Australian Army Discussions and Updates

[Anthony_B_78]

I am sure you realise that the combat air wing of the US Marines is much larger than the Australian and Singaporean air forces combined. This means the Americans can do stupid things that Australian or Singaporean ground troops can’t afford in terms of their orbat. A flight of 4 USAF B-52s, in support of a US Marine MEU can drop more ordinance on the Taliban THAN a squadron of Australian Super Hornets.

The US Army has more tanks than most countries, they certainly can attach a few to any MEU or MEF. The problem for the American Navy is the relative lack of amphibious shipping in relation to their ‘needs’ to move the large amount of forces they have on hand; and in this respect they are expecting region amphibious forces to bring MBTs in any fight.

Yep, I do. The point I was making was simply that one should be conscious that the US Marines - defence professionals that they are - are planning to forego armour. It's a controversial move, may be overturned, and, yes, there is the US Army to bring tanks, while US air power is certainly unrivalled. The fact remains - the Marines are planning to go without tanks, which means it's not unreasonable for someone here to argue that position. (Though I don't personally agree with it myself.)

On the last sentence, the USMC has by far the world's largest amphibious shipping to draw on. That it isn't sufficient to move as much as they might like in a single fleet is true. But the idea that they're expecting regional amphibious forces to bring the MBTs in any fight? Not one I've seen, nor one I am buying given that no one else has anywhere near the amphibious shipping that the US does.

 

[Todjaeger]

Agree on all counts. Was only making the point that this planning by the USMC does show some defence professionals have different ideas on these matters. Notwithstanding that they are rather controversial, could well be reversed, and that the US does still have the Army to bring the armour.

The USMC having other services available to provide options that the USMC is planning on deleting means that USMC planning can possibly afford to go down paths that Australia just cannot follow. In the case of Australia, what the ADF has, that is essentially it. A closer analogy would be is the US military was across the board looking at eliminating heavy armour. If the decisionmakers were to decide to pursue this course of planning, I would imagine various psyche specialists would get involved, possibly with the aide of calming substances like benzodiaxepine.

I don't know about others' thinking (and please don't get me wrong, I absolutely do not support DOA), but there is also the prospect of using such capabilities in a forward engagement sense. That is, occupying an island, or natural choke point, and using your - particularly - land-based anti-ship missiles to contain your foe. It just feels a little defensive and putting too many of your eggs in one basket to me, especially if it comes at the expense of other capabilities, and as ADMk2 said, it shouldn't. The funding - we are told - is there.

If one were to look at Australia and the island chains to the north and NW, how many natural chokepoints could Australia actually base such capabilities at? Relating to that, whose territory are these chokepoints located within? From what I am seeing, there are really not too many such sites within the extent of current Australian-controlled territory. Now some of these capabilities could be used to help protect some isolated Australian territories which could serve (to one extent or another) as a sort of FOB with Christmas Island and the Keeling Islands in the west, and Norfolk and Lord Howe in the east. However, if the idea is really to used land-based assets to impact or close a chokepoint to hostile forces, Australia would first need to establish forces on territory currently belonging to other nations. If Australia were to attempt to do so without the permission of the nation(s) where such Australian forces would be operating, that could likely require not only amphibious operations, but potentially opposed landings, and that is not something Australian forces are currently configured to do.

 

[OPSSG]

On the last sentence, the USMC has by far the world's largest amphibious shipping to draw on. That it isn't sufficient to move as much as they might like in a single fleet is true. But the idea that they're expecting regional amphibious forces to bring the MBTs in any fight? Not one I've seen, nor one I am buying given that no one else has anywhere near the amphibious shipping that the US does.

Part of the Obama era 1,000 fleet navy plans of the past. This is why the Koreans (Dokdo-class), Japanese (Hyūga-class) and Singaporeans (JMMS) are interested in augmenting the US Navy and are developing their fleet. The Koreans and Japanese are not only stopping at LHDs but moving onto STOVL carriers — like the British with no reduction in their LHDs.

How long will the US Navy be the leader in tonnage for LHDs and LPDs? China is making efforts to address the PLA(N)’s shortfall with the rapid construction of 3 Type 075 amphibious assault ships to join 6 to 8 Type 071 LPDs. The current Chinese build rate for their LHDs and LPDs terrify me. The PLA(N) will grow to the point that it is expected they will dwarf all US allies combined in LHDs TONNAGE by 2049 (if not earlier).

 

[Anthony_B_78]

The USMC having other services available to provide options that the USMC is planning on deleting means that USMC planning can possibly afford to go down paths that Australia just cannot follow. In the case of Australia, what the ADF has, that is essentially it. A closer analogy would be is the US military was across the board looking at eliminating heavy armour. If the decisionmakers were to decide to pursue this course of planning, I would imagine various psyche specialists would get involved, possibly with the aide of calming substances like benzodiaxepine.

I agree. There's no argument here. The point I was making, however, is valid. On this, I haven't seen any evidence that the Marines are planning for US Army armour to back them up. Rather, they genuinely don't believe MBTs will fit into their operations. There is a lot of argument about that. "Controversial" generally means there are those opposed to this course. And I agree that the decision could be reversed.

As for the rest, this is getting very hypothetical. Remembering I don't disagree with you, I was only pointing out that one could see the benefits of enhanced long range fire capabilities and not have a DOA mindset.

 

[Anthony_B_78]

Part of the Obama era 1,000 fleet navy plans of the past. This is why the Koreans (Dokdo-class), Japanese (Hyūga-class) and Singaporeans (JMMS) are interested in augmenting the US Navy and are developing their fleet. The Koreans and Japanese are not only stopping at LHDs but moving onto STOVL carriers — like the British with no reduction in their LHDs.

How long will the US Navy be the leader in tonnage for LHDs and LPDs? China is making efforts to address the PLA(N)’s shortfall with the rapid construction of 3 Type 075 amphibious assault ships to join 6 to 8 Type 071 LPDs. The current Chinese build rate for their LHDs and LPDs terrify me. The PLA(N) will grow to the point that it is expected they will dwarf all US allies combined in LHDs TONNAGE by 2049 (if not earlier).

Still not seeing evidence that the USMC is planning for its allies to bring the MBTs? I would think that would be a rather controversial idea.

When do you think the PLA(N) will get to that point? When will it have the shipping to realistically be able to, for example, invade Taiwan?

 

[OPSSG]

Still not seeing evidence that the USMC is planning for its allies to bring the MBTs? I would think that would be a rather controversial idea.

It impossible for USMC to make such plans as it is out of the scope of a MEU or MEF Commander.

I note that the United States Indo-Pacific Command has contingency drawer plans — that rotates forces or draw upon allied resources (Japan and Australia especially) at a multi-domain level.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1425260263087935491

This is why the United States Indo-Pacific Command have stored some equipment at certain forward deployed locations for their ‘rotational forces.’ Please read up on the older, places not bases idea in the Obama era.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1274599257366913025

The United States Indo-Pacific Command have surge plans that exceed the capacity of all allies in logistics (which is why they considered expanding military logistics command) — by tapping on commercial car carriers. But Obama era plans were left in limbo by the DoD under Trump.

As the latest QE deployment shows, USMC F-35Bs will fly off from UK carriers. The USMC rotational forces are trained to use Australian LPDs (supported by ADF forces that include Australian M1 MBTs) and USMC recon marines are familiar with Singapore’s NDU to the point that they can deploy off any of Singapore’s helicopters and LPDs. They may be the first wave, subsequent waves of Singaporean forces include Leopard 2SG MBTs

 

[Anthony_B_78]

It impossible for USMC to make such plans as it is out of the scope of a MEU or MEF Commander.

I note that the United States Indo-Pacific Command has contingency drawer plans — that rotates forces or draw upon allied resources (Japan and Australia especially) at a multi-domain level.

That's my point though. The USMC is not planning to ditch its tanks because it believe it will be supported by others in that regard; it's doing so because it does not believe they are needed for the operations they expect to be executing.

Now, just to restate, I don't agree with this approach. My point in referencing the USMC in this regard was that there are defence professionals with different views; very different views. As there always have been.

 

[Todjaeger]

That's my point though. The USMC is not planning to ditch its tanks because it believe it will be supported by others in that regard; it's doing so because it does not believe they are needed for the operations they expect to be executing.

Now, just to restate, I don't agree with this approach. My point in referencing the USMC in this regard was that there are defence professionals with different views; very different views. As there always have been.

Umm... No. The USMC is expecting the US Army to provide heavy armour support if/when/where needed. If one is only focusing on what the USMC will be fielding, then only is not looking all the pieces of the US military puzzle. Yes, USMC planners are absolutely defence professionals, but because there are entire additional services within the US military which can and have been tasked with conducting certain types of operations, and/or providing certain types of support, the USMC can cease providing a type of capability because it is still being provided elsewhere within the overall US military. The USMC still expects to draw upon other US services during operations.

This article in the Marine Corps times outlines not only what the change is, but also what some of the major potential issues could be. My own qualms about the USMC planning on no longer fielding tanks is essentially a spin-off from the US Army adopting Stryker brigades preceding and during the 2nd Gulf War. The idea as presented was that the lighter, highly mobile vehicles could strike rapidly, advance and maneuver as well as get transported into a combat area rapidly by being light and expeditionary. IIRC the belief at the time was that because the vehicles were to be highly mobile, that mobility would provide protection and therefore the vehicles did not require the armour levels heavy vehicles like tanks possessed. The reality in service appears to have been somewhat different, especially in areas of rough or urban terrain.

 

[Anthony_B_78]

Umm... No. The USMC is expecting the US Army to provide heavy armour support if/when/where needed. If one is only focusing on what the USMC will be fielding, then only is not looking all the pieces of the US military puzzle. Yes, USMC planners are absolutely defence professionals, but because there are entire additional services within the US military which can and have been tasked with conducting certain types of operations, and/or providing certain types of support, the USMC can cease providing a type of capability because it is still being provided elsewhere within the overall US military. The USMC still expects to draw upon other US services during operations.

That's not the rationale they have given. They're not saying they don't need it because the US Army will provide it; they're saying they don't need it, but if a heavy armoured force is needed it will be provided by the US Army. That's a subtle but important difference. (It's also pissed off a lot of Marines and former Marines.) They're not expecting to draw upon the US Army for the operations they are planning for; they don't believe tanks are suited to those operations. They're saying if the country needs "heavy ground armor capability" it will "continue to be provided by the U.S. Army". That word "continue" is important.

From the Force Design Report:

Divestment of tanks - We have sufficient evidence to conclude that this capability, despite its long and honorable history in the wars of the past, is operationally unsuitable for our highest-priority challenges in the future. Heavy ground armor capability will continue to be provided by the U.S. Army.

The Marines Times also has a good read on the reforms, including this:

A series of wargames conducted between 2018 and 2019 helped inform the Corps’ decision to divest of tanks and outmoded units and equipment that will have trouble surviving in fight with peer adversaries like China, according to a Marine Corps force redesign report.

 

[ngatimozart]

Agree on all counts. Was only making the point that this planning by the USMC does show some defence professionals have different ideas on these matters. Notwithstanding that they are rather controversial, could well be reversed, and that the US does still have the Army to bring the armour.



I don't know about others' thinking (and please don't get me wrong, I absolutely do not support DOA), but there is also the prospect of using such capabilities in a forward engagement sense. That is, occupying an island, or natural choke point, and using your - particularly - land-based anti-ship missiles to contain your foe. It just feels a little defensive and putting too many of your eggs in one basket to me, especially if it comes at the expense of other capabilities, and as ADMk2 said, it shouldn't. The funding - we are told - is there.

If you look at the USN Distributed Lethality strategy, the USMC DOA fits in with that. The idea of DOA is to support USN A2/AD and for that the USMC don't require armour. They are going back to their traditional naval role, causing mischief and mayhem from the sea. The US has the US Army to do all the armoured warfare type things and that's what the Army is for.

However the ADF doesn't have that luxury, so IMHO any attempts to draw a comparison would give a false conclusion because the initial data inputs are flawed. Secondly, the ADF doesn't have the luxury of funding for two such forces. However the USMC DOA strategy is something that the ADF should consider investigating to determine whether or not it would have merit within ADF CONOPS, because it would be quite sensible to have a close look at it. Personally I quite like the strategy because it denies significant area to an enemy, forcing them to react.

You say it's a little defensive, but another way of looking at it is active defence. Mao Tse Tung coined the term and codified the strategy of active defence, which is the standard defensive strategy of the PLA. A2/AD is an active defence strategy.

 

[Bob53]

And what would you expect the infantry to ride into battle in / on? The back of brumbies or march? Come on get bloody real.

I’m not sure I made my point all that clearly. But yes I was suggesting some robbing of Peter to pay Paul….not giving the team push bikes….just a handful less CRV or IFVs and putting that money to long range fires.

Most of my posts are really with defence of Australia in mind. i am not a fan of overseas interventions. The last 60 years of interventions have a poor track history when it comes to outcomes…as they say the road to hell is littered with good intentions. we win lots of battles but the wars slip away from us. Probably Timor and Solomons the only positives I can find.

Back to my post…my logic is I think it’s better to deny or degrade a landing than to fight once they land. I only look at the denial strategy being used by China that apparently puts the USN at risk and see the commentary around having to take a different approach to the western pacific. Time and time again we are seeing the answer appears to lay in longer range weapons. It’s the same stratagem employed by Taiwan otherwise I suspect China would be on the water now.

I am not sure where the putting men’s lives at risk or knowing better came etc came from… no offence was intended ….you could argue that any idea on this forum that isn’t current defence department policy could be argued as doing that… and for the blokes who chipped in support…cheers.

 

[Bob53]

Why are we assuming budgets are getting tight? Even in the year of COVID, Defence’s budget including Army’s slice of that, has grown substantially, not tightened…

Long range fires and LAND 400 are both fully funded, as is everything else in the FSP. Some rescheduling of programs may well occur, but I don’t see significant loss of funding for ADF being likely, except maybe with respect to submarines in the near future...

yes they are funded but I think the point was 18 launchers was on the skinny side and a there is a view that giving up some of land 400 to pump up the LRF capability with additional launch vehicles could be a better approach.

 

[cdxbow]

That's not the rationale they have given. They're not saying they don't need it because the US Army will provide it; they're saying they don't need it, but if a heavy armoured force is needed it will be provided by the US Army. That's a subtle but important difference. (It's also pissed off a lot of Marines and former Marines.) They're not expecting to draw upon the US Army for the operations they are planning for; they don't believe tanks are suited to those operations. They're saying if the country needs "heavy ground armor capability" it will "continue to be provided by the U.S. Army". That word "continue" is important.

From the Force Design Report:

Divestment of tanks - We have sufficient evidence to conclude that this capability, despite its long and honorable history in the wars of the past, is operationally unsuitable for our highest-priority challenges in the future. Heavy ground armor capability will continue to be provided by the U.S. Army.

The Marines Times also has a good read on the reforms, including this:

A series of wargames conducted between 2018 and 2019 helped inform the Corps’ decision to divest of tanks and outmoded units and equipment that will have trouble surviving in fight with peer adversaries like China, according to a Marine Corps force redesign report.

Their new construct is closer to what they started as, soldiers from the sea often operating at squad/platoon level. This iteration adds long range fires, organic antiair and a bunch of drones. For the marines it's going back to their roots with a lot of new tech. They have designed the LAW to specifically support the concept.

Folks concentrating on the loss of tanks are really missing the point and not seeing the big picture. I think the ADF should look very closely at what the Marines are doing. Of all the US services the Marines seem to be adapting the quickest and most successfully to a future war in the Pacific. The USN probably the worst, but I think navies are facing the most uncertainty with a rather big question. What does a survivable, future Navy look like?

 

[Boagrius]

Problem is that divesting tanks in the Army means divesting tanks in the ADF, and severely compromising our ability to conduct close contact with a peer opponent in the process. That's not a trivial loss - but a central one to the entire joint force.

Agree that 18 MLRS launchers sounds anaemic, but it remains to be seen if this is all we'll end up with. I am less cynical about the likelihood of these things getting funded, because we are not in the midst of the post cold war peace dividend any more, and I think even our pollies have begun to realise it.

 

[Todjaeger]

Their new construct is closer to what they started as, soldiers from the sea often operating at squad/platoon level. This iteration adds long range fires, organic antiair and a bunch of drones. For the marines it's going back to their roots with a lot of new tech. They have designed the LAW to specifically support the concept.

Folks concentrating on the loss of tanks are really missing the point and not seeing the big picture. I think the ADF should look very closely at what the Marines are doing. Of all the US services the Marines seem to be adapting the quickest and most successfully to a future war in the Pacific. The USN probably the worst, but I think navies are facing the most uncertainty with a rather big question. What does a survivable, future Navy look like?

There is honestly a potentially very large issue with the USMC "adapting" to a future war in the Pacific, and that is the very real likelihood that the US and thus the USMC, will end up with combat operations somewhere other than where they have "adapted to". Also, if one looks at the force structure which appears intended to take, hold and deny islands/island chains from hostile forces, then that really focuses the force on combating one potential rival power, and limiting the force adaptation to the island chains in the S. Pacific and the island chains and archipelagoes which make up the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia. The force would likely be much less appropriate or capable should the need to engage in ops in the Caribbean, or even elsewhere in the Pacific like if there was a conflict in/around Korea again.

To also provide a bit of context on the history of the USMC, the USMC has a long and proud history of land battles which have nothing to do with amphibious operations. Battles in WWI like the Battle of Belleau (1918) or the Battle of Chateau Thierry (1918) being but two, famous examples.

What I am concerned about, is the interest some have for adopting changes the USMC seems to be making, without apparently realizing or understanding that the US has other force elements which can be called upon if/when the USMC units are not the appropriate type units to utilize.

 

[Boagrius]

There is honestly a potentially very large issue with the USMC "adapting" to a future war in the Pacific, and that is the very real likelihood that the US and thus the USMC, will end up with combat operations somewhere other than where they have "adapted to". Also, if one looks at the force structure which appears intended to take, hold and deny islands/island chains from hostile forces, then that really focuses the force on combating one potential rival power, and limiting the force adaptation to the island chains in the S. Pacific and the island chains and archipelagoes which make up the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia. The force would likely be much less appropriate or capable should the need to engage in ops in the Caribbean, or even elsewhere in the Pacific like if there was a conflict in/around Korea again.

To also provide a bit of context on the history of the USMC, the USMC has a long and proud history of land battles which have nothing to do with amphibious operations. Battles in WWI like the Battle of Belleau (1918) or the Battle of Chateau Thierry (1918) being but two, famous examples.

What I am concerned about, is the interest some have for adopting changes the USMC seems to be making, without apparently realizing or understanding that the US has other force elements which can be called upon if/when the USMC units are not the appropriate type units to utilize.

Indeed. Additionally, given the comparatively large size of the USMC and the fleet of amphibs that supports them, I have to question whether the Army or the RAN could feasibly mimic their emerging CONOPS.

Last I checked our amphibious capability was centred on lodging Army assets in what? One or two locations tops? A far cry from the highly distributed operations the USMC seems to be envisaging...

 

[cdxbow]

There is honestly a potentially very large issue with the USMC "adapting" to a future war in the Pacific, and that is the very real likelihood that the US and thus the USMC, will end up with combat operations somewhere other than where they have "adapted to". Also, if one looks at the force structure which appears intended to take, hold and deny islands/island chains from hostile forces, then that really focuses the force on combating one potential rival power, and limiting the force adaptation to the island chains in the S. Pacific and the island chains and archipelagoes which make up the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia. The force would likely be much less appropriate or capable should the need to engage in ops in the Caribbean, or even elsewhere in the Pacific like if there was a conflict in/around Korea again.

To also provide a bit of context on the history of the USMC, the USMC has a long and proud history of land battles which have nothing to do with amphibious operations. Battles in WWI like the Battle of Belleau (1918) or the Battle of Chateau Thierry (1918) being but two, famous examples.

What I am concerned about, is the interest some have for adopting changes the USMC seems to be making, without apparently realizing or understanding that the US has other force elements which can be called upon if/when the USMC units are not the appropriate type units to utilize.

Sure, the Marines have fought many non-amphibious battles but there origin is naval soldiers.
Suggesting ADF have a good look, not necessarily adopt. Overall pattern of disaggregation with use of smaller, more mobile units capable of bringing significant force in a few domains.
WRT larger theatres:
- the Pacific remains the most likely place for the party to start.
- there is always the US Army
- the Marines are not all downsizing, keeping many of the big amphibians.
- small marine units can be aggregated. I'm sure they simulate these sorts of change in structures.

I think it's a brilliant strategy, very practical and one they can actually pull off quickly. No overambitious technology, mainly re-organization and using operational systems from the other US services and weaving them into what looks like an effective CONOPS. They have made some tough calls eg: tanks, but also received generally good PR about it. It's seems to have navigated around any potential US political problems and would provide a real concern for an opponent in the Pacific.

 

[ngatimozart]

@Bob53 Fair enough. WRT the defence of Australia, where are you going to do that? That's a whole strategic argument in itself and personally I don't think a concept such as Fortress Australia is going to fly. IIRC Hugh White is a fan of what I would call Festung Australis, my play on Hitler's obsession with Festung Europa - Fortress Europe to protect Nazi Germany from the Western allies and the bolshevik hordes to the east. If such a strategy was enabled IMHO it would wreck Australia's economy because it would be excessively capability and platform intensive. You basically would be waiting for an enemy to land on your shores and then you are in the business of reacting to them. IMHO a good defence is as far away from your place as practicable so that your place isn't being wrecked. I quite like active defence and that's why I like the current USMC concept.

However, as I posted earlier the USMC has the US Army armoured divisions, so it can afford to divest its tanks. Whether that's a correct decision or not remains to be seen. The ADF are not in that position and shouldn't countenance the idea at all of divesting its MBTs. In fact, if anything it should build its MBTs up.

The next point is its long range fires. 18 MRLS may not be a lot, but its 18 more than you had last year. It's a start and they can always be added to later. Don't forget that you are also getting SPG as well and like the MRLS that has to be inducted and worked up. There is no real reason why the Army couldn't acquire truck mounted NSM and do a USMC by inserting detached troops of mobile NSM units on islands and keeping them covert. They can be supported by a LAW or its equivalent. Hell you could hide them in places up in the top end as well and on the Tiwi Islands. That'll bottle that whole area up. That's a lot of A2/AD for a relatively small investment. And your MRLS batteries are still with the main artillery force where they are required.

 

[Boagrius]

FWIW I did some digging and according to last year's Strategic Update it would appear that up to ~$5bn had been envisaged for the new MLRS capability.

https://www1.defence.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-11/Factsheet_Land.pdf

If realised I suspect that ought to allow for more than 18 launchers when all is said and done. Here's hoping.

 

[Redlands18]

@Bob53 Fair enough. WRT the defence of Australia, where are you going to do that? That's a whole strategic argument in itself and personally I don't think a concept such as Fortress Australia is going to fly. IIRC Hugh White is a fan of what I would call Festung Australis, my play on Hitler's obsession with Festung Europa - Fortress Europe to protect Nazi Germany from the Western allies and the bolshevik hordes to the east. If such a strategy was enabled IMHO it would wreck Australia's economy because it would be excessively capability and platform intensive. You basically would be waiting for an enemy to land on your shores and then you are in the business of reacting to them. IMHO a good defence is as far away from your place as practicable so that your place isn't being wrecked. I quite like active defence and that's why I like the current USMC concept.

However, as I posted earlier the USMC has the US Army armoured divisions, so it can afford to divest its tanks. Whether that's a correct decision or not remains to be seen. The ADF are not in that position and shouldn't countenance the idea at all of divesting its MBTs. In fact, if anything it should build its MBTs up.

The next point is its long range fires. 18 MRLS may not be a lot, but its 18 more than you had last year. It's a start and they can always be added to later. Don't forget that you are also getting SPG as well and like the MRLS that has to be inducted and worked up. There is no real reason why the Army couldn't acquire truck mounted NSM and do a USMC by inserting detached troops of mobile NSM units on islands and keeping them covert. They can be supported by a LAW or its equivalent. Hell you could hide them in places up in the top end as well and on the Tiwi Islands. That'll bottle that whole area up. That's a lot of A2/AD for a relatively small investment. And your MRLS batteries are still with the main artillery force where they are required.

Operating SP Arty Weapon systems are going to be very much an exercise in walk, crawl, run for the RAA(Royal Australian Artillery) there is no institutional knowledge within the Corps for anything other then operating towed Guns. They will need to lean heavily on the Armoured Corps and Mech Inf to learn how to operate Tracked Vehicles, the ADF has to learn how to operate land based SSMs and MRLs, again there is no real institutional knowledge on these systems.