Defence of Taiwan

RobWilliams

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Why would I need to check the education? If their academic record is something you wish to push then by all means provide the information about it (I would also like to know how you would expect me to find out the sort of academic standards those employees have, ring the companies up and ask for copies?), but it's not what matters to me and thus I won't bother.

My involvement is - and always has been - getting a clear idea of the numbers involved, accurate numbers plus evidence have been supplied by swerve and that's all the information I was looking to get.
 

alexsa

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There you go, your first words...sound very patronizing and condescending. How may I conduct myself when I'm making an argument? What kind of tone is acceptable, may I ask? Shall I give you a heads-up first before I post to see if the tone of my post meets approval?
Or I could have simply meant good for you. That was what was meant and repeated in response to your posts on my profile. I admit my patience with you is at end as you insist on being respected and heard but feel no hesitation in demanding others back up their statements despite the fact you often provide no real evidence of you position.
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
Todjaeger's numbers are correct in principle. but are a little out of date. The most recent official figures for Filipino workers in Taiwan, from Taiwan's Council of Labor [sic] Affairs, as of end March 2013,
Indeed my numbers were a little old. They were from the latest reports I could find from the Philippine gov't on overseas workers, so some of them were from 2010. Thanks for locating more up to date information.

As had been brought up later on though, what sector the Filipinos work in, or even their average level of education is not particularly important. What IS important is whether as a group, OFW's in Taiwan can/are earning enough to send significant remittances back to the Philippines. In this case, the ability to send back an average of ~$1,700 p.a. per working in Taiwan is significant since that is nearly half the per capita (PPP) GDP. In effect, one of the Philippines most significant exports is workers, and another country threatening to place restrictions on that 'export' can be significant.

-Cheers
 

OPSSG

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Todjaeger's numbers are correct in principle. but are a little out of date. The most recent official figures for Filipino workers in Taiwan, from Taiwan's Council of Labor [sic] Affairs, as of end March 2013, are -
Total: 87516
In services (this includes all the domestic workers, hospital workers, etc): 23015
In manufacturing: 63151

Of which the main employers are -
Electronic parts & components: 26593 (i.e. more than in all services)
Electronic & optical products: 6630
Fabricated metal products: 6508
Machinery & equipment: 4388

Source
TVBS News Report on Taiwan's reaction after the lapse of dateline

Initial indications are that the Taiwan Government was not satisfied with Philippines' official response and it was reported as lacking in sincerity and failed to meet the conditions imposed. News sources report the following: "Taiwan freezes hiring of Philippine workers over fisherman's death".
...This shooting-at-sea incident once again demonstrates the incompetence of the Philippine Government in the area of crisis management (its chronic misguided sense of self-importance and lack of urgency in a crisis). This incompetence will again have unfortunate consequences for their citizens abroad and make life more difficult than necessary for those seeking to leave Philippines to earn a living in Taiwan...

<snip>

...Pinoy pride is likely to prevent a quick settlement that may result in a period of hostility and tensions. The second and third order effects following from the incident is unfortunate and counter-productive for countries sharing a maritime border...
As predicted two days ago pride prevented a quick settlement. A second batch of 8 new sanctions being planned at a later time, with another dateline imposed. Details on the 8 new sanctions to be applied later is lacking, as a press conference will be held later, today. I am waiting for a Taiwan based English language media source for confirmation later in today or tomorrow. Likewise this latest development has not been reported by international media, like CNN or BBC, at the moment. Given that there is no invasion fleet (only a show of force in disputed EEZ waters), with little or no danger of war between Taiwan and the Philippines, this latest development is not deemed news worthy by the international media.

Edit: Taiwan English language news source with more details -Gov't unsatisfied with Philippines' response. It seems that the Philippines failed to reach agreement with Taiwan on how to compensate for the death of the 65-year-old Taiwanese fisherman. The Philippines will send MECO Chairman Amadeo R. Perez, the de facto Philippines embassy in Taiwan in lieu of diplomatic ties, to Taiwan today as a special envoy to express condolence and apology to Hung's family.

IMHO, the answer is simple from Taiwan's point of view. An ultimatum has been given and missed. Therefore, Taiwan must make good on their promise to freeze Filipino immigration and work permits, with further additional economic sanctions to follow.
 

Sun

New Member
Desired and likely outcome will determine what happens next.

The situation is quite confusing, with so many interested parties, conflicting accounts, and more importantly the unspoken political agendas. It would probably be easier to just ignore what you hear and see on the ground, on the seas, and in the relevant domestic media (foreign media to most of us). If you look at the situation from a desired outcome perspective, you can get a better feel for what will likely need to happen to achieve that desired outcome.

For China, the best outcome is for Taiwan to partner up and present an united stance, politically and militarily. That would be the dream come true for China, as it can kick start some sort of reunification process; remember that China and Taiwan already share very deep racial and cultural ties, are still technically at war, and each side still claims the other as its own.

On the other hand, as often happens in schoolyard fights, the antagonists have a tussle, and then make up and turn into the best of friends. I think it would be far more likely that the Philippines and Taiwan will make good, and embark on some enhanced level of cooperation - while being guided (goaded) by the big man in the room, the USA, who is supposedly neutral. The reasons for this more likely outcome is that: 1) nobody wants to actually fight; 2) nobody wants to team with China - at least for now; 3) The leaders can appear mature and wise by turning what appears to be an inflammatory and escalating armed situation, into greater understanding and friendship; 4) Taiwan, for all its military capabilities, has more than its hands full with the Taiwan Straits situation vis-a-vis China; 5) Despite its one China policy, the USA can't let Taiwan slip closer to China; 6) the Filipino attack was probably accidental, or acted out by a loose canon (they may even have thought the ROC ship was PROC - and Filipinos have a bigger axe to grind with China). I'm 99.9% certain the act was not officially sanctioned. As such, it's easy for the Philippine government to acknowledge the mistake, make amends, and earn some respect, credibility, and emotional capital.

If the desired and most likely outcome is where the Philippines and Taiwan make good, then I think you will see a few things:

i) The situation will escalate a bit more until both sides' pride run into some undetermined dangerous threshold.
ii) Then one side or both will acknowledge mistakes were made, followed by some joint apologetic statements and expressions of regret or remorse.
iii) Both sides will form some committee or process to tighten cooperation in the political and maritime spheres. The stated goals will be to prevent this type of incident from reoccurring, but a partial intent is to present an united front against China's rising maritime assertiveness.
iv) Everybody walks away happy. Even China, which won't lose anything, but has said a few things and so may plausibly claim they influenced a positive outcome.
 

OPSSG

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For China, the best outcome is for Taiwan to partner up and present an united stance, politically and militarily. That would be the dream come true for China, as it can kick start some sort of reunification process; remember that China and Taiwan already share very deep racial and cultural ties, are still technically at war, and each side still claims the other as its own.
What has race got to do with this shooting-at-sea incident between Philippines and Taiwan?

Do you even read the thread you post in?!?

BTW, China is comprised of over 50 ethnic groups; and Taiwan has its own indigenous peoples, too (and not just Chinese). Further, the Chinese are comprised of various dialect groups (with their own unique spoken dialect and customs). As you may be aware, there are many political and economic differences between China and Taiwan, in terms of systems of government, stage of economic development and political culture. In terms of written language alone, Taiwan uses the complex character set, whereas, China uses the simplified character set - these are all political choices, made by politicians/leaders in both sides of the Cross Straits divide. For China, 'putong hua' is a relatively recent historical and political construct, used as a unifying language for the different dialect groups in China (i.e. a political tool, used to 'unify' China). Likewise 'kuo yu' or national language is a political construct, used as a unifying language for the different ethnic groups in Taiwan. In broad terms, these differences negate simple claims of common political culture that transcends political divides, when there is quite a bit of diversity in the so called 'Chinese' diaspora in Asia. This means the myth of a 'Han Chinese' in Asia, is just that a myth when you look at the details (i.e. an over simplified stereotype that is often used for political purposes by commentators). IMHO, what we are seeing is the development of distinct brand of Taiwanese nationalism, from this incident.

If you don't mind, I would say that it would be more accurate to say that being Chinese is an ethnic identity, rather than racial identity. Please do not bring this point on race again, in such a stereotypical manner (as racism relies on the use of negative stereotypes). While what you have said does not cross the line, please be aware that it is forum policy to immediately ban all racists (see rule 12 of forum rules). Read the prior warnings and directions issued by the Moderators and Super Moderators in this thread. No reply or further clarification, by you, on this point will be necessary.

On the other hand, as often happens in schoolyard fights, the antagonists have a tussle, and then make up and turn into the best of friends.
What school yard fight!?! School yard fights do not result in 52 bullet holes and death (we will only know more once the investigation is completed and further information released by the Philippine Authorities). In the mean time, have some respect for the Taiwanese fishermen who have died in the past in this disputed fishing area in the hands of law-enforcement authorities.

I think it would be far more likely that the Philippines and Taiwan will make good, and embark on some enhanced level of cooperation...
How is this relevant now? Think before posting.

There is a huge difference between having a wishful political opinion or political advocacy of a position versus having a sound technical understanding of the military and economic levers available to the Government of Taiwan (in its options for escalation, in the event of non-compliance). For example, Taiwan can just cancel prior self-imposed limits they had set in terms of naval patrols in the disputed EEZ areas, to deny access to Philippine law enforcement. Reading the thread before posting would help prevent a discussion from going in circles.

The reasons for this more likely outcome is that: 1) nobody wants to actually fight; 2) nobody wants to team with China - at least for now; 3) The leaders can appear mature and wise by turning what appears to be an inflammatory and escalating armed situation, into greater understanding and friendship; 4) Taiwan, for all its military capabilities, has more than its hands full with the Taiwan Straits situation vis-a-vis China; 5) Despite its one China policy, the USA can't let Taiwan slip closer to China; 6) the Filipino attack was probably accidental, or acted out by a loose canon (they may even have thought the ROC ship was PROC - and Filipinos have a bigger axe to grind with China).
Your whole discussion quoted above is not useful enabling other members understand the options available to Taiwan, as they bring more pressure to bear on the Philippine authorities, with the 8 new sanctions.
I'm 99.9% certain the act was not officially sanctioned. As such, it's easy for the Philippine government to acknowledge the mistake, make amends, and earn some respect, credibility, and emotional capital.
That is not the issue. The issue at hand is that Philippines law enforcement authorities in a bigger and faster boat (a 115.45 ton vessel and over 30m in length) killed an unarmed Taiwanese citizen by firing at least 52 rounds at his smaller fishing boat (a 15.15 ton vessel at 14.7m in length). Which is why Taiwan and external parties like the US welcome the conduct of a transparent Philippine investigation on this latest shooting-at-sea incident.

The situation will escalate a bit more until both sides' pride run into some undetermined dangerous threshold.
No, this is a wrong assessment.

In 2 prior posts I have covered escalation options and Taiwan's mastery of it (please read them before posting another reply to this post). There is no Philippine invasion threat or any such hostile intention to attack the forces of another country by the Taiwanese. It has been stated that Taiwan's Navy and Coast Guard will not enter Philippine territorial waters. Further, the Taiwanese Navy is NOT going to attack and sink Philippine ships; given the disparity of naval and air power between the parties a show of force by Taiwan is intended to demonstrate Philippine naval impotence. As I mentioned before, the Philippines has a very poor hand in escalation options; but their pride prevents a quick settlement.

In essence, this is a fisheries dispute between Taiwan and Philippines, with Taiwan applying economic sanctions to motivate the Philippines authorities and therefore it is hardly even news worthy for international media. Just turn on TV and watch BBC or CNN and they are not reporting the latest developments as a headline news item.

Everybody walks away happy. Even China, which won't lose anything, but has said a few things and so may plausibly claim they influenced a positive outcome.
How so? More magical thinking by you, I see.

China's opinion stated through the editorial comments in news sources controlled by them and condemnation has caused more resentment in the Philippines and as I mentioned earlier, complicates the options currently available to Taiwan. The Taiwanese may not be appreciative of China's acts and deeds, if they do intervene. If China was a leader, it has few willing followers. Check-book diplomacy (and often acknowledged as such by client states of China) and naked displays of force can increase tensions in the region. Do not mistake fear/concern as respect.

As for your quib on positive outcome, the family of the fisherman killed will never get him back. A responsible Taiwanese government would want to prevent such an incident from recurring, and statements of support made by China has been of no help to Taiwan. On the other hand, Taiwan's unilateral demand for an investigation will help start the process of ensuring transparency and shine a light on Philippine law enforcement practice and ROEs.
 
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OPSSG

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According to the Manila Times report dated 20 May 2013, 'PH official bungles talks with Taiwan'. See quote below for details.
20 May 2013 -- Officials of the Taiwan Economic and Cultural Office (TECO) on Monday also revealed that two letters presented by the Manila Economic and Cultural Office (MECO) to Taiwan were deemed acceptable at first but were scrapped after a “secret phone call” from the official, who has not been named. The phone call “blew up everything” previously agreed upon, David Chen, TECO’s assistant to the representative, told reporters during a luncheon briefing in Makati City. He said the phone call was made to Antonio Basilio, MECO’s resident representative in Taipei, merely minutes after a third “acceptable” letter was handed to Taiwan Foreign Minister David Lin...

According to Chen, the fourth and final version of the letter was “unacceptable and beyond imagination”... All four letters, which were presented between 8 p.m. and midnight of May 14, were signed by Basilio but the last version had a second copy signed by MECO Chairman Amadeo Perez Jr., President Benigno Aquino 3rd’s personal representative to Taipei.

Chen said the first and third letters were acceptable to Taiwan because the “regret and apology” over the incident were conveyed by the “Philippine government” and not by the “Filipino people” as mentioned by the second and fourth versions.
It seems that Philippines and Taiwan were so close and yet so far apart over the details of the apology letters, particularly, the 4th version of the letter. In other words, an ultimatum was given with conditions; and that Taiwan had some expectation that Philippines would meet those terms. From Taiwan's point of view, an ultimatum has been given and missed. Therefore, Taiwan made good on their promise to freeze Filipino immigration and work permits. The freeze bars new work permits, and the 88,000 Filipino workers in Taiwan now must leave once their contracts end. Contracts of this sort usually cover three years. According to Forbes, when Taiwan banned importation of Filipino labor in over a civil aviation dispute 14 years ago, the number of migrant workers onshore dropped from about 114,000 to just under 73,000 between 1999 and 2001. There is no word on how long the current freeze will last. Further, Filipinos working in Taiwan remit more than US$650 million in total to the Philippines each year, according to a statement made by the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Manila.

Another issue at hand is the ongoing investigation by the Philippines law enforcement authorities, in the shooting-at-sea incident; where there is thus far limited cooperation between the relevant Philippines authorities and Taiwan, with parallel investigations. Taiwan claims that the shooting was “a disproportionate response by the Philippine authorities.” If Taiwan admits that it was a response to something, what then were the Philippine law enforcement authorities responding to? By way of background, the Philippine Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources vessel - PCG-BFAR MCS-3001 involved in the in the shooting-at-sea incident was a bigger and faster boat (a 115.45 ton vessel and over 30m in length) killed an unarmed Taiwanese citizen by firing over 50 rounds at a smaller Taiwanese fishing boat (a 15.15 ton vessel at 14.7m in length), in a fisheries law enforcement incident. According to a Taiwanese source, 'Shipboard data refutes Manila’s claim'.

Taipei Times said:
22 May 2013 -- The US is calling on both Taiwan and the Philippines to quickly complete their separate investigations into the shooting of a Taiwanese fisherman. “We have not seen final reports from either investigation, from either side,” US Department of State spokesman Patrick Ventrell said on Monday. “We hope these will be released soon and will help clarify the circumstances surrounding the incident,” he said. Speaking at a daily press briefing, Ventrell said that although US Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Yun was going to the region he would not become directly involved in any negotiations involving the incident...
This is why external parties like the US, welcome the conduct of a transparent Philippine investigation on this latest shooting-at-sea incident; as a means to resolve the crisis. Unfortunately, with the lack of cooperation between the parties this is going to be another sticky point that would not go away.

IMHO, neutral parties should start to question how this incident has been handled by both parties - with their desire to take positions even before the end of investigations. This crisis, seems to look like a series of mis-steps by both parties that does not do credit to the credibility of either. Taiwan's ability to apply military and economic levers against Philippines is limited; but their are not without options. One of options that I mentioned earlier:- Taiwan can just cancel prior self-imposed limits they had set in terms of naval patrols in the disputed EEZ areas, to deny access to Philippine law enforcement.

An absolute freeze Filipino immigration and work permits for period beyond 6 months hurts Taiwan too; and is a crude tool. But they can change such a measure to a relatively large 'annual processing fee' for each Filipino immigration and work permit processed; which will give employers a choice of paying more for Philippine workers or using another country source (substitution effect). This will filter out the low end of some parts of the complex OFW market in Taiwan, while giving Taiwanese employers an option to retain better valued employees for a fee. And a variety of these sort of measures have been implemented in other countries to keep a lid on immigration. The Taiwanese Government could also provide tax breaks for greater automation, which will a side effect of reducing demand for workers in factories.

Options like the above can be very painful for the Philippine Government to bear; and if carefully calibrated, Taiwan can inflict pain on the Philippine Government without a US response.
 

neocloud

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Looks like Taiwan is considering abolishing the southern boundary for fishing protection, it will be interesting to see how long Taiwan will keep the patrols up and what the response from the Philippines government will be


By Adam Tyrsett Kuo ,The China Post
May 21, 2013 - The government is moving toward abolishing Taiwan's southern boundary for fishery protection, an act which would extend the formal operational area of the Navy, the Coast Guard and local fishermen further south within Taiwan's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) toward the Philippines.

The boundary is currently set at the latitude of 20 degrees north.

In light of the recent fatal shooting of a local fisherman by Philippine coast guards, the Ministry of the Interior (MOI) and the Fisheries Agency (FA) are currently in the process of revising the government's fishery protection procedures to achieve an equal basis for negotiations with the Philippines over a possible fishery pact.

Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Anna Kao (高安) said that fishery talks are one of four demands made following the shooting incident, adding that the Foreign Ministry hopes to demarcate operation procedures between Philippine and Taiwanese fishermen.

Collecting evidence and investigating the case, however, are currently the higher priorities for the ministry, Kao said, adding that the commencement of fishery talks will depend on whether the case can be resolved.

Given that fishery protection operations conducted by the Coast Guard Administration and the Navy are not limited by the southern boundary, the boundary itself, which was announced by the Council of Agriculture, is effectively void, even though as a formal guideline it still exists.

After the government announced that protection operations will not be limited by the boundary, four Taiwanese fishing boats operating in the Bashi Channel crossed it yesterday morning to fish further south, while three approached waters close to the Philippines' Batanes Islands and Babuyan Islands.

Since Taiwan and the Philippines are at a critical juncture with regard to talks over a joint investigation into the shooting, the CGA's three vessels stuck close to the southern boundary yesterday morning, apparently to avoid giving rise to more tension.
 

OPSSG

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Philstar said:
25 May 2013 -- Justice Secretary Leila de Lima said... the NBI has “bits and pieces of initial findings” and is beginning to draft a report. The STAR learned from a source that coast guard personnel manning the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) patrol vessel may face criminal and administrative charges for possible violations of rules of engagement, excessive use of force, and neglect of duty. PCG personnel admitted having fired warning shots at two Taiwanese vessels some 39 nautical miles off Bantayan Island in the Balintang Channel. Authorities said such warning shot is not allowed under the rules of engagement.

There is excessive use of force if the 50 bullet holes reportedly found on the fishing vessel can be proven to have come from the firearms of PCG personnel.

In its incident report submitted to the NBI, the PCG confirmed that its personnel left the site after firing at the fishing vessel without checking on the victim...

<snip>

...MECO head Amadeo Perez, however, said visas had already been issued to eight NBI agents and forensic experts and that De Lima already agreed to the demand of Taiwanese investigators that they be allowed to see the video footage of the May 9 encounter...

<snip>
According to a news report from the Philstar, a source said that coast guard personnel manning the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) patrol vessel may face criminal and administrative charges for possible violations of rules of engagement, excessive use of force, and neglect of duty. However, as the final investigation report is not out, let us not jump to conclusions at this point. A lingering source of tension between Taiwan and Philippines over this incident, will be the reports (when they are eventual published) produced by both sides, as Taiwan, Philippines to launch parallel probe into fisherman's death.

Looks like Taiwan is considering abolishing the southern boundary for fishing protection, it will be interesting to see how long Taiwan will keep the patrols up...
I understand that there is a fishing season (which is not too long but I don't have the details on hand) for certain types of fish in that area. They don't have to be there all the time; and these patrols should be there to follow and protect Taiwanese fishermen (until an agreement is reached with the Philippine Government). If that does not occur, Taiwan might have to do it again for a few months, next season; and the Taiwan lobby in the US should go to work and shortly, we shall see Think tanks explain Taiwan's perspective of the incident to US Congress. The Taiwan lobby will also work to ensure support from members of US Congress; and urge them to speak on this issue. These include:-

(1) Rep. Ron DeSantis (R-Florida) wrote a letter to the Philippine Ambassador to the United States Jose Cuisia - urged Manila to work with Taipei to expeditiously and peacefully resolve the issue to the satisfaction of both parties, including an apology, appropriate compensation for the victim's family, the conduct of a thorough investigation into this incident, ensure accountability, and work together on a fishery agreement);
(2) Rep. Howard Coble (R-North Carolina) wrote a letter to Taiwan's President Ma - expressed his condolences to the family and friends of the dead fisherman, 65-year-old Hung Shih-cheng);
(3) Rep. Kerry Bentivolio (R-Mich.), who wrote to the Philippine ambassador;
(4) Rep. Scott DesJarlais (R-Tenn.), who wrote to Taiwan's President Ma;
(5) Rep. Robert Brady (D-Penn.), who wrote to both Taiwan's President Ma and the Philippine ambassador;
(6) Rep. Steve Chabot (R-Ohio) issued a statement in support of Taiwan;
(7) Rep. Eni Faleomavaega (D-American Samoa) issued a statement in support of Taiwan; and
(8) Rep. Matt Salmon (R-Ariz.) issued a statement in support of Taiwan.​

Taiwan was the 10th largest investor the Philippines in 2012 (at US$58.54 million or 0.85 percent of total FDI); and each month that this dispute drags on, 2,500 OFW jobs in Taiwan are affected (the number of work permit applications, per month, before the freeze). Technically, the hiring freeze from Taipei is technically more of a “slowdown.” Visa processing has not stopped, but the 7-day processing period has lengthened to 14 days. Taiwan was the 9th top exporter to the Philippines with a total value of exports of US$1.92 billion; and was 4th top import country with a total value of imports of US$4.83 billion in 2012. Peaceful resolution is in everybody's interest - for both Philippines and Taiwan. In related news, see this story on an event in Taiwan: 'Young Taiwanese show solidarity with Filipinos'.

...what the response from the Philippines government will be.
The logical Philippine response is to monitor the Taiwanese presence; and do nothing more to avoid any escalation. On 23 May 2013, President Ma Ying-jeou said Taiwan is a peace-loving country and it is not seeking to flex its military muscles, while receiving the French representative to Taipei at the Presidential Office:

"While we have to take measures to protect our fishermen operating within our 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone, none of these actions should be misconstrued as military exercises or flexing our military muscles."​

Despite President's Ma's statement, that is not how the Philippines would see it. In President Aquino III’s speech at the Philippine Navy’s anniversary on 21 May 2013, he said (translated from Filipino):

“We have a clear message to the world: The Philippines is for Filipinos, and we have the capability to resist bullies entering our backyard.”​

The link enclosed is what a reporter Rigoberto D. Tiglao of Manila Times, thought of President Aquino III’s speech quoted above; namely, Aquino rattles non-existent saber. As I said in another thread, war is unlikely between the Philippines and it's neighbours to the north, like China (2012 defence spending of US$166 billion) or Taiwan (2012 defense spending of US$10.7 billion). This is because the power disparity between China or Taiwan versus the Philippines (2012 defense spending of US$2.97 billion) is just too great for war to occur.
 

OPSSG

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Taiwan’s defence budget has increased to TWD433.1 billion (US$13.1 billion), a significant increase. In addition, see Shepard Media’s article and Taiwan unveils new mortar carrier based on CM-32 8x8 armored vehicle | August 2019 for details from Taipei Aerospace and Defense Technology Exhibition (TADTE) in Taipei. 2019 TADTE also showcases a new trailer-mounted multiple launcher of the Jian Hsiang" (劍翔) suicide drone. This looks like an interesting implementation of IAI’s Harpy loitering munition. The Jian Hsiang shown at TADTE 2019 has been developed by the Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST), which has a USD2.54 billion five-year contract to develop and manufacture a fleet of such weapons. The Israeli connection to Taiwanese weapons development is clear as Taiwan’s Hsiung Feng 1 cruise missile is really a locally made Gabriel Mark 5.

As Shepard Media reported, Taiwan’s Army estimates it will purchase 250 Cloud Leopard Mark IIs in the coming three years. This will compliment Taiwan’s purchase of 108 M1A2T Abrams tanks to increase mobility of their army in their active defense strategy.

At TADTE 2019, in Taipei, a Cloud Leopard II mortar carrier fitted with an 81mm mortar was displayed. With an electro-servo control system and automatic fire control modules, it can provide rapid fire effects for mortars of both 81mm and 120mm calibre. Many features are added to the Cloud Leopard Mark IIs. For example, the UAV Forward Observation System developed by the 202nd Arsenal can be integrated. This UAV offers real-time imagery at ranges of up to 6km, thus providing battlefield situation awareness for the gun crew. Furthermore, a Panoramic Vehicle Imaging System (PAVIS) enables a 360° all-round view for visible, IR and fused images. This mast-mounted equipment increases situation awareness by day or night. While I like PAVIS, I am not a fan of the 81mm mortar. Given Taiwan’s threat matrix, they should have implemented an 120mm mortar solution, to increase weight of fire, for the Cloud Leopard II mortar variant.

Besides the mortar variant, the development team plans to install a turret containing a 105mm gun on future Cloud Leopard IIs. Cooperating with 202nd Arsenal, two 105mm Mobile Gun System prototypes will roll out no later than Q4 of 2024.

Meanwhile, mass production the Cloud Leopard armed with a Mk44 Bushmaster II 30mm chain gun commenced in 2019. It is estimated more than 280 vehicles will be ordered to provide high mobility and greater firepower for mechanised infantry. The CM34 carries 420 rounds of standard 30mm AP, HEI and TP ammunition. As well as the weapon system, the 30mm Chain Gun Turret System offers surveillance capabilities.

In September 2018 Jane’s also reported that the Taiwanese Ministry of National Defence (MND) has placed an order for one landing platform dock (LPD) vessel. The contract with local shipbuilder CSBC Corporation was awarded in April 2018, as the first in a planned class of four ships. It will have an overall length of 153 m, an overall beam of 23 m, and a hull draught of 6 m — with 1 helicopter landing spot. It can attain a maximum speed of 21.5 kt and a range of 12,500 n miles at the economical cruising speed of 13 kt. “In terms of design, we have taken references from the San Antonio class,” said the representative, pointing to the vessel’s superstructure. “We will evaluate the performance of the first ship after it is commissioned and use this experience to decide on changes for the next three ships.”
 
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OPSSG

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In early August 2019, US President Trump told the press that he had approved a F-16V arms sale to Taiwan and he indicated his confidence that the US Senate would pass the US$8 billion weapons deal for 66 F-16Vs. These 66 Block 70 aircraft will come with 70 GE F110 engines (in contrast with Taiwan's current Block 20s which are running on PW F100). Trump said that the deal will bring a lot of jobs to the US, indicating his confidence that Taiwan will use the F-16 "very responsibly." On 20 Aug 2019, the US State Department approved the sale of 66 F-16 fighters to Taiwan. Read more at US approves sale of 66 F-16 fighters to Taiwan

Janes has also reported that Taiwan's Aerospace Industrial Development Corp (AIDC) is scheduled to unveil the first prototype Advanced Jet Trainer (AJT) in September 2019, when ground testing is due to begin, with the first test flight set for June 2020. AIDC has been commissioned to design and build 66 AJTs by 2026. They will replace the ageing AT3 trainers and F5 fighters.
 

ngatimozart

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In early August 2019, US President Trump told the press that he had approved a F-16V arms sale to Taiwan and he indicated his confidence that the US Senate would pass the US$8 billion weapons deal for 66 F-16Vs. These 66 Block 70 aircraft will come with 70 GE F110 engines (in contrast with Taiwan's current Block 20s which are running on PW F100). Trump said that the deal will bring a lot of jobs to the US, indicating his confidence that Taiwan will use the F-16 "very responsibly." On 20 Aug 2019, the US State Department approved the sale of 66 F-16 fighters to Taiwan. Read more at US approves sale of 66 F-16 fighters to Taiwan

Janes has also reported that Taiwan's Aerospace Industrial Development Corp (AIDC) is scheduled to unveil the first prototype Advanced Jet Trainer (AJT) in September 2019, when ground testing is due to begin, with the first test flight set for June 2020. AIDC has been commissioned to design and build 66 AJTs by 2026. They will replace the ageing AT3 trainers and F5 fighters.
It had to happen and the US is required by law to provide Taiwan with suitable weapons for it's defence. I would posit that the F-16V would meet that definition. Beijing will start screeching and screaming, however they really have to learn that the people of Taiwan made their choice in 1949 and do not want to be ruled by the present govt in Beijing. To much bully boy crap coming out of Beijing.
 

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.., the people of Taiwan made their choice in 1949 and do not want to be ruled by the present govt in Beijing.
Minor correction, on the Taiwanese being able to make a choice in 1949. I note that the Kuomintang (KMT) ruled Taiwan under martial law until the late 1980s, with the stated goal of being vigilant against Communist infiltration and KMT led reunification with the mainland. Taiwan ceased to be a single-party state in 1986/1987 and political reforms beginning in the 1990s loosened the KMT's grip on power. IMO, the Taiwanese really only had a choice only after 1986 — kindly note that Chiang Ching-kuo, son of Chiang Kai-shek, remained as President of Taiwan from 1978 until his death in 1988.

Taiwanese domestic politics under Tsai's Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) is toxic, so I am not sure if they can agree on who is the enemy — the opposition alliance led by the KMT or China under Xi Jinping. Or it could be that the DPP is it’s own worse enemy, as Taiwan is set to hold its presidential election in January 2020 amid heightened tensions with China. See: China-friendly Taiwan mayor beats Foxconn's Gou in opposition's presidential primary - Reuters

KMT’s then leader Ma Ying-jeou, who served as Taiwan’s President from 2008 to 2016, met Xi Jinping on 5 November 2015, in Singapore, for a new page in history for cross-strait relations. That 2015 KMT and CCP rapprochement is gone with the DPP in power. There is background on why things are the way it is between China and Taiwan. China under Xi Jinping has tried, within certain parameters, to accommodate Taiwanese aspirations. There are real consequences to DPP rule (or mis-rule, depending on who you ask in Taiwan) that has an impact the geo-politics of North East Asia.
 
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OPSSG

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Tanner Greer has written a poorly researched article in the Foreign Affairs in Sept 2019 titled ‘Taiwan’s Defense Strategy Doesn’t Make Military Sense: But It Does Make Political Sense.’ While I agree that Taiwan needs to up its game for defence procurement (against a PLA invasion scenario), Greer’s article demonstrates his ignorance of real and valid Taiwan’s concerns — with his objection to Taiwan refreshing their submarine force — including their fear of their SLOCs being choked and thereafter restricted in their ability to trade by the PLA(N), from distant seas. The PLA(N) is on the verge of or has acquired a blue water capability. IMO China does not have to fight in the Taiwan Straits anymore, or invade, to coerce Taiwan, as the PLA(N) is able to deploy to distant seas to protect their interests.

The Taiwanese Ministry of National Defence (MND) expects to retire its F-5 and Mirage 2000v5 fighters in the early 2020s and is in the process of buying 66 F-16Vs (see: US risks China's anger after sealing $8bn deal to sell Taiwan 66 fighter jets | Taiwan | The Guardian). MND is also moving to modernize its old F-16A/Bs, but any fighter has a fixed airframe life, measured in flight hours. Modernization is a medium term solution, not a long term one, and does nothing to address the growing numeric imbalance across the strait. With 24 F-16A/Bs out of service for upgrades at any point, 16 in the US for training at Luke AFB, and 30% of the remaining machines (32) unavailable for other maintenance, Taiwan’s fleet of 146 F-16s shrinks to about 74 F-16A/Bs in operational service. If equivalent rates hold true for the 71 locally built and upgraded F-CK-1C/Ds, that means about 50 Hsiung Ying fighters, for a total available fleet of just 124 fighters.
 
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John Fedup

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Probably a good thing there is some ocean between them instead of a land border. The only winner in this dispute is China. It seems to be escalating to the point that even when the US gets a POTUS that understands the importance of international relationships it may be too late to cool things down and re-establish some decorum between these two nations.
 

OPSSG

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Understanding Taiwan’s Chronic Gap
1. The Legislative Yuan approved NT$358 billion (US$12.1 billion) for national defense spending across fiscal 2020, a 3.47 percent increase compared with 2019, while China’s military budget this year is NT$5.4 trillion, more than 15 times that of Taiwan.

2. Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) legislators Wang Ting-yu (王定宇) and Chao Tien-lin (趙天麟) said there is no need to enter an arms race with a “warmongering” China, as President Tsai Ing-wen’s (蔡英文) administration has introduced policies to increase the quality and quantity of the nation’s armed forces.

3. China’s development model differs from Taiwan, as it aspires to be a global hegemon, while Taiwan only seeks to protect its citizens, Wang said, adding that the two are not comparable. An arms race with China is out of the question, Chao said, as Taiwan cannot hope to compete, nor is it necessary.
4. Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) has 215,000 budgeted positions among all branches, of which 188,000 are soldiers and the rest civilian employees. Only 153,000 of those positions were filled in 2018—just 81 percent of the personnel the military should have.

5. The Taiwanese have no intention of building a credible deterrence. If they were, they would not have ended their prior conscription system — that used to be like that of Korea. But 2017’s changes slashed the conscription period to just four months. Most draftees serve even less, as up to two weeks can be deducted if they’ve completed military training classes in high school and college. The four-month conscripts typically receive five weeks of basic training before they are assigned to field units for more specialty training. But they’re more a burden than an aid, not treated seriously by career or noncommissioned officers as their short stays mean they are seen as guests rather than soldiers.

6. But worse than these irrational moves to end conscription, they have not properly resourced their new all volunteer force — such that frontline combat units only have 60% to 80% of the required manpower. They are already combat ineffective during peacetime.
 
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Musashi_kenshin

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KMT’s then leader Ma Ying-jeou, who served as Taiwan’s President from 2008 to 2016, met Xi Jinping on 5 November 2015, in Singapore, for a new page in history for cross-strait relations. That 2015 KMT and CCP rapprochement is gone with the DPP in power. There is background on why things are the way it is between China and Taiwan. China under Xi Jinping has tried, within certain parameters, to accommodate Taiwanese aspirations. There are real consequences to DPP rule (or mis-rule, depending on who you ask in Taiwan) that has an impact the geo-politics of North East Asia.
I hope you don't mind me commenting on an old comment, but I rarely see discussions on Taiwan. Obviously in 2019 a DPP victory was far from being nailed-on, but thanks in part to China over-reaching in Hong Kong it was another DPP landslide.

You can't justifiably blame the DPP for the state of relations with China. President Tsai has held out her hand more than once to Beijing. She doesn't have any conditions for talks, she just doesn't accept Taiwan is part of China (why would she?). It's Xi and the CCP that have the preconditions. Yes, Ma did meet Xi. But the meeting didn't achieve anything other than some short-lived propaganda.

Also, putting aside the destruction of 1C2S in Hong Kong, Xi's "offer" to Taiwan was always hollow. The CCP has never set out what its red lines are for a future settlement with Taiwan - e.g. a Beijing-appointed governor or requiring Taiwanese politicians to be vetted by a pro-Beijing committee, a permanent garrison in Taiwan, whether Taiwan can continue to arm itself and import arms, etc. Saying stuff like Taiwan can have "HK Plus" or "enhanced autonomy" is meaningless.

Regarding the July 2020 article, I've seen those reports about manpower shortages. I don't think it's right to say Taiwan has "no intent" of building a credible deterrence. Forcing conscription on a populace that doesn't want it is dictatorial. Taiwan is a democracy now. Maybe they need to put more money in to allow for a volunteer army, but that doesn't mean Taiwan isn't trying. My own view is that it will take more time to make the volunteer military truly successful.
 

OPSSG

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Also, putting aside the destruction of 1C2S in Hong Kong, Xi's "offer" to Taiwan was always hollow. The CCP has never set out what its red lines are for a future settlement with Taiwan - e.g. a Beijing-appointed governor or requiring Taiwanese politicians to be vetted by a pro-Beijing committee, a permanent garrison in Taiwan, whether Taiwan can continue to arm itself and import arms, etc.
1. I see your point of view on why 1 country, 2 systems has no hope of working. There are different angles and ways to look the dysfunctional cross-straits relations from a political standpoint. Beijing and Taipei sharply disagree on the island’s status and the fact is that 2015 Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Kuomintang (KMT) rapprochement is gone with the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in power. You certainly know the background on why things are the way it is between China and Taiwan.

2. For ASEAN there is only “one China” and that Taiwan is an inalienable part of it. Beijing says Taiwan is bound by an understanding reached in 1992 between representatives of the CCP and the KMT then ruling Taiwan. Referred to as the 1992 Consensus, it states that there is only “one China” but allows for differing interpretations, by which both Beijing and Taipei agree that Taiwan belongs to China, while the two still disagree on which entity is China’s legitimate governing body. The tacit agreement underlying the 1992 Consensus is that Taiwan will not seek independence.

3. The responsibility for defending Taiwan lies with the Taiwanese — they have to pretend to be willing to fight — being caught selling war plans on eBay — filed as obviously not trying.

Regarding the July 2020 article, I've seen those reports about manpower shortages. I don't think it's right to say Taiwan has "no intent" of building a credible deterrence. Forcing conscription on a populace that doesn't want it is dictatorial. Taiwan is a democracy now. Maybe they need to put more money in to allow for a volunteer army, but that doesn't mean Taiwan isn't trying. My own view is that it will take more time to make the volunteer military truly successful.
4. Compared to the rate of military capability advancement in China, Taiwan’s rate of change is seen by me as slowly crawling along — I am not the only one to state the obvious.

5. One of the reasons why China has cemented its place as the world’s fifth largest arms exporter is cost-effectiveness. Whether it’s a Type 56 assault rifle or a diesel-electric submarine, the technology of its military products is familiar and the price isn’t exorbitant. The same applies to Norinco’s VP11 MRAP whose features are tailored for armies saddled with meager budgets. Clearly applying the timeless lessons of South African protected trucks–the monocoque hull and bulging side panels–the VP11 is unique for being smaller than usual.

6. From my perspective, Taiwan can decide what iI wants. The current president, Tsai Ing-wen, leader of the DPP has rejected the 1992 Consensus that Taiwan will not seek independence. In a January 2019 speech, she declared the “one country, two systems” framework advanced by Beijing unacceptable. Her rejection of the consensus, along with that of other leading voices in the governing DPP, leaves open the possibility of future Taiwanese independence.

7. The Taiwanese can do whatever they want, including disbanding conscription. But if war breaks out, don’t drag others into it.
 
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Musashi_kenshin

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Taiwan doesn't have the budget to build dozens of new first-class warships, unless it reverts to the old KMT dictatorship era and starts depriving schools and hospitals of much needed funding. (China, on the other-hand, has cash registers in its hospitals to charge people up front, so it's understandable it can build and upgrade lots of vessels.)

As for your last point, all free countries have the right to ask for outside assistance if they're attacked. Realistically it would be a mostly US force, albeit maybe with some Japanese/Australian support - ASEAN could easily not even get involved at all. No one would be forced to intervene, but letting China take over Taiwan would be bad for everyone in Asia (except the CCP).
 

OPSSG

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Let me add to my prior post above:
As for your last point, all free countries have the right to ask for outside assistance if they're attacked.
8. No help will be coming to Taiwan (and it is not even a member of the UN) unless there is a legal framework, like a status of forces agreement and the legal indemnities undertaken by Saudi Arabia with coalition forces during Gulf War I. We are talking months before any non-US help could or would come — for force prep and getting a legal framework in place for Taiwan to sign under duress.

9. An alternative to an ad hoc undertaking (which the Taiwanese will not give due to trust issues), is the entry into a legal framework like the FPDA (or NATO like in structure).
(a) Even under the FPDA, which alllows for intelligence sharing, commitment of forces is not automatic. But the consultation process (for intervention) is speeded up and enabled for specific and planned military contingencies.​
(b) After 9-11, NATO invoked Article 5 to enable the creation of the NATO led ISAF for Afghanistan. While that process was pretty fast, it took until Oct (almost a month), before invoking of Article 5 was announced. The process took until Dec 2001 by UN Resolution 1386, as envisaged by the Bonn Agreement for ISAF to be created.​
No country, even the US is willing to enter into any treaty like agreement with Taiwan — due to inherent mistrust of all parties. The Taiwanese do not trust the Americans and vice versa. I would go so far as to say that the Taiwanese should not be trusted. IMO, it would be hard for the Taiwanese to strike a good deal with anyone.
Realistically it would be a mostly US force...
10. Not true. The Americans have a policy of strategic ambiguity that has been followed by four American presidents —Washington could take a judicious approach in such a situation. It could insist that China call off the attacks and could threaten military action—while quietly telling Taipei to retract any independence rhetoric if it expected American military help. Such a strategy might well work in quelling the conflict before it escalated enough to directly involve the US.

11. Entry into a fighting naval coalition is not a simple process and fraught with difficulty on escalation limits, National caveats, logistics compatibility, and/or other issues.
...albeit maybe with some Japanese/Australian support.
12. The China-Taiwan relationship is one of the most dangerous in the world.
  • The Prime Ministers of Australia and Japan will treat it with proper care and be carefully balanced in their responses to Taiwan. Australian and Japanese responses to Mar 2010 ROKS Cheonan sinking and Nov 2010 bombardment of Yeonpyeong in Korea, were carefully balanced. These incidents with a US ally demonstrated that if the stakes are high enough, no one really dares to or wants to escalate. If the PLA(N) sinks a Taiwanese navy boat, no war is expected — the Taiwanese are not even American allies.
  • Keep in mind that since Taiwan lost its United Nations seat as "China" in 1971 (replaced by the PRC), most sovereign states have switched their diplomatic recognition to the PRC, recognizing the PRC as the representative of all China, though the majority of countries avoid clarifying what territories are meant by "China" in order to associate with both the PRC and Taiwan.
  • As of 20 September 2019, Taiwan maintains official diplomatic relations with about 14 UN member states and the Holy See, although informal relations are maintained with nearly all others.
  • A simple commitment of forces or supply of weapons (to support Taiwan) by the Australians or the Japanese would be seen by the diplomatic community as mishandling the situation.
ASEAN could easily not even get involved at all.
13. ASEAN as a community is not an Asian version of NATO and a much looser arrangement than the EU. Plus ADMM is not intended to be used that way — will need to review this in 20 years (in 2040).
No one would be forced to intervene, but letting China take over Taiwan would be bad for everyone in Asia (except the CCP).
14. But IMO, China does not want to invade — they are not so stupid to make such a strategic mistake that will bleed them dry. It is clear that the PLA has developed some interesting military capabilities should the use of force become necessary— it may simply be to shoot at the Taiwanese military or for the PLA(N) to apply military pressure in other ways (eg. a distant interdiction of trade routes). The Taiwanese are aware of the PLA(N)’s bombers that carry 400km YJ-12 ASCMs and 2000km CJ-20 ALCMs, which make the US made block 2, Harpoon missiles, in Taiwan’s inventory, look very short ranged by comparison.

15. If the Japanese Prime Minister or the US President who wants to commit forces to show support, they will be faced with a real domestic politics dilemma (if it is not an invasion).
 
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