Indo Pacific strategy

[OPSSG]

Let me add to my prior post above:

As for your last point, all free countries have the right to ask for outside assistance if they're attacked.

8. No help will be coming to Taiwan (and it is not even a member of the UN) unless there is a legal framework, like a status of forces agreement and the legal indemnities undertaken by Saudi Arabia with coalition forces during Gulf War I. We are talking months before any non-US help could or would come — for force prep and getting a legal framework in place for Taiwan to sign under duress.

9. An alternative to an ad hoc undertaking (which the Taiwanese will not give due to trust issues), is the entry into a legal framework like the FPDA (or NATO like in structure).

​

(a) Even under the FPDA, which alllows for intelligence sharing, commitment of forces is not automatic. But the consultation process (for intervention) is speeded up and enabled for specific and planned military contingencies.​

​

(b) After 9-11, NATO invoked Article 5 to enable the creation of the NATO led ISAF for Afghanistan. While that process was pretty fast, it took until Oct (almost a month), before invoking of Article 5 was announced. The process took until Dec 2001 by UN Resolution 1386, as envisaged by the Bonn Agreement for ISAF to be created.​

​

No country, even the US is willing to enter into any treaty like agreement with Taiwan — due to inherent mistrust of all parties. The Taiwanese do not trust the Americans and vice versa. I would go so far as to say that the Taiwanese should not be trusted. IMO, it would be hard for the Taiwanese to strike a good deal with anyone.

Realistically it would be a mostly US force...

10. Not true. The Americans have a policy of strategic ambiguity that has been followed by four American presidents —Washington could take a judicious approach in such a situation. It could insist that China call off the attacks and could threaten military action—while quietly telling Taipei to retract any independence rhetoric if it expected American military help. Such a strategy might well work in quelling the conflict before it escalated enough to directly involve the US.

11. Entry into a fighting naval coalition is not a simple process and fraught with difficulty on escalation limits, National caveats, logistics compatibility, and/or other issues.

...albeit maybe with some Japanese/Australian support.

12. The China-Taiwan relationship is one of the most dangerous in the world.

• The Prime Ministers of Australia and Japan will treat it with proper care and be carefully balanced in their responses to Taiwan. Australian and Japanese responses to Mar 2010 ROKS Cheonan sinking and Nov 2010 bombardment of Yeonpyeong in Korea, were carefully balanced. These incidents with a US ally demonstrated that if the stakes are high enough, no one really dares to or wants to escalate. If the PLA(N) sinks a Taiwanese navy boat, no war is expected — the Taiwanese are not even American allies.
• Keep in mind that since Taiwan lost its United Nations seat as "China" in 1971 (replaced by the PRC), most sovereign states have switched their diplomatic recognition to the PRC, recognizing the PRC as the representative of all China, though the majority of countries avoid clarifying what territories are meant by "China" in order to associate with both the PRC and Taiwan.
• As of 20 September 2019, Taiwan maintains official diplomatic relations with about 14 UN member states and the Holy See, although informal relations are maintained with nearly all others.
• A simple commitment of forces or supply of weapons (to support Taiwan) by the Australians or the Japanese would be seen by the diplomatic community as mishandling the situation.

ASEAN could easily not even get involved at all.

13. ASEAN as a community is not an Asian version of NATO and a much looser arrangement than the EU. Plus ADMM is not intended to be used that way — will need to review this in 20 years (in 2040).

No one would be forced to intervene, but letting China take over Taiwan would be bad for everyone in Asia (except the CCP).

14. But IMO, China does not want to invade — they are not so stupid to make such a strategic mistake that will bleed them dry. It is clear that the PLA has developed some interesting military capabilities should the use of force become necessary— it may simply be to shoot at the Taiwanese military or for the PLA(N) to apply military pressure in other ways (eg. a distant interdiction of trade routes). The Taiwanese are aware of the PLA(N)’s bombers that carry 400km YJ-12 ASCMs and 2000km CJ-20 ALCMs, which make the US made block 2, Harpoon missiles, in Taiwan’s inventory, look very short ranged by comparison.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1290888421444001793

15. If the Japanese Prime Minister or the US President who wants to commit forces to show support, they will be faced with a real domestic politics dilemma (if it is not an invasion).

 

[OPSSG]

16. EVEN if it is a clear cut invasion threat, it can take more than 2 weeks for the first shipments of American weapons to trickle-in and a further one to two months before any Japanese help can trickle-in to Taiwan. As far as American and Japanese interests are concerned, any Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with Taiwan, in the of tension period prior to war would seek to facilitate the following:

(i) Unhindered entry of American and Japanese troops during times of emergency.​

(ii) Exemption of military personnel from visa or passport formalities and local laws.​

(iii) Unrestricted entry of equipment and supplies, without being subject to custom formalities.​

(iv) A framework for the movement of American and Japanese personnel and supplies into Taiwan for exercise.​

(v) Specifies a particular legal code to be applied in case of damage inflicted to the host nation by American and Japanese military personnel during an exercise.​

Knowing Taiwanese pride do you think they can accept a SOFA as envisaged? Where the SOFA would not provide similar facilities to Taiwanese personnel who could be sent to Japan for training and related purposes — their pride will be their downfall.

Taiwan doesn't have the budget to build dozens of new first-class warships, unless it reverts to the old KMT dictatorship era...

17. This is a false choice. Instead of spending on defence a portion Taiwanese funding has been diverted to industry to buy what I consider are the wrong products and weapons are less suitable in meeting their actual operational demands (to futher their island defence plan)— I see their failure to upgrade the M-60 tanks and lack of focus on getting 120mm mortars and 155mm wheeled artillery, being a case in point.

18. The corruption behind the "Lafayette Affair" has dragged on for two decades and has involved at least 8 bizarre deaths, multiple court cases, hundreds of millions in frozen Swiss bank accounts and high-level government probes in both Taiwan and France that have reached deep into the corridors of power. If the Taiwanese political and military leadership are really serious about defence they would not be using arms procurement as an excuse to enrich themselves.

19. I am saying the Taiwanese should do better with how they execute their arms procurement (instead of doing U-turns) or diverting money for corruption. For Taiwan’s sake, in addition to the build plan for 8 submarines, I remain hopeful for their planned local build programs for four frigates/destroyers, 10 to 15 3,000-ton catamaran frigates, and amphibious transport docks to replace 11 dock landing ships and tank landing ships.

20. Under the present circumstances, do you think the Taiwanese can last 2 weeks to 2 months fighting alone? With the F-16V upgrade, the Taiwanese have done all they can for their AN/APG-83 Scalable Agile Beam Radar equipped F-16 fleet that are Harpoon armed.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1291811768784674817

 

[Musashi_kenshin]

8. No help will be coming to Taiwan (and it is not even a member of the UN) unless there is a legal framework

If the US or anyone else thinks it's absolutely necessary to intervene, they'll do so and get their lawyers to draft something quickly. Any assurances necessary from Taiwan aren't going to be withheld. Countries aren't going to go "we really need to help Taiwan out - but it's going to take at least 3 weeks of committee discussions first".

​

No country, even the US is willing to enter into any treaty like agreement with Taiwan — due to inherent mistrust of all parties. The Taiwanese do not trust the Americans and vice versa. I would go so far as to say that the Taiwanese should not be trusted.

I have no idea what you're basing that statement on. Taiwan is eminently trustworthy enough, otherwise countries wouldn't have de-facto embassies there or make trade/investment deals with it.

The Americans have a policy of strategic ambiguity that has been followed by four American presidents

I didn't say that it didn't. I said that a force would mostly be US (if not entirely US) in a hypothetical sense, i.e. if there was a force.

Entry into a fighting naval coalition is not a simple process

No, but if countries deem it necessary to intervene they will do all they can. The JMSDF in particular is very well-suited to work with the USN.

responses to Mar 2010 ROKS Cheonan sinking and Nov 2010 bombardment of Yeonpyeong in Korea, were carefully balanced

Yes, because South Korea decided the pace of the response. Also, realistically South Korea wouldn't need outside help against North Korea except from the US. Whereas Taiwan (and the USN) would benefit from support from other countries.

Keep in mind that since Taiwan lost its United Nations seat as "China" in 1971 (replaced by the PRC), most sovereign states have switched their diplomatic recognition to the PRC, recognizing the PRC as the representative of all China, though the majority of countries avoid clarifying what territories are meant by "China" in order to associate with both the PRC and Taiwan.

Yes, because at the time the KMT refused to take a deal where Taiwan could remain in the UN if they accepted the CCP were the government of China. Since then major countries have had unofficial relations with Taiwan to get around Beijing's threats of what happens if countries recognise Taiwan. The lack of formal diplomatic ties has nothing to do with how countries would react if Taiwan was attacked.

A simple commitment of forces or supply of weapons (to support Taiwan) by the Australians or the Japanese would be seen by the diplomatic community as mishandling the situation.

Well the "diplomatic community" doesn't set national policy. If the diplomats can avoid a military conflict, fine. But if there is conflict - including a physical blockade that would eventually require military action - the diplomatic community wouldn't have a right to complain.

ASEAN as a community

I know, which is why I said that ASEAN could easily not get involved. I was trying to show I agreed with you.

But IMO, China does not want to invade

Not right now, but who knows? Also, if China just pokes away at Taiwan that's something that Taipei can live with. "Distant" blockading of trade routes would be seen as piracy by the international community and would either lead to escorting of merchant vessels by the US and a potential coalition - because no US president apart from a weakling is going to let China dictate who it can trade with - or ships simply lying about where they were going to until it was too late (your scenario suggests a close blockade of the island isn't happening).

If the Japanese Prime Minister or the US President who wants to commit forces to show support, they will be faced with a real domestic politics dilemma (if it is not an invasion).

I disagree. Washington isn't going to see it has much option if China starts blockading US trade or indeed any trade to Taiwan. If it just sat back, that would give a signal to the world that China was now the dominant global power.

As for Japan, Tokyo would avoid any suggestion it was taking unilateral action or declaring war on China. But the mood in Japan has turned against China in recent years, and I think the public would be less objectionable to the MSDF helping out the US to deter "piracy"

it can take more than 2 weeks for unilateral American help to trickle-in

Yes, assuming that a Chinese build-up can be successfully hidden and the US decides to do nothing. Then again if the intelligence and political situation suggests an invasion is imminent, the US may start to get ready a response.

The corruption behind the "Lafayette Affair" has dragged on for two decades

You're conveniently forgetting that his all kicked off in the early 1990s when the KMT was still firmly in charge of Taiwan, democracy was still limited and proper oversight of the military non-existant. Since then people have gone to jail and some money has been recovered. Certainly the French nearly a decade ago were admitting they were going to have to pay up. But if Switzerland is refusing to return the bulk of the money they hold, that says more about them than it does the Taiwanese.

Are there any similar, more recent, corruption scandals involving procurement you can think of?

 

[OPSSG]

@Musashi_kenshin,

1. You seem to think that:

(i) Taiwan’s government and military leadership will do the right thing at a time of crisis. On the other hand, I have reason to believe that may not be the case;​

(ii) opening the air or sea corridor will solve the problem of delivering military aid to the Taiwanese — once conflict starts. Whereas, I believe that Taiwanese airports and posts will bombed so much and so often (on a daily basis) that the US has to send in the repair crews and equipment — that’s why it will take 3 weeks for first significant air shipments to get in;​

(iii) Taiwan’s citizens will fight — almost everyone I speak to in Taiwan wants to run, when fighting starts and have opened banks accounts abroad for that contingency; and​

(iv) Taiwanese counter intelligence don’t have their hands full with their own citizens trying to sell out — at some level they really don’t expect or want to prepare.​

2. Singapore is the only country that sends our conscript soldiers to train in Taiwan; and we do observe them first hand. I can only feel sad for their soldiers as we take training much more seriously than them. We care for our privates and NCOs in a way that they don’t. We have better weapons and better doctrine. We know we spend more to make our traning realistic. When the Taiwanese army see our guys at our unilateral training exercise, they tell us they feel demoralised (when they look at how they train compared to us).

3. Are you telling me you have observed the Taiwanese Army first hand and met their rank and file? Their majors and LTCs are great at making presentations but go talk to their men and NCOs. Ask them if they will fight or run for cover.

4. In the ‘80s and ‘90s the Taiwanese were an above average conscript army — they would give the Koreans a run for their money. Despite going all volunteer in 2020, their regular army are not better, in training, in doctrine or tactics. But this general statement on standards of their army does not include Taiwanese special forces (that have to undergo a 350-kilometer march) and these elite troops are trained to a very high standard.

5. Singapore’s Army has an all professional arm in the ADF. Except for their Special Forces, regular Taiwan Army troops can’t hope to match our conscripts much less our professional infantry troops — the work up process to get our ADF ready and operational is a golden mile ahead of the Taiwanese.

6. In 2017, Singapore even had to assure Taiwan that our military training agreement relating to Exercises Starlight and High Noon will stay.

PS. See this link for details of the late ‘80s Di Xia Jie Incident where there was a fight between 4SIR and their local police.

 

[Musashi_kenshin]

(i) Taiwan’s government and military leadership will do the right thing at a time of crisis. On the other hand, I have reason to believe that may not be the case

It's impossible to know. It just takes one weak Prime Minister or President to paralyse a country in a time of crisis. But it's not something you can base assumptions on, otherwise you're taking the hypothetical so far it becomes pointless. It would be like saying "what happens if the 3G dam bursts during a critical phase of a Chinese attack on Taiwan".

I think most people would agree that the current Tsai administration in Taiwan is fairly firm in its resolve and wouldn't hide under a table if China attacked. That's all you can say for a hypothetical scenario.

Whereas, I believe that Taiwanese airports and posts will bombed so much and so often (on a daily basis) that the US has to send in the repair crews and equipment — that’s why it will take 3 weeks for first significant air shipments to get in

Again, it assumes the US does nothing until hostilities break out. Also, a disruption to air shipments into Taiwan doesn't stop a (military) air or naval response.

Taiwan’s citizens will fight — almost everyone I speak to in Taiwan wants to run, when fighting starts and have opened banks accounts abroad for that contingency

Err, that's a pretty weird thing to say given that the vast majority of people in a country like Taiwan don't have vast foreign currency cash reserves to send overseas. Most Taiwanese will have some savings, but it's going to be in Taiwanese dollars, which would become worthless if China attacked.

Also, most civilians run away and hide in a time of conflict. The idea of mass civilian resistance is largely a fairy-tale, even in dictatorial socities.

Taiwanese counter intelligence don’t have their hands full with their own citizens trying to sell out — at some level they really don’t expect or want to prepare

Again, this isn't the sort of thing you can easily judge because it's not something any country can be transparent about.

We have better weapons and better doctrine.

That may well be the case. It doesn't mean Taiwan is in a hopeless situation. After all, I think most people here would already believe that Singapore's forces are well-equipped and disciplined.

 

[OPSSG]

@Musashi_kenshin, I am glad you are optimistic about the US Navy’s ability to intervene at the right time and I can see the points you raised. However, I am slightly less optimistic as I would assume a bad start state (which might not be the case). But from a planning point of view, I would assume the worse and hope for the best; rather than the other way round.

1. In my earlier posts, I noted that the Taiwan army has serious manning issues that seem to be chronic. Further, Taiwanese training standards seem to have at least stagnated. I do hope they solve these serious problems over time and being complacent will get people killed.

2. In contrast, the PLA is making big strides in trying to be a learning organisation. They even successfully concluded Exercise Cooperation, a bilateral army exercise, held from 27 July to 5 August 2019, in Singapore with our commando conscripts. The 10-day exercise involved about 240 personnel from the SAF's 3rd Singapore Division and 1st Commando Battalion, as well as the PLA Commander Southern Theatre Command Army's (STCA) 74th Army Group. See the SAF’s video of the simultaneous assault in the Murai Urban Training Facility in Singapore back in 2019.

3. The PLA is very different the past when Exercise Cooperation first started in 2009 in Guilin, China. This 2019 exercise in Singapore is the fourth edition of the exercise. Over the years, Thailand and Singapore are careful in what is shown to the PLA; and we are certain that they’ve learned everything they could from us. In return, we had an opportunity to observe their rank and file. PLA trains much more with the Thai military than the SAF.

4. The Thai and Chinese Special Forces have conducted 4 exercises under the codename “Strike”: in 2007, 2008 and 2010, followed by a gap of eight years until 2019. Thai and Chinese naval personnel (including Marines) have exercised four times using the codename “Blue Strike”: in 2010, 2012, 2016 and 2019 — which would improve PLA amphibious capability. The RTAF and PLAAF have exercised three times under the codename “Falcon Strike”: in 2016, 2017 and 2018. To avoid arousing concern in neighbouring countries, Thai-China exercises have focused on addressing non-traditional security threats (such as counter-terrorism), humanitarian and disaster relief (HA/DR) and maritime search and rescue.

5. While the PLA’s STCA 74th Army Group guys who came to Singapore are likely to be a specially selected unit, it does not change the fact that the PLA is impressive — they are learning fast and have the ability to be much better soon.

6. Thanks for your responses.

 

[ngatimozart]

@Musashi_kenshin

You are arguing without supplying evidence to back your claims. Whereas OPSSG is basing his arguments on knowledge gained from either being in Taiwan, speaking to individuals within the Singaporean army who have been to Taiwan on duty, plus he's supplied evidence to back up his claims as well. Your arguments are starting to appear circular as well and this is getting to be a tad repetitive. I would strongly suggest that you start providing evidence to support your arguments.

 

[Musashi_kenshin]

But from a planning point of view, I would assume the worse and hope for the best; rather than the other way round.

I can understand that. However, in that scenario Taiwan is without a hope, which is why I've been assuming a more moderate sequence of events.

Thanks for your responses.

It was a very interesting discussion, thanks for taking the time to give me your views.

plus he's supplied evidence to back up his claims as well

I don't really have a problem with much of what OPSSG said. I'm just less pessimistic not least on the political and diplomatic front. I didn't dispute the particular sources he provided or even suggest that his views on the capability of the Taiwanese military were false (even if I thought a comparison with the quality of Singaporean personnel and equipment was a little unfair).

Your arguments are starting to appear circular as well and this is getting to be a tad repetitive.

That's fine, I don't have anything else to say for now, and I enjoyed discussing the issue with OPSSG.

 

[OPSSG]

I can understand that. However, in that scenario Taiwan is without a hope, which is why I've been assuming a more moderate sequence of events...

1. In the Indo-Pacific, there around 120 diesel electric submarines in these waters, with about 170 to 200 boats in total (if you count SSNs and SSBNs), on patrol. There were reports in April 2020 that the PLAN had taken delivery of two more Type 094s, which, if true, would bring the total number of these submarines in service to six. In February, the Office of Naval Intelligence told members of Congress that China only commissioned four of these submarines so far, though it expected six ballistic missile submarines to be in Chinese service by 2025 and eight by 2030. This total could eventually include some number of new Type 096 ballistic missile submarines, a follow-on class to the Type 094 that is reportedly in development.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1287941163521937409

2. Yulin is a major base for the PLAN's steadily larger and more modern submarine force, as well as its surface fleets, as well, and famously features a large network of underground facilities, including pens that submarines can sail in and out of directly. The Chinese will have about 59 to 64 modern diesel electric boats in the water.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1041568346821472256

3. The Koreans and Japanese each aim to have around 20 diesel electric submarines. Vietnam has 6, Indonesia has 5, Singapore has 4, Malaysia has 2 and even Mynmar has 1. Time seems to have stood still for the Taiwanese Navy, in relation to advancing their submarine capability — their 2 most capable boats were acquired from the Netherlands in the 1980s — the Hai Lung (Sea Dragon) and the Hai Hu (Sea Tiger) —in 2016, the Taiwanese Ministry of Defense began a life-extension upgrade for its Hai Lung-class submarines, extending their service life by fifteen years.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1111677432669618177

...even if I thought a comparison with the quality of Singaporean personnel and equipment was a little unfair.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1292850350442057728

4. If you compare Taiwan to its North East Asian neighbours (as major league players naval powers), the gap is much worse than when comparing it against South East Asian countries (the little league).

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1293589846095618049

5. China’s PLA(N) has encircled Taiwan by deploying it’s bombers in it’s artificially reclaimed islands the South China Sea.

6. With the KDX-III (Sejong the Great-class destroyers) and KDDX programs, the ROKN is really trying to build a blue water navy to almost rival the JMSDF. No one is expecting Taiwan to do the same; we just hope that they to do better in their program by making better use their existing resource allocation.

 

[swerve]

"The Koreans and Japanese each aim to have around 20 diesel electric submarines. "
Since JS Ōryū commissioned in March Japan has 20 in commission, plus two which were formerly front-line but are now training subs.

 

[OPSSG]

Some regional updates & JMSDF developments

1. Navies working together gives us the best chance for a peaceful outcome, to regional tensions — there is a strong incentive for the small navies to work with larger navies, to hone their skills.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1294243139473965056

2. Thanks to the Japanese PAO, we have these lovely images to share of four navies training and working together (namely, Australia, Brunei, Japan and Singapore), in this multi-national group sail, even before the start of RIMPAC 2020.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1140061705323417600

3. Japan's Acquisition Technology and Logistics Agency (ATLA) announced on 9 Aug 2017 the launch of a new surface vessel programme called 30DX for the JMSDF with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) selected as prime contractor. The first ship of the class is nearing completion. Prime Minister Abe has repeatedly earmarked increased funding for the nation's defence budget, expanding the capabilities of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) with plans to repeal the post-Second World War constitutional limitations and reinstate a power projection focused force structure and doctrine to be supported by Japan's industrial capability to modernise and equip itself in the face of growing regional instability and tensions.

4. Following approval in December 2018 for the conversion of the Izumo Class into aircraft carriers, imagery has emerged of the JNS Izumo as it undergoes the major structural modification and conversation to enable the vessels to host the F-35 and V-22 Osprey's planned to support the burgeoning anti-submarine, amphibious and expeditionary capabilities Japan currently has in development. The US$28 million modifications underway at Yokohama will clear and reinforce Izumo’s deck in order to transform the vessel from a helicopter carrier into a light aircraft carrier capable of supporting Japan’s 42 F-35B STOVL fighter jets.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1279812289344962561

5. It is envisaged that the modernised and converted Izumo Class will provide tactical and strategic mobility for the JSDF and enable them to support the rapid response deployment of the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force's (JGSDF) 'Amphibious Rapid Deployment' brigade.

6. This JSDF amphibious unit is similar to US Marine Expeditionary Units designed to defend Japanese interests in the South China Sea, namely the Senkaku Islands, which have served as a flash point between China and Japan.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1292143540022267904

7. Beyond Increased naval activities, the JSDF has its own A2AD strategy for the defence of its islands.

8. It is ironic that 75 years since World War II (WWII) ended in the Pacific with Japan's surrender, the country has returned back to operating carriers. The outcomes of the war in the Pacific can still be seen and felt today. Due to Japan's history of offensive operations during WWII, for decades, the JMSDF was prevented from operating aircraft carriers (as these were considered to be offensive weapons systems – capable of supporting power projection doctrines and 'hard power' policies).

9. In 2020, the region (except for China), welcomes Japan’s return to carrier aviation due to growing uncertainty of the regional security environment. JMSDF’s exercises with ASEAN navies is seen to promote a balance of power that favours ASEAN interests by strengthening their partnerships and military presence vs the PLA(N)’s attempts to unilaterally challenge the status quo through militarisation, provocation, gray-zone coercion, and salami slicing.

 

[swerve]

The Japanese Ministry of Defence used to have* on its website the official interpretation of what the constitution allowed & did not. It did not say that aircraft carriers were not allowed because they were offensive, but that offensive aircraft carriers were not allowed. A very significant distinction!

As I've often pointed out to people who said that Japan's constitution forbids it from having aircraft carriers, or x or y other weapon, the constitution says nothing at all about any specific weapon. What matters is the interpretation of the difference between "waging war" & "self defence", & the official interpretation was very carefully worded in both Japanese & English not to exclude aircraft carriers per se, but only offensive ones - whatever they are.

*May still have, but I've not checked recently.

 

[OPSSG]

The Japanese Ministry of Defence used to have* on its website the official interpretation of what the constitution allowed & did not. It did not say that aircraft carriers were not allowed because they were offensive, but that offensive aircraft carriers were not allowed. A very significant distinction!

As I've often pointed out to people who said that Japan's constitution forbids it from having aircraft carriers, or x or y other weapon, the constitution says nothing at all about any specific weapon. What matters is the interpretation of the difference between "waging war" & "self defence", & the official interpretation was very carefully worded in both Japanese & English not to exclude aircraft carriers per se, but only offensive ones - whatever they are.

*May still have, but I've not checked recently.

Agreed. They do explain. As extracted from the JSDF website:

“Under the Constitution, Japan is permitted to possess the minimum necessary level of self-defense capability. The specific limit is subject to change relative to the prevailing international situation, the level of military technologies, and various other factors, and it is discussed and decided through annual budget deliberations and other factors by the Diet on behalf of the people. Whether such capability constitutes a "war potential" that is prohibited by Article 9, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution must be considered within the context of Japan’s overall military strength. Therefore, whether the SDF should be allowed to possess certain armaments depends on whether such possession would cause its total military strength to exceed the constitutional limit.

The possession of armaments deemed to be offensive weapons designed to be used only for the mass destruction of another country, which would, by definition, exceed the minimum necessary level, is not permissible under any circumstances. For example, the SDF is not allowed to possess intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), long-range strategic bombers, or attack aircraft carriers.”

Further, the Japanese Government “has determined three conditions for the "use of force" as measures for self-defense permitted under Article 9 of the Constitution

1. When an armed attack against Japan has occurred, or when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness.

2. When there is no appropriate means available to repel the attack and ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people.

3. Use of force to the minimum extent necessary.”

 

[Vivendi]

My (layman) impression is that politics and strategy tend to drive the processes, more so than tactical considerations. The strategy will be driven by the objective of the players. I tend to agree with the analyst in the interview below; that the objective of the US will be to contain and limit China's influence. It's difficult to see that the US will readily sacrifise Taiwan if that's the objective. Thus the US will have to defend Taiwan in case of an attack; failure to do so will basically mean that they cannot reach the objective and the US strategy will have failed. I don't think we are there yet, but I may be wrong of course.

There is a serious chance that (China) could become a regional hegemon in Asia. And the United States does not tolerate peer competitors. The idea that China is going to become a regional hegemon is unacceptable to the United States.

Q: Your 2014 essay titled “Say Goodbye to Taiwan” stirred debate. Do you think the United States would abandon Taiwan if China intervenes?

A: I believe the United States will fight to defend Taiwan if China invades Taiwan. In my opinion, it's unthinkable that the United States would stand by and allow China to conquer Taiwan. If we didn't defend Taiwan, it would have devastating consequences for our relationship with Japan, South Korea and our other allies in East Asia.

I would say however, and this was why the editors at The National Interest had used the title “Goodbye Taiwan,” you can imagine a possible situation in 30 or 40 years where China has grown so powerful that the United States simply cannot defend Taiwan because of the geographical location.

Interview with John Mearsheimer

I don't think there will be an invasion of Taiwan any time soon; I think the Chinese understands the US strategy and therefore will not invade Taiwan until they have a decisive advantage over the US in the region. It seems odd to assume as JM does, that this could happen "in 30 or 40 years"; I would say it's almost impossible to predict when or if this will happen. I am not saying that as an expert of course (because I am not) but simply observing that it's impossible to make predictions about developments so far into the future.

 

[OPSSG]

@Vivendi, thanks for the Interesting link but don’t you think Americans tend to see things through the distorted lens of great power (or Sino-American) rivalry? Evidence suggests that China is emulating Russian tactics in the information space. Just as China is learning from Russia, democracies under threat can learn from one another to find common approaches to countering malign influence activities.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1295441515989225473

Sino-American rivalry is a valid and relevant point of view but it obscures intra-ASEAN tensions over excessive and overlapping EEZ claims.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1295515566631837696

Building interoperability for a possible future conflict with China involved could be a reason for some, but not all, participating navies in RIMPAC 2020. There are many other security scenarios where interoperability with the US Navy, JMSDF and the Australian Navy is required and RIMPAC is not just about war-fighting.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1295603770840080384

Japan of course keep great records of determined Chinese intrusion into Japanese waters (with the latest figures in Aug 2020): The numbers of Chinese government and other vessels that entered Japan's contiguous zone or intruded into territorial sea surrounding the Senkaku Islands (PDF).

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1295273481920081921

Pretty clear that the 4 ASEAN claimants in the South China Sea (SCS) need to get their act together before they can manage bigger fish — like the Chinese coastguard and the PLA(N). The Pinoys and Vietnamese tend to shoot own goals, as this case with Malaysia exemplifies.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1295282067370958848

In the case of the Pinoys, the May 2013, Guang Da Xing No. 28 incident comes to mind. Unlike the Pinoys, the Malaysians seemed to have followed escalation of force procedures.

 

[Sandhi Yudha]

Canada is sending at least two frigates, one of them with a (new?) camouflage/pattern livery.

RIMPAC: Exercise Rim of the Pacific 2020 Kicks Off - Naval News

Ten nations, 22 surface ships, one submarine, multiple aircraft, and approximately 5,300 personnel will participate in an at-sea-only iteration of the biennial Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise scheduled Aug. 17-31, in the waters around the Hawaiian Islands.

www.navalnews.com

 

[t68]

Canada is sending at least two frigates, one of them with a (new?) camouflage/pattern livery.

RIMPAC: Exercise Rim of the Pacific 2020 Kicks Off - Naval News

Ten nations, 22 surface ships, one submarine, multiple aircraft, and approximately 5,300 personnel will participate in an at-sea-only iteration of the biennial Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise scheduled Aug. 17-31, in the waters around the Hawaiian Islands.

www.navalnews.com

Looking at the photo of the disruptive pattern Canadian vessel I quite like it it. But in this day and age is it any real advantage anymore

 

[oldsig127]

Looking at the photo of the disruptive pattern Canadian vessel I quite like it it. But in this day and age is it any real advantage anymore

I think you'll find it's associated with the anniversary of the end of WW2. RCN played a major role in the Battle of the Atlantic. Not unusual to paint a commemorative scheme on aircraft, but bloody expensive on a ship

oldsi

 

[oldsig127]

Canada is sending at least two frigates

For the sake of interest HMA Ships Hobart, Arunta, Stuart and Sirius are taking part. One of the LHDs had been included but when the Exercise was changed to At Sea only I imagine they found better to do with an amphibious ship. Still one of our larger RIMPAC deployments.

oldsig

 

[OPSSG]

Canada is sending at least two frigates, one of them with a (new?) camouflage/pattern livery.

There is a strong historical focus this year. 75 years ago on 14 Aug 1945, war in the Pacific ended with Japan's surrender in World War II; the U.S-Japan Alliance after this surrender remains the cornerstone of peace and security in the Indo-Pacific for over seven decades.

As part of this historical focus, in mid-Aug a US Navy amphibious assault ship, USS Essex sailed into Hawaii, carrying an unusual collection of 14 vintage World War II planes that includes a P-51 Mustang fighter, B-25 Mitchell bomber, and Texan trainer, among other planes — with flyovers planned on 29-30 Aug and on 2 Sep 2020 in Hawaii.

#Warbirds flyovers

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1296449929586651141

For the 1st time, Korea will undertake the role of a task group commander in RIMPAC 2020.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1296437579559006210