Indo Pacific strategy

[StingrayOZ]

The PM has categorically stated that missiles will not be based in Darwin and further that the US has not asked them to be based in Darwin.
Peter Jennings was interviewed on Speers today and suggested that the most likely places will be Japan or S.Korea. This would be in answer to Chinese and N. Korean deployments of intermediate range missiles which have not been part of the defunct treaty (ignored by Russia).

Would seem to be an odd place to put them in Darwin. But putting them there drives newspaper sales and clicks.

I think increasing missiles in Japan and S.Korea is very likely. However, I do think in the current climate Australia announcing it was acquiring 16 long range missiles would be a complete non-event and likely supported by those in our region and probably not even register with China. LRASM or similar. It is expected the LRASM is to be IOC on the F-18SH this year, so I am expecting something more around that space for Australia.

Either that and/or possible ICBM interception acquisition starting..

Jennings aired these views 12 months ago Trump means we need a ‘Plan B’ for Defence

The Darwin port thing is likely to become a bit of a political football. Wonder where it will end up. Don't see nationalizing it, happening. It just isn't that important. Plenty of other places to set up military ports. I think its more about the NT government trying to get money out of the commonwealth more than anything.

 

[OPSSG]

Post 1 of 3: The Quad will not work

I have started this thread for discussion of all issues pertaining to strategy and geopolitics in the Far East, especially with a maritime focus.

1. Thank you and I have merged other relevant posts to your thread.

Currently, there is a major history shift in geopolitical power underway. For the last 70 years or so, global commerce via sea routes, and thus the global economy, has been able to thrive due to the US navy’s command of the world’s oceans. This is changing today as a wealthy China builds the navy strength to rival American naval strength. What will be the consequences of this challenge to American maritime hegemony?

2. Hard to say but StingrayOZ and Raven22 have excellent posts that I quote in Posts 2 and 3 below for their insights. In addition, on 7 August 2019, Prof. Anthony H. Cordesman of CSIS published a comprehensive series of articles on China and the United States: Cooperation, Competition, and/or Conflict. The net assessment is divided into eight major sections, with links to 3 sections provided here:

• PART ONE: China's National Strategy provides summaries of China’s evolving strategy using direct quotes from its key white papers, particularly its 2019 Defense White Paper. It then provides similar excerpts from the new U.S. National Security and National Defense Strategies that the United States issued in 2017 and 2018, and from assessments of Chinese strategy by the U.S. Director of National Intelligence, the Department of Defense, DIA, and INDOPACOM.
• PART SIX: China, the U.S., and Other Asian Powers — Competing Claims in Asia and the Pacific focuses on the competing Chinese and other country claims in the Western Pacific and the Chinese build-up of forces in the South China Sea that is a key U.S. strategic concern.
• 
  
• PART EIGHT: Chinese Force Development and Modernization examines the key force trend in each major aspect of Chinese force development. Once again, the quotes are provided from both Chinese White Papers and U.S. strategy documents and official assessments of China’s forces.

One response has been an attempt at forming an alliance to balance growing Chinese influence, known as the Quad. This group includes the US, Japan, India and Australia. This is not a formal alliance in the tradition of NATO, as each of the participants has different goals. How relevant is it in Asia’s security architecture?

3. The ‘free and open Indo-Pacific strategy’ most stridently championed by the US is to some extent supported by members of the Quad security bloc, but ASEAN refuses to be drawn into any configuration which focuses on a putative China threat (see: America and Japan's vision of an Indo-Pacific free from Chinese threat runs into deep waters). With regard to the Quad:

One, we should note that Indian navy chief Adm. Sunil Lanba "made it quite clear that there wasn't an immediate potential for a quad."

Two, the Indians are obsessed with Pakistan and their domestic Kashmir related issue. In August 2019, India’s PM Modi and his Hindu-nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party are stirring the pot again, fulfilling a longtime BJP campaign promise by moving to strip Kashmir of the special status it has enjoyed under India's constitution for decades. The move will delight Modi's base, but revoking long-standing concessions to the region, including its own constitution, flag, autonomy in local decision-making and special property rights for residents will infuriate Kashmiris, who are fiercely protective of their culture, and risks escalating tensions with Pakistan once more.

Three, the Quad does not work, as the Indians have their own agenda and problems — and it is inevitable that Donald Trump will soon focus on opening up the Indian markets (by trade war if necessary), unless his ego is satisfied after his fight with China.

From the Chinese point of view, have they done anything wrong? They argue that if America can aspire to be a great power, why can’t they? Were the Athenians correct in their speech to the Melians, as reported by Thucydides: “The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must”?

4. Let me share four more points on ‘might is right’:

One, I think that the narrative of ‘might is right’ applies very well to the US, as a bully, under the Trump administration — whose more hawkish members are hostile to trade and international institutions. The bigger problem is Trump’s naked and unwieldy money grabbing approach to US allies in Asia, without any understanding of the region’s political history and geo-economics.

Two, with regard to disputes in the Sea of Japan and the South China Sea, let me add 2 sub-points:

(i) If China keeps its goals moderate from 2019 till 2021, they win. If China's goals are slightly less than moderate but freedom of navigation for trade is not impeded prior to 2026, they will also win - where the ‘new normal’ is tense and China continuously pushes the ‘red line’. Not only has China built military facilities in the South China Sea; it also deploys offensive capabilities, conducts exercises and actively prevents other vessels and aircraft (be they reconnaissance, civilian fishery or commercial resource exploitation) from conducting their activities. Operations in the South China Sea have developed into ‘grey zone’ warfare, employing a mixture of military coercion, economic inducement, information warfare, and even historical narratives. More importantly, non-claimant stakeholders with vital interest in the region are also targeted. Involvement of these third parties provides Beijing with a pretext to continue its militarisation; for instance, Beijing continuously calls-out US conducted FONOPs as military escalations.

(ii) But if China starts shooting prior to 2026 they lose (continuing from our 2016 post on round 3: 2021 to 2026, of the disputes in the South China Sea). Their goals in the South China Sea till 2031 (round 4) are achieved, all without firing a single shot, as per Sun Tzu - ‘The biggest victory is the one that requires no battle’. So shooting is something China does not intend on doing. They don't need to.​

Three, by 2049, everything between China and the other claimant states in South East Asia can be re-negotiated in China's favour (especially if Trump wins a second term and keeps its current trajectory as America Ignored). The rise of China and the US' retreat from multilateralism has provoked widespread anxiety over the future of the “liberal international order.”

 

[OPSSG]

Post 2 of 3: The limits of bullies in a multi-polar world

Four, Trump’s bully boy approach hasn’t gotten him all that far. He did manage to orchestrate a successor deal to NAFTA—one that looked a lot like its predecessor—and extract some more defense money from NATO countries. So far, however, there haven’t been a lot of other goodies—and some experts say any short-term gain from the strong-arming tactics can come at a long-term cost. Today, foreign leaders can brush off the insults. Tomorrow, they might be less willing to strike a deal—or even face domestic political pressure to avoid one, lest they be seen as folding to the demands of a president who is deeply unpopular abroad. Trump’s bullying approach to demanding more monetary contributions from long-time allies is problematic for both Japan (and Korea), with Japan a supportive bill paying member of the Quad. See: Trump's push for South Korea to pay more for U.S. troops puts Japan on notice | The Japan Times

• In July Japan announced it would tighten control over three chemicals — fluorinated polyamides, photoresists, and hydrogen fluoride — that are crucial to producing semiconductors in Korea. Under new regulations, Japanese companies would need a license for each chemical to import them to South Korea, and the process could take up to 90 days. Tokyo imposed restrictions on exports crucial to tech giants such as Samsung following a series of South Korean court rulings ordering Japanese firms to pay for wartime labour. Then on 1 August 2019, Japan removed Seoul from its “white list,” the first time a country has been removed from Tokyo’s list of trade partners with minimum export regulations. Two weeks later, South Korea returned fire by announcing it would remove Japan from its own white list.
  
• “Under previous administrations of whatever political stripe, the credibility of the U.S. commitment—and vigorous arm-twisting when required—tended to keep Japan-South Korean spats within bounds,” said Stewart Patrick of the Council on Foreign Relations. “Trump’s periodic questioning of the U.S. strategic posture and his general unpredictability have increased hedging behavior.” Minus a strong U.S. presence, Japan is acting more aggressively than it has in many decades. Earlier this month, Tokyo abruptly removed most-favored-nation status from Seoul over lingering issues dating from Japan’s forced-labor and forced-prostitution practices during the war, after a South Korean court ordered that Japanese firms must compensate wartime victims.
  
• In mid-Aug 2019 President Trump said in a tweet that "South Korea has agreed to pay substantially more money to the United States in order to defend itself from North Korea," in an apparent move to mount the pressure on Seoul ahead of the cost sharing negotiations set to kick off in the near future. This comes as the negotiation for 11th Special Measures Agreement (SMA) is expected to start soon, with this year's deal expiring at the end of this year. In February 2019, South Korea and the U.S. signed a new deal that increased Seoul's contribution for stationing American troops by 8.2 percent to 1.04 trillion won ($861 million).
• "It seems the pressure from the U.S. side will be quite strong this time, considering the media reports that the U.S. might ask South Korea to pay $5 billion, which was about 6 trillion won," said Shin Beom-chul, a senior research fellow at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies. He was referring to recent reports citing an anonymous diplomatic source which said Bolton asked for $5 billion when he visited Seoul last month.
• "The South Korean government is likely to delay the decision to send its naval fleet to the Strait of Hormuz as well as its decision whether it would deploy more U.S. weapons, as the cost sharing negotiations will not end by the end of this year," Shin said

Finally, there is a growing arms race among many regional countries, enabled by greater prosperity and concerns about Chinese intention...

5. IMO, not even Japan or India combined can compete in a naval arms race with China going forward. No naval arms race by any Asian power against China is possible — if there is an arms race, China has won it. Especially given the rapid development and growth in tonnage has seen the PLA(N); where they have surpassed the combined naval fleets of S. Koreans and the Indians in JUST one decade.

• For Beijing its naval rivals were, strategically, the US Navy but Japan was highlighted as the more immediate concern, in light of ‘naval hatred stretching over 100 years’, Diaoyu Islands sovereignty, maritime boundaries in the East China Sea, and the possibility of Japanese military interference in the Taiwan issue and the South China Sea.
• Additionally, Vietnam and the Philippines were listed as ‘local tactical opponents’ and India as a ‘potential blue water opponent’. The PLA(N) is building warships at an unprecedented rate. It now operates an aircraft carrier, 33 destroyers, 50 frigates, 41 corvettes, 109 missile boats and 75 submarines – a fleet three-to-five times the size of India’s.

The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) has a fleet of 154 ships and 346 aircraft and even the very capable Japanese need to adjust to the new reality of the PLA(N) at their door step.

I think that there is a point coming where both Australia and NZ will have to make hard decisions about their relationships with China. My hope is that both countries make the same decision for similar reasons... : trade or sovereignty?

Its complicated. You want to engage and trade, but also not be usurped. Trade mean $'s and $'s can be spent on defense. China doesn't have to be feared or hated because its China, is the actions they do that will get them in trouble.

Australia seems to be proceeding that both outcomes are happening at the same time, we are both heading towards war, and heading towards peace. There are soft and hard power aspects at play you want to keep in the game.

China opening fire on a small ship from a tiny powerless non-aligned nation is one thing. China opening fire on significant regional/global power alliance, with tremendous military capability, and its biggest trading partners is quite another. Australia has been absolutely critical in disrupting China's muscle flexing and power games in the region.

I don't know about a quadrilateral, but we definitely have a tri-part understanding between the US, Australia and Japan. That is literally what Talisman Sabre was all about. All under Australian command (this time).

As for Australia, more than any other country on the planet, I think is quite clearly tooling up.... We aren't reliant on the unreliable's to be able to do that, but we also can't do it alone.

There are also opportunities at levels other than high intensity war against a peer. China is winning in the soft power war, not the hard power war.

The LHD's have already shaped the region. They are tangible examples of Australia's capability and commitment. Being able to front up in the region after disaster, instability, terrorism, threats that disturb peace and prosperity and fix it. That is power. That is the power other nations leaders crave. The security, prosperity and development of their nation.

They were never for invading mainland China/Imperial Japan/Nazi Germany/alien base in an Amphibious Assault. Doesn't mean amphibious landings will never happen, and won't be strategically important, and aren't a good exercise to conduct with them with partnering nations...

6. Only the US can engage in a naval arms race with China, to resolve its security dilemma. For the security dilemma to manifest itself there has to be evidence that both sides are consciously arming against each other. Interestingly, the US has recently started to hint that certain weapons would be ideal for a confrontation with China. Three key weapons systems are a good measure of American plans for a potential China contingency: the increased and sustained production of Virginia-class nuclear powered attack submarines (SSNs), the resurrection of the Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyer (DDG), and the development of the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM). In the event of hostilities between the US Navy and the PLA(N), a crucial American tactical advantage would be in submarine warfare, with SSNs as the key. Although the real or perceived challenge of the Chinese military has been on American strategic planners’ minds since at least the late 1990s, the American SSN arsenal was allowed to decline from a high of 98 in 1987, to just 51 at the end of the 2018 fiscal year.

 

[OPSSG]

Post 3 of 3: Role of agency by a middle power

7. While China is growing in naval capability, the PLA is not an invasion threat to Singapore or Malaysia because:

(i) the PLA is not designed to fight in complex urban terrain in maritime South East Asia; and

(ii) Singapore by itself has 6 divisions and in many war scenarios, the SAF only needs 2 divisions to defend Singapore, leaving 4 divisions for for a forward defence (for details see: The best strategy to defending Singapore Island). IMO the PLA can easily project this much power to Vietnam or Myanmar (with whom they share a land border) and even to Taiwan in the near future. BUT the PLA does not have the ability to project so much power, to the Straits of Singapore which is around 2,500km away from mainland China.​

Which is why there is no need to be hostile to a country that is not a realistic invasion threat, even in the 2032 to 2036 time frame (round 5), when Singapore will shrink our forces by 1/3). China is seeking to enhance its limited military to military relationships with Singapore. As such, Singapore and China have agreed on an updated defence agreement that could see them increase the scale of existing military exercises, with new areas of cooperation between troops. The revised Agreement on Defence Exchanges and Security Cooperation (ADESC) is expected to be signed later in 2019.

The PLA and the SAF successfully concluded Exercise Cooperation, a small scale bilateral army exercise, held from 27 July to 5 August 2019. Launched in 2009, Exercise Cooperation is in its fourth edition. This 2019 exercise underscores the warm and friendly bilateral defence relations between Singapore and China, and enhances mutual trust and understanding between the SAF and PLA. Besides bilateral exercises, the two armed forces also interact regularly through high-level exchanges, mutual visits, cross-attendance of courses and port calls.

8. Trump “has a transactional approach to international relations, in which there is little regard for historic allies or even traditional enemies. It is all about getting headlines in U.S. media that might endear Trump to his base at home,” said former Pakistani Ambassador to the U.S. Husain Haqqani. Other nations are increasingly going their own way as it becomes clear that the Trump administration has only one consuming interest—its own—and no desire to even discover what anyone else’s interests might be. We’ve seen it in East Asia, with Trump ignoring regional threats from North Korea’s new missile tests and taking little part in the recent uproar between Japan and South Korea—precisely the sort of spat a more credible Washington has prevented in the past. We’ve seen it as other nations declined to join a U.S.-led tanker protection force in the Persian Gulf, though the United Kingdom, under new Trump-friendly Prime Minister Boris Johnson, may sign on. Trump’s philosophy of “America First” has become, in practice, something more: America Only.

9. For better or worse, China is ASEAN’s neighbour and we have to figure out a way of growing together and managing any disputes going forward without American leadership. That is why it is also important for ASEAN and Oceania defence forces to modernise and be more professional in our outlook and interactions — to deserve a seat at the table with US and China. With a world order that is moving towards greater multipolarity, Australians and Singaporeans are showing the way forward in balanced force development and training for our respective military forces, with a particular focus on:

(i) maturing our tertiary air forces for power projection and persistence — Exercise Pitch Black, set in the top end city of Darwin, Australia, gives Singaporean airmen an opportunity to train with the Australians bi-annually;

(ii) raising, training and sustaining our submarine forces for prolonged undersea ASW operations with the forthcoming introduction of the Invincible class (or Type 218SG) in the mid-2020s for Singapore and the Australian plans for the Attack class submarines in the mid-to-late 2030s, with the design work already started; and

(iii) developing an improved capability for amphibious operations — Exercise Trident, a signature bilateral exercise between the militaries of Australia and Singapore which features a heli-insertion operation and ship-to-shore operation at the Shoalwater Bay Training Area in Queensland.​

I think that before you talk capability, you have to talk the strategy behind it. Try as I might I simply can’t think of any plausible scenario that would see a power try to destroy merchant ships wholesale on the high seas.

When we discuss this of course, we are really discussing China. While Russia has the ability to cause a nuisance in places like the middle east that will disrupt trade (and drive up oil prices to their own benefit) they certainly don’t have the moxy to destroy trade anywhere relevant to Australia. So that leaves China.

But how does China making a concerted effort to destroy international trade, like Germany in the world wars, possibly align with their national interest? They want to control the world trade, not destroy it. International trade, and the prosperity it brings to China, is the only thing keeping the domestic population happy and content (and stopping them getting all finger-pointy at the government). Take away that prosperity and China’s own population would become a much bigger problem than any external aggressor (hence why China are trying to develop their domestic consumer appetite, and reduce reliance on exports for their growth).

I can certainly see China deliberately disrupting trade, in an un-attributable way, as a cassius bellito stick their nose where is doesn’t belong (‘the continued disruption of international trade has forced us to deploy a naval task group to the Malacca Straights to secure trade in the region…’), but wholesale destruction of the world’s merchant ships can’t possibly be in their national interest.

Comparisons to the world wars aren’t very helpful, in my opinion. Germany used submarine warfare as an exhaustion strategy against the UK, because there was no other option available. Due to the allied blockade they had very little stake in international trade, so seemingly little to lose (although it did guarantee the eventual entrance of the USA and other neutral powers into both world wars, which is hardly an advertisement for its use by China).

I think a far better analogy is the Soviets attempting to close the Atlantic during a cold war gone hot. They would have attempted to interdict Atlantic trade not to force the European nations to capitulate, but simply to isolate the European theatre until the Red Armies had done the business on the North German Plain. The comparison with China are pretty obvious – China would attempt to interdict allied naval and supporting merchant marine movements to prevent interference in some sort of decisive action – seizing Taiwan, for example. The purpose of the A2AD system is obvious here. Extending this further, I think the problem for Australia is not having to escort merchant ships to Australia, but to escort Naval task groups away from Australia. A significant challenge, obviously, but very different to escorting international trade ships around the globe.

I think we can all agree that the biggest threat to Australia is not a great power (*cough* China *cough*) attempting to strangle Australia into submission, but simply instability somewhere around the globe disrupting the international trade system enough to undermine the just-in-time economy of Australia. Trump doing something stupid to force the Iranians to close the Straight of Hormuz; a miscalculation in the South China Sea that Sea that stops ships transiting the Malacca Straights for a week etc. This would certainly be enough to significantly disrupt the economy, and may be enough to prevent us intervening militarily in whatever is going on, but it’s certainly not going to bring us to our knees as a nation.

10. Australia as a middle power has a military modernisation plan that broadly works and is seen as credible player by others in ASEAN and the Pacific islands. In particular, I praise the Australian provision of a surveillance capability to the Philippines by providing two AP-3C Orion aircraft to support operations during the 2017 battle of Marawi. See: Train, Advise, Assist Mission in the Philippines | The Cove

 

[StingrayOZ]

Some great insights there OPSSG.

I think it clear to everyone that the Quad doesn't really function and that India was added for mass rather than actual security interests and alliance. The recent developments around Kashmir highlight that. India isn't set on looking outwards, they see inwards. They aren't cemented and aligned with the US and are still a non-aligned nation at their very core. Also there are issues that China can encourage and discourage around India. Also India never really saw themselves as integrating into a US lead force in a high intensity war against China. India certainly has no interest in projecting a carrier group into the South China Sea, and picking new, far away, fronts to annoy China on. There is a way of engaging with India, but a Quad is not it.

The Quad is dead, from its ashes the trident of US-Japan-Aus is very much a live and going from strength to strength. It is this alliance that is needed, not the quad. IMO India has its own complications, particularly for Australia. With in the JAUS alliance you have 3 nations, of three different sizes, with 3 different strengths but each capable in its own way. The alliance is more of interconnected peers. There is real complimentary capability there when dealing with situations like in South East Asia and ASEAN. Its tight and like minded. We can work together on projects that blend civilian/military/economic objectives. There is some diversity, interfacing with Japan or Australia might be much easier than interfacing directly with US etc. Or historical baggage. If the US political leadership doesn't or can't lead, you have two very valid leaderships who can. Aid for example, seems a lot more reliable if 3 partners agree to it. Economic power is also magnified across the three. Its also interesting because the Australia-Japan thing because it is an alliance without the US. The relationship isn't dependent on US political leadership, it is a direct interface. Much like Australia's relationship with Singapore (or several other nations).

Japan and Australia Set the Stage for a Security Alliance Independent of the U.S.
Blazing the way forward in Japan-Australia security ties | The Japan Times

 

[OPSSG]

In early August 2019, US President Trump told the press that he had approved a F-16V arms sale to Taiwan and he indicated his confidence that the US Senate would pass the US$8 billion weapons deal for 66 F-16Vs. These 66 Block 70 aircraft will come with 70 GE F110 engines (in contrast with Taiwan's current Block 20s which are running on PW F100). Trump said that the deal will bring a lot of jobs to the US, indicating his confidence that Taiwan will use the F-16 "very responsibly." On 20 Aug 2019, the US State Department approved the sale of 66 F-16 fighters to Taiwan. Read more at US approves sale of 66 F-16 fighters to Taiwan

Janes has also reported that Taiwan's Aerospace Industrial Development Corp (AIDC) is scheduled to unveil the first prototype Advanced Jet Trainer (AJT) in September 2019, when ground testing is due to begin, with the first test flight set for June 2020. AIDC has been commissioned to design and build 66 AJTs by 2026. They will replace the ageing AT3 trainers and F5 fighters.

 

[ngatimozart]

In early August 2019, US President Trump told the press that he had approved a F-16V arms sale to Taiwan and he indicated his confidence that the US Senate would pass the US$8 billion weapons deal for 66 F-16Vs. These 66 Block 70 aircraft will come with 70 GE F110 engines (in contrast with Taiwan's current Block 20s which are running on PW F100). Trump said that the deal will bring a lot of jobs to the US, indicating his confidence that Taiwan will use the F-16 "very responsibly." On 20 Aug 2019, the US State Department approved the sale of 66 F-16 fighters to Taiwan. Read more at US approves sale of 66 F-16 fighters to Taiwan

Janes has also reported that Taiwan's Aerospace Industrial Development Corp (AIDC) is scheduled to unveil the first prototype Advanced Jet Trainer (AJT) in September 2019, when ground testing is due to begin, with the first test flight set for June 2020. AIDC has been commissioned to design and build 66 AJTs by 2026. They will replace the ageing AT3 trainers and F5 fighters.

It had to happen and the US is required by law to provide Taiwan with suitable weapons for it's defence. I would posit that the F-16V would meet that definition. Beijing will start screeching and screaming, however they really have to learn that the people of Taiwan made their choice in 1949 and do not want to be ruled by the present govt in Beijing. To much bully boy crap coming out of Beijing.

 

[OPSSG]

.., the people of Taiwan made their choice in 1949 and do not want to be ruled by the present govt in Beijing.

Minor correction, on the Taiwanese being able to make a choice in 1949. I note that the Kuomintang (KMT) ruled Taiwan under martial law until the late 1980s, with the stated goal of being vigilant against Communist infiltration and KMT led reunification with the mainland. Taiwan ceased to be a single-party state in 1986/1987 and political reforms beginning in the 1990s loosened the KMT's grip on power. IMO, the Taiwanese really only had a choice only after 1986 — kindly note that Chiang Ching-kuo, son of Chiang Kai-shek, remained as President of Taiwan from 1978 until his death in 1988.

Taiwanese domestic politics under Tsai's Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) is toxic, so I am not sure if they can agree on who is the enemy — the opposition alliance led by the KMT or China under Xi Jinping. Or it could be that the DPP is it’s own worse enemy, as Taiwan is set to hold its presidential election in January 2020 amid heightened tensions with China. See: China-friendly Taiwan mayor beats Foxconn's Gou in opposition's presidential primary - Reuters

KMT’s then leader Ma Ying-jeou, who served as Taiwan’s President from 2008 to 2016, met Xi Jinping on 5 November 2015, in Singapore, for a new page in history for cross-strait relations. That 2015 KMT and CCP rapprochement is gone with the DPP in power. There is background on why things are the way it is between China and Taiwan. China under Xi Jinping has tried, within certain parameters, to accommodate Taiwanese aspirations. There are real consequences to DPP rule (or mis-rule, depending on who you ask in Taiwan) that has an impact the geo-politics of North East Asia.

 

[OPSSG]

Tanner Greer has written a poorly researched article in the Foreign Affairs in Sept 2019 titled ‘Taiwan’s Defense Strategy Doesn’t Make Military Sense: But It Does Make Political Sense.’ While I agree that Taiwan needs to up its game for defence procurement (against a PLA invasion scenario), Greer’s article demonstrates his ignorance of real and valid Taiwan’s concerns — with his objection to Taiwan refreshing their submarine force — including their fear of their SLOCs being choked and thereafter restricted in their ability to trade by the PLA(N), from distant seas. The PLA(N) is on the verge of or has acquired a blue water capability. IMO China does not have to fight in the Taiwan Straits anymore, or invade, to coerce Taiwan, as the PLA(N) is able to deploy to distant seas to protect their interests.

The Taiwanese Ministry of National Defence (MND) expects to retire its F-5 and Mirage 2000v5 fighters in the early 2020s and is in the process of buying 66 F-16Vs (see: US risks China's anger after sealing $8bn deal to sell Taiwan 66 fighter jets | Taiwan | The Guardian). MND is also moving to modernize its old F-16A/Bs, but any fighter has a fixed airframe life, measured in flight hours. Modernization is a medium term solution, not a long term one, and does nothing to address the growing numeric imbalance across the strait. With 24 F-16A/Bs out of service for upgrades at any point, 16 in the US for training at Luke AFB, and 30% of the remaining machines (32) unavailable for other maintenance, Taiwan’s fleet of 146 F-16s shrinks to about 74 F-16A/Bs in operational service. If equivalent rates hold true for the 71 locally built and upgraded F-CK-1C/Ds, that means about 50 Hsiung Ying fighters, for a total available fleet of just 124 fighters.

 

[OPSSG]

Post 1 of 2: Update on LAC Fiasco

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1273478468919951361

1. An Indian Army patrol that was attacked by the PLA with nail-studded rods on 16 June 2020 has suffered 20 deaths and 76 injured in the clash with China in the Galwan Valley along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). The good news is that 4 of the critically injured soldiers are out of danger.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1273263657040764931

2. As an external observer, I see the Delhi’s response as limited and lacking in resolve. That being the case, Beijing will use the standard Leninist tactic of 'probe with a bayonet – If you encounter mush, proceed; if you encounter steel, withdraw.' IMHO, only when the Delhi, as the weaker and less prepared party, steel up their resolve, will this probing process by Beijing stop. Having steel in their resolve does not mean going to war. It also does not mean a short term deployment of more Indian troops to the LAC (which is temporary in nature) or the knee jerk burning of Chinese flags. IMHO, having steel in their resolve may mean:

​

(i) investing in even more roads and railways in Arunachal and Assam that will be needed to mobilise the offensive strike groups and transport them to the border fast enough to pre-empt any Chinese counter deployment;​

​

(ii) speeding up the retirement of antiquated MiG-21s and acquiring modern fighters as replacement and investing in better IFF systems (to prevent friendly fire) — to routinely protect and defend Indian airspace;​

​

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1273547504076746753

(iii) improving ISR capability through the acquisition and deployment of 3 new squadrons of advanced UAVs to patrol the LAC along with the necessary improvements made to 3 to 4 airbases near the LAC to house additional fighter squadrons with hardened aircraft shelters; and​

​

(iv) providing better support to troops on the LAC by having 12 to 24 hour notice to move, QRFs (to be housed/stationed at various staging points along the LAC), properly supported with adequate numbers of CH-47F Chinooks with IFF systems (to conduct a company sized troop lift of men and their organic helicopter-lift vehicles, in 1 wave, for each of these QRF battalions) and a flight of AH-64E Apaches to protect the troop lift. The Bronco would be the ideal low ground pressure vehicle in this role for the QRF battalions.​

​

3. On the one hand, following the deaths of 20 Indian soldiers along the LAC, Prime Minister Narendra Modi said “peace-loving” India was capable of giving a fitting reply if provoked.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1273448949051883520

They are more or less joined at the hip with Pakistan highly dependent upon the PRC economically and more so as each day passes.

4. On the other hand, actions of China and Pakistan, to raise tensions with India at their respective LACs are coordinated. This will present the Indian Army with a dilemma to split their focus.

5. "On 16 June 2020, in the late evening hours, Pakistan initiated unprovoked ceasefire violation along the LOC in Naugam Sector by firing mortars and other weapons," the defence spokesman was quoted as saying by news agency PTI. He said Indian Army strongly retaliated to Pakistan's unprovoked firing.

6. External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar said the extremely violent incident on Monday night “will have a serious impact on the bilateral relationship” between the two neighbours. Both accused troops of the other side for violating the understanding reached by their respective senior commanders on June 6 but agreed to "cool down" tensions on the ground "as soon as possible" and maintain peace and tranquillity in the border area. Jaishankar also said the Chinese side reneged on the June 6 agreement on de-escalation and disengagement along the LAC when it sought to erect a structure in the Galwan valley “on the Indian side of the LAC... While this became a source of dispute, the Chinese side took pre-meditated and planned action that was directly responsible for the resulting violence and casualties.”

7. The Indian Army’s Mountain Strike Corps has been hit by lack of funds and the ITBP’s requirements for all-weather border posts at Pangong long been delayed. Most importantly, while Report(s) of the Indian Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence highlighting depressing delays – 68% of Indian Army equipment is classified as ‘vintage.’ Further, the PLA is prepared consolidate their gains on the ground and Chinese diplomats are prepared to handle Indian protests by diplomatic channels. What strong message did India send?

8. As a journalist and former solider, Ajai Shukla, is speaking truth to power against the lies of his country’s politicians. The PLA(AF) flies some 2,000 combat aircraft – more than thrice the size of the IAF. The 1962 Sino-Indian war was fought entirely between land troops, with neither side using its air force or navy against each other. But in a military face-off today, the PLA(AF), will operate in numbers from the ten-odd air bases in Tibet. To degrade the IAF, the PLA would very likely begin the war with cruise and ballistic missile strikes on Indian air bases in Tezpur, Bagdogra and Hashimara, using missiles from the PLA’s Second Artillery. This might be preceded, or accompanied, by a carefully directed cyber attack to disable the IAF’s surveillance network, satellite communications and command and control systems. His 2012 article, “Don’t fight 1962 all over again”, contains key insights of reforms needed.

(i) He said that: “Indian Army needs to rethink its strategy, relying on local partnership as in the 1950s, rather than on an overwhelming presence that could start being resented...​

​

(ii) This must involve a three-fold action plan:​

​

Firstly, recruit at least twenty territorial army battalions from local tribes, which will defend their homeland fiercely against the Chinese, rather than relying on regular army battalions....​

​

Secondly, rather than committing the bulk of our regular army battalions into defensive deployments aimed at stopping the Chinese at the border, reorganise these formations into offensive strike groups that are geared, trained and equipped to retaliate against any Chinese incursion with counter-incursions into Tibet...​

​

Thirdly, create the infrastructure of roads and railways in Arunachal and Assam that will be needed to mobilise the offensive strike groups and transport them​

​

(iii) In his view, “it is foolish to adopt an entirely defensive deployment, and that too focused almost exclusively on the areas in which the Chinese attacked in 1962 (as if to say that the Chinese would just dust out the old plans and re-implement those, instead of coming up with an entirely new plan). Instead of trying to unilaterally fight the 1962 war all over again, [India] should let [the PLA] come in, defeat them in-depth, and simultaneously launch ripostes in pre-decided sectors with pre-prepared, pre-rehearsed and properly supported strike groups.”​

​

(iv) He has also given talks on the 1962 War, that India lost, to ensure lessons learnt are retained.​

 

[OPSSG]

Post 2 of 2: A lose-lose outcome

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1273546372348669954

9. Both Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi have built public support in large part on hyper nationalism and a promise of future greatness. This often translates into jingoism and aggressive rhetoric, particularly when playing to a domestic audience. Such an approach was evidenced in Chinese coverage of the PLA maneuvers in the Himalayas. Equally, despite Delhi's announcement Saturday of easing tensions, leading Indian government figures struck an aggressive tone with Home Affairs Minister Amit Shah telling a rally of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) that "any intrusion into the the borders of India will be punished."

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1282605727719161856

10. India will now impose costs on China whenever it tries its favourite salami-slicing tactics in a bid to incrementally grab territory, a move that marks a decisive change in India's long-standing border management policy to largely maintain “peace and tranquility” along the Line of Actual Control, said top official sources. The “days of walk-in options for the PLA are over” said the sources, even as Indian armed forces went on their highest state of alert along the 3,488-km LAC as well as the eastern seaboard after the bloody skirmish in the Galwan Valley.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1273455194680856577

11. China has in the last three decades, transformed its military, and is prepared to use the same to pursue its policy. It has enforced a status quo with respect to border infrastructure on its own terms. In the meanwhile, the clueless Indian ministry of defence is belatedly re-thinking the protocol followed by its soldiers of carrying firearms in the forward areas, given that PLA has flouted the 2013 Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (2013 BDCA) and 4 other agreements, including the 1996 CBM on the LAC Agreement — these agreements lay down norms to exercise restraint in use of weapons during confrontations. But that is for border policing in normal times and not during military operations. The agreement does not lay down any restrictions on carriage of weapons. Moreover, when the lives of soldiers is threatened, the commander on the spot can use all weapons at his disposal, including artillery fire. The decision to not carry weapons was deliberate and a wrong one taken by the military hierarchy.

12. Despite the potential for clashes at the LAC, five major Sino-Indian agreements have – until now – largely kept the peace. The first of these, the Border Peace and Tranquillity Agreement (BPTA), signed in September 1993, is the “mother agreement.” It was supplemented with the 1996 confidence-building measures (CBM) on the LAC agreement; a 2005 standard operating procedures for patrols that come into contact agreement; a 2012 agreement that sets out processes for consultation and co-operation; and, most recently, the 2013 BDCA. Both Beijing and New Delhi realise that a mutually delineated LAC would end the uncertainty that causes troop clashes. The 1996 agreement explicitly notes the need for a “common understanding of the alignment of the line of actual control in the India–China border areas”. It states that the two sides “agree to exchange maps indicating their respective perceptions of the entire alignment of the line of actual control as soon as possible”. However, China stonewalls the exchange of LAC maps, keeping alive the window for clashes.

13. In the standoff between India’s 14 Corps led by Lt General Harinder Singh and the Xinjiang Military Command, Major General Lin Liu, we see a fiasco unfolding at multiple levels for both Beijing and Delhi.

​

On the one hand, the PLA and the CCP have a PR fiasco for initiating the attack and killing Indian soldiers with nail-studded rods. The PLA is shown as engaging in thuggery, not soldiering —destroying PLA’s hard earned international reputation, as military professionals, by its strong participation in numerous UN peacekeeping operations and its evacuation of 35,860 Chinese nationals stranded in riot-torn Libya were rescued in a huge air, sea and land operation in Feb and Mar 2011. This thuggish mindset is like the Johnson South Reef Skirmish that took place on 14 March 1988, where the PLA(N) was perfectly willing to gun down Vietnamese troops attempted to erect the Vietnamese flag on the reef.​

​

On the other, the Indian BJP government suffered from a credibility gap given its hyper nationalist language usage, obvious spin control with lies and actual actions — where it is ONLY re-thinking the protocol followed by its soldiers of not carrying firearms. There is also a gap the Indian ability to conduct timely ISR to support its unarmed troops under attack. And I am not even sure if they have a QRF for timely rescue of the injured. The BJP government should have given powers to the the Indian Armed Forces to make emergency procurements to stock up its war reserves, months ago (and not just after 20 had died). If that had been authorised months ago, it would have signalled real resolve.​

14. IMO, like China’s propaganda mouth pieces, BJP’s jingoistic rhetoric also does not allow critical engagement in any sphere. It projects anything critical of the BJP ruling party as anti-national. The reality is that it is the BJP that decided to procure only 36 Dassault Rafale in a Euro €7.87 billion contract (and failing to order a 2nd tranche of 36 more). Likewise the previous government failed to conclude the MRCA tender for 126 fighters and only ordered 11 C-17s by moving too slowly before the line closed (when they had a requirement for 16). In the 2011 C-17 contract, for 10 aircraft, was worth US$4.7 billion, India had an option to purchase 6 more C-17s over its order of ten. However, a lack of funds ensured that the follow-on order was not processed.

15. From China’s arms procurement perspective, India does not have a competent arms procurement process —India’s ruling party and its opposition can never find a bipartisan path forward to spend on defence. Even now, with Indian soldiers dead and injured the politicians are more or less engaging in political stunts to blame each other rather than finding a fix to their problems in defence. Correctly understood, it has a ministry of defeat, instead. The Indian defence ministry also took years to sign the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) with the US, despite years of buying American weapons. Without COMCASA, the Americans had to strip out equipment on aircraft sold to India, including crucial comms equipment for the Indian P-8Is.

16. The real art of public policy is not treating security and prosperity as strict alternatives but finding ways that get the most for both. PLA’s June 2020 hostile action to gain some inconsequential land along the LAC has resulted China destroying the trust created by prior border agreements and creating another enemy, when they could have kept India in the neutral camp.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/818337640973930497

(i) China’s self defeating approach extends to the Nov 2016 HK Terrex episode, where Chinese intelligence caused HK to detain Singapore’s armoured vehicles being shipped back from Taiwan — earning the distrust of another ‘neutral,’ who has now entered the F-35B club in Asia, along with Japan. Singapore's recent purchase of the F-35B fighter jets is part of the vital and longstanding relationship shared between the two countries, the US Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, Mr Rene Clarke Cooper, said on 10 Feb 2020. Speaking to global media, Mr Cooper also said that “the US-Singapore partnership is one very clear tangible example of the United States' commitment to a very free and open Indo-Pacific for all states in the region," he added. The US government has approved the sale of up to 12 F-35Bs to Singapore, the first sale to a country in South-east Asia.​

(ii) Many in the Indo-Pacific are hedging with the rise of China. With Trump’s unpredictability, there is strong incentive for Japan, Indonesia and Australia, as G20 members, to grow closer bilateral defence and economic ties. On the diplomatic front, the 6 Dec 2019 joint statement from the Australia–Indonesia foreign and defense ministers’ meeting expressed “serious concerns” about developments in the South China Sea. The rare united statement is a starting point for more discussions on how both countries could work together on strengthening sovereignty.​

​

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1270724519846526981

(iii) In Southeast Asia, there is no “one-size-fits-all” narrative regarding China. While many countries are increasing ties with China to hedge against declining US influence, the survey also underscored how power dynamics in Southeast Asia are about much more than just the US and China. Japan and India, are also viewed as major players, with Indonesia holding significant influence in its own right.​

​

(iv) China’s unnecessary turn to hostility with its neutral neighbours has increased hedging behaviour in Asia, resulting in the trilateral naval exercise involving India, Singapore and Thailand in Sep 2019 that includes HTMS Kraburi and RSS Tenacious, from Thailand and Singapore. The Indian Navy was represented by INS Ranvir, INS Kora, and INS Sukanya along with a P8I MPA.​

 

[OPSSG]

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1284500865055813633

The Trump Administration is again considering withdrawing some troops from South Korea, if South Korea’s Moon does not pay more for maintaining a 28,500-strong US contingent deterring North Korean aggression.

The potential decision to pull troops from South Korea comes as Washington and Seoul have yet to reach a solid cost-sharing agreement after the last one expired 31 Dec 2019. The deal, known as the Special Measures Agreement (SMA), lapsed amid the Trump administration's demands for South Korea to pay significantly more to base American troops there.

In 2019, the Trump administration attempted to get South Korea to pay about US$1.6 billion to house American troops but later agreed to an increase to US$1 billion with the understanding that the SMA would be negotiated for 2020. But subsequent negotiations earlier this year were not successful, leading to a lapse of the SMA. The two countries reached a temporary deal but Trump has insisted South Korea contribute about US$5 billion a year, or about 400% more than what it paid in the now-expired SMA. Both sides say the Trump Administration's demands have since softened, but a new deal has yet to be reached.

Trump has advocated the need for allies, such as South Korea and Japan, to pay more of the costs associated with hosting U.S. troops. During the 2016 presidential campaign, Trump said he would consider removing troops from the two countries unless they boosted their contributions. Japan must be wondering are they next on Trump’s to-do-list for a shake down. Under the Japan-US security treaty, about 50,000 American troops are stationed in Japan. This forward presence enable the US Navy to respond rapidly to contingencies in the Asia-Pacific region.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1284311032706428930

Apologies for the seemingly off-topic link on the Trump administration’s announcement to pull 9,500 troops from Europe. IMO, this decision is rash — Asia is watching the American withdrawal from Europe with concern.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1284460535543717889

The show of force using American carriers has triggered a response from China on its new islands. There has been debate within the Malaysian academic and think tank community over the country’s response and its approach to the South China Sea more broadly, with some advocating a more conciliatory stance toward China in the interest of closer bilateral relations. Given the uncertainty in U.S.-China relations Malaysia is reluctant to make any decisions that could result in them being caught between the two.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1283760780857479168

The rationalizations offered by US national security adviser Robert O’Brien and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo are a validation of the president’s personal grievances against Germany and its chancellor, Angela Merkel, not a thoughtful strategy. This decision would be a major blow to US credibility in Europe and a win for Russia.

American Forces stationed in Germany provide a strategic advantage for the US, especially in Africa and in the Middle East — they provide logistical support, intelligence capabilities, medical services, and contracting assistance to US governmental and military organizations in Europe, Africa and the Middle East. The forces in Europe are “an ocean closer” to many hot spots.

For example, the mission in Germany includes medical support at Landstuhl Regional Medical Center. This joint military medical facility is one the military’s largest trauma centers. Landstuhl serves the military and their families, but it also transfers the wounded and sick from other continents.

 

[OPSSG]

Wrong analysis of alternatives does not help solve the border problem

1. The importance of this crisis is clear. China has taken by force small pieces of territory that India perceives as its own. In doing so, China crossed two important Indian red lines: seizing territory and killing Indian soldiers. Do modern conquests typically involve large, valuable areas or smaller areas whose worth one must squint to discern? And what can be done in response? Answering these questions exposes the surprising normalcy of what has happened in Ladakh. To my mind and most western security analysis, deterrence “is the use of a threat (explicit or not) by one party in an attempt to convince another party not to upset status quo” (Quackenbush, 2010: 60). More specifically, deterrence is the persuasion of an aggressor that the cost and/or risk of a given course of action he might take outweighs its benefits (George & Smoke, 1974: 11). Where the preference is not to fight.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1284307711601999872

2. In common with the Chinese mindset, deterrence for the Indians is a mutual relationship that involves communication and signaling and assumes that states in competition or conflict make decisions in accordance with rational cost-benefit calculations that can be manipulated (Mazarr & Goodby, 2011).

3. But the key difference is China’s willingness to fight, as a next step, to communicate to the Indians in the language of deterrence by shedding blood. That is why I worry a lot when I see an Indian reporter say:

​

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1284037158534168576

“...China clearly wants more. India faces the choice of moving towards becoming a vassal state or purposefully safeguarding its sovereignty and self-respect. True, China is several times more powerful and wealthy than India, and a military confrontation would incur a heavy cost. However... Sovereignty has a price and sometimes that price has to be paid.”​

​

4. I believe that the CCP’s strategy must be understood correctly — as the fait accompli. Each fait accompli is a calculated gamble and the CCP bet that it could take small areas in Ladakh without provoking India to start a wider war. So far, that bet has played out in Beijing’s favor, but the crisis is not over. I suspect that China’s motive is to establish deterrence against India by a limited border skirmish and the Indian politicians must be prepared to suffer deaths to draw a line and after that happens, to seek a path to peace. The choice is not about becoming a vassal state or sovereignty. The choice for India is to be sovereign but to pay for such unpreparedness in blood. That is to engage in war planning but execute with clear stop lines.

5. China’s encroachments in Ladakh share the most baffling quality of conquest in recent decades: risking military conflict for such a small territorial payoff. Only when the Indians are in a position to make such a payment, can they get China to withdraw to their side in a manner that minimises the amount of bloodshed for this border dispute.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1284532393991450626

6. It is my suspicion that India is headed to a path of a limited war with China. Peaceful coexistence and restoration of Sino-Indian relations after a limited war would not be possible without wisdom and pragmatism by the leaders on both sides.

 

[Sandhi Yudha]

China's trick is to do everything bit by bit, slowly, over a long period. The chinese expect that India regards loosing a small piece of land is not worth a full war. But over the years these small bits together are quite large of course.

And this trick can be very successful, just look to the Spratly Sea. The last decades china has built many 'fishermen villages' and 'scientific laboratoria for peaceful purposes' at that place, and now a large part of that sea is under control of china.

Also the process of strengthening the control over Hong Kong, is step by step and slowly but sure.

 

[Ananda]

believe that China’s ability to mobilize people and resources to safeguard China's core interests, is far greater than that of Indonesia. It is likely that by 2035, China will ask for your country’s leader to surrender even more of Indonesia’s interests in favour of China.

China always try to get into each countries politicall establishment and buy their influence in. They're doing it in Asean, South Asia, Middle East, Africa, even in Europe and North America.
We know some Indonesian politicall circle already under Chinese influence. However China create own problem for their own private interest by asking and demanding too far and I can say too soon.

This COVID 19 also change many domestic perspective in many countries about China accountability, like it or not for China or their supporter everywhere (including their ten cents army on lines). While at the same time they are demanding more from their neighbors. They simply willingly playing to US accusations circles.

It's getting harder to be pro Chinese. Off course they will always play business and Investment card, but US simply showing one thing (at least in Asean), China demand part of your sovereign rights. That what China with their action in SCS, just dig themselves deeper toward US playbook.

 

[OPSSG]

China’s land reclamation in the South China Sea is aimed at pushing its own sensor and weapons range so far into the Pacific that it becomes impossible for American forces to touch Chinese positions without risk to its fleet.

This is to gain freedom of action to assert its own interests against Taiwan. The only contingency PLA(N) can not manage as a 335-ship fleet would be a distant blockade by the US Navy. Capt (retd.) James Fanell has estimated that by 2030, the Chinese fleet will have a surface force of over 450 ships and a submarine force of about 110 boats. China could attempt to counter by increasing self-reliance or the careful establishment of a string of strategic positions in peacetime. Both are already core elements of current Chinese policy, namely “China 2049” and the “Belt and Road Initiative.”

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1256410095610544128

Destroyers, frigates, carriers and bombers of the PLA(N)

1. Nanchang, the first Type 055 ship of the class, began construction in 2014 at the Jiangnan Shipyard in Shanghai, and was commissioned on 12 January 2020. There will be at least 6 of these 180 metre long, 13,000 ton destroyers/cruisers that are armed with 112 HHQ-9B surface-to- air missiles.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1285777251758292993

2. Kunming, the first 157 metre long, 7,500 ton Type 52D destroyer was commissioned on 21 Mar 2014 and is the first Chinese surface combatant to use canister-based universal VLS, as opposed to the concentric type VLS. 64 HHQ-9B surface-to- air missiles are carried, with 10 of this ship’s class being constructed (with 13 being planned according to the above graphic). Having entered military service on 12 Jan 2020, Zibo is the PLA Navy’s first ship of the improved version of the Type 052DL. This new Type 052DL is 161 metre long, with an extended flight deck (to carry the Z-20 helicopter) and a new long-range radar on its mast. The PLA(N) has plans for up to 13 Type 052Ds and 12 Type 52DLs in the near future.

3. Lanzhou and Haikou, the first two 155 metre long, 7,000 ton Type 52C destroyers were laid down at the Jiangnan Shipyard in Shanghai in 2002, and entered service in 2004 and 2005 respectively. The other 4 were of the class, Changchun, Zhengzhou, Jinan and Xi’an were built much later, around 2013, as the shipyard that built them was relocated.

4. Guangzhou and Wuhan, 155 metre long, 6,500 ton Type 052B destroyers were the first two Chinese-built warship capable of area air defence and entered service in 2002.

5. Binzhou, the first of 30 frigates of this class. These 4,053 ton Type 054A and 054A+ frigates are 134.1 metre long, armed with 32 HQ-16 or HQ-16B air defence missiles, was first built at the Guangzhou-based Huangpu Shipyard in 2005. An much improved variant beginning with the 17th unit has the seven-barrelled Type 730 CIWS replaced by the more capable 11-barrelled Type 1130, and is unofficially referred as Type 54A+. Another reported improvement over the original Type 054A includes the incorporation of a towed array sonar and present an overmatch against the capabilities of the Taiwanese Kang Ding class frigates. These 054A frigates are bigger and better armed than Singapore’s Formidable class frigates, who are the most heavily armed frigates that are based on the La Fayette design.

6. Ma'anshan, and Wenzhou, were the only Type 054 frigates built in 2003 and were commissioned in 2005. These outdated 134 metre long, 3,900 ton frigates were armed with the inferior HQ-7 (when compared to the HQ-16 and HQ-16B air defence missiles of the Type 054A). The Type 054 who are armed with the HQ-7 (similar to the French Crotale) resembled the French La Fayette-class frigates in shape and displacement and were intended to match the capabilities of the Taiwanese Kang Ding class frigates.

7. Right now in 2020, the PLA(N), operates 2 carriers, Liaoning (with 26 J15s) and Shandong (with 32 J15s) and a large fleet of Xian H-6 bombers armed with the YJ-12 anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM). The danger posed by the YJ-12 comes from its range of 400 km, making it the longest-ranged ACBM ever engineered, and its ability to travel at high rates of speed (up to Mach 3). These ASCMs when launched from the air, give the PLA(N) plenty of long range strike options. Just imagine how powerful the Chinese Navy will be by 2032, when it has 3 carriers and it begins to modernise its bomber fleet. Given its large H-6J and H-6G bomber fleet, the PLA(N) is more than its carriers — each of which carries 8 YJ-12 supersonic ASCMs.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1288870200356544513

8. A PLA(N), carrier battle group is heavily armed, with about 304 cells for air defence missiles. The destroyers serving as escorts also carry numerous vertically-launched YJ-18 ASCMs, CJ-10 land attack cruise missiles, and the YJ-83 anti-ship missiles. The PLA(N)’s Yu-6 torpedo completed development in 2005 and is carried on their destroyers and frigates. At speeds of sixty-five knots, the Yu-6 is faster than the listed speeds of the Mk 48 Mod 6 ADCAP. The ships in a Chinese carrier battle group would typically consist of:

• 1 aircraft carrier (with 26 or 32 J15s)
• 1 Type 055, Renhai class cruiser with 112 air defence missiles
• 2 Type 052D or 052DL Luyang III class destroyers with 64 air defence missiles on each destroyer
• 2 Type 054A or 054A+ frigates, with 32 air defence missiles on each Jiangkai II frigate
• a Type 901 support ship

 

[OPSSG]

Understanding Taiwan’s Chronic Gap
1. The Legislative Yuan approved NT$358 billion (US$12.1 billion) for national defense spending across fiscal 2020, a 3.47 percent increase compared with 2019, while China’s military budget this year is NT$5.4 trillion, more than 15 times that of Taiwan.

2. Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) legislators Wang Ting-yu (王定宇) and Chao Tien-lin (趙天麟) said there is no need to enter an arms race with a “warmongering” China, as President Tsai Ing-wen’s (蔡英文) administration has introduced policies to increase the quality and quantity of the nation’s armed forces.

3. China’s development model differs from Taiwan, as it aspires to be a global hegemon, while Taiwan only seeks to protect its citizens, Wang said, adding that the two are not comparable. An arms race with China is out of the question, Chao said, as Taiwan cannot hope to compete, nor is it necessary.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1287921933380542466

4. Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) has 215,000 budgeted positions among all branches, of which 188,000 are soldiers and the rest civilian employees. Only 153,000 of those positions were filled in 2018—just 81 percent of the personnel the military should have.

5. The Taiwanese have no intention of building a credible deterrence. If they were, they would not have ended their prior conscription system — that used to be like that of Korea. But 2017’s changes slashed the conscription period to just four months. Most draftees serve even less, as up to two weeks can be deducted if they’ve completed military training classes in high school and college. The four-month conscripts typically receive five weeks of basic training before they are assigned to field units for more specialty training. But they’re more a burden than an aid, not treated seriously by career or noncommissioned officers as their short stays mean they are seen as guests rather than soldiers.

6. But worse than these irrational moves to end conscription, they have not properly resourced their new all volunteer force — such that frontline combat units only have 60% to 80% of the required manpower. They are already combat ineffective during peacetime.

 

[Musashi_kenshin]

KMT’s then leader Ma Ying-jeou, who served as Taiwan’s President from 2008 to 2016, met Xi Jinping on 5 November 2015, in Singapore, for a new page in history for cross-strait relations. That 2015 KMT and CCP rapprochement is gone with the DPP in power. There is background on why things are the way it is between China and Taiwan. China under Xi Jinping has tried, within certain parameters, to accommodate Taiwanese aspirations. There are real consequences to DPP rule (or mis-rule, depending on who you ask in Taiwan) that has an impact the geo-politics of North East Asia.

I hope you don't mind me commenting on an old comment, but I rarely see discussions on Taiwan. Obviously in 2019 a DPP victory was far from being nailed-on, but thanks in part to China over-reaching in Hong Kong it was another DPP landslide.

You can't justifiably blame the DPP for the state of relations with China. President Tsai has held out her hand more than once to Beijing. She doesn't have any conditions for talks, she just doesn't accept Taiwan is part of China (why would she?). It's Xi and the CCP that have the preconditions. Yes, Ma did meet Xi. But the meeting didn't achieve anything other than some short-lived propaganda.

Also, putting aside the destruction of 1C2S in Hong Kong, Xi's "offer" to Taiwan was always hollow. The CCP has never set out what its red lines are for a future settlement with Taiwan - e.g. a Beijing-appointed governor or requiring Taiwanese politicians to be vetted by a pro-Beijing committee, a permanent garrison in Taiwan, whether Taiwan can continue to arm itself and import arms, etc. Saying stuff like Taiwan can have "HK Plus" or "enhanced autonomy" is meaningless.

Regarding the July 2020 article, I've seen those reports about manpower shortages. I don't think it's right to say Taiwan has "no intent" of building a credible deterrence. Forcing conscription on a populace that doesn't want it is dictatorial. Taiwan is a democracy now. Maybe they need to put more money in to allow for a volunteer army, but that doesn't mean Taiwan isn't trying. My own view is that it will take more time to make the volunteer military truly successful.

 

[OPSSG]

Also, putting aside the destruction of 1C2S in Hong Kong, Xi's "offer" to Taiwan was always hollow. The CCP has never set out what its red lines are for a future settlement with Taiwan - e.g. a Beijing-appointed governor or requiring Taiwanese politicians to be vetted by a pro-Beijing committee, a permanent garrison in Taiwan, whether Taiwan can continue to arm itself and import arms, etc.

1. I see your point of view on why 1 country, 2 systems has no hope of working. There are different angles and ways to look the dysfunctional cross-straits relations from a political standpoint. Beijing and Taipei sharply disagree on the island’s status and the fact is that 2015 Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Kuomintang (KMT) rapprochement is gone with the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in power. You certainly know the background on why things are the way it is between China and Taiwan.

2. For ASEAN there is only “one China” and that Taiwan is an inalienable part of it. Beijing says Taiwan is bound by an understanding reached in 1992 between representatives of the CCP and the KMT then ruling Taiwan. Referred to as the 1992 Consensus, it states that there is only “one China” but allows for differing interpretations, by which both Beijing and Taipei agree that Taiwan belongs to China, while the two still disagree on which entity is China’s legitimate governing body. The tacit agreement underlying the 1992 Consensus is that Taiwan will not seek independence.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1291140651338199041

3. The responsibility for defending Taiwan lies with the Taiwanese — they have to pretend to be willing to fight — being caught selling war plans on eBay — filed as obviously not trying.

Regarding the July 2020 article, I've seen those reports about manpower shortages. I don't think it's right to say Taiwan has "no intent" of building a credible deterrence. Forcing conscription on a populace that doesn't want it is dictatorial. Taiwan is a democracy now. Maybe they need to put more money in to allow for a volunteer army, but that doesn't mean Taiwan isn't trying. My own view is that it will take more time to make the volunteer military truly successful.

4. Compared to the rate of military capability advancement in China, Taiwan’s rate of change is seen by me as slowly crawling along — I am not the only one to state the obvious.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1160894434914910209

5. One of the reasons why China has cemented its place as the world’s fifth largest arms exporter is cost-effectiveness. Whether it’s a Type 56 assault rifle or a diesel-electric submarine, the technology of its military products is familiar and the price isn’t exorbitant. The same applies to Norinco’s VP11 MRAP whose features are tailored for armies saddled with meager budgets. Clearly applying the timeless lessons of South African protected trucks–the monocoque hull and bulging side panels–the VP11 is unique for being smaller than usual.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1291297029717721089

6. From my perspective, Taiwan can decide what I wants and it’s current president, Tsai Ing-wen, leader of the DPP has rejected the 1992 Consensus that Taiwan will not seek independence. In a January 2019 speech, she declared the “one country, two systems” framework advanced by Beijing unacceptable. Her rejection of the consensus, along with that of other leading voices in the governing DPP, leaves open the possibility of future Taiwanese independence.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1289400900717436928

7. The Taiwanese can do whatever they want, including disbanding conscription. But if war breaks out, don’t drag others into it.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1276435611331842050

 

[Musashi_kenshin]

Taiwan doesn't have the budget to build dozens of new first-class warships, unless it reverts to the old KMT dictatorship era and starts depriving schools and hospitals of much needed funding. (China, on the other-hand, has cash registers in its hospitals to charge people up front, so it's understandable it can build and upgrade lots of vessels.)

As for your last point, all free countries have the right to ask for outside assistance if they're attacked. Realistically it would be a mostly US force, albeit maybe with some Japanese/Australian support - ASEAN could easily not even get involved at all. No one would be forced to intervene, but letting China take over Taiwan would be bad for everyone in Asia (except the CCP).