Indo Pacific strategy
- Thread starter gonefishing
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Sandhi Yudha
Well-Known Member
I was quite surprised that the Bougainville A622 participated with RIMPAC 2020, but it seems that the ship is permanently based in Papeete, Polynésie française.
Bougainville (A622) — Wikipédia
fr.m.wikipedia.org
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thats only if China start much aggressively target everybody, i doubt china is that stupid to do that. They are still negotiating code of conduct. so far phillippine already bent to china, malaysia is typically have decent relationship with china, singapore is more neutral, indonesia/vietnam has more issue with china but still rely trading with china, cambodia is more friendly toward china. Thailand is purchasing weapon from china and got alot tourist from mainland. beside each of them on their own has dispute against each others.
Pentagon Report: China Now Has World’s Largest Navy as Beijing Expands Military Influence - USNI News
China is bent on creating a world-class military that can conduct joint operations across the globe and already boasts the world’s largest navy, according to the Pentagon’s latest annual assessment of the Chinese military. A “permanent condition of military inferiority is anathema” to China’s...news.usni.org
Well, as biggest fleet actually PLAN already achieve that for sometime. However the biggest fleet with increasingly blue water capabilities, that PLAN still struggling to achieve.
Thus with the latest strive at least in this decade, they're seems going to achieve that also.
Still this also run a question how they are going to achieve effective blue water operation. With increasingly aggressive behavior of PLAN and their quasi Navy the coast guards toward Chinese immediate neighbors, this will create increase spending for Navy in neighborhood.
If I see the Chinese Forums, those idiots ten cents seems only think the opposition for PLAN only come from USN. They're so sure without USN the rest of neighbors will meek down to mighty Chinese will and demand in the sea.
They're seems not graped the idea even without USN the neighbors will combine themselves toward China. The thinking of the more aggressive PLA/PLAF/PLAN will automatically delivered everyone to China demand.
This's kind of thinking that Third Reich hold. Those Chinese Nationalistics grass roots seems not conceiving the idea that combination of their neighbors Navy in the sea still have enough force to dettered PLAN access to Indies and Western Pacific. The idea of the rest of their Neighbors will submit to China whims without US support, seems ingrained in the head of those idiots.
How they're thinking that making adversarial reaction to China neighbors still ok, as long as they 'buy' friend in Africa, Iran, and South America. Those Chinese new friends can not be reach by China without access through their Neighbors.
Hope cooler heads still available in Chinese Administration, although with current administration in China, I have doubt on their continue prevailing.
Countering Chinese Propaganda Points
2. China’s land reclamation in the South China Sea is aimed at pushing its own sensor and weapons range so far into the Pacific that it becomes impossible for American forces to touch Chinese positions without risk to its fleet.
3. Working together with the 2 Chinese carriers, the Type 075 landing helicopter dock (075 LPD) built by the Hudong–Zhonghua Shipbuilding company offer a means of power projection into the South China Sea that solves the problems identified in the 2006 naval campaign design, described as “attacks against coral islands and reefs” (dui shanhu daojiao jingong zhanyi). At least three of the 075 LPDs are being built. With 8 Type 071 LPDs alone, the PLA(N) would already be able to project a force of more than 2 marine brigades within the 1st island chain, not to mention the other PLA that can be transported by the 60 or so LSTs displacing between 1,000 and 5,000 tons. By 2026, the PLA(N) would have acquired all the naval platforms needed to address prior logistics weaknesses identified and win in the naval campaign scenario against littoral states that was identified in 2006.
4. Certain Indo-Pacific navies, particularly those of Australia, China, Japan, Korea and Singapore—are acquiring or have acquired the types of force projection naval platforms that, taken together, increasingly provide them with what is required to fundamentally transform their fleets and their numbered naval flotilla. In particular, those systems related to precision strike, and above all C4ISR and networking comprise some of the key hardware ingredients essential to implementing a modern revolution in military affairs. These emerging capabilities, in turn, have the potential to significantly affect naval strategy and operations and alter the determinants of critical capabilities for success in modern naval warfare.
1. How would you explain plans to attack other littoral counties that are published in China’s military academies as campaign studies? The development of China’s operational campaign doctrine suggest that the PLA(N) has carefully studied how to create the conditions needed for fighting and winning against other claimants over these small islands and coral reefs.
(a) For example, in the 2006 edition of The Science of Campaigns contains a new type of naval campaign, described as “attacks against coral islands and reefs” (dui shanhu daojiao jingong zhanyi), a campaign scenario that appears to be tailored to the South China Sea disputes where China might consider attacking islands and reefs held by other claimants.
(b) The discussion of the campaign is brief, only five pages long. Moreover, most of the discussion highlights the obstacles and challenges that the PLA(N) would face, including the distance from the mainland and difficulties in command, air defense, and logistics support along with the harsh natural environment characterized by typhoons and subsurface obstacles. The emphasis on the difficulties in the discussion of this campaign is noteworthy.
2. China’s land reclamation in the South China Sea is aimed at pushing its own sensor and weapons range so far into the Pacific that it becomes impossible for American forces to touch Chinese positions without risk to its fleet.
(a) US Navy Capt (retd.) James Fanell has estimated that by 2030, the Chinese fleet will have a surface force of over 450 ships and a submarine force of about 110 boats. In his fifth State of the Nation Address (SONA) Duterte says he is inutile and Beijing is in possession of South China Sea: “China has the arms. We do not have it... They are in possession of the property... so what can we do? We have to go to war, and I cannot afford it, I cannot do anything.”
(b) Further, China’s Spratly Island outposts’ offer Beijing decisive information superiority against any challenger in the South China Sea. Their primary purpose is not military power projection and the deployment of weapons, but information power. The Chinese bases’ main contribution is to facilitate substantial command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities in the South China Sea.
3. Working together with the 2 Chinese carriers, the Type 075 landing helicopter dock (075 LPD) built by the Hudong–Zhonghua Shipbuilding company offer a means of power projection into the South China Sea that solves the problems identified in the 2006 naval campaign design, described as “attacks against coral islands and reefs” (dui shanhu daojiao jingong zhanyi). At least three of the 075 LPDs are being built. With 8 Type 071 LPDs alone, the PLA(N) would already be able to project a force of more than 2 marine brigades within the 1st island chain, not to mention the other PLA that can be transported by the 60 or so LSTs displacing between 1,000 and 5,000 tons. By 2026, the PLA(N) would have acquired all the naval platforms needed to address prior logistics weaknesses identified and win in the naval campaign scenario against littoral states that was identified in 2006.
4. Certain Indo-Pacific navies, particularly those of Australia, China, Japan, Korea and Singapore—are acquiring or have acquired the types of force projection naval platforms that, taken together, increasingly provide them with what is required to fundamentally transform their fleets and their numbered naval flotilla. In particular, those systems related to precision strike, and above all C4ISR and networking comprise some of the key hardware ingredients essential to implementing a modern revolution in military affairs. These emerging capabilities, in turn, have the potential to significantly affect naval strategy and operations and alter the determinants of critical capabilities for success in modern naval warfare.
Some more footage of the Type 075 sailing, and I'm no deck condition expert but that looks like fire damage on the flight deck aft of the island ?
Type 075 sailing aerial footage (source : Naval News Recap YouTube)
Type 075 sailing aerial footage (source : Naval News Recap YouTube)
I did a screen grab off your video link and it does look like smoke or heat damage to the deck covering anyway. The Buffer's been a tad slow in getting his painters on the job
i'm refer to directly occupy others island outright and start building bases on those occupied island. even than, if china only occupy said vietnam island, i can only see ASEAN been weary, but not enough to have a united alliance against china. especially given how malasia/laos/cambodia, to a degree thailand relationship with China. looking at how china occupy scarborough shoal, unless i'm wrong, i didn't heard any ASEAN nations significantly help phillippine on this subject. They each have their own agenda/interest too. However, i dont think china will do this for now, given current focus on US, trade war and all that, also india/china border dispute. I see this as potential opportunity for ASEAN to milk both China and US
as for plans to attack, every country has those. remember back in old days, US even have plan to invade canada. i'm sure US/russia/china all have certain plans to invade/attack each other, doesn't mean it will happen. hope for the best but prepare for the worst.
as for land reclamation, its provocative but not enough to get ASEAN to ally against China. we haven't seen them start doing that yet since 2012 when china start doing land reclamation. even vietnam/phillippine has its own land reclamation project, though on much smaller scale. However, if china outright occupy other island and start building bases than i can see ASEAN will bound together against china.
as for their navy, i never heard of any large economy that doesn't spend $$ upgrade their ships. especially given current US-China relationship.
From china perspective, ScS is basically China's monroe doctrine
Ananda
The Bunker Group
Seems from your posts, you're more see the belligerent action by Chinese only to ASEAN. In reality the Chinese actions already bring out reverse response from many of it's neighbors.
The Growing Indo-Pacific Dimension in Indonesia-Australia Relations
A recent interaction highlighted the convergences between the two countries in the wider strategic space amid continued challenges and limits.
thediplomat.com
This's an example, the idea of Indonesia, India and Australia put common stances, few years ago will be unthinkable. Both Indonesia and India has guard their respective 'independence' foreign policies, and putting similar standing with US close allies like Australia will be unthinkable.
However they're now talking due to common interest on how to cope with rising China. You're not talking on that scenarios if the neighbors are not worries with China behavior.
All three have big trade and Investment with China. Economically China importance are continue rising for all three of them.
This can potentially also bring Japan and South Korea interest later on. Both are wary to each other, and only US so far that can mediated both of them. However now both of them also have to think their increasingly common concern, the Chinese behavior.
China seems think that with Economics dependence of their neighbors on Chinese market and investment, means they will also willing to let China aggresive action.
This's which so far shown adverse action. Perhaps you're right, some of the smaller neighbors like Philippines, Cambodia, Thailand or even Malaysia will take more or less submissive position. However Vietnam not showing that, and other bigger economics neighbors, so far showing more adversarial response than what China hope for.
i'm sure there are country do some maneuvering like you mentioned. but an united ASEAN Aggressively against China. I dont think that will happen soon, unless china start invading islands left/right. Japan is also worry about China, and continue to arm itself, but still keep a decent relationship with China due to been one of their biggest trading partner. ASEAN/Japan/Skorea will only tolerate certain level of aggression from china, appropriate action have appropriate response. With US-China current situation, +india, last thing China want right now is alienated ASEAN/Japan/SKorea. So i see china continue arm up their bases in ScS, building ships, some fishing fleet issues etc, but these action not gonna push every ASEAN together and aggressively against China. i dont think they are going do a FON into 12 nm of chinese claimed island like US did right now.Seems from your posts, you're more see the belligerent action by Chinese only to ASEAN. In reality the Chinese actions already bring out reverse response from many of it's neighbors.
The Growing Indo-Pacific Dimension in Indonesia-Australia Relations
A recent interaction highlighted the convergences between the two countries in the wider strategic space amid continued challenges and limits.thediplomat.com
This's an example, the idea of Indonesia, India and Australia put common stances, few years ago will be unthinkable. Both Indonesia and India has guard their respective 'independence' foreign policies, and putting similar standing with US close allies like Australia will be unthinkable.
However they're now talking due to common interest on how to cope with rising China. You're not talking on that scenarios if the neighbors are not worries with China behavior.
All three have big trade and Investment with China. Economically China importance are continue rising for all three of them.
This can potentially also bring Japan and South Korea interest later on. Both are wary to each other, and only US so far that can mediated both of them. However now both of them also have to think their increasingly common concern, the Chinese behavior.
China seems think that with Economics dependence of their neighbors on Chinese market and investment, means they will also willing to let China aggresive action.
This's which so far shown adverse action. Perhaps you're right, some of the smaller neighbors like Philippines, Cambodia, Thailand or even Malaysia will take more or less submissive position. However Vietnam not showing that, and other bigger economics neighbors, so far showing more adversarial response than what China hope for.
the 3 countries you mention are not in good term with China right now. but ASEAN is more than just indonesia.
China may even try to cozy up ASEAN due to ongoing geopolitical situation. which i think is opportunity for ASEAN/Japan/SKorea. they could benefit from trade war.
also many these countries buying arms from China including indonesia, if diplomatic situation is bad, i doubt these sells will happen.
Ananda
The Bunker Group
Well, that's the problem. The trust on China will not doing aggresive action including invading dispute islands or forcefully control dispute waterways is eroding.
Again, the thinking on India and Indonesia willing to let go their non-aliagnce international stance and working out with Australia a known US allies is unthinkable few years back.
The fact now both India and Indonesia talking with Australia on building common stances shown China basically pushing some of the neighbors on common standing.
You seems still put the idea that with China problem with US and India, they will not allienated the rest of the neighbors. Logically China should not do that. Well, that's what happen.
Indonesia used to buy some weapons with China, few years back. However nothing as major system and only limited numbers.
Now there're no weapons system being order or talk with China. All the major system either with Euro, South Korea or US.
The Economics cooperation still there, the Investment also still happening. However more and more the neighbors especially the ones with relative larger economics, begin to preapare counter balances.
That's what seems the Chinese present administration shown conflicting massage to the neighbors. The trust is eroding.
Again, the thinking on India and Indonesia willing to let go their non-aliagnce international stance and working out with Australia a known US allies is unthinkable few years back.
The fact now both India and Indonesia talking with Australia on building common stances shown China basically pushing some of the neighbors on common standing.
You seems still put the idea that with China problem with US and India, they will not allienated the rest of the neighbors. Logically China should not do that. Well, that's what happen.
Indonesia used to buy some weapons with China, few years back. However nothing as major system and only limited numbers.
Now there're no weapons system being order or talk with China. All the major system either with Euro, South Korea or US.
The Economics cooperation still there, the Investment also still happening. However more and more the neighbors especially the ones with relative larger economics, begin to preapare counter balances.
That's what seems the Chinese present administration shown conflicting massage to the neighbors. The trust is eroding.
LAC Fiasco — continued segment 1
1. The situation along the LAC is one of heightened tension, which will need some sane handling from both sides and as such the talks should continue. There is always a probability of a spiral, wherein hardening of positions have the potential to lead to a skirmish. Any escalation is definitely not in the interest of either China or India. As China plans and prepares to challenge the US for global supremacy, some Indians think that China can not afford a conflict with India. While others believe China can afford the conflict.
2. Indian sources have reported that: "In Pangong Tso itself, Chinese troops withdrew only a bit and then stalled. And instead, the PLA has made preparations to sit out the winter. All military-to-military conversations in the past month have been quite rough and hostile, at times plain rude". Not sure what has changed in the dynamics of the withdrawal negotiations; but I am pretty sure Indian politicians will not be willing to pay the necessary price despite the fact that tensions remain.
3. The Indian army said in a statement that Chinese troops carried out military movements over the weekend to change the status quo on their disputed border in a fresh flare-up between the two sides (see: reut.rs/31L5WUS). The committing of the Special Frontier Force into Indian operations in Ladakh is a signal from New Delhi of how seriously it takes the Chinese intrusions and the lengths India will go to in combating them, said a senior diplomat and China expert.
4. The Chinese military spokesman said China is taking countermeasures and will safeguard its territorial sovereignty.
1. The situation along the LAC is one of heightened tension, which will need some sane handling from both sides and as such the talks should continue. There is always a probability of a spiral, wherein hardening of positions have the potential to lead to a skirmish. Any escalation is definitely not in the interest of either China or India. As China plans and prepares to challenge the US for global supremacy, some Indians think that China can not afford a conflict with India. While others believe China can afford the conflict.
2. Indian sources have reported that: "In Pangong Tso itself, Chinese troops withdrew only a bit and then stalled. And instead, the PLA has made preparations to sit out the winter. All military-to-military conversations in the past month have been quite rough and hostile, at times plain rude". Not sure what has changed in the dynamics of the withdrawal negotiations; but I am pretty sure Indian politicians will not be willing to pay the necessary price despite the fact that tensions remain.
3. The Indian army said in a statement that Chinese troops carried out military movements over the weekend to change the status quo on their disputed border in a fresh flare-up between the two sides (see: reut.rs/31L5WUS). The committing of the Special Frontier Force into Indian operations in Ladakh is a signal from New Delhi of how seriously it takes the Chinese intrusions and the lengths India will go to in combating them, said a senior diplomat and China expert.
4. The Chinese military spokesman said China is taking countermeasures and will safeguard its territorial sovereignty.
Sandhi Yudha
Well-Known Member
Indo-Pacific......everytime i read that word, ive the feeling we only talk about the Indonesia's surrounding waters and a part of the Pacific Ocean close to Indonesia.
Now Germany also shows more interest and have the wish to visit this region more often.
www.navalnews.com
Now Germany also shows more interest and have the wish to visit this region more often.
Germany Anticipates Growing Role in Indo-Pacific Region - Naval News
The German Government recently formulated the interests, principles and central areas of German policy in the Indo-Pacific region. The new guidelines are also a contribution to a possible European Union (EU) overall strategy for the region, the country’s Ministry of Defense stated on September 2.
www.navalnews.com
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1. Haha, me too.
2. German and French naval officers are deployed to the IFC in Singapore and they have a stake and vote in protecting NE Asian trade routes to Europe. Together they represent the core of EU’s internationals security policy and outlook going forward — in a future where American influence in the Indo-Pacific is on the steady decline
3. German Leopard 2 tanks, vehicles, submarine designs (Type 209 and Type 218SGS) and torpedoes are being sold to Indonesia and Singapore — they want to be a good security partner to the leader of ASEAN and also to their largest arms customer in ASEAN. Likewise for French arms sales to Indonesia and Singapore which includes H225Ms and NG MICA. In Jan 2020, Indonesian Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto held a bilateral meeting with his French counterpart Florence Parly, as the two countries aim to strike a defense cooperation deal, similar to the one they already have with Singapore.
4. By late 2030s, I expect Indonesia to outspend Singapore on defence and start to catch up with us in network centric warfare and making the country earn the title as the biggest growth market within ASEAN for European weapons.
5. Robert Kaplan and Elbridge Colby write in Foreign Affairs magazine that Americans should not see the necessary competition with China as primarily about ideology. Doing so will misconstrue the nature of the competition. Beijing’s motivations in pursuing its goal of regional hegemony are largely not ideological.
(a) China very likely seeks to form a regional trade area or bloc favorable to its economy. The idea behind the American shift to great power competition is not to be blindly confrontational but to preserve central objective of American foreign policy since the end of WWII. The freedom of states, particularly US allies and partners to chart their own courses wIthout interference from a domineering regional hegemon.
(b) The CCP’s drive for hegemony also has strategic purpose. China has long felt fenced in. wants to compel neighboring states, like India, Korea, Japan, Taiwan and ASEAN to take security cues from Beijing.
(c) After “century of humiliation,” China is eager to stand tall, asserting its power in Asia and beyond. None of these imperatives is strictly ideological. While the Australians, Americans and Europeans may wish for China to become less authoritarian, it's not their responsibility, necessary, nor would it solve all problems. The scale and growth of China’s power would cause profound concern for Australians, Americans and Europeans policymakers even if China were a democracy. So these countries must be clear-eyed and selective
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LAC Fiasco — continued segment 2
5. It was officially announced that Tenzin Nyima, a Company Commander of the Special Frontier Force (SFF) under the Indian Army, died as the result of an operation on the night of 29 Aug 2020 to enable the Indian army to seize high ground on the south bank of Pangong lake (allegedly to pre-empt a Chinese move).
6. On the north bank of the Pangong lake, the PLA has shifted the LAC to its advantage by about eight kilometres, from Finger 8 to Finger 4. On the south bank, however, the strongly held Thakung post – which has a mixed garrison of army soldiers and Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) troopers – continues to dominate the Pangong lake’s southern bank.
7. Even as the PLA’s continuing aggression in Pangong hogs the spotlight, senior Indian planners apprehend this might be a Chinese ploy to divert attention from Depsang, in Northern Ladakh, which might be China’s actual target.
8. Depsang offers the shortest and easiest route for Indian armoured columns to reach the strategic Tibet-Xinjiang road (Highway G219), the security of which is Beijing’s core sensitive in this area. PLA intrusions 15 kilometres into the Depsang sector have currently blocked Indian patrols’ routes to the LAC.
9. New Delhi would remember how Egypt imposed upon a far more powerful Israel a cost for its enmity, even fighting a limited war to bring Tel Aviv to the table. Israel’s crushing defeat of the combined Arab armies of Egypt, Syria and Jordan in the Six-Day War of 1967, coming soon after its victory in the 1948 War, had engendered a widespread impression of Israeli invincibility and Arab impotence. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat realized that his country was held hostage by the no-war-no-peace situation that existed with Israel. Knowing that an acceptable and sustainable peace settlement with Israel required Tel Aviv to be equally convinced of its benefits, Sadat ordered his military to prepare for a war with clear strategic aims.
10. According to Ajai Shukla, India must do what is necessary – including the use of military power – to enforce a PLA withdrawal to its side of the LAC. If China insists in the negotiations upon retaining its territorial gains, it must also feel the pain. This is feasible, now that India’s military has built up its numbers and neutralised the PLA’s head start.
11. The Indian Army has moved over a division worth of Special Forces to Ladakh, which can operate between Chinese positions and occupy tactically important heights to isolate them. The air force, despite its shortfalls in fighter aircraft and force multipliers such as airborne warning and control aircraft and mid-air refuellers, enjoys significant advantages over the PLA Air Force, whose aircraft would suffer major performance degradation from operating from the oxygen-starved, high-altitude airbases in Tibet. Unlike in 1962, Indian ground troops would benefit from close air support.
12. If the reports are correct, given the casualties on both the Indian Army and the PLA — they are at war, even if it is a limited war — both sides are hiding the scale of operations to reduce domestic alarm but make no mistake — no matter how misleading the Indian or Chinese politicians are, both armies have moved beyond Phase Zero planning into Phase 1 operations.
5. It was officially announced that Tenzin Nyima, a Company Commander of the Special Frontier Force (SFF) under the Indian Army, died as the result of an operation on the night of 29 Aug 2020 to enable the Indian army to seize high ground on the south bank of Pangong lake (allegedly to pre-empt a Chinese move).
(a) Certain less reliable news sources have reported that another two soldiers, including Tenzin Londhen, who was also critically injured in the same explosion, and is currently undergoing treatment at the military hospital in Ladakh. These soldiers belonged to the 7th Battalion of the SFF, a unit under the Indian Army made up of Tibetans. Indian soldiers call them the “Vikas Battalion”.
(b) PLA crossed into the Indian side of the LAC south of Pangong Tso lake, occupied a mountain called Helmet Top and began building fortifications.
(c) It has been reported that the SFF soldiers launched an operation to repel the Chinese intrusion around the Black Top Hill that had been occupied by Chinese soldiers. Black Top Hill adjoins Helmet Top and India’s important Thakung Post. Both Black Top and Helmet Top are on India’s side of the LAC. While details are classified, PLA soldiers are said to have been injured in the clash.
(d) There are differing accounts of what transpired but, according to one source, the SFF detachment clashed with Chinese troops and inflicted significant casualties on them. One Tibetan SFF officer was reportedly killed and at least two injured in the operation. PLA's political commissar would certainly be concerned with the use of SFF soldiers in an operation, given its implications for Tibet.
6. On the north bank of the Pangong lake, the PLA has shifted the LAC to its advantage by about eight kilometres, from Finger 8 to Finger 4. On the south bank, however, the strongly held Thakung post – which has a mixed garrison of army soldiers and Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) troopers – continues to dominate the Pangong lake’s southern bank.
7. Even as the PLA’s continuing aggression in Pangong hogs the spotlight, senior Indian planners apprehend this might be a Chinese ploy to divert attention from Depsang, in Northern Ladakh, which might be China’s actual target.
8. Depsang offers the shortest and easiest route for Indian armoured columns to reach the strategic Tibet-Xinjiang road (Highway G219), the security of which is Beijing’s core sensitive in this area. PLA intrusions 15 kilometres into the Depsang sector have currently blocked Indian patrols’ routes to the LAC.
9. New Delhi would remember how Egypt imposed upon a far more powerful Israel a cost for its enmity, even fighting a limited war to bring Tel Aviv to the table. Israel’s crushing defeat of the combined Arab armies of Egypt, Syria and Jordan in the Six-Day War of 1967, coming soon after its victory in the 1948 War, had engendered a widespread impression of Israeli invincibility and Arab impotence. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat realized that his country was held hostage by the no-war-no-peace situation that existed with Israel. Knowing that an acceptable and sustainable peace settlement with Israel required Tel Aviv to be equally convinced of its benefits, Sadat ordered his military to prepare for a war with clear strategic aims.
10. According to Ajai Shukla, India must do what is necessary – including the use of military power – to enforce a PLA withdrawal to its side of the LAC. If China insists in the negotiations upon retaining its territorial gains, it must also feel the pain. This is feasible, now that India’s military has built up its numbers and neutralised the PLA’s head start.
11. The Indian Army has moved over a division worth of Special Forces to Ladakh, which can operate between Chinese positions and occupy tactically important heights to isolate them. The air force, despite its shortfalls in fighter aircraft and force multipliers such as airborne warning and control aircraft and mid-air refuellers, enjoys significant advantages over the PLA Air Force, whose aircraft would suffer major performance degradation from operating from the oxygen-starved, high-altitude airbases in Tibet. Unlike in 1962, Indian ground troops would benefit from close air support.
12. If the reports are correct, given the casualties on both the Indian Army and the PLA — they are at war, even if it is a limited war — both sides are hiding the scale of operations to reduce domestic alarm but make no mistake — no matter how misleading the Indian or Chinese politicians are, both armies have moved beyond Phase Zero planning into Phase 1 operations.
Modus operandi of a Indian oxygen thief or two
1. Beware of fake news from Indian Twitter and sources during this period, just like past Indian claims of a Pakistani F-16 shootdown when it was an Indian MiG-21 Bison that was lost in an air-to-air encounter between the two rival air forces on 27 February 2019 during Operation Swift Retort.
2. It is also not uncommon for some Indian social media who support the BJP to attack the bearer of bad news or people who dare to point out the fake news from Indian social media.
3. I normally do not share Twitter Links from Indo Pacific News, as they seem to disproportionately share news that is unfavourable to China; but they are useful in providing background information and for updates on news related to the South China Sea. I think it is quite novel for certain Indian Twitter accounts to accuse the Indo Pacific News Twitter account of being pro-China, when it is anything but.
4. As I mentioned in another thread, in Asia, trade is strategy. Nothing unites North East Asian (NE Asian) interests like a threat to their shipping — which is why, both Korea and Japan have deployed naval ships to the Gulf of Aden.
5. Just because India has a border dispute with China it does not mean that the Indian Navy is free to escalate in any manner it likes. China is not at war with Japan, Korea, Taiwan or Singapore; and in a capitalistic society, businesses will seek profit, even if that profit is from moving China’s cargo in the Indian Ocean to get round an Indian blockade. Just as the South China Sea is not a Chinese lake, the Indian Ocean is not an Indian lake.
8. Three points to note: One, attempts by Indian strategists to talk about disrupting Chinese (aka NE Asian) trade routes in the Indian Ocean is not credible. Two, as a non-aligned state (free of alliance responsibilities), Indian attempts to get more than lip service sympathy from ASEAN members with regards to its border issues, with China or Pakistan, is doomed to failure. Three, China’s 3,700 plus merchant ships carry cargo from not just China but for NE Asia, and vice versa for the Japanese, Korean and Taiwanese merchant ships in these interlinked economies. Any Indian Navy attempt to disrupt commercial shipping will make it a pariah state.
7. Just because India has a border dispute with China it does not mean that the Indian Navy is free to escalate in any manner it likes. China is not at war with Australia, Japan, Korea, Taiwan or ASEAN members (like Indonesia and Singapore) and the businesses of these countries will seek profit, even if that profit is from moving container cargoes, bulk cargoes, oil and LNG cargoes that are ultimately destined for China, at a later stage, and transiting through the Indian Ocean.
8. The reverse is also true, just because China has a border dispute with India, it does not mean that the PLA(N) is free to escalate in any manner it likes.
1. Beware of fake news from Indian Twitter and sources during this period, just like past Indian claims of a Pakistani F-16 shootdown when it was an Indian MiG-21 Bison that was lost in an air-to-air encounter between the two rival air forces on 27 February 2019 during Operation Swift Retort.
2. It is also not uncommon for some Indian social media who support the BJP to attack the bearer of bad news or people who dare to point out the fake news from Indian social media.
3. I normally do not share Twitter Links from Indo Pacific News, as they seem to disproportionately share news that is unfavourable to China; but they are useful in providing background information and for updates on news related to the South China Sea. I think it is quite novel for certain Indian Twitter accounts to accuse the Indo Pacific News Twitter account of being pro-China, when it is anything but.
4. As I mentioned in another thread, in Asia, trade is strategy. Nothing unites North East Asian (NE Asian) interests like a threat to their shipping — which is why, both Korea and Japan have deployed naval ships to the Gulf of Aden.
5. Just because India has a border dispute with China it does not mean that the Indian Navy is free to escalate in any manner it likes. China is not at war with Japan, Korea, Taiwan or Singapore; and in a capitalistic society, businesses will seek profit, even if that profit is from moving China’s cargo in the Indian Ocean to get round an Indian blockade. Just as the South China Sea is not a Chinese lake, the Indian Ocean is not an Indian lake.
8. Three points to note: One, attempts by Indian strategists to talk about disrupting Chinese (aka NE Asian) trade routes in the Indian Ocean is not credible. Two, as a non-aligned state (free of alliance responsibilities), Indian attempts to get more than lip service sympathy from ASEAN members with regards to its border issues, with China or Pakistan, is doomed to failure. Three, China’s 3,700 plus merchant ships carry cargo from not just China but for NE Asia, and vice versa for the Japanese, Korean and Taiwanese merchant ships in these interlinked economies. Any Indian Navy attempt to disrupt commercial shipping will make it a pariah state.
(a) A simple way for China to avoid Indian Navy attempts to do so, would be to reflag 15% to 30% of Chinese flagged merchant ships to another flag (eg. Singapore, Panama, Marshall Islands, and Hong Kong to name 4 of the top 5 flag states). About 8,600 ships fly the Panamanian flag. By comparison China has just over 3,700 registered vessels. From decision to the massive reflagging (for 550 to 1,100 ships), this administrative task can be done in about 3 to 4 weeks. In the event of an Indian blockade, the PLA(N), wil just escort some of their own remaining merchant ships, with higher value cargos in convoys — in 2019, China had a 335-ship naval fleet, according to a US Congressional Research Service report — the PLA(N) is also well rehearsed in forming counter piracy escort groups for the last 12 years. The PLA(N) has the capability to conduct convoy escorts for its own merchant ships on the scale of Operation Earnest Will, conducted by the Americans, in 1987.
(b) If the Indian Navy plays its cards wrongly, and their dispute with the PLA(N) affects innocent merchant traffic, the RAN, JMSDF, ROKN, ROCN and RSN could end up running escorts to convoy NE Asian and Oceania cargo routes transiting through the Indian Ocean — esp container liner trade that is currently controlled by:
(i) Mitsui OSK Lines, NYK and Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha;
(ii) Hyundai Merchant Marine, CK Line, Dongjin Shipping, Don Woo Shipping, Dong Young Shipping, Hansung Line, Heueng-A Shipping, KMTC, Namsung Shipping, Pan Continental Shipping, Pan Ocean, Sinokor Shipping, SM Line and Tai Young Shipping;
(iii) Evergreen Line and Yang Ming Marine Transport; or
(iv) Pacific International Line.
(c) Japanese, Korean, Indonesian and Singaporean owned or flagged cargo ships would just enjoy high cargo usage — from a multi-modal transport cost point of view, cargo moved by sea is much cheaper than rail.
(d) For the energy trade, to evade an Indian Navy blockage, Chinese SOEs could also buy a portion of its supply from other trading hubs (eg. Singapore) or from sources that do not need to sail through the Indian Ocean. The LNG and oil will be owned by MNCs importing it into a port outside the reach of the Indian Navy — the Chinese would buy it there — thereafter, their merchant ships pick it up from the trading hub — by-passing an useless Indian Ocean blockage.
7. Just because India has a border dispute with China it does not mean that the Indian Navy is free to escalate in any manner it likes. China is not at war with Australia, Japan, Korea, Taiwan or ASEAN members (like Indonesia and Singapore) and the businesses of these countries will seek profit, even if that profit is from moving container cargoes, bulk cargoes, oil and LNG cargoes that are ultimately destined for China, at a later stage, and transiting through the Indian Ocean.
8. The reverse is also true, just because China has a border dispute with India, it does not mean that the PLA(N) is free to escalate in any manner it likes.
Ananda
The Bunker Group
If India blockade Chinese trade routes in Indies, it will only benefit China as so far China doesn't do any trade disruption in SCS.
Both Chinese and Indian forums, blogspot, media are full of Ten Cents and Fifty Rupees that their sole purpose to provide miss directions and Nationalistics Bravado to raised up tensions.
I put on other thread on how Indonesia, Australia and India talking toward building 'understanding' toward response on PRC development in SCS. However in same time (at least from Indonesia side), there's still unease with India especially under current BJP's administration. Both Xi Jinping and Modi are frequently drum up Nationalistics mood especially if facing internal problems.
If India unilaterally put disruption toward Chinese shipping in Indies International waters, then they will isolated them selves. There's no ground for Asean for instance to hindered PLAN movement to Indies Ocean from their water, as India open the front first.
Pakistan for sure will give access to PLAN on their ports and perhaps joining them to counter Indian Navy. What can also happen is for Both Srilanka and Bangladesh to take sides with China. Thus if Indian Navy doing unprovoked actions toward Chinese trade in Indies, they are just isolating it self, and only drove their other South Asian neighbors toward China.
That will be extremely unproductive for India, as standing now only Pakistan that openly gang up against India with China.
Both Chinese and Indian forums, blogspot, media are full of Ten Cents and Fifty Rupees that their sole purpose to provide miss directions and Nationalistics Bravado to raised up tensions.
I put on other thread on how Indonesia, Australia and India talking toward building 'understanding' toward response on PRC development in SCS. However in same time (at least from Indonesia side), there's still unease with India especially under current BJP's administration. Both Xi Jinping and Modi are frequently drum up Nationalistics mood especially if facing internal problems.
If India unilaterally put disruption toward Chinese shipping in Indies International waters, then they will isolated them selves. There's no ground for Asean for instance to hindered PLAN movement to Indies Ocean from their water, as India open the front first.
Pakistan for sure will give access to PLAN on their ports and perhaps joining them to counter Indian Navy. What can also happen is for Both Srilanka and Bangladesh to take sides with China. Thus if Indian Navy doing unprovoked actions toward Chinese trade in Indies, they are just isolating it self, and only drove their other South Asian neighbors toward China.
That will be extremely unproductive for India, as standing now only Pakistan that openly gang up against India with China.
Modus operandi of a Indian oxygen thief or two - Segment 2
10. Recently Indian nationalists had encouraged a boycott of Malaysian palm oil due to comments by Dr M, when he was PM. It would be accurate to say that some citizens in Malaysia are hostile to the BJP government — it is just that the Malaysian government cannot at this time afford to be openly hostile.
12. The Indian Navy can posture differently and force the PLA(N), to increase its deployments to the IOR and there is no need to push neutrals with capable navies, like Australia, Korea, Japan or Singapore, to be hostile to India by enacting an Indian Ocean blockade on Chinese shipping. I am certain Modi does not dare to announce a blockade against Chinese shipping; and the Indian Navy will advice against it. For an objective analysis, there is an excellent US-China ESRC report to provide background. The PLA Navy has extended combat reach to Indian Ocean (with useful reference to IISS Military Balance to get a sense of perspective).
13. Even President Kennedy did not dare utter that phrase in 1962 and called it a naval quarantine during the Cuban Missile Crisis. We should also remember that:
14. As I mentioned, both India and China have moved into Phase One (beyond Phase Zero planning). No one wants to declare war but this tense situation at the Sino-Indian border will result in more deaths in the days ahead, even if war is not declared.
17. As the Americans have noted, Singapore has pursued close relationships with India, the United States and China while attempting to protect its autonomy in foreign affairs; and remains dedicated to its relationship with the United States, as exemplified by its robust economic and security ties — including a fighter fleet (F-16V, F-15SG & F-35B) that is all made in America. The United States and Singapore hold an annual Strategic Partnership Dialogue to strengthen bilateral cooperation and to discuss ways to expand collaboration in new areas. One mechanism that further strengthens mutual cooperation for the benefit of the Asia-Pacific region is the Third Country Training Program (TCTP). Aimed at providing technical assistance and training to ASEAN member states.
18. At the same time, Beijing seeks a closer economic and military relationship with Singapore. Rhetorical commitment to greater security ties with China, as well as our role as a financial hub for China’s BRI, demonstrates the challenges Singapore faces in hedging between India, the United States and China. Likewise, in Jul 2018, India and Singapore have elevated their ties to the ‘strategic partnership’ level and signed bilateral agreements to upgrade defence cooperation, including ministerial-level dialogue and in areas like cyber security, shipping and civil aviation, during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit.
9. Agreed.
10. Recently Indian nationalists had encouraged a boycott of Malaysian palm oil due to comments by Dr M, when he was PM. It would be accurate to say that some citizens in Malaysia are hostile to the BJP government — it is just that the Malaysian government cannot at this time afford to be openly hostile.
11. A blockade is a declaration of war — no responsible Indian politician who understand its grave implications for India would dare to do it. The Soviets and Cubans were actively shooting at the USAF, as they conducted over flights on Cuba in 1962 and not one In the Kennedy administration was willing to declare war, officially.
12. The Indian Navy can posture differently and force the PLA(N), to increase its deployments to the IOR and there is no need to push neutrals with capable navies, like Australia, Korea, Japan or Singapore, to be hostile to India by enacting an Indian Ocean blockade on Chinese shipping. I am certain Modi does not dare to announce a blockade against Chinese shipping; and the Indian Navy will advice against it. For an objective analysis, there is an excellent US-China ESRC report to provide background. The PLA Navy has extended combat reach to Indian Ocean (with useful reference to IISS Military Balance to get a sense of perspective).
13. Even President Kennedy did not dare utter that phrase in 1962 and called it a naval quarantine during the Cuban Missile Crisis. We should also remember that:
(a) India got its ass kicked during 1962 Sino-Indian Border Conflict. The 1962 Sino-Indian border war was inevitable due to diplomatic meltdown and the ‘denied negotiation’ with each side being stuck at its ideological calling. By 1962 both India and China had developed two different notions of negotiations, with each misunderstanding the other. Such erroneous conclusions and recommendations gave further weight to the stringent diplomatic stance.
(b) If war occurred in 2020, the PLA is expected to kick the Indian Army on its ass. The Indian Army is brave (but being brave is not the issue) and the country has many options that would make the PLA regret any prior bravado — but then Indian Army is not expected to win against a determined PLA on a land battle — as a retired Indian Army Col has suggested, New Delhi would remember how Egypt imposed upon a far more powerful Israel a cost for its enmity, even fighting a limited war to bring Tel Aviv to the table.
(c) The Indian Army has 7 battalions of SFF paratroopers recruited from the Tibetan refugee community in India. Trained and equipped for operations behind Chinese lines, these troops, once inside Tibet, would live off the land, dependent for food and shelter on a restive Tibetan populace that is intensely hostile to the Chinese. Any stirring up of the Kashmir insurgency by China, or by Pakistan at its behest, would see the SFF being launched into action immediately.
14. As I mentioned, both India and China have moved into Phase One (beyond Phase Zero planning). No one wants to declare war but this tense situation at the Sino-Indian border will result in more deaths in the days ahead, even if war is not declared.
15. Agreed.
16. From an ASEAN perspective, India is also a threat to our economic growth if they are silly enough to impose a blockade on Chinese shipping.
17. As the Americans have noted, Singapore has pursued close relationships with India, the United States and China while attempting to protect its autonomy in foreign affairs; and remains dedicated to its relationship with the United States, as exemplified by its robust economic and security ties — including a fighter fleet (F-16V, F-15SG & F-35B) that is all made in America. The United States and Singapore hold an annual Strategic Partnership Dialogue to strengthen bilateral cooperation and to discuss ways to expand collaboration in new areas. One mechanism that further strengthens mutual cooperation for the benefit of the Asia-Pacific region is the Third Country Training Program (TCTP). Aimed at providing technical assistance and training to ASEAN member states.
18. At the same time, Beijing seeks a closer economic and military relationship with Singapore. Rhetorical commitment to greater security ties with China, as well as our role as a financial hub for China’s BRI, demonstrates the challenges Singapore faces in hedging between India, the United States and China. Likewise, in Jul 2018, India and Singapore have elevated their ties to the ‘strategic partnership’ level and signed bilateral agreements to upgrade defence cooperation, including ministerial-level dialogue and in areas like cyber security, shipping and civil aviation, during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit.
@OPSSG an ANI article that supports you argument about the futility of the Indian Navy of attempting to block PRC trade in the Indian Ocean. It suggests different reasons, but has the same end result.
navalinstitute.com.au
Delusion of India throttling China’s maritime trade | The Australian Naval Institute
navalinstitute.com.au
Modus operandi of a Indian oxygen thief or two - Segment 3
20. Beijing's disdain for New Delhi is clear. The PLA flatly refuses to return to its side of the border, or to define the LAC — going so far as to tell Indian ministers that Indian troops need to behave. Sources on the ground say the PLA brought along enough building materials to Helmet Top to construct fortifications for 300 to 400 soldiers.
21. Patience is running out on the Indian Army which believes China is tying it down in fruitless dialogue, while continuing its aggression on the ground. Also, Indian Army has concerns that PLA is really focused on changing LAC in Depsang, while diverting Indian attention towards Pangong. But the Indian Army is not without options for escalation at the Sino-Indian border — but these are hard choices to make for the political class. The best option is to occupy unheld territory with SSF and Scouts and then trade.
22. Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) General Bipin Rawat has stated that, if dialogue does not persuade Beijing to withdraw its troops from Indian territory in Ladakh, a military option remained on the table.
19. Thanks for that link — a naval blockade against Chinese shipping is not an option on the table for the Indian Navy. Those who suggest it are idiots.@OPSSG an ANI article that supports you argument about the futility of the Indian Navy of attempting to block PRC trade in the Indian Ocean. It suggests different reasons, but has the same end result.
Delusion of India throttling China’s maritime trade | The Australian Naval Institute
20. Beijing's disdain for New Delhi is clear. The PLA flatly refuses to return to its side of the border, or to define the LAC — going so far as to tell Indian ministers that Indian troops need to behave. Sources on the ground say the PLA brought along enough building materials to Helmet Top to construct fortifications for 300 to 400 soldiers.
21. Patience is running out on the Indian Army which believes China is tying it down in fruitless dialogue, while continuing its aggression on the ground. Also, Indian Army has concerns that PLA is really focused on changing LAC in Depsang, while diverting Indian attention towards Pangong. But the Indian Army is not without options for escalation at the Sino-Indian border — but these are hard choices to make for the political class. The best option is to occupy unheld territory with SSF and Scouts and then trade.
22. Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) General Bipin Rawat has stated that, if dialogue does not persuade Beijing to withdraw its troops from Indian territory in Ladakh, a military option remained on the table.