The best strategy to defending Singapore Island


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Post 1 of 2: 2022 toys to further develop SAR & Special Operations capabilities in the SAF

1. The death of Islamic State leader Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Quraishi in a US military operation in Syria is a "significant development" in the fight against global terrorism, Singapore's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) said in a statement on 5 Feb 2022.
(a) Since 2013, the French and the UN have had sizeable deployments to "support the Malian government in combatting terrorism;" a mission that is doomed from the start. France is treating the symptoms of “Terrorism" rather than the causes (climate change, overpopulation and poor government) — the Sahel Region in Africa is seeing increasing violence perpetrated by state and non-state religious and political armed groups. They operate in an environment of growing competition over dwindling resources.​
(b) I suspect that the eventual collapse of the French-led counter-terrorism mission in the Sahel Region in Africa would probably have greater long-term ramifications for Europe and Africa in the 2030s than the fall of Afghanistan (to the Taliban) or the increasing levels of violence in Yemen or Iraq. After two coups in Mali since 2020, France and other Western nations complain that the junta has missed deadlines to restore civilian rule and become increasingly hostile to the presence of French and European soldiers on its soil.​
(c) In 2021, the Islamic State claimed 50.7 military operations per week on average — there was a total of 2,636 attacks in 22 countries. Peaks in the group’s attacks in Iraq (Apr 2021 to around Aug 2021) and in Nigeria — the highest number of terror attack fatalities in Nigeria occurred in Feb 2021, followed by a June 2020 attack that killed 179 civilians by the Boko Haram. Nigeria’s bandit violence has its roots in clashes between nomadic cattle herders and sedentary farmers over land and resources. But tit-for-tat attacks have over the years spiralled into broader criminality. "Terrorism and violent extremism remain serious threats for countries across the world, including Singapore," said MFA.​
(d) Beyond the SAF’s Special Operations Forces (SOF) (as the force of choice), the Singapore Police established In-Situ Reaction Teams (IRTs) and Rapid Deployment Troops (RDTs). These IRTs & RDTs are “specially trained, equipped” first responders to achieve the “political & military imperative” of neutralising terrorists. The SOF have the means (material factors) and will (moral factors) to protect Singapore, as a city, from urban terrorist attacks because of their capabilities in asymmetric warfare, which regular police officers (in IRTs & RDTs) do not possess. Firstly, SOF have superior firepower to perform the mission of responding effectively to domestic attacks than police IRTs and RDTs. Secondly, special forces have unique intelligence collection capabilities – such as non-official covers & advanced ISR technologies to track and monitor terrorists.​

2. On 14 Jan 2020, a Singaporean man, Imran Kassim, (36), was found guilty for financing terrorism in a trial. ISD has continued to detect self-radicalised Singaporeans and foreigners. Since 2015, 54 individuals were dealt with under the Internal Security Act for terrorism-related conduct. 44 of them were self-radicalised, of which 14 were dealt with since 2019. Two attack plots against specific communities at their places of worship in Singapore were foiled in late 2020 and early 2021. To underline Singapore’s efforts in counter-terrorism:
(a) The SAF deploys it’s brand new H225M helicopters, and special forces at Star Vista mall in a night-time counter-terrorism exercise on 7 Feb 2022 night. Singapore has taken delivery of five H225Ms since the first aircraft arrived in the country in late 2021, with 125 Squadron in the process of converting to the new type. While there are no public announcements about how many H225Ms Singapore has on order, French civil aviation registration data suggests 16 airframes were built.​
(b) Members of the Special Operations Task Force rappelled from a H225M helicopter hovering above the roof of a 15 storey office building cum retail mall (The Star Vista mall, in Buona Vista), which is part of a large residential estate. This was part of a counter-terrorism exercise conducted by the SAF throughout Monday night to test its operational readiness in a "realistic urban setting", said Mindef. Several of these systems are unique to the Singaporean H225Ms, with engineers and other personnel from Singapore having been sent to Airbus Helicopters in France to work on the integration and certification.​
(c) On 20 Jan 2022, the Singapore Navy commissioned the last 2 of 4 Sentinel-class Maritime Security and Response Vessels (MRSVs) under the Maritime Security and Response Flotilla. This consists of 4 refurbished patrol vessels and 2 tug boats on lease, with 4 new purpose-built vessels set to replace the MRSVs in due course. The MRSVs will augment the 8 Independence-class littoral mission vessels (LMVs) to secure Singapore’s waters against intrusions by vessels sent by the Malaysian Government.​
(d) The MRSVs and LMVs will operate along with Maritime Security USVs to patrol Singapore's waters. Therefore, there is manned and unmanned teaming in the vessels deployed for maritime security work. This manned and unmanned teaming includes the 22-metre long Specialised Marine Craft (SMCs) form part of the Singapore Navy’s capabilities in maritime security operations. With a crew of 4, the SMCs are armed with a stabilized 12,7 mm OTO Melara Remote Weapon System. The Defence Technology Prize Team (Engineering) Award secured by the SMCs designers back in 2006 and the tight lid SAF imposed on any image or mention of the SMC's warfighting potential until 2015, provide telling hints on how special this craft really is.​

3. Bravo Zulu to the Warships team reporting on the minor switchboard fire on the 1st Type 218SG (RSS Invincible), that resulted in 7 months of work — these were in harbour for additional inspections — after the minor damage was quickly repaired.

4. The 1st Type 218SG when is delivered to Singapore Navy in 2022 (7 months behind schedule), will add to the country’s ISR and special forces (for diver delivery) capabilities.
(a) When the NDU commemorated its 50th anniversary in Dec 2021, the formation restructured to strengthen its capabilities to respond to unconventional threats, which has grown in scale and complexity.​
(b) The restructured NDU is responsible for the development of "raise-train-sustain" capabilities for maritime special operations, which ranges from underwater security operations, underwater explosive ordnance disposal to maritime counter-terrorism operations.​
(c) Key skills to support special operations in the maritime domain, such as end-to-end ship boarding capabilities, will also be centralised under the NDU. This will enable the NDU to better support operations by SAF task forces such as the Maritime Security Task Force and the Special Operations Task Force. The NDU will also operate the Combat Craft Large (CCL). The CCL, first developed in 2018 and unveiled in 2021, is a 26 m-long craft designed to be highly maneuverable and to achieve high speeds, and armed with a stabilized 12,7 mm OTO Melara Remote Weapon System.​
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Post 2 of 2: 2022 toys to further develop SAR & Special Operations capabilities in the SAF

5. The RSAF remain on track to receiving 4 F-35Bs in 2026 and for the RSAF to start basing training in Guam from 2029 onwards. Mike Yeo also suggests that Singapore may operate up to 26 Chinooks — the RSAF currently operates 10 CH-47SD helicopters (which were equipped digital engine controls and glass cockpits) and is in the process of acquiring 16 CH-47Fs. Maj. Gen. Kelvin Khong said Singapore’s 5 CH-47Ds, which were used to train Singaporean Air Force personnel while the aircraft were based in the United States and Australia, “will be progressively drawn down.” This means that the Singaporean Chinook training detachment in the Australian Army Aviation Training Centre at Oakey in the state of Queensland, Australia will eventually operate 5 CH-47Fs.

6. Australia and Singapore have a long history of military cooperation, with extensive interactions through bilateral and multilateral exercises, professional exchanges, cross attendance of courses and joint operational deployments.
(a) Overseas training, like the conduct of the SAF Ranger course, the annual Exercise Wallaby and Exercise Trident (with the Australians), held in the Shoalwater Bay Training Area (SWBTA) in Queensland, Australia, can be done without the expense of shipping helicopters from Singapore. During Exercise Wallaby 2021 participants trained to operate from RSS Endeavour, with RSAF CH-47Fs based in Australian Army Aviation Training Centre at Oakey (held from 13 Sep to 21 Oct 2021) that were forward deployed to SWBTA for the exercise.​
(b) Further, steady progress has been made in the joint development of training areas and advanced training facilities in Central and Northern Queensland under the Singapore-Australia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, which includes a Treaty on Military Training and Training Area Development in Australia. This consolidation and expansion of army and helicopter training in Queensland will bring savings for SAF helicopter operations.​
7. All of the RSAF’s 26 Chinooks are fitted with fuel tanks larger than comes standard as well as a radar in the nose, with the CH-47SD versions serving with 127 Squadron at Sembawang Air Base. I suspect that this may be a transitional phase, with some of the SDs going into long term storage as war reserves, as Singapore is unlikely to operate so many heavy lift helicopters (without full mobilisation of air force reserve personnel).
(a) Given that 2 new Chinooks will be able to lift a single Bronco ATTC for heliborne operations (in support of an armoured thunder-run to KL or HADR operations within ASEAN), these new Chinooks are a more flexible platform for Singapore to conduct a range of high intensity operations from the upcoming JMMS. The JMMS is the future helicopter carrier from which logistics or fire support be lifted as under-slung loads. What the JMMS lacks now is a Ship to Shore Connector.​
(b) The reinforced fleet of 26 Chinooks will operate alongside the 16 H225Ms (SAR and Special Operations capable helicopters) being delivered to 125 Squadron, which is in the process of converting to the new type. Satcom equipped helicopters will enable the SAF to push more data to its heliborne forces being inserted for high intensity operations.​
(c) Singapore’s fleet of Super Pumas have been in use since 1985 and are progressively being replaced by the Airbus H225Ms — Singaporean H225M pilots are also equipped with the Thales Scorpion helmet-mounted display, which Segaran said allows them to access critical flight data without having to scan physical instruments. These unique H225Ms are also fitted with the helicopter integrated electronic warfare suite, a satellite communications dome, an electro-optical turret and an 800-watt Trakka A800 searchlight that is compatible with night vision systems.​
8. As I have repeatedly stated in this thread, Singapore's defence policy is based on the twin pillars of deterrence and diplomacy.
  • The first pillar of deterrence is provided by developing a strong and capable SAF with weapons purchases like the F-35B and a resilient Singapore, through the institutions of National Service and Total Defence.
  • The second pillar of defence diplomacy is built by establishing strong and friendly ties, through extensive interactions and cooperation, with defence establishments and armed forces of ADMM Plus members and in the region. In the area of defence diplomacy, Singapore has also hosted the annual Shangri-La Dialogue, organised by the International Institute of Strategic Studies, since 2002.
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Post 1 of 5: New toys under budget 2022 & beyond for the SAF to address a range of threats

The SAF in the 2040s, unveiled in a single graphic — with the biggest winner in the budget wars — the navy. Given the above, my hopes of a A400 campaign for RSAF just died.

1. While unspecified in the graphic, I believe and speculate that the naval helicopter fleet will grow (may be up to 12 to 16?) from the present 8, as this is grossly insufficient, to meet the MRCV and JMMS needs. A number of key changes from the naval perspective include:
(a) the deployment of the navy’s first tranche of Maritime Security Unmanned Surface Vessels, while the Formidable-class frigates will undergo a mid-life upgrade to increase its combat capabilities; and​
(b) the acquisition of new naval platforms like:​
(i) a Fokker 50 MPA replacement (replacement type unspecified);​
(ii) 4 OPVs (size unknown); and​
(iii) the likely continuation of previously announced naval programs like the JMMS and MRCV.​

2. From the land war perspective, each Singaporean combined arms division (namely, the 3rd, 6th and 9th divisions), in any future land war will face multiple challenges and threats. Therefore, to remain operationally effective, these forward defence divisions must be ready to operate dispersed and retain the ability to aggregate quickly if and when necessary — the multi-day, traffic Russian jam outside Kyiv (an example of how not to do it for battlefield geometry).
(a) The relationship between manoeuvre brigades, including the mechanized infantry SIR battalions and the armoured SAR battalions, and their allocated combat support battalion and sub-units, will affect a division’s battlefield geometry and its area of influence. To support the optimal battlefield geometry, the SAF will acquire at least 4 new land platforms, including the Bronco 3 (to replace Bronco 1), a new wheeled Next-Gen self propelled howitzer, a medium tactical vehicle, a new wheeled tactical bridge, and so on. The wheeled Next-Gen howitzer unsurprisingly looks like it will be based on a MAN HX chassis.​
(b) Beyond, army, navy and air force, the SAF will establish a 4th service arm: The Digital and Intelligence Service (DIS).“It will also be responsible for digital defence of the SAF through cyber defence and electronic protection of our networks and systems, and psychological defence to strengthen our servicemen’s commitment and resilience in operations,” MINDEF said in a factsheet.​
(c) The Command, Control, Communications and Computers and Intelligence (C4I) Community will be evolved into the DIS. IMHO, DIS is about the ability to conduct limited cyber attacks, to use intelligence proactively (to deter an enemy), and to throw punches at Singapore’s enemies through psyops, even during phase zero, war planning. But the DIS Service Chief is also the weakest and has the most meaningless job (when compared to the resources and forces controlled by the two star navy or air force service chiefs).​
(d) The work done by DIS has the potential to help Singapore shape regional threat perceptions in its favour. Looking at the recent role played by:​
(i) Singapore’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (on Ukraine) and MINDEF at Shangrila Dialogue to further the agenda of peace through strength; and​
(ii) MINDEF’s efforts at international military-to-military cooperation, be it in multilateral exercises and also at ADMM Plus level, to further the agenda of military-to-military confidence building.​
(e) In relation to hybrid threats, Singapore’s defence diplomacy will use the intelligence gathered by the DIS for decision making. Concurrently, Total Defence efforts will take inspiration from the approach taken by Finland, the other Nordic countries or even the Baltic states. Defence Minister Ng Eng Hen said on 1 Mar 2015 on his Facebook page that there are many lessons Singaporeans can draw from these countries. Lithuania has reinstated military conscription (for 9 months) for 4,000 of their citizens each year, on a voluntary basis.​

3. An intelligence organization will fail without proper strategic guidance. Tactical success does not equal strategic victory. A cyber or real world operation may be perfectly executed and rely on flawless code, but this does not automatically lead to mission success. By 2040, many of the SAF’s new unmanned systems can be easily heli-lifted with 7SIB for the conduct of operations from a sea base, for forward sensing, to look round corners and observe different levels of a target building in security operations. To see better, the SAF’s divisions and brigades have acquired an organic capability, be it:
(a) using a mini UAS;​
(b) using the Veloce 15 mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (with a MTOW of 17.5 kg, a length of 1.8m and a wingspan of 3.7m); and​
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Post 2 of 5: New toys under budget 2022 & beyond for the SAF to address a range of threats
(c) using the Orbiter 4 Mini UAV System (with a MTOW of 50 kg, and a wingspan of 5.4m). To be operated by the RSAF, the Orbiter 4 can also be launched from the deck of Singapore naval vessels, including small boats with limited deck space.​

4. Increasingly, Singapore’s School of Army Reconnaissance (SOAR), training recce troops to use mini UAS, like the 0.32 kg Parrot ANAFI, for close reconnaissance, and information collection in urban operations. The usage of small VTOL UAVs are proliferated across the Singapore Army to enhance its urban operations sensing capabilities in peace support missions. The 5 day SOAR course will ensure the safe usage of drones in Singapore.

5. Former NSA employee Charlie Miller puts it, “Cyberwar is still aided by humans being located around the world and performing covert actions.” In the case of the Stuxnet attacks, for example, a Dutch mole, posing as a mechanic, helped the United States and Israel collect intelligence about Iranian nuclear centrifuges that was used to update and install the virus.
(a) For Singapore to see better, does not mean sending more data (as that takes up bandwidth) and requires a secure back end system. The near future goal is to used AI-based vision on encrypted, offline edge appliances and embedded systems, transforming any camera into a smart camera. Improved Air Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (AISR) is not about more UAVs to see better, rather, it’s about more off-line processing and transmitting only relevant data, for every camera used in a swarm. Data analytics will be used to manage swarms of data from each embedded AI-based vision device.​

(b) As part of the SAF's transformation into a next-generation defence force by 2040, by employing technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), robotics and data analytics, there "was a reorganisation of HQ Army Intelligence and HQ Singapore Artillery under 6 Division to integrate capabilities from both to 'see better' and 'shoot faster' with less manpower," said Dr Ng Eng Hen.​
6. According to David Kilcullen, the future environment will be urban, littoral, and connected. The data suggest that this is the environment in which future conflict will occur. To centrally plan, monitor and manage multiple Counter-Terrorism (CT) operations in an urban, littoral, and connected environment, the SAF in 2019 stood up the Special Operations Command Centre (SOCC).
(a) The SOCC is also equipped with enhanced Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) systems. It is able to process information from multiple sources including Whole-of-Government sensors, the SAF's internal sources and last-mile surveillance assets, like the Rapide-i4 UAV. This is a weatherproof system for information-gathering system for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. Equipped with Electro-Optical/Infra-Red systems, it is able to conduct surveillance in both day and night.​
(b) Both the Elbit Hermes 450 and IAI Heron 1 UAV are approaching obsolescence, as the operational lifespan of a UAV fleet is much shorter than a manned fighter. In Feb 2020 interview, RSAF Chief Major General Kelvin Khong said:​

“Smaller UAVs are becoming increasingly capable and offer new options to meet our operational requirements. For example, they can be paired with larger UAVs as they have a smaller signature and we can operate them closer to the adversary without being noticed. We are keeping track of the technology developments in UAVs and we are studying new concepts to achieve the outcomes we want.”​
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Post 3 of 5: New toys under budget 2022 & beyond for the SAF to address a range of threats

7. At the battle of Marawi (23 May-23 Oct 2017) the Philippines had a pro-active plan using social media to evacuate a majority of the civilians and fortunately many of them chose to leave. ISIS insurgents did use mini-UAVs and did force small civilian groups to remain in order to be used as human shields. Amnesty International recorded 47 civilians killed during the battle. Unlike expensive traditional UAVs, the SAF invests in a plethora of smaller UAVs, so that there is no heart burn when they are shot down by the enemy. Indeed, the Aeronautics Ltd, Orbiter 4, as the SAF’s Close-Range Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (CR-UAV), will pave the way for heliborne assault, to reduce risk to helicopters.

(a) With an endurance of 24 hours, an operational radius of 150 km, the CR-UAV mission set is to reduce manned aviation losses. This will further enhance the SAF’s ISR capabilities, in the face of enemy SAMs. The CR-UAV, complements the RSAF’s existing fleet of UAVs, will provide the SAF and security forces with improved ground situational awareness in the recce, counter-recce space, for urban warfare.​
(b) Likewise, the Veloce 15 mini-UAV can be assembled without tools, a two-man team can snap it together in two minutes. Combined with improved autonomous pre-flight checks, the drone is ready to launch in less than 15 minutes. This VTOL capability is ideal for deployment with armoured vehicles to look one bound ahead.​
(c) Thanks to the threat presented by SAMs, air launched weapons on attack helicopters are growing in range such that in the near future, you will need a separate UAV as a sensor for an Apache helicopter to shoot.​

8. Each Singapore division must keep moving instead of being stuck in a traffic jam. The limiting factors for a division are (i) distance required to be moved for direct fire mutual support, (ii) the range of indirect fire mutual support, (iii) the challenge of resupply, and (iv) time required for aggregation. To disperse and aggregate, Singapore needs good intelligence and the ability to update each SIR or SAR battalion, in a division sector, at war. This divisional sector can also be called its area of influence.
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Post 4 of 5: New toys under budget 2022 & beyond for the SAF to address a range of threats

9. Every time I read a nonsensical article about the use of Singapore designed, made or specified weapons, written by a Malaysian, I shake my head is disbelief at their ignorance on the tactics the SAF will use for the defence any causeway linked to Malaysia. With the SAF’s sense and strike capabilities, engagements with the enemy are not going to be short ranged (300m to 500m); instead they will take place further away, when the shooter can’t be easily seen. On 3 Apr 2022, a typically ignorant Malaysian, Mihar Dias wrote:

“The arrival of the Matador which helped fulfil Ukrainian demands for anti-tank missiles would give Singapore and its partners the opportunity to fully test the weapon in a war zone.​
From earlier reports, they would certainly work well in a Ukrainian urban environment. With a “calibre of 90mm, the one-metre long portable and disposable Matador that weighs just 9kg is able to fire up to 500 metres at a muzzle velocity of 250m/s.” The Russian tanks would be blown to bits.​
Since the Matador was co-developed by the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) and the Defence Science and Technology Agency (DSTA), in partnership with Rafael Advanced Defence Systems of Israel and DND, this was certainly an opportune moment for Singapore to open its first embassy in Israel.​
So what?​
Meanwhile, when these critical events were taking place in other parts of the world, back in Kuala Lumpur, on March 29, we learnt that a student from B40 economic background was still without a laptop to catch up with technological developments happening overseas.​
The rest of us in Malaysia wonder no more about the Singapore-Israel relationship and stop gaping at the capability of Singapore’s infantry to defend itself on the ground. The Matador could destroy any dreams of the tiny republic being successfully raided and conquered by military tanks or armoured personnel carriers from hostile invaders.”​
10. The Matador is NOT the weapon of choice to stop an armoured raid supported by MBTs, given that the SAF’s infantry battalions are all armed with the Spike SR, Spike LR and 120mm Mortars; the Matador will only be used if plan B for our sector defence plan had an unexpected outcome; and the block force was bypassed; in reality:
(a) sense and strike means hitting the enemy earlier, way before the enemy reaches our delay line — in this respect the Singapore Army’s Veloce 15 mini-UAV (replaces the prior mission set of the Skyblade III), will aid in sensing; and​
(b) the SAF’s capability is designed for offensive action — a static defence of Singapore island, within the weapons engagement zone of enemy MBTs, is the last choice. The preference is to counter-attack an enemy force before it came get into a meeting battle with our delay lines.​

11. Singapore has started to build an effective cyber command into five category framework: people, exploits, toolset, infrastructure, and organizational structure — known exploits and tools can also be highly effective if Singapore has a superior knowledge of the Malaysians and their capabilities. As an aspiring cyber power, at the tip of the spear of a Singapore division, for forward defence, is the Hunter Armoured Battle Group — the 42nd Battalion, Singapore Armoured Regiment (42 SAR) recently concluded their rotation training to operationalise the first Hunter ABG.

12. The Hunter Armoured Fighting Vehicle (AFV) is designed to build on the strength of the tech-savvy generation. The Hunter AFV possesses enhanced C4 and network capabilities, which the integration of Spike LR missiles, digital radios, GPS and the battlefield management system.
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Every time I read a nonsensical article about the use of Singapore designed, made or specified weapons, written by a Malaysian, I shake my head is disbelief at their ignorance on the tactics the SAF will use for the defence any causeway
Indeed; we have people of all types writing stuff they don't fully understand and without doing prior research. In sharp contrast however planners in the MAF; as well as certain Malaysian analysts/writers have a pretty good idea as to the actual capabilities and weaknesses of various neighbouring countries.

It's also a two way street; over the years I've come across various reports/opinion pieces done by Singaporean and other writers who lack a basic understanding of how things are in Malaysia in general ; the MAF and the actual threat calculus as seen by Malaysian planners. A lot of what is written is based on poor research; a lack of subject matter understanding; assumptions and at times a self serving and narrow view of things.


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Post 5 of 5: New toys under budget 2022 & beyond for the SAF to address a range of threats

13. Radjev Lal Madan Lal, a mover at a logistics company, was detained in April 2022, the Internal Security Department (ISD) said in a press release on 10 May 2022. Singaporeans are putting a stop their relatives, before they can take action to harm others.

(a) Radjev’s path to radicalisation began in 2013 when he was introduced to the online sermons of Imran Hosein, a foreign radical preacher who originated from Trinidad and Tobago. In 2007, Imran was banned from entering Singapore due to his radical preaching.​

(b) Separately, two self-radicalised Singaporeans were released from detention under the ISA in Jan and Feb 2022, namely, Hazim Syahmi Mahfoot (31), and Ruqayyah Ramli (35). Ruqayyah Ramli had been detained under the ISA in April 2021 after being radicalised by her husband, Malaysian Mohd Firdaus Kamal Intdzam​

14. By way of background, Radjev was first investigated by ISD in 2013 for posting extremist content on social media and was warned to steer clear of radical activities. Arrangements were made for him to undergo religious counselling. ISD said that this was the first detention linked to the prophesised Black Flag Army.
  • “Imran’s preaching on Islamic eschatological prophecies such as the imminent End of Times and the rise of the Black Flag Army (BFA) resonated with Radjev, who had a keen interest in conspiracy theories,” ISD said.
  • Radjev became convinced that it was his “religious obligation” to participate in armed violence with the BFA to "kill the enemies of Islam", ISD added. “In his view, these ‘enemies’ included non-Muslims who meddled in Islamic affairs, as well as Western countries like the US and Israel,” ISD said.
  • Radjev created a social media group to spread his radical ideology with his online contacts. None of his family members or friends in Singapore responded positively to him, said ISD.
15. Since 2015, the SAF has also deployed units as part of the multinational coalition efforts against ISIS. These deployments included Intelligence Fusion Officers, Imagery Analysts, and an SAF medical team in Iraq. Singapore has also stepped up our information sharing and intelligence cooperation with other countries. The SAF has offered the assistance of the Information Fusion Centre in Changi Naval Base to the Trilateral Sea Patrol to combat terrorism and kidnappings.

16. In 2016, the SAF stood up the Army Deployment Force (ADF) comprising highly-trained regulars to fulfil an expanded range of counter-terrorism operations, such as setting up cordon operations to contain the incident site. The SAF and the Home Team have enhanced their joint responses to homeland security threats, with more SAF forces committed for a wider range of counter-terrorism operations. As I mentioned previously, this includes setting up the Island Defence Training institute (IDTI) to train about 18,000 soldiers from active and NS units yearly in homeland security operations; which will enable IDTI to train 10x the number of troops in 10 years.
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2. It’s a risk all Ukrainian artillery guys take every time they go for a fire mission. Depending on the intelligence picture, the time period for an Ukrainian artillery battery to take cover after 1st shot out can be shorter than 10 mins 30 seconds, at certain locations — especially where the Russians are massed.
Taking cover is one thing; successfully relocating in time a completely different thing as you're aware. If the said unit is equipped with towed guns the problem becomes somewhat more complicated.
1. Agreed. Towed guns are at risk of counter fire and loitering munitions, if detected.

2. But having said that, the M777 is suited for the Ukrainian Army’s CONOPS at this stage of capability development. The M777 is accurate, has a small crew, light on logistics, and can hide easily. This gun also doesn't have propensity for as much damage.

3. Russian artillery is good, but not necessarily precise. Precise fire needs ISR or deployed forward observers (FOs) to adjust fire using their radio and binoculars (or small drone). The Russians seem to be not using FOs in a manner that I can understand — that is just my lack of knowledge speaking.

…our enemy also operate MLRS paired with a WLR, the SAF knows it has to be faster than the enemy’s OODA, for our counter battery work to succeed.
The ''enemy'' would also be aware that Singapore arty has to be faster and will attempt to be even faster in order not to be targeted. The ''enemy'' can also attempt to hold back some guns/rockets to be used against his enemy's counter battery assets. Like everything else; it won't only be only a matter of skill; proficiency and other things but also an element of luck.
4. Apologies for going off-topic:

(i) Understanding West Malaysia’s geography, the <delete name> with an over spec sensor-shooter solution Singapore uses for your WLR radar emissions, detection is both tightly integrated and faster than even our network centric artillery WLRs / HIMARS batteries. The SAF is using WLR for fire correction, as a secondary purpose.​
(ii) The goal is to avoid a SG WLR vs M’sia WLR fight — rather the goal is to sense and strike in a manner that does not face the same counter-fire risk — this is what I mean by ‘to be faster than the enemy’s OODA’. The SAF ISR system is hungry for data and this <delete name> system is hiding it’s true software enabled capability — to preserve the element of surprise; you can make luck work for you, when it is an AI enabled algorithm for the decision support engine.​
(iii) Ideally both countries should work together, rather than seeing each other as enemies. The risk of armed conflict is low but not zero. Past Malaysian leaders like Dr M can achieve short-term gains with their attempts at coercion in Oct 2018, but their potential will always be limited by the fact of Singapore Government’s decision position the SAF for escalation dominance by early 2019. In conclusion:​
(a) a shooting incident should be avoided but Singapore’s sovereignty is non-negotiable (with ramming of intruding Malaysian boats, an option); and​
(b) good relations with Malaysia is desired. Given documented past grey zone behaviour by Malaysia, Singaporeans believe we have sufficient international support for the current method of avoiding war; but this peace through strength approach requires a credible military deterrence. Thus far, deterrence theory has worked to prevent war.​
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Appreciate the follow up post. Was informative.

The goal is also to avoid playing to an enemy's strengths and to operate in a manner; in line with actual resources, terrain and other things; where ones strengths - whatever they may be - are maximised as far as possible.

One can plan and train extensively for various operational scenarios and can have all the technology money can buy but the unexpected does and will happen on the battlefield and to use a cliche the ''fog of war'' always sets in. Waging war is the most challenging of endeavours known to mankind.

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
Appreciate the follow up post. Was informative.

The goal is also to avoid playing to an enemy's strengths and to operate in a manner; in line with actual resources, terrain and other things; where ones strengths - whatever they may be - are maximised as far as possible.

One can plan and train extensively for various operational scenarios and can have all the technology money can buy but the unexpected does and will happen on the battlefield and to use a cliche the ''fog of war'' always sets in. Waging war is the most challenging of endeavours known to mankind.
Keeping the peace seems to be just as challenging as waging war…unfortunately.


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Apologies for going off-topic:
I also apologise for going off topic but since reference was made to Malaysia and of it being termed an ''enemy'' I replied. I didn't reply the last few times; including when you openly spoke about [I won't use the term 'bragg] about the SAF's ability to do various things including hitting Malaysia's power infrastructure. One would get the impression that Malaysia/Singapore are in a cold war or that there is a state of tensions which will inevitably lead to war - nothing could be further from the truth.

ideally both countries should work together, rather than seeing each other as enemies.
- The vast majority of Malaysian have far pressing issue to worry about [the economy, rising prices, education, etc]; to put it bluntly they couldn't care less about Singapore. As you're aware the vast majority of Malaysians are indifferent towards defence; rightly or wrongly; due to historical and other factors. They also aren't uptight/paranoid/insecure about possible external threats.

- The Malaysian political leadership has long understood that for various reasons Singapore has a policy of ensuring it has a key edge over Malaysia and Indonesia; it has no issues with that and if you ask senior MAF people; in private they'll tell you which neighbouring country Malaysia is more concerned about in the long term.

- The MAF has various other things to focus on; if Singapore was considered an enemy the country would be investing much more in defence and there would be a much higher troop concentration in Johore - hasn't changed much for decades. Also note that if Malaysia's threat perceptions were centered ''south'' a newer fighter base wouldn't have been constructed up north near the Thai border and a sub base wouldn't have been constructed in East Malaysia thousands of KM away. Unlike the SAF which trains/focuses to fight the MAF and to a lesser extent the TNI; the MAF does not train/focus on the SAF as it has other concerns/priorities.

good relations with Malaysia is desired.
Good relations is is indeed desired but to get an accurate perspective on things on also has to look at the view from the ''other side of the hill'' so to speak. Singaporeans in general like to give the impression that all that has gone wrong in the Malaysia/Singapore bilateral relationship is the fault of Malaysia and Malaysia alone. We both discussed this as far back as a decade ago via PM. We discussed Mahathir and a host of other things. I'll say the same thing I did then : it's a two way street and Malaysia also has its concerns and its interests; plus the fact that no matter how one wants to spin it; no single side has a monopoly on truth or of being a good/bad neighbour... Viewing things from the perspective of only one side may enable a satisfying feeling and bolster one's narrative but it also enables a distorted and self serving picture.

Given documented past grey zone behaviour by Malaysia
There have long been certain grey zone behaviours by Singapore or behaviours which normal ''good'' neighbours don't normally indulge in.

The difference is that Malaysia generally does not publicise such things; just like the case in 1988/89 when a Singapore spy ring was discovered. Mahathir spoke of the involvement of a certain neighbouring country but declined to publicly name it for the sake of maintaining good relations.

As Ken Conboy points out in his book on Cambodia; the discovery of the Singaporean spy ring effected what both countries were doing in Cambodia with regards to assisting the Khmer resistance.

Singapore’s sovereignty is non-negotiable
Malaysia's is also non-negotiable.

(with ramming of intruding Malaysian boats, an option);
Yes, you've mentioned this on multiple occasions.

Anyway; I've said my piece and if given a choice; would like to focus on the Ukraine/Russia war.
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Part 1 of 3: Protests by followers of UAS in Medan and Jakarta along with threats of cyber and physical attacks

1. There were calls for cyberattacks against Singapore government social media accounts on Indonesian chat groups (after Abdul Somad & 6 followers were denied entry & sent back to Batam on 16 May 2022). In a YouTube video, Abdul Somad Batubara said people in Riau see Singapore as part of their land because Singapore was part of the Temasek Malay kingdom.

"To say that I'm tired of going to Singapore is the same as saying I'm tired of going to Minangkabau. This is because Singapore is a Malay land. My grandmother has brothers, children and grandchildren who live in Singapore,” Abdul Somad added.​

2. Abdul Somad's supporters held a protest outside the Singapore Consulate-General office in Medan on 20 May 2022. Detik reported that a small number of protesters in Jakarta — who are members of the Islamic Sharia Ideology Defenders (Perisai) — were carrying the Indonesian flag & handing out pamphlets calling for condemnation of Singapore's decision to deny Abdul Somad entry.

3. Abdul Somad was previously been prevented from entering other countries, including Timor-Leste, The Netherlands & Germany. Not sure what basis Perisai has for taking sides & defending Somad, as a preacher of hate. A number of Indonesian politicians, including from Muslim political parties, have accused the country of Islamophobia; but Indonesian Foreign Ministry spokesman Teuku Faizasyah said that any country reserves the right to deny anyone entry into its territory.

4. Abdul Somad was not singled out by the Singapore authorities by virtue of his religion. The Muslim community is thriving in Singapore and is free to practice its religion, while Singapore’s government respects the community’s key institutions including mosques and a shariah court system. Singapore has consistently prohibited any behaviour, regardless of the perpetrator’s faith, that may potentially jeopardise the country’s religious and communal harmony.
(a) In 2017, a Muslim preacher, Imam Nalla Mohamed Abdul Jameel, was deported from Singapore after making offensive remarks about Christians and Jews in one of his sermons. The imam, who originated from India and had served a local mosque for 7 years, was slapped with a fine of $4,000.​
(b) In 2019, Christian American preacher Lou Engle was not allowed to come to Singapore because he made offensive remarks against Muslims at a church. In an article, he was alleged to have said, ‘Muslims are taking over the south of Spain … But I had a dream, where I will raise up the church all over Spain to push back a new modern Muslim movement.’​
(c) Abdul Somad (or better known as UAS) has a large following online: 6.5 million followers on Instagram, 2.7 million subscribers on YouTube, more than 700,000 followers on Facebook. But we should remember that Abdul Somad has:​
(i) claimed that suicide bombing attacks are legitimate, and they are legitimate martyrdom (“istishhadi”) operations. This kind of support for violence, in our view, is very dangerous; and​
(ii) made highly derogatory, denigrating remarks about Christianity. For example, he has said that “infidel spirits” (“jinns”), he calls them, live on the crucifix. He even tells Muslims not to travel in Red Cross ambulances with crucifixes because it has a cross! I don’t think this type of hate speech is acceptable in Singapore.​
(d) Abdul Somad has preached that Muslims should not accept non-Muslims as their leaders, given that he says non-Muslims could conspire to oppress Muslims and, I quote, “slit their throats”. Most citizens would not consider that acceptable in Singapore. In 2018, Somad was excluded from Indonesia’s Religious Affairs Ministry's list of 200 moderate Islamic preachers.​
(e) Speeches from UAS is completely in line with what most Islamist believe. Faith of the non-believers should be mocked and humiliated. However any slight mockery of Allah by supporters of UAS is met with riots or a death penalty; there is no contradiction an Islamist world view.​

5. Supporters of Abdul Somad have “poison-pill” demands for Singapore to limit the country’s sovereignty (aka control of borders) and they pretend that free speech does not come with responsibility; given that Abdul Somad will not stop inciting hatred between Muslims and other religions.
(a) Supporters of Abdul Somad refuse to even admit that he supports "suicide bombing" and attempt to justify his anti-Semitic and anti-Christian videos, in ways that is impossible for a multi-ethic society like Singapore to accept.​
(b) Indonesia’s Ambassador to SG Suryo Pratomo revealed that UAS received a not-to-land notice; a not-to-land notice is an official no-landing warning issued by the ICA of Singapore. UAS received a not to land notice because he did not meet the criteria. UAS & his gang of 6 returned to Batam Indonesia on a ferry. UAS arrived at the Batam Center TPI Port at 18.10 WIB on the same day.​
(c) UAS is an individual, & does not represent Indonesia in an official capacity. His supporters assert a right, when he has none. A visitor to SG is a guest. UAS is like a creepy stalker; he does not get to urinate on door, if he rings the bell & told he is not welcome.​
(d) On 23 May 2022, an Indonesian student arrested by anti-terrorism forces has admitted being radicalized by the Islamic State group & wanting to carry out a suicide attack on a public target that could have included a church, according to police. The 22-year-old student at Brawijaya University in Malang, East Java province, was arrested at his lodgings. National police spokesman Ahmad Ramadhan told reporters on 25 May 2022 that the student had been in close contact with a suspected terrorist from the Jamaah Ansharud Daulah (JAD) group who was detained earlier this year.​
(e) Stanislaus Riyanta, terrorism observer and executive director of the Center for Indonesian Political and Strategic Policy Studies at the University of Indonesia, said the student’s arrest was disturbing but showed how terrorists have penetrated various levels of society.​
(f) Often Indonesian Islamic nationalists want Singapore to extradite non-existent Indonesians (who may or may not have transited through Singapore) without proper evidence, while concurrently refusing to arrest Abdul Somad for Singapore’s ISD.​

6. One comment – Meta has disabled the account for violating its community standards, and has removed the comment, says,

“Dear You, the leaders of Singapore, the Islamophobic Countries, we are waiting 2x24hours to apologise to the Indonesian People and Muslims”

“If you ignore our warning, then we will not hesitate to expel the ambassador of your country. We will send Islamic Defender Troops, Prosperous Justice Troops and Ulama Defender Troops to attack your country like 9/11 in New York 2001, and we will also expel Singaporeans who pretend to transit and live in Indonesia.”

7. As the above example shows, some of Abdul Somad followers have also publicly threatened on social media to physically attack Singapore in a manner similar to the 9/11 attacks in New York in 2001. Another comment called on Singapore to be bombed, Law and Home Affairs Minister K Shanmugam on 23 May 2022 noted. “I think one shouldn’t dismiss them completely,” Shanmugam said “Parallels are being drawn with 9/11. Parallels are being drawn with Singaporeans being led by non-Islamic leaders and that Singapore should be attacked.”

8. In Jan 2020, a 17-year-old Singaporean boy who had watched videos of Abdul Somad’s teachings was also detained under the ISA. He had watched Somad’s YouTube lectures on suicide bombing. And the young boy began to believe that if you fought for ISIS, and if you are a suicide bomber, you can die as martyr and receive rewards in heaven.
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The Bunker Group

Abdul Somad's supporters held a protest outside the Singapore Consulate-General office in Medan on 20 May 2022. Detik reported that a small number of protesters in Jakarta — who are members of the Islamic Sharia Ideology Defenders (Perisai) — were carrying the Indonesian flag & handing out pamphlets calling for condemnation of Singapore's decision to deny Abdul Somad entry.
This turn more to Political actions against present administration rather then Singapore. Singapore immigration action against UAS (Ustad Abdul Somad, that's he's being call by media), is actually just an excuse by some Conservative Moeslem organizations to make issue against present administration.

Jokowi's administration recently including during COVID lock down, has make some actions against some Conservative Moeslem preacher (being either call Ustad or Habib in here). So they are demand for Singapore ambassador kick out from Indonesia, as counter action, just try to push some Political points. They know it will not be granted, but they know it is point issue to exploit.

Elections is two years away, but some Conservative Moeslem organizations try to rebuild their base as bargaining chip for any Political factions that need votes in next election. That's PA 212 got names before because they claim as Political driver to manage to get previous Jakarta Governor Ahok (Basuki Purnama) being push away.

Aren't democracy just sweet ;)


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Part 2 of 3: Protests by followers of UAS in Medan and Jakarta along with threats of cyber and physical attacks

Elections is two years away, but some Conservative Moeslem organizations try to rebuild their base as bargaining chip for any Political factions that need votes in next election. That's PA 212 got names before because they claim as Political driver to manage to get previous Jakarta Governor Ahok (Basuki Purnama) being push away.

Aren't democracy just sweet ;)
8. Good point. After Abdul Somad was denied entry into Singapore, he has taken to social media and given interviews and he is making maximum use of the publicity.
One, Abdul Somad is a popular preacher in Indonesia. is attempting but failing to ride a wave of Islamic populism to be a political force. Thankfully with Jokowi’s political genius, mainstream Indonesia has rejected this Islamist approach, at this time.​
Two, rising Islamism in Indonesia has become a pronounced trend over the past few years, presumably one of the reasons why Jokowi himself tried to improve his religious reputation — therein lies Jokowi’s political genius.​
Three, it now appears unlikely that Jokowi’s 2019 election win has been an uncontested win for democracy, that a Western liberal minded person can recognise. What we see in Indonesia is a species of Islamist nationalism among its more hardline Muslim groups & as part of their identity politics, they try to make it obligatory for all segments of their society. — that is to formulate an Islamist nationalism identity for themselves & then manifest it on any pretext.​

9. The Nov 2021 arrest of Farid Ahmad Okbah, a member of Jemaah Islamiyah's consultative council, who is also the chairman of Indonesia’s People Dakwah Party (Partai Dakwah Rakyat Indonesia/PDRI), reveals the existence of a newly established JI political front, an addition to its traditional fronts of dakwah (religious outreach) and armed jihad (military struggle).

10. Also arrested in Nov 2021 was Ahmad Zain An-Najah, a member of the fatwa commission of Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI), or Indonesia Ulema Council, the nation's top Islamic clerical body.

(a) Established in 1993, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) aspires to create an Islamic state in Indonesia through its two-pronged strategy, dakwah and armed jihad. Over the last few years, Indonesia’s anti-terror police force Detachment 88 has gradually crippled both of these fronts, starting with the decapitation of JI’s military front.​
(b) However, JI launched a political component named tamkin siyasi (political consolidation) as one of its strategies, as revealed in the court documents of several convicted key JI leaders. Tamkin siyasi is part of a larger JI strategy, strategi tamkin (tamkin strategy), which emphasises the methodical acquisition and consolidation of influence over territory and to build community support.​

11. Often, supporters of UAS ignore the fact that any country (be it Israel, US or Singapore), has the right to self defence, no matter how much a Muslim, in Indonesia, or Singapore, may with disagree with a specific country’s policies.

(a) IMO, in many cases, suicide terrorism is a rational decision it incorporates an assessment that a successful attack on a hard, well-protected target that could withstand a conventional insurgency attack outweighs the cost of losing one member.​

(b) The 2001 Al-Qaeda terrorist attacks of 9-11 were not the first use of suicide terrorism to achieve their objectives. Other examples include the 1981 bombing of the Iraqi embassy in Beirut, Hezbollah’s attack on US Marine barracks in Lebanon & the 1996 suicide bombings in Israel.​
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Part 3 of 3: Protests by followers of UAS in Medan and Jakarta along with threats of cyber and physical attacks

(c) Hamas and PIJ use of suicide bombers and conduct of rocket attacks on Israel are attempts to rally more Palestinians to join their antisemitic movement, and paint these terrorists as the guardian of Palestinian rights.​
  • Israel’s conduct of it’s defence against suicide bombers and rocket attacks is not escalation;
  • Palestinian diplomacy and calls for a ceasefire after each war, are fraudulent both in form and in substance; and
  • Some conflicts can only have a military solution.
12. "Agnotology" is "the cultural production of ignorance." Science historian Bob Proctor and linguist Iain Boal invented the term. Let me attempt to apply the concept of on "agnotology" and Islamist incitement to violence, which relies of Indonesian lay believers ignorance of the correct interpretation of Islam.

13. The concept of "agnotology" is powerful because it precisely identifies the root structure and aim of these arguments made by supporters of Ustad Abdul Somad (UAS). These arguments listed below are intended to prevent the Indonesian public and counter-terrorism policymakers from making decisions to stop the spread of the ideology of hate and are therefore fundamentally anti-democratic. For radical Islam to spread, producing "ignorance" required a propaganda apparatus that:

(a) cast doubt on the link between Islamists like Abdul Somad, his followers, Jemaah Islamiyah or ISIS on advocating violence to be done onto infidels be it in the Middle East, Singapore or Indonesia and shielded Indonesian Islamists political action groups like PA212 and the Islamic Sharia Ideology Defenders (Perisai), from scrutiny and attempted to shift debates to focus on *** blaming the victims of the suicide bomber ***;​
(b) block research into the effect of hardline Ustad’s incitement to glorify suicide bombing, by blaming THE JEWS, Christians, or other such infidels to justify their preaching of hate instead of their act of brain washing the less informed Muslims in Indonesia. Singapore’s RRG are experts on de-radicalisation and they deeply understand the Koran and they help Muslim families have been hurt by the radicalisation of a family member;​
(c) shield Islamists political action groups like PA212 and the Islamic Sharia Ideology Defenders (Perisai), from counter-terrorism scrutiny and shift responsibility to THE JEWS or another country remotely associated with THE JEWS (eg. Singapore’s government, never mind the fact that we have a Muslim President as head of state); and​
(d) smiles and say that “you have to understand Islam well and correctly to be able to understand the UAS lecture material. If you don't understand, you will only misunderstand and misunderstand.”​
14. As the point above shows, any discussion on the Koran’s teachings on hate speech culture is technical, and UAS supporters often attempt to act to gatekeep any debates and pick apart any imprecise language, and "agnotology" manifests itself in some specific ways in the recent UAS debate, on the fake social media “deportation” debate or the correct interpretation of the Koran. UAS and Islamists political action groups:
(a) refuse to explain that he was not ‘deported’ but refused entry, so they place a bad faith rhetorical burden back on the Singapore Government to explain its the refusal to let UAS enter Singapore;​
(b) refuse to even admit that UAS supports "suicide bombing on THE JEWS" so they place a bad faith rhetorical burden back on anti-suicide bombing advocates, like the Singapore Goverment and the RRG, who are Muslims trying to help Muslims families with radicalised family members; and​
(c) deflect the debate on lies told by saying that: “You have to understand the context deeply, because it is in the context of the war between Palestine and Israel. If there is nothing to defend and defend, then committing suicide bombings is of course prohibited. Because in Islam, suicide is a big sin and the punishment is hell.”​

15. Lacking an Asatizah Recognition Board (ARB) as is the case in Singapore, Indonesia’s appointment of asatizah is without a proper support structure. There is only one small problem with the Indonesian process for training religious leaders, it lacks quality checks — allowing a defective asatizah like UAS to slip through the cracks. UAS is an antisemite, as he supports the mission of Hamas (mandated by its charter, is antisemitic, anti-Israel, & anti-democratic) — keeping in mind that the Gaza-based terrorist group has carried out more than 80 suicide attacks in Israel.

16. The Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG) did not name any individuals in its statement, but shared a statement in a Facebook post, as follows: "The Religious Rehabilitation Group responds with deep shame and deep regret for its fellow preachers who have emerged to dominate and spread views that are contrary to accepted Islamic and universal values towards humanity, compassion, unconditional love for others."

17. The need to have some form of accreditation for asatizah in Singapore was mooted in the 1990s by senior scholars and asatizah in the Singapore Islamic Scholars & Religious Teachers Association.
(a) The proposal was forwarded to Muis for deliberation. In 2004, Muis formed the ARB. SG’s support for the Asatizah Recognition Board (ARB); & later the Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG) was formed. This is aimed at giving Muslims somewhere to look for aid other than terrorist groups.​
(b) IMO, it is more important to make correct decisions at the strategic level than at the tactical level in counter-terrorism. Mistakes in operations and tactics in fighting online radicalism can be corrected, but strategic mistakes can have long term consequences. By Indonesia’s failure to delegitimize hardline Ustads, this allows a fertile pool of supporters of suicide terrorism to grow. I hope that in time, Indonesia’s counter terrorism responses by Indonesia’s National Counter-Terrorism Agency (or BNPT) will be proactive to address Asatizah interactions by taking into account some of their organizational factors.​
(c) "Currently, BNPT has a flagship program related to the deradicalization program, namely the Nusantara Terpadu Area (KTN) which has been soft launched in East Java. This program aims to improve the welfare of deradicalization partners as well as victims and survivors," Boy Rafli Amar added.​
(d) On 18 May 2022, Komjen Pol. Dr. Boy Rafli Amar, Head of BNPT met Desmond Tan, Minister of State of Singapore, to strengthen collaboration and exchange of information to fight radicalism. In addition to introducing the KTN program, the Head of BNPT also hopes that Indonesia and Singapore can strengthen bilateral relations, especially in dealing with the phenomenon of online radicalization.​
(e) BNPT Director of Prevention Brigadier General Ahmad Nurwakhid said that the efforts made by Singapore was early anticipation of potential threats to their country. "I see this as an important lesson for Indonesia to also take precautions from upstream by prohibiting radical views, understandings and ideologies that can lead to acts of terror and violence," said Nurwakhid. "Singapore dares to take this step because it is clear that lectures, attitudes and views that are exclusive, intolerant are the basic characteristics of the emergence of a radical understanding of terrorism due to the doctrine of al-wala wa bara and takfiri," he said.​

18. Individually-targeted counterterrorism efforts are much more difficult to identify than those on the societal level, however, policies that prevent individuals from beginning down a pathway to suicide terrorism like the Singapore’s RRG are essential in the long run.
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