Ahem SCUBA wasn't around during WW1.
The best strategy to defending Singapore Island
- Thread starter Twister
- Start date
Part 1 of 2: Prabowo’s missile targets in Singapore
1. Prabowo’s missile targets in Singapore still trying to justify continued cooperation with the TNI. I would like to thank Prabowo’s team for their own goals scored — against US interests by planning to use missiles to attack US allies & partners — to raise his international profile before elections in Feb 2024.
2. Wishful Australian or Singaporean fund manager thinking ahead of the Feb 2024 elections in Indonesia will not cut it anymore. Based on data for Mar 2022, Indonesia's debt to Singapore is the highest compared to debt from other countries at US$60.9 billion (or Rp. 892.8 trillion).
3. Given that SRBM tech supplier is likely to be China, at this point I have to ask:
4. Alternately, Prabowo & his ballistic missiles can ask China to extend a bigger line of credit. Trust takes years to build.
5. The SAF is accustomed to the duality of the TNI, some parts friendly, some hostile. I think the relations between Indonesia & the Philippines will take a bit longer to recover.
6. The SAF has treated a TNI problem as a problem, we as Singaporeans must dig deep to help solve, quickly — that’s our value add as a tiny country. But we can slow down (by a few hrs) & consider a bit more before acting — the road ahead is long. It is Indonesia’s choice.
1. Prabowo’s missile targets in Singapore still trying to justify continued cooperation with the TNI. I would like to thank Prabowo’s team for their own goals scored — against US interests by planning to use missiles to attack US allies & partners — to raise his international profile before elections in Feb 2024.
(a) A mortar launched from Batam has a fight time of 15 secs to 2 mins — the hardest to defend against. A SRBM has a fight time of 3 to 8 mins; a MRBM flies for 9 to 19 mins: and a IRBM files 3,000 to 5,500 km, in 20 to 26 mins.
(b) As the missile threat landscape becomes more dynamic & the proliferation of SRBMs, MRBMs & IRBMs means that, if Singapore wishes to maintain the ability to conduct operations while under attack, it needs to invest more to develop its BMD capability.
2. Wishful Australian or Singaporean fund manager thinking ahead of the Feb 2024 elections in Indonesia will not cut it anymore. Based on data for Mar 2022, Indonesia's debt to Singapore is the highest compared to debt from other countries at US$60.9 billion (or Rp. 892.8 trillion).
3. Given that SRBM tech supplier is likely to be China, at this point I have to ask:
Q: Whose interests is Prabowo working for (China (or Russia)?
4. Alternately, Prabowo & his ballistic missiles can ask China to extend a bigger line of credit. Trust takes years to build.
(a) Most Indonesians don’t realise that SAF troops in Jurong Island are issued frangible ammo (due to backstop concerns).Frangible ammo is intended to disintegrate into tiny particles upon target impact to minimize their penetration of other objects.
(b) When Singapore’s troops/ships/aircraft are in the line of fire (eg. with Malaysia over Tuas waters intrusion), the personnel manning the weapon systems know that Mindef & the whole of Govt is behind them. That is why the planning is so detailed (down to ammo type).
(c) If Indonesia’s defence minister & potential presidential candidate can’t understand ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity — don’t attack other ASEAN states, no great power will take ASEAN seriously. At #SLD23 & at this presentation, Prabowo showed that as a Presidential candidate, he is unfit to lead ASEAN & a joke at G20.
5. The SAF is accustomed to the duality of the TNI, some parts friendly, some hostile. I think the relations between Indonesia & the Philippines will take a bit longer to recover.
6. The SAF has treated a TNI problem as a problem, we as Singaporeans must dig deep to help solve, quickly — that’s our value add as a tiny country. But we can slow down (by a few hrs) & consider a bit more before acting — the road ahead is long. It is Indonesia’s choice.
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Not really. They are quoted to be first buyers of the Khan/Bora tactical ballistic missiles from Turkiye. A 300 km range ring will align closely to that missile due to MTCR restrictions.
Edit: with links
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Indonesia to be first foreign user of Turkey’s Khan missile system
A company official said Roketsan will develop a tailor-made air defense system for the Indonesian Army.
www.defensenews.com
They flirted some collaboration with China, e.g joint production on C704 ASHMs, which did not take off under a previous administration. And that's the whole point. These type of relationships are driven largely by which politicians or parties are in power. Ananda can explain better than I ever can.
I would separate the military (TNI) from the politicians. It is the politicians that stir shit mostly, most notably with Mr Red Dot that caused SAF to go on full alert at one point.... At a military level, SAF/TNI seems to have a functional relationship.
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Good point.
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Ananda
The Bunker Group
Indonesia MinDef has no SRBM tech co-op with China. In fact it is already known from the last Indo defense the SRBM that's being work out is Roketsan Tayfun/Khan/Bora. Which they workout with Czech Excalibur (on providing TEL).
Turkish defense giant successfully tests ballistic missile Tayfun
Turkish missile producer Roketsan Tuesday successfully tested the short-range ballistic missile Tayfun (Typhoon) in the country's Black Sea province...
www.dailysabah.com
As for the target in the slides, MinDef cannot shown the real targets anyway. If they only shown South China Sea as target, then it is open acknowledgement that this SRBM program is to answer potential China threats. So in typical Indonesian way, they then put every one as targets.
The choices are between him, Anies Baswedan, and Ganjar Pranowo. The last ones basically under heavy influence from Megawati, which during her short Presidency also not shown any meaningful leadership toward Asean.
US begin open up to Indonesia again on defense and political co-op after SBY era, and practically side line Megawati. I don't want to go much on Indonesian politics on this forum, but that US move shown Megawati's faction can be more extreme then Prabowo's.
So, that's the potential choices for Indonesia 2024. I give to anyone assessments on that choices, as it is open to public information on each of them track record. I have mine but as this forums policy I don't want to talk about it, less some will think I open political campaign here.
It is election season in Indonesia and I am expecting this sort of posturing from the candidates. Nothing we need to take too seriously for now, especially such fancy and colourful videos that is clearly directed at general public.
PDI-P faction under Megawati would be worst, if I am not wrong. They are pretty much pro-Russian, anti-west.
PDI-P faction under Megawati would be worst, if I am not wrong. They are pretty much pro-Russian, anti-west.
Ananda
The Bunker Group
It is not the PDIP it self, but more Megawati and her close circles. However Megawati has the final say on PDIP. Problem is she sees her and her party as her father and his PNI successors. So she seems so far see what her father done is the glorious era in Indonesia, and broke down by Soeharto era.
Part 2 of 2: Prabowo’s missile targets in Singapore
9. While this is an indirect relationship, the SRBM tech supplier is China. Even hyper rich Qatar went to buy the Chinese BP-12A SRBM (which was delivered in 2017), direct from source.
7. As you said, the Indonesian contract for the Tayfun/Khan/Bora ballistic missile system (TBM) is bought through the Czech Excalibur Army as the prime contractor of the TEL, with Roketsan a sub-con, & the contract funded by loan from Czech Eximbank. When the TNI buy from Turkey, there is one level of mark-up (from a Chinese SRBM design) but to buy from Czech Excalibur as prime, Prabowo paid for 2 mark-ups. Prabowo is just using arms purchases to collect money to run his 2024 election.
8. But this Roketsan Bora TBM:
(a) has a 610 mm diameter, a length of 8.0m, and a total weight of 2500 kg;
(b) is based on the Chinese B-611 (also known as BP-12A) — when I checked into the tech transfer details.
9. While this is an indirect relationship, the SRBM tech supplier is China. Even hyper rich Qatar went to buy the Chinese BP-12A SRBM (which was delivered in 2017), direct from source.
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Given that one of the potential target of this weapon may be Chinese in origin, I think in this particular case, it's a wise move not to buy direct from the source.
In all honesty, I am not worried about Indonesian SRBMs because the parties will try to coexist. The real problem with this sort of issue — is that it slows down the rate of change in Indonesia & decreases the scope of TNI-SAF cooperation.
Very good point.
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Ananda
The Bunker Group
Everyone doing side business and they share with each others. Those who take it all by themselves usually are the ones that being taken by Anti Corruption Agency. The democratic era also open for Political factions take side business for next elections. Why do you think China win High Speed train project instead Japanese (which is more discipline with proper project management and calculations) ?
Bora perhaps got initial tech from Chinese, but realities now Turkiye doing armed business on their own. They're practically not depend much with either China/Russia and US/Euro. Makes them more attractive toward political factions compromises in Indonesia. This is also why Frenchie become acceptable compromises. Not everyone happy Indonesia "kowtow" to US threats on CATSA for example.
If you want to jump on Propelant and Balistic missile tech, more likely you have to play with China or Russia. Remember even ROK balistic tech also benefits much with their Russian co-op. Using Turkish tech at least less sensitive for every factions compromises.
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Come on, mate, that is reaching.
Your original point (below) was alluding to a connection/orientation between China and Indonesia as a result of the TBM acquisition. That might have some truth if it was a direct acquisition from CASIC. I am well aware that the source of Turkiye's capabilities in this space came via tech transfers from China, but it was not relevant at the point.
The acquisition of arms from Turkiye (Bora TBM, Trisula SAM, Havelsan's ADVENT combat system for their new OPV) is a trend of realigning to a different supplier and specifically, a rising Islamic power. You see the same thing happening in some quarters in Malaysia, with people talking about PMX's (Anwar) relationship with Turkiye and the Ada class as a strong contender for the LMS Batch 2 program.
The Chinese are somewhat liberal as far as selling arms are concerned. No issues selling MRTC restricted TBMs to anyone that walks in with a suitcase of cash it seems.
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Agreed. It’s more of a joke now after Ananda explained the local dynamics & thinking process.
There are questions to my mind, including:
Q: How serious is Indonesia, when it comes to developing a local capability to make its own SRBMs/MRBMs?
If Indonesia is as serious as the Koreans on SRBMs/MRBMs, they have to work with the Chinese at some point. The Koreans are developing parts of a triad — the KSS-III submarines are capable of carrying 6 submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). I am pretty impressed with the SLBM launch on 15 Sep 2021 by South Korea.
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Indonesia is among the earliest country in ASEAN to have a rocket industry, really, right in the Sukarno era. Remember vaguely reading about their rockets during that era. The Indonesian research entity, LAPAN, has been building a series of solid fuel rockets (RX series) for a long time for research purposes and they have the capability to cast solid fuel motors. So if they wanted to be serious, they could have done it a long time ago, much like what the Argentinians/Egyptians were doing on the Condor program.
IMO, the reported procurement of the Bora missiles feels more political like most Indonesian purchase. I used "reported" because until I see it being off loaded Tanjong Priok, I remain skeptical.
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Lone Ranger
Member
MAF's PT-91M led to the introduction of Leo2SG in Singapore. Indonesia's plan of licensing C-705 to produce locally, possibly also motivated the collaboration between ST Engineering and IAI to manufacture Blue Spear locally. Will this also result in the SAF consider introducing LORA (also from IAI), or similar system that can be produced locally, in its ORBAT? It is modular and easy to deploy both on land and ships (as long as there's heli-deck or any available deck space). RSN's ships have lot of deck space.
SAF has a policy of not being the first to introduce offensive system in the region. However to maintain its level of deterrence, it might play catch-up game in this case.
For the region, ASEAN, this might be good as it raise the deterrence capability.
SAF has a policy of not being the first to introduce offensive system in the region. However to maintain its level of deterrence, it might play catch-up game in this case.
For the region, ASEAN, this might be good as it raise the deterrence capability.
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The RSN’s inaugural firing of the VL MICA missile
2. USN & RSN training together for biannual Ex Pacific Griffin. Lots of Easter eggs in the USN Photos. As USN Capt. Sean Lewis said: “We have an unwavering commitment to our partners in this region. Pacific Griffin provides a challenging & technologically advanced training opportunity that allows us to become more dynamic & build competencies as an integrated maritime force.”
3. The RSN operates a class of 8 corvette-like LMVs (commissioned btw May 2017 & Jan 2020). At #PacificGriffin 2023, RSS Tenacious fired Harpoon missiles & @ridzwan_rahmat of Jane’s also reported that RSS Dauntless, has carried out the class' inaugural firing of the VL MICA missile. A video of the naval serials conducted at Ex #PacificGriffin, including:
4. Participating USN assets include USS Manchester (LCS 14), Ticonderoga cruiser USS Shiloh (CG 67), USNS Cesar Chavez (T-AKE 14), & maritime patrol aircraft fm CTF-72. Participating RSN assets include RSS Tenacious (71), RSS Dauntless (21), & a S-70B Naval Helicopter.
5. RSN's Commander First Flotilla and exercise Co-Commander Task Group, Colonel Ng Kok Yeng Daniel said, "Exercise Pacific Griffin is an important exercise, and is part of a series of regular bilateral interactions with our US counterparts. It serves as a valuable platform for both navies to enhance our mutual cooperation and understanding. With the vast training space in the waters off Guam, the exercise also provides us with the opportunity to hone our sharp edge and capabilities."
6. RSN naval divers also conducted training in areas such as maritime explosive ordnance disposal and maritime counter-terrorism operations. On the sidelines of the exercise, RSN personnel partnered USN personnel in community relations activities to aid the local community in Guam following Typhoon Mawar.
1. Thanks, saw your post there. In Apr 2023, submarine commanders fm Australia, Canada, France, Japan, Korea, UK & Singapore met with U.S. Pacific Fleet commanders at the 2023 Submarine Warfare Commanders Conference (SWCC) to exchange perspectives.
2. USN & RSN training together for biannual Ex Pacific Griffin. Lots of Easter eggs in the USN Photos. As USN Capt. Sean Lewis said: “We have an unwavering commitment to our partners in this region. Pacific Griffin provides a challenging & technologically advanced training opportunity that allows us to become more dynamic & build competencies as an integrated maritime force.”
3. The RSN operates a class of 8 corvette-like LMVs (commissioned btw May 2017 & Jan 2020). At #PacificGriffin 2023, RSS Tenacious fired Harpoon missiles & @ridzwan_rahmat of Jane’s also reported that RSS Dauntless, has carried out the class' inaugural firing of the VL MICA missile. A video of the naval serials conducted at Ex #PacificGriffin, including:
(a) the ASW serial with the launch & recovery of a S70B;
(b) the anti-air warfare serial with a VL MICA launch by RSS Dauntless; &
(c) the ASuW serial with the launch of 2 Harpoons by RSS Tenacious.
4. Participating USN assets include USS Manchester (LCS 14), Ticonderoga cruiser USS Shiloh (CG 67), USNS Cesar Chavez (T-AKE 14), & maritime patrol aircraft fm CTF-72. Participating RSN assets include RSS Tenacious (71), RSS Dauntless (21), & a S-70B Naval Helicopter.
5. RSN's Commander First Flotilla and exercise Co-Commander Task Group, Colonel Ng Kok Yeng Daniel said, "Exercise Pacific Griffin is an important exercise, and is part of a series of regular bilateral interactions with our US counterparts. It serves as a valuable platform for both navies to enhance our mutual cooperation and understanding. With the vast training space in the waters off Guam, the exercise also provides us with the opportunity to hone our sharp edge and capabilities."
6. RSN naval divers also conducted training in areas such as maritime explosive ordnance disposal and maritime counter-terrorism operations. On the sidelines of the exercise, RSN personnel partnered USN personnel in community relations activities to aid the local community in Guam following Typhoon Mawar.
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Part 1 of 2: Buying strategic depth
Singapore is a founding member of the Forum of Small States (FOSS), a grouping of small & micro states — many FOSS members are also weak states. By land size, Singapore is the smallest state in ASEAN — smaller than Brunei (as a micro-state). As a small city state, Singapore does not fit the definition of a micro-state nor does it have the armed forces a typical of a small state.
Despite the fact that Canada is acquiring 88 F-35As in a US$14.2 billion deal announced by the Ottawa government, a WSJ editorial noted: "Canada PM Justin Trudeau was in Lithuania this week for the annual NATO summit, but it’s too bad there wasn’t a junior table where he could sit. That’s where his country belongs based on Ottawa’s feeble commitment to alliance defense." Thanks to superior execution, I am grateful that the US & our FPDA partners cannot accuse Singapore of being a free rider on defence.
Unlike Canada, whose weapons procurement processes is mired in dysfunction, the Defence Science & Technology Agency (DSTA) of Singapore has a track record of efficiently implementing defence technology plans, acquiring defence material & developing defence infrastructure.
Many in America, Canada, & Europe, are not aware that Singapore:
The average troll on Twitter will never understand the difference between actual capability & bullsh!t, when they are so full of it — just as they will never understand the difference in training & standards between different types of forces using helicopters & specialist boats like the CCL to insert & recover forces for distributed operations, like:
Singaporean troops are trained to operate in coalition with others in the FPDA but our citizen-soldiers view our country’s defence as our responsibility. Unlike some countries who rely only on others to do the heavy lifting, it is important for the SAF to develop relevant capability to meet our regional threat matrix.
Singapore is a founding member of the Forum of Small States (FOSS), a grouping of small & micro states — many FOSS members are also weak states. By land size, Singapore is the smallest state in ASEAN — smaller than Brunei (as a micro-state). As a small city state, Singapore does not fit the definition of a micro-state nor does it have the armed forces a typical of a small state.(a) To manage regional security threats & to secure our SLOCs, the Govt has invested between 3% to 3.5% of the country’s GDP to raise, train & sustain the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF). With a 2023 defence budget of SGD17. 98 billion (USD13. 4 billion), on a per capital basis, each year, Singapore invests more on defence than the average defence budget of many countries in Europe. The IISS estimates that, if all promises are kept, the average level of defence expenditure among NATO’s European members will be 1.8-1.9% of GDP by 2032, compared with 1.6% in 2022 and 1.3% in 2014.
(b) As host of the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore uses defence diplomacy or the peaceful application of military resources to support a rules based order & to achieve outcomes. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, erodes the rules based order. We know that in the real world, a small & weak state gets to manoeuvre from a weak position into another weaker position.
(c) When under pressure from larger states, certain small states with lesser diplomatic and military capability than Singapore end up in a position of doing self harm to their own credibility. This is why recently, Cambodia on behalf of China, sought to sink Indonesia’s proposed joint ASEAN naval drills. Indonesia proposal for first-ever bloc exercises in South China Sea met vocal resistance from China’s pawn, Cambodia.
(d) In 2012, Singapore also watched with concern as definitive force was used by the Chinese Coast Guard & PLA Navy to create a fait accompli — the conversion of the South China Sea into a Chinese lake, against the wishes of the Philippines. Beijing’s actions at the 2nd Thomas Shoal falls within James Cable’s concept of gunboat diplomacy. If one were to read up on the numerous Haiyang Dizhi sagas against Malaysia & Vietnam, Beijing keeps the level of tension in the South China Sea managed with no desire for shooting.
Despite the fact that Canada is acquiring 88 F-35As in a US$14.2 billion deal announced by the Ottawa government, a WSJ editorial noted: "Canada PM Justin Trudeau was in Lithuania this week for the annual NATO summit, but it’s too bad there wasn’t a junior table where he could sit. That’s where his country belongs based on Ottawa’s feeble commitment to alliance defense." Thanks to superior execution, I am grateful that the US & our FPDA partners cannot accuse Singapore of being a free rider on defence.Unlike Canada, whose weapons procurement processes is mired in dysfunction, the Defence Science & Technology Agency (DSTA) of Singapore has a track record of efficiently implementing defence technology plans, acquiring defence material & developing defence infrastructure.(a) Since 1987, the Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) became superior in the air when compared to any other ASEAN air force.
(b) Interestingly, in Jun 2021, Malaysia said it sent a diplomatic protest to Beijing & summoned the Chinese ambassador after the military detected 16 Chinese aircraft in its airspace off the Borneo coast. While the Malaysia protests a PLAAF intrusion into their Borneo airspace, a Malaysian Government AW-139-9M helicopter was also caught intruding into Singapore airspace on Sept 11, 2021. This triggered a RSAF fighter scramble & the Malaysian High Commissioner to Singapore was summoned for this hostile act.
Many in America, Canada, & Europe, are not aware that Singapore:(a) operates more fighters (60 F-16s & 40 F-15SGs) than Finland (64 F-35As);
(b) is committed to replace its 60 strong F-16V fleet with F-35s, to ensure that the air force has the largest & most capable fighter fleet in ASEAN;
(c) has a small but capable navy with a range of built in Singapore vessels that enable the navy to secure our SLOCs (up to 1,000km away);
(d) has acquired from Germany, 4 Type 218SGs to match or exceed the underwater warfare capability of Canada (as NATO member, & middle power).
The average troll on Twitter will never understand the difference between actual capability & bullsh!t, when they are so full of it — just as they will never understand the difference in training & standards between different types of forces using helicopters & specialist boats like the CCL to insert & recover forces for distributed operations, like:
(a) Commandos;
(b) ADF & Guards (both from 7SIB); &
(c) combat swimmers / divers from the NDU’s Special Warfare Group.
Singaporean troops are trained to operate in coalition with others in the FPDA but our citizen-soldiers view our country’s defence as our responsibility. Unlike some countries who rely only on others to do the heavy lifting, it is important for the SAF to develop relevant capability to meet our regional threat matrix.(a) Developing the SAF’s weapon platforms & buying weapons, munitions & technology abroad (from our American, French, German, Israeli & Swedish counterparts), to gain strategic depth, would not be possible without DSTA’s good management of the weapons procurement process.
(b) Locally developed weapon platforms include the V15 mUAV, Terrex ICV, Bronco 3 ATTC, Hunter AFV, Primus SPH, Independence class LMVs & Endurance class LPDs, to name a few. The Singapore Army’s V15 mUAV in particular, is designed for concurrent operations with the RSAF’s Heron 1 UAV, to aid in sense & strike operations for the division strike centre.
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1. On Sept 11, 2021, a Malaysian police helicopter tested Singapore fighter scramble timing. On 9 Aug 2023, another Malaysian-registered civilian AS350 helicopter causes 2 RSAF F-16s to scramble. Changi Airport operations was affected between 12.50 pm and 13.28 pm local time. A total of 9 arrival flights and 11 departure flights experienced some delay.
2. This is a pattern of Malaysian grey zone behaviour that persists that will come in threes — which means, I expect another intrusion to occur.
3. This is similar to the testing of our navy that occurred on 23 May 2008, when RSS Brave faced a Malaysian Navy vessel who sailed in a dangerous & provocative manner near Pedra Branca. "We took immediate & decisive steps to avoid a head-on collision & issued warnings that these were our territorial waters," recalled ME3 Eng Cheow Ang.
2. This is a pattern of Malaysian grey zone behaviour that persists that will come in threes — which means, I expect another intrusion to occur.
3. This is similar to the testing of our navy that occurred on 23 May 2008, when RSS Brave faced a Malaysian Navy vessel who sailed in a dangerous & provocative manner near Pedra Branca. "We took immediate & decisive steps to avoid a head-on collision & issued warnings that these were our territorial waters," recalled ME3 Eng Cheow Ang.
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Post 1 of 2: Changing the way we fight!
1. Ex Forging Sabre 2023 chooses to unveil:
in the video. This division ex is a high use of virtual-real resources of #DIS (who is capable of both cyber attack & defence).
2. Started in 2005, the unilateral exercise has evolved from a small scale integrated strike exercise with just 300 personnel into a complex, multi-domain strike wargame, blending conventional strike capabilities such as fighter jets with innovative concepts like drone swarm and Industry 4.0 technologies like machine learning. As Chen Chuanren wrote, “the Ukraine war underscores the vital role of rapid and agile adoption of technology in modern warfare. A small armed force like Singapore's needs to continually leverage novel technologies such as autonomous systems and AI to complement its proven warfighting platforms…”
4. Chen Chuanren is a defence journalist & contributes to publications like Aviation Week & Shephard Media. He witnessed Exercise Forging Sabre in person in 2015, 2017 & 2023. Chuanren notes that smaller drones made their debut in 2021, but it is the first time they are deployed as drone swarms at such scale & operating concepts.
1. Ex Forging Sabre 2023 chooses to unveil:
(a) the SAF’s CONOPS & use of AI for drone swarms; &
(b) autonomous tunnel mapping robots (robot dogs),
in the video. This division ex is a high use of virtual-real resources of #DIS (who is capable of both cyber attack & defence).
2. Started in 2005, the unilateral exercise has evolved from a small scale integrated strike exercise with just 300 personnel into a complex, multi-domain strike wargame, blending conventional strike capabilities such as fighter jets with innovative concepts like drone swarm and Industry 4.0 technologies like machine learning. As Chen Chuanren wrote, “the Ukraine war underscores the vital role of rapid and agile adoption of technology in modern warfare. A small armed force like Singapore's needs to continually leverage novel technologies such as autonomous systems and AI to complement its proven warfighting platforms…”
4. Chen Chuanren is a defence journalist & contributes to publications like Aviation Week & Shephard Media. He witnessed Exercise Forging Sabre in person in 2015, 2017 & 2023. Chuanren notes that smaller drones made their debut in 2021, but it is the first time they are deployed as drone swarms at such scale & operating concepts.
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