Australian Army Discussions and Updates

[old faithful]

From what others are saying, it seems the maintenance requirement has proven to be more than what was expected. I can see the logic in trying to deliver more capability for the same number of personnel. If we think about operations from the LHDs too, six MRH-90s can take off and land, what, 96 soldiers if they use seats, more if not, in one go? That's almost a full rifle company. Six Blackhawks would carry two-thirds the number perhaps? Hindsight is, of course, never wrong.

I will leave it now. I have been an infantry soldier, been in UH1H, Chinooks and blackhawks, zero experience with the NH 9O’s.
In theory , to lift a platoon, you would only need 2 NH 99’s compared to 3 blackhawks.
Do you know your infantry tactics?
Each Blackhawk would land a section in a position of mutual support. 2 NH 9O,s would put 2 sections in one position and one in another. Not to bad, 2 up 1 depth, where as the 3 blackhawks could put in all round defence, or same 2 up. You would have 10 spare seats for the NH 90,s to!

 

[ADMk2]

Is it because there are fleets in the thousands of Blackhawk and Chinooks and parts supply logistics is simpler?

It could be. It could be us under-estimating the logistical requirements for these platforms and not ordering enough, or in a timely enough fashion, or it could be a manufacturer that struggles to deliver on their promises... Certainly the cost and the developmental status of their products, appear to be a struggle for Airbus Helicopters, and that is by no means, merely an Australian issue...

 

[Todjaeger]

Operating more platforms to deliver the same lift would surely cost more in personnel numbers? And isn't personnel about half the ADF's costs?

I am not certain that the MRH90's would really deliver more lift capability than a Black Hawk, TBH. Yes, the spec sheet lists space for 20 seated troops, but how many soldiers that are kitted out with and wearing their battle rattle can actually fit? There is also the related question of just how many so equipped soldiers can an MRH90 rapidly embark or disembark? Others like @Takao might know (and be able to comment) what the current Australian experience and practice with the MRH90 is, in terms of troop lift. If the planned troop lift numbers are similar to the Black Hawk like I suspect, i.e. about 11 per helicopter-flight, then the MRH90 would not really be 'better' than Black Hawk. In terms of cargo lift, IMO they are essentially the same with the MRH90 being able to lift ~100 kg more in a slung load.

What I would be very interested to find out is if there is more recent information regarding MRH90 costs per flight-hour than that 2014 ANAO report. I know that report has been linked to previously (by myself and likely others) here on the forum, and from memory the ANAO reported that after significant improvements, the MRH90 costs and maintenance requirements were both ~5x that of the S-70A Black Hawk. Again, being reported after improvements to processes which cut the maintenance-hour per flight-hour from ~97 (Jan 2012) to ~27 (April 2014) IIRC there remained a shortfall in availability from what was specified in the contract where the MRH90 had ~50% availability vs. a contract requirement of 65%.

IIRC this was one of the reasons why TAG or TAG-East had to retain other helicopters to meet some of their potential service needs, in that there was as I understand it, a lack in confidence in there being enough MRH90's fit and available for service if and when needed should TAG or TAG-East need to suddenly deploy.

 

[Todjaeger]

It could be. It could be us under-estimating the logistical requirements for these platforms and not ordering enough, or in a timely enough fashion, or it could be a manufacturer that struggles to deliver on their promises... Certainly the cost and the developmental status of their products, appear to be a struggle for Airbus Helicopters, and that is by no means, merely an Australian issue...

I can certainly believe that Australia underestimated some of the logistical & maintenance requirements for a brand new helicopter fleet. However, I would apportion a significant portion of the fault for that occurring to helicopter manufacturer/designer. After all, the data used to make requirements estimates would be coming from the manufacturer, and if the data was inaccurate, then those estimates are going to be inaccurate as well.

If Australia was planning on the MRH90 flying an average of 220 flight-hours per year, each, and was given an estimate that widget XYZ would require replacement after ~100 flight-hours, but experience determined that the part needed replacement after ~30 flight-hours... It would be no real surprise that Australia did not order enough parts, in a timely enough fashion for when actual experience ended up dictating when they were needed.

Any issues had with establishing a timely supply of parts needed, potentially sooner than estimated, would also have been exacerbated by the delays experienced in getting fully developed MRH90 helicopters delivered so they could be put into operational service. IIRC there was a 53 month delay in that happening, which meant that there was a lag in the sustainment contract being able to be put into effect and made use of.

 

[kato]

If the planned troop lift numbers are similar to the Black Hawk like I suspect, i.e. about 11 per helicopter-flight, then the MRH90 would not really be 'better' than Black Hawk. In terms of cargo lift, IMO they are essentially the same with the MRH90 being able to lift ~100 kg more in a slung load.

Outside actual Australian use : In German operational use the NH90 TTH - same chassis as MRH90 - is fitted for 16 fully geared up soldiers in the cabin, reduced by a further 4 if door armament is mounted (gunners count extra).

 

[Todjaeger]

Outside actual Australian use : In German operational use the NH90 TTH - same chassis as MRH90 - is fitted for 16 fully geared up soldiers in the cabin, reduced by a further 4 if door armament is mounted (gunners count extra).

I could be mistaken, which is part of why I would be interested if @Takao could respond, but that sort of German operational use figure does roughly line up with what I recall Australian forces encountering. The German figure permits a dozen embarked, kitted-out troops with the NH90 TTH having door guns/gunners.

If Australia's MRH90 were to largely just be used for air movements getting troops from Point A to Point B, then the larger space for personnel and kit would be more valuable. However, since presumably the MRH90's will (or at least are expected to) provide insertion and/or extraction capabilities in hostile areas, then door guns and gunners would likely be needed, and reduce the number of personnel which can be lifted in a given amount of time,

 

[Shanesworld]

20 seems very unrealistic. Our units limited training with rnzaf nh90 has always centred around 12 kitted soldiers. A large section. And it is tight. When watching the high readiness company/platoon/section and a half I have usually only counted 10 for fast roping.
For evacuating civilians in hdar that I think was 16 pers.
We should have got blackhawks and chinooks. We should now get blackhawks and chinooks.

 

[Bob53]

On my another note ... new night vision kit. My sums may be wrong but looks to be about $30k per set? Bladdy expensive but assume there is some support in there? Government invests in night-fighting gear - APDR

 

[Stampede]

I am not certain that the MRH90's would really deliver more lift capability than a Black Hawk, TBH. Yes, the spec sheet lists space for 20 seated troops, but how many soldiers that are kitted out with and wearing their battle rattle can actually fit? There is also the related question of just how many so equipped soldiers can an MRH90 rapidly embark or disembark? Others like @Takao might know (and be able to comment) what the current Australian experience and practice with the MRH90 is, in terms of troop lift. If the planned troop lift numbers are similar to the Black Hawk like I suspect, i.e. about 11 per helicopter-flight, then the MRH90 would not really be 'better' than Black Hawk. In terms of cargo lift, IMO they are essentially the same with the MRH90 being able to lift ~100 kg more in a slung load.

What I would be very interested to find out is if there is more recent information regarding MRH90 costs per flight-hour than that 2014 ANAO report. I know that report has been linked to previously (by myself and likely others) here on the forum, and from memory the ANAO reported that after significant improvements, the MRH90 costs and maintenance requirements were both ~5x that of the S-70A Black Hawk. Again, being reported after improvements to processes which cut the maintenance-hour per flight-hour from ~97 (Jan 2012) to ~27 (April 2014) IIRC there remained a shortfall in availability from what was specified in the contract where the MRH90 had ~50% availability vs. a contract requirement of 65%.

IIRC this was one of the reasons why TAG or TAG-East had to retain other helicopters to meet some of their potential service needs, in that there was as I understand it, a lack in confidence in there being enough MRH90's fit and available for service if and when needed should TAG or TAG-East need to suddenly deploy.

Troop lift capacity for NH-90..........No Idea!!!
Often comes up as a subject with many numbers given.
Asked a Taipan maintainer this question at the Airshow and he was open about numbers, but stressed all the variables of distance versus Load and all that entails.
In other words no golden answer.

One thing that did stand out was the safety margin of operating off the Amphibs.
Generally two less Pax.
A rough guide given was 14 with Kit
Again the variables of what kit / Distance / Land / Sea / etc / etc.

Should we have bought something else?

Depends who you ask.

I suggest as we have them in too great a number to sell off, we just live with it, and make it work.



Regards S

 

[ngatimozart]

A little bit of research goes a long way is a pretty condescending tone.
Do you think the RNZAF would have bought the NH 90 if the ADF didn’t?
8 NH90’s gives you a marginal increase in lift capability. Does the RNZAF load it with 20 fully geared up grunts? Are all 8 available all the time?
If you do an ET type operation, how many will NZ be prepared to deploy, 4? 6?
In the real world, 12 blackhawks would have given the NZDF a lot more flexibility, I doubt very much 20 fully equiped grunts per platform compared to 9-11 per platform would be a money saver or an operational advantage. Being that there is about a $25 million saving per platform, and spare parts available from Bunnings type convenience supply chain.

I am not being condescending. I have copies of the documentation released after the acquisition was made and it gave the reasoning for the decision. It listed the five shortlisted contenders and their pros and cons.

You are making suppositions on why the NZ government acquired the NH90 with your argument that we acquired it just because Australia did. If that was the case why didn't we go the whole hog and have ours assembled in Brisbane? Instead ours will built in France and we had an an engineering oversight team in the plant right from the start. However I do believe that commonality between the two defence forces would have been a consideration from Defence, but up until about 2005 the Clark government ran an anti Australian foreign policy, so in 2006 / 07 there would have still been a hangover from that. Clark also hated the US so that kiboshed a Blackhawk deal as well as the offer from Australia to join the them on their C-130J acquisition deal.

Like other nations we had problems, for example with the cabin floor, so we put load spreaders in. Interestingly enough, apparently we had to do the same with the UH-D/H Iroquois as well. A recent RNZAF publication said that the RNZAF had the highest availability rate of 72% for the NH90.*

* I will have to hunt the reference down but it was in an Air Force News.

 

[ngatimozart]

20 seems very unrealistic. Our units limited training with rnzaf nh90 has always centred around 12 kitted soldiers. A large section. And it is tight. When watching the high readiness company/platoon/section and a half I have usually only counted 10 for fast roping.
For evacuating civilians in hdar that I think was 16 pers.
We should have got blackhawks and chinooks. We should now get blackhawks and chinooks.

I agree about Chinooks because they would be a great asset for NZDF. But no Kiwi govt is going to get rid of the NH90 and buy Blackhawks to replace them. In their mind it would be a decrease in capability. We didn't get enough of the NH90 in the first place and that's creating the problem of us ending up thrashing them to death, just like we did with the 5 SH-2G(NZ) Seasprites that we had, and we ended having to replace them early.

I don't think spitting the dummy and replacing the NH90 with the Blackhawk is the correct move. But we do require more rotary wing lift capability.

 

[Volkodav]

You want to know - look at some of the comments between your comment and now - it generally comes down to ignorance with some poisoning from MRH-90. Note I've never been involved with MRH-90 and can't - and won't - make any comments on that capability.

There's enough of my posts through here that lay out AIR87's selection and use of Tiger in the Regt. The reality is most of Tiger is shrouded in a seemingly impenetrable layer of BS myth. Even stuff like the famed ANAO report is full of errors - some of which I'm convinced was insiders trying to push a point of view.

Some key ones:

Apache would have been better. With hindsight, possibly. But we were being offered D's without Longbow and with a bunch of avionics stripped out. Effectively A's. They'd have been out of date well before a feasible MLU / CAP. It was a close run thing, but at the time the -64D Longbow was the final version going to be made and Tiger had a better starting point and way ahead.

It can't communicate. It was never designed to. AIR87 is the last major Army project before BMS was stood up. It was going to have L16, but the CoA removed that after Army stood up BMS. No matter which variant won, it wouldn't have been fitted, nor been able to communicate.

We didn't buy enough. We bout exactly what we wanted. We didn't give numbers, we gave an availability rate. We wanted x% of the fleet available 60% of the time and y% at 80%. Tenders had to submit their fleet numbers. Eurocopter said 22, Boeing 21 and Bell 19. This is the point where I think the CoA made it's biggest error - we didn't ask for clarification on the maintenance hours per flying hour. Eurocopter and Bell both gave unrealistic numbers that, because they were new helicopters with modern digital avionics, HUMS and fault finding, we accepted. Just like every single platform we have decided since then. Turns out, both of them we about 33% under the reality. Funnily enough, about 20 - 30% more spares, frames and workforce would have made the fleet a dream. BTW - the first point about Apache? We could only afford 1x of them. So we wouldn't have been able to buy 21 anyhow...

IOC was delayed. I worked on the deployment plan to put jets into operational theatres in the late 00's and early 10's, before IOC was called. The delays to IOC related primarily to three things - one of which isn't possible for any attack helicopter, one of which was a result of us turning LPAs into LHDs and one of which was a problem that we should have focused on earlier - but wasn't an issue in fighting in those areas at that time. It was a political decision to not throw them in, not a capability issue.

Technicality. Tiger is the most complicated thing that the Army owned until the CRV comes in. Senior's underestimating this complexity hurt us for years. It was just meant to be a modern, gunned up Kiowa - but we bought something much, much more capable. It was sold to us with the same 1990s ideas about maintenance that the US and Europe followed - HUMS tells you everything and you don't need complex fault finding or highly skilled technicians. So we raped RAEME and AAvn. Oops; turns out you do need that stuff.... To give an idea, be 100% reliable for the maintenance of ~30 1971 VW Beetles. Stuff you need a 1/2" spanner, a Phillips head screwdriver and some tape and that's it. Now, rip them out and replace with some 2008 Porsche 911 GT2s. Imagine what you need to learn.

CoA relationships. Let's not kid ourselves, it's been rough. Not all of that was Eurocopter though - the CoA did some really silly stuff. I cringe when I see that 'we've learnt the lessons of AIR87'. Ha. But let's not throw too many stones. With Tiger, we generally had front row seats as we were making it work unlike the other three nations. We pushed hard. And demanded some dumb things. On some things we got shit service. I think AIR 9000 poisoned a lot of this, but we had worked out most of our misunderstandings and errors by early 2010s.

Australian-isation killed it. We made three alterations, one no cost and two that turned a profit. They had no delay and the French retrofitted two, the Spanish all three and the German's one.

---

The reality is that the Army was playing catch up. We needed attack helicopters, and had delayed purchasing it through the 1980s and 90s. We got exactly what we asked for; perhaps we didn't think about what we wanted well enough - but I'm not sure on that. The tender and initial doctrine was sound. We've updated it heaps obviously, as we've learnt the capability. But it was always meant to be gone by the end of the 2020s, and hopefully the replacement won't be such a learning curve. We underestimated the technical requirements, we put too much faith in the latest technology in glossy brochures (oh, hello Collins, Attack, Hobart, P-8, F-35, BMS, AS4, CIOG, etc etc etc...) and didn't sell it's successes. The frustrating tale about Tiger isn't Tiger - but sitting in Canberra watching mistakes like these being made again, again and again....

Spot on and not really surprising considering your resume.

I would only add that I can not think of a single successful defence procurement from the mid 90s to the mid 2000s. This was a period that coincided with undertaking the most complex acquisitions to date, while systematic gutting uniform, public service and government owned enterprise engineering capability. Quite simply ministers, due to the lack of experienced and competent technical advisors (as they had been seen as tail and not teeth and had been made redundant), relied on consultants and lobbyists for advice that should have been coming from the greater defence organisation.

While defence may have gotten some of the platforms they wanted there was a lack of in depth technical understanding in regards to risk, maturity, required support, life cycle etc. because the people in the know either weren't with defence any more or weren't listened to. If you don't know where you are and what your risks are, it is impossible to mitigate / plan. This is seen in some obviously risky systems progressing more smoothly than supposedly simpler procurements / acquisitions because problems were expected risks better understood and successfully mitigated for on the riskier projects while it was assumed that the contractor knew what they were doing and the brochures believed on the allegedly MOTS solutions.

There is also a culture of looking backwards and ignoring gains and achievements made. i.e. Tiger, MRH 90, MU-90, Wedgetail, KC-30 and many others were bleeding edge highly developmental projects that had not achieved IOC anywhere when we signed up, yet were managed as if they were MOTS or even FMS by our delusional politicians. In many cases, our depleted over worked support systems and T&E functions had to step up and take the lead as the ADF found themselves ahead of the parent service (when there was one) in reaching various milestones. Instead of recognising that the ADF and supporting elements had stepped up and delivered under very difficult circumstances government (often egged on by media) often responded by launching punitive reviews and enquiries that saw heads roll (usually the people who came in and fixed things as opposed to those who made the decisions in the first place), work forces gutted and, sadly, often resulted those who made the original bad decisions being brought back as consultants (due to their experience of getting it wrong in the first place but foresight to get clear before the problems became obvious).

The issue for a long time has been a lack of a holistic / strategic vision at the levels that should be doing so, a lack of understanding of what is required to deliver the required capability, and a lack of accountability for the actual decision makers.

 

[Volkodav]

I agree about Chinooks because they would be a great asset for NZDF. But no Kiwi govt is going to get rid of the NH90 and buy Blackhawks to replace them. In their mind it would be a decrease in capability. We didn't get enough of the NH90 in the first place and that's creating the problem of us ending up thrashing them to death, just like we did with the 5 SH-2G(NZ) Seasprites that we had, and we ended having to replace them early.

I don't think spitting the dummy and replacing the NH90 with the Blackhawk is the correct move. But we do require more rotary wing lift capability.

With the size of the NZDF it would actually make sense to skip the medium helo and concentrate on Chinooks and light utility helicopters. A useful number of heavy lift types would deliver far more capability and do things the MRH or Blackhawk could never do, while a smaller utility type could cover everything the heavy lift type was not as good for.

 

[Bob53]

The wheeled Artillery comp for the US army flys in a different direction to what the Australian Army is heading. Israeli, Serbian, And Swedish Self-Propelled Howitzers Are Headed To A U.S. Army Shoot-Off
Only mentioning in this thread as I was put in my place for suggesting Archer for the Australian army (primarily on transport and logistics grounds) but looks like the US army likes the idea. Of course it has not yet been chosen and it’s a competitiion so will be interesting to see the outcome. High self sufficient mobility, fast shoot and scoot times, crew under armour at all times while firing so seems to tick the required boxes.

 

[FoxtrotRomeo999]

The wheeled Artillery comp for the US army flys in a different direction to what the Australian Army is heading. Israeli, Serbian, And Swedish Self-Propelled Howitzers Are Headed To A U.S. Army Shoot-Off
Only mentioning in this thread as I was put in my place for suggesting Archer for the Australian army (primarily on transport and logistics grounds) but looks like the US army likes the idea. Of course it has not yet been chosen and it’s a competitiion so will be interesting to see the outcome. High self sufficient mobility, fast shoot and scoot times, crew under armour at all times while firing so seems to tick the required boxes.

The "Apples versus ... " argument applies here. We are after almost the same "High self sufficient mobility, fast shoot and scoot times, crew under armour at all times while firing..." but we are also after a tracked solution for a Heavy Armour Formation (OK, we won't have a lot of tanks, but maybe we will get up to 90, plus add the heavy M1 based Assault/Engineering vehicles and whatever IFV wins Land 400 Phase 3), not a Light/Medium Armour Stryker Formation. As far as I know, the US Tank formations are not going for wheeled artillery. And the chosen solution, Australian produced Hanwha K9 Redback (and the K10 ammunition vehicle) ticks our boxes, gives us a leap in artillery capability, and Hanwha are partnering with Konigsberg to ensure state of the art Command and Control capability. From my perspective, a wheeled solution would be effective but the Hanwha solution is superior for our needs.

 

[ngatimozart]

The "Apples versus ... " argument applies here. We are after almost the same "High self sufficient mobility, fast shoot and scoot times, crew under armour at all times while firing..." but we are also after a tracked solution for a Heavy Armour Formation (OK, we won't have a lot of tanks, but maybe we will get up to 90, plus add the heavy M1 based Assault/Engineering vehicles and whatever IFV wins Land 400 Phase 3), not a Light/Medium Armour Stryker Formation. As far as I know, the US Tank formations are not going for wheeled artillery. And the chosen solution, Australian produced Hanwha K9 Redback (and the K10 ammunition vehicle) ticks our boxes, gives us a leap in artillery capability, and Hanwha are partnering with Konigsberg to ensure state of the art Command and Control capability. From my perspective, a wheeled solution would be effective but the Hanwha solution is superior for our needs.

Whereas a wheeled solution would suit the NZ Army because we don't have a heavy armoured capability. So it is basically horses for courses.

 

[south]

The wheeled Artillery comp for the US army flys in a different direction to what the Australian Army is heading. Israeli, Serbian, And Swedish Self-Propelled Howitzers Are Headed To A U.S. Army Shoot-Off
Only mentioning in this thread as I was put in my place for suggesting Archer for the Australian army (primarily on transport and logistics grounds) but looks like the US army likes the idea. Of course it has not yet been chosen and it’s a competitiion so will be interesting to see the outcome. High self sufficient mobility, fast shoot and scoot times, crew under armour at all times while firing so seems to tick the required boxes.

US Army has the mass to operate air mobile, wheeled, and tracked artillery.

 

[Takao]

The running gear is irrelevant - the initial needs for the SPH didn't care if it was tracked or wheeled. Both have advantages and disadvantages and frankly it wasn't going to be a deciding factor.

The issue with these guns being assessed by the US is two-fold - protection and time to action.

The former is mainly there is no protection for the crew. That's a no go. It can be mitigated through an automated turret, but the lack of protection for the reminder of the platform no comes into play. GOATs are very susceptible to being M-killed through frag or direct fire damage to the non-armoured turret or the lightly armoured cab.

The latter is only an improvement over towed guns. From memory, the K9 can stop, fire a round and drive off before a Ceaser has fired a round. The time in and out is too slow for counter-battery fire from a peer enemy.

Overall, a GOAT is less flexible, less capable, slower and less resilient to a SPH - tracked or wheeled. It is an advantage if you have to replace a towed gun and don't expect to fight a real enemy, or have a super tight budget.

 

[Boagrius]

From memory, the K9 can stop, fire a round and drive off before a Ceaser has fired a round. The time in and out is too slow for counter-battery fire from a peer enemy.

If I had a dollar for every time I'd posted this video (in this thread)...

It's all good - never gets old for me.

 

[Takao]

Bingo @Boagrius - exactly the clip I was thinking of. Used it as evidence whenever people started talking about GOATs as an option for a non-towed artillery capability. Almost always quietened people faster than the K9.