the front line, you got to be prepared for gang rape cases. It's bound to happen sooner or later.
Is the purity of the race still a requirement today? I have a very strong dislike for racial purity arguments because they are implicit of racial superiority theory. Whilst comrade Xi Jinping, currently resident in Beijing, may believe in the racial superiority of Han Chinese, it makes him no better than Adolf Hitler or members of the Klu Klux Klan who asserted their racial superiority and thought that their shit didn't stink either. But it did stink and racial superiority in any form is a hateful philosophy that breeds nothing but hate and death.
 
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