Our tank squadrons are the same size as those of the British army and as a US army tank company. I am not sure but a USMC may have a fourth, four tank platoon, while some armies have three, three tank platoons to a company, another tank in CHQ for for a total of ten. Different armies also have different numbers of squadrons or companies to a regiment or battalion, i.e. in the 91 Gulf War the British deployed both three and four squadron regiments as well as reinforcing some armoured infantry battalions with a single squadron of tanks, i.e. the Royal Scots.
I'd thought the pressing need for the ADF is not to get more MBTs, but an M113 replacement. MBTs do need infantry support, especially from mounted infantry. I've my reservations about the M113 being able fulfil that role, especially in high-threat scenarios i.e. urban operations. It would probably be fine as a support/rear echelon vehicle sans turret (frees up space in the trooper compartment), but not for frontline combat.
This is covered by LAND400 which is well under way.
I recall reading something a year or more ago that indicated that the money set aside to update our current Abrams fleet was actually sufficient to replace the entire fleet with fully kitted out new build M-1A2s with money to spare.
New build? Damn. Would we be better off updating them to M1A2 or would it be wiser to see how the M1A3 variant turns out??
On subject of MBT's and urban warfare, Have we expressed any interest in acquiring TUSK (Tank Urban Survival Kit) units??
TUSK kits have already been bought and been in service for some time. Most of the components are in storage and will only be fitted when needed.
Regarding tank numbers, there's been a lot of discussion regarding how many Australia needs. In order to answer this with any relevancy one needs to understand how tank are actually used in Australia.
At the moment the Army has two tanks squadrons. Quite obviously this is not enough for the three Beersheeba brigades, so unless someone makes a very unexpected decision a third tank squadron will be raised for 7 Bde (2 Cav/3 Bde will own a tank squadron by the end of the year, ready or not). This doesn't necessarily mean more tanks will be bought - it would be possible to sustain three squadrons with the current number of tanks as long as tanks were rotated from brigade to brigade as part of the force generation cycle. However, this would be a terribly bad idea and I would be amazed if another dozen or so weren't bought to equip the third squadron. This will likely occur either as a result of the coming white paper or be purchased as part of Land 907-2 (the tank capability assurance program which will see the upgrade/replacement of the current tank fleet to keep them in service and competitive out to 2030).
Essentially we can expect that each brigade will have its own tank squadron by 2018. However, all the current modelling and experience has shown that this is not enough based on how tanks are going to be employed by the brigades. Tanks, as anyone has read any history will know, should be applied en masse. Due to their limited numbers, tanks in Australia will always be the main effort that will be unleashed at the decisive place at the decisive time to achieve decision.
The question is can a single squadron create enough mass to be decisive? Particularly when the squadron is diluted to serve other purposes? For instance, every single brigade commander from now until eternity is immediately going to place one of the tank troops in the brigade reserve. It has always happened and will always happen. So already the Squadron is down to two troops. Do you split those two troops up as well to provide tanks to support more than one combat team, or do you keep them centralised to enable a decisive effect?
There's also the massive issue of CSS. The A1 ech for the tank squadron is designed to support the squadron as a whole. While you can split tank troops off to support other combat teams, you can't split the A1. The general rule is you can split the tank squadron once (ie, have one troop supporting another combat team and keeping the other ten tanks centralised), as long as they share a boundary. Trying to split the tanks further (for instance, assigning a tank troop to three different combat teams) is simply not possible - the A1 won't be able to support it. Essentially, a single squadron isn't enough to be decisive as part of a Beersheba brigade.
It's worth pointing out here that the Beersheeba Brigade, as it currently stands, is not designed to be fought as is. It is a designed to enable the raise, train and sustain of the various components that would then be combined as necessary based on need. Hence the concept of the 'Reinforced' Combat Brigade. If a contingency came up that needed more than a single squadron of tanks in the brigade, then tanks from another brigade would be used to reinforce. Obviously this is not sustainable for ever, but it is a start. All this essentially means is Army won't be able to justify buying lots more tanks, based on the needs of a single brigade, because it will simply be told to pool tanks when needed.
What then is a realistic sized tank force? Personally, I think the best we will get is for the tank squadrons to be enlarged to a four-troop construct. If the A1 was also boosted, this would then enable tanks to be split off from the squadron for other tasks (such as brigade reserve) and still maintain a large enough mass to be decisive. I think the way to justify this is for the 'fourth' troop to be designated the SEQ troop, equipped with mine blows and tank rollers, and be considered part of the manoeuvre support capability and not part of the gun tank capability. But engineering vehicles are a whole different kettle of fish...
I guess a point I am trying to make is arbitrarily saying 'we need XX number of tanks', without understanding how they will be used is pretty pointless (albeit good fun). Defence is a zero sum game, and a big pot of gold is not going to fall in our laps any time soon, so increasing one capability somewhere has to come at the expense of reducing another capability somewhere else. It is certainly not easy, and simply saying 'buy more of everything' isn't a very useful answer.
Sorry for the ramble.
At the moment the Army has two tanks squadrons. Quite obviously this is not enough for the three Beersheeba brigades, so unless someone makes a very unexpected decision a third tank squadron will be raised for 7 Bde (2 Cav/3 Bde will own a tank squadron by the end of the year, ready or not). This doesn't necessarily mean more tanks will be bought - it would be possible to sustain three squadrons with the current number of tanks as long as tanks were rotated from brigade to brigade as part of the force generation cycle. However, this would be a terribly bad idea and I would be amazed if another dozen or so weren't bought to equip the third squadron. This will likely occur either as a result of the coming white paper or be purchased as part of Land 907-2 (the tank capability assurance program which will see the upgrade/replacement of the current tank fleet to keep them in service and competitive out to 2030).
Essentially we can expect that each brigade will have its own tank squadron by 2018. However, all the current modelling and experience has shown that this is not enough based on how tanks are going to be employed by the brigades. Tanks, as anyone has read any history will know, should be applied en masse. Due to their limited numbers, tanks in Australia will always be the main effort that will be unleashed at the decisive place at the decisive time to achieve decision.
The question is can a single squadron create enough mass to be decisive? Particularly when the squadron is diluted to serve other purposes? For instance, every single brigade commander from now until eternity is immediately going to place one of the tank troops in the brigade reserve. It has always happened and will always happen. So already the Squadron is down to two troops. Do you split those two troops up as well to provide tanks to support more than one combat team, or do you keep them centralised to enable a decisive effect?
There's also the massive issue of CSS. The A1 ech for the tank squadron is designed to support the squadron as a whole. While you can split tank troops off to support other combat teams, you can't split the A1. The general rule is you can split the tank squadron once (ie, have one troop supporting another combat team and keeping the other ten tanks centralised), as long as they share a boundary. Trying to split the tanks further (for instance, assigning a tank troop to three different combat teams) is simply not possible - the A1 won't be able to support it. Essentially, a single squadron isn't enough to be decisive as part of a Beersheba brigade.
It's worth pointing out here that the Beersheeba Brigade, as it currently stands, is not designed to be fought as is. It is a designed to enable the raise, train and sustain of the various components that would then be combined as necessary based on need. Hence the concept of the 'Reinforced' Combat Brigade. If a contingency came up that needed more than a single squadron of tanks in the brigade, then tanks from another brigade would be used to reinforce. Obviously this is not sustainable for ever, but it is a start. All this essentially means is Army won't be able to justify buying lots more tanks, based on the needs of a single brigade, because it will simply be told to pool tanks when needed.
What then is a realistic sized tank force? Personally, I think the best we will get is for the tank squadrons to be enlarged to a four-troop construct. If the A1 was also boosted, this would then enable tanks to be split off from the squadron for other tasks (such as brigade reserve) and still maintain a large enough mass to be decisive. I think the way to justify this is for the 'fourth' troop to be designated the SEQ troop, equipped with mine blows and tank rollers, and be considered part of the manoeuvre support capability and not part of the gun tank capability. But engineering vehicles are a whole different kettle of fish...
I guess a point I am trying to make is arbitrarily saying 'we need XX number of tanks', without understanding how they will be used is pretty pointless (albeit good fun). Defence is a zero sum game, and a big pot of gold is not going to fall in our laps any time soon, so increasing one capability somewhere has to come at the expense of reducing another capability somewhere else. It is certainly not easy, and simply saying 'buy more of everything' isn't a very useful answer.
Sorry for the ramble.
Thanks for that Raven, seriously thanks, most of us have now where near the knowledge or experience that you have.
A thought has crossed my mind that a possible alternative could be to use a US ACR troop structure instead of a second tank squadron. The organisation of the ACR troop is, or at least used to be, THQ with one MBT and one CFV (M-3), two tank platoons with four MBTs each and two scout platoons with six CFVs each, as well as a support platoon, including a pair of mortar carriers, an ARV, and a couple of APCs, a total of nine tanks and thirteen CFVs.
Would it be viable to replace one or even both of the cavalry squadrons with such a structure? It would provide the extra tanks needed and could be capable of dividing into two. The scout platoons would initially be equipped with ASLAVs but later with what ever we get under LAND 400 and the tank squadron could still for a separate pat of the ACR, the difference is it would remain whole with the cavalry tanks being used for the ancillary roles. Should the funding be available a full US ACR squadron would be an interesting option, three cavalry troops and a tank company providing near a tank regiments strength but four independent armoured elements?
A thought has crossed my mind that a possible alternative could be to use a US ACR troop structure instead of a second tank squadron. The organisation of the ACR troop is, or at least used to be, THQ with one MBT and one CFV (M-3), two tank platoons with four MBTs each and two scout platoons with six CFVs each, as well as a support platoon, including a pair of mortar carriers, an ARV, and a couple of APCs, a total of nine tanks and thirteen CFVs.
Would it be viable to replace one or even both of the cavalry squadrons with such a structure? It would provide the extra tanks needed and could be capable of dividing into two. The scout platoons would initially be equipped with ASLAVs but later with what ever we get under LAND 400 and the tank squadron could still for a separate pat of the ACR, the difference is it would remain whole with the cavalry tanks being used for the ancillary roles. Should the funding be available a full US ACR squadron would be an interesting option, three cavalry troops and a tank company providing near a tank regiments strength but four independent armoured elements?
Definitely watching the developments with interest. Will post a few more thoughts on the matter once I'm a little less bogged down with work.
Raven22, thank you very much for sharing your insights. Always learn a lot from what you have to share.
Three brigades, three squadrons. No issue on that. While I agree that decisively massing forces at the right time and place is precisely what turns the tide of battle in one's favour, I don't know if there will be such a lack of firepower from just one squadron of MBTs considering the fact that the Beersheba brigade's ACR is expected to be supplanted by a calvary squadron. If the brigade commander chooses to employ both of these squadrons together, I'd think that there's going to be a pretty substantial amount of firepower - to me, that's the massing issue partially addressed.
Its interesting that there was a very serious push to create a regular tank brigade as part of Australia's planned post war regular army supported by two CMF (reserve) brigades. Each would have had five regiments of tanks plus brigade elements including motorised, perhaps even mechanised infantry, SPGs, engineers etc. The regular brigade was to have been equipped with Centurions and the CMF brigades with Comets.
There is now way such a force was ever going to get up, especially during the post war austerity, but it is interesting to compare it to the reality of three regular infantry battalions, which I believe were at light "Jungle" establishment, and an armoured car squadron (later expanded to a single armoured regiment) that formed the core of Australia's regular army instead. As far as I know there has never been more than a single armoured (tank) regiment since WWII, although a squadron of Centurions was assigned to a CMF cavalry unit for a period in the late 50s or 60s, and there was also talk of a second regiment (to have been equipped with M-1A2s), being formed with the move of forces north in the late 80s, that came to nothing. I also recall the old service pamphlets clearly stating how we would employ our 2nd tank regiment. You do not need to look too deep to realise that the army has always recognised the need for more tanks but has never been able to sell the idea to the people holding the purse strings.
I know old plans that never reached fruition or old structures for old circumstances don't necessarily count today but I do find it interesting that no matter how well manned or equipped the rest of the ADF is at any given time there are certain key capabilities that other nations often prioritise, including tanks, that the ADF never seems to have enough of. When our battle plans included two tank regiments we had one and now we need a minimum of three squadrons, we have two.
The situation strikes me as a bit back to front, yes it does take longer to train a modern infantryman to proficiency than it used to, pretty much making the idea of a rapidly raised citizen army obsolete, but it takes longer to train armoured vehicle crews and establish armoured units, or for that matter engineers or other specialised troops, imagine trying to integrate SPGs or HIMARS into the ADF at short notice. To me it would make more sense to beef up the capabilities that are harder to generate quickly, make sure they are ready and available, as it will take far longer to boost them than the infantry. This is especially the case as there are significant numbers of reserve infantry to draw on, a sufficient number of whom could be brought up to speed much faster than training recruits from scratch, while most reserve cavalry units are no longer armoured and most reserve artillery has only mortars, how on earth could they hope to boost numbers effectively, even if the US did divert a prepositioning squadron to us with an full Heavy Brigades worth of equipment?
There is now way such a force was ever going to get up, especially during the post war austerity, but it is interesting to compare it to the reality of three regular infantry battalions, which I believe were at light "Jungle" establishment, and an armoured car squadron (later expanded to a single armoured regiment) that formed the core of Australia's regular army instead. As far as I know there has never been more than a single armoured (tank) regiment since WWII, although a squadron of Centurions was assigned to a CMF cavalry unit for a period in the late 50s or 60s, and there was also talk of a second regiment (to have been equipped with M-1A2s), being formed with the move of forces north in the late 80s, that came to nothing. I also recall the old service pamphlets clearly stating how we would employ our 2nd tank regiment. You do not need to look too deep to realise that the army has always recognised the need for more tanks but has never been able to sell the idea to the people holding the purse strings.
I know old plans that never reached fruition or old structures for old circumstances don't necessarily count today but I do find it interesting that no matter how well manned or equipped the rest of the ADF is at any given time there are certain key capabilities that other nations often prioritise, including tanks, that the ADF never seems to have enough of. When our battle plans included two tank regiments we had one and now we need a minimum of three squadrons, we have two.
The situation strikes me as a bit back to front, yes it does take longer to train a modern infantryman to proficiency than it used to, pretty much making the idea of a rapidly raised citizen army obsolete, but it takes longer to train armoured vehicle crews and establish armoured units, or for that matter engineers or other specialised troops, imagine trying to integrate SPGs or HIMARS into the ADF at short notice. To me it would make more sense to beef up the capabilities that are harder to generate quickly, make sure they are ready and available, as it will take far longer to boost them than the infantry. This is especially the case as there are significant numbers of reserve infantry to draw on, a sufficient number of whom could be brought up to speed much faster than training recruits from scratch, while most reserve cavalry units are no longer armoured and most reserve artillery has only mortars, how on earth could they hope to boost numbers effectively, even if the US did divert a prepositioning squadron to us with an full Heavy Brigades worth of equipment?
The thing is, the U.S. ACR construct is designed for a specific purpose. They already have the tanks and other fighting vehicles integrated at the subunit level because they know that is exactly how they are going to fight them. That is the opposite of the philosophy behind Plan Beerhseeba, which is for barracks organisation to be there only for raise, train and sustain, with all the different components of the brigade being combined as necessary based on the specific contingency.
Thst is why a U.S. ACR construct wouldn't be appropriate for Australia. When the CFV/IFV comes online, a Beerheeba brigade could still easily create an organisation essentially identical to the U.S. ACR construct, with tanks and other vehicles integrated at the subunit level, so why bother having them like that in barracks?
Relevant to the discussion on tanks is an article in the Land Power Forum:
Shock action - Australian Army
While only short and not particularly detailed, the article does point out the use of tanks (and supporting capabilities) for the Australian Army. Things like shock action are understood by those who's job it is to provide it, but it is hard to articulate to the public and other commentators.
Shock action - Australian Army
While only short and not particularly detailed, the article does point out the use of tanks (and supporting capabilities) for the Australian Army. Things like shock action are understood by those who's job it is to provide it, but it is hard to articulate to the public and other commentators.
On one hand it is great that concepts like this are now able to be utilised again. On the other I find it frustrating and terrifying that something as fundamental as "shock action" was ever not an approved term.
It has been the basis of mechanised warfare from the very beginning and a core element of warfare for millennia. The medieval knights, Roman Legions and Greek Phalanx all understood shock action as a key element of their tactical toolbox.
That the ADF has only recently rediscovered the term is insane.
The Army in particular seemed to have an almost pacifist culture up until early/mid-2000s. Concepts of overwhelming firepower and heavy armour seemed not just alien but actively resisted and mocked as crude and brutish.
I can only guess it came about due to the cultural impacts of the post-Vietnam War era but the Army has always favoured lighter combat units over the heavier stuff. There is still far to go, that article is focused only at the lowest levels and only drew on lessons from the Western world. The Soviet "Deep Battle" and it's heavy use of artillery has a similar shock impact but on a much larger scale. This was in the 1920s and '30s but the Army has all but given up on SPG/MLRS entering service anytime in the near future.
It has been the basis of mechanised warfare from the very beginning and a core element of warfare for millennia. The medieval knights, Roman Legions and Greek Phalanx all understood shock action as a key element of their tactical toolbox.
That the ADF has only recently rediscovered the term is insane.
The Army in particular seemed to have an almost pacifist culture up until early/mid-2000s. Concepts of overwhelming firepower and heavy armour seemed not just alien but actively resisted and mocked as crude and brutish.
I can only guess it came about due to the cultural impacts of the post-Vietnam War era but the Army has always favoured lighter combat units over the heavier stuff. There is still far to go, that article is focused only at the lowest levels and only drew on lessons from the Western world. The Soviet "Deep Battle" and it's heavy use of artillery has a similar shock impact but on a much larger scale. This was in the 1920s and '30s but the Army has all but given up on SPG/MLRS entering service anytime in the near future.
I recall shock action being listed in documentation in the late 80s, pre DOA, and armour was very much in favour following Desert Storm, with a 2nd armoured regiment being mentioned in the early 90s. I wonder if a lot of the more traditional doctrine disappeared during the DOA and the following tail to teeth reorganisations of the90s.
There's a bit of word smithing here. The army didn't forget what shock action was or how to use it, just that it (on the word of a single officer apparently) wasn't in higher level conceptual doctrine. It still would have appeared in tactical level doctrine, as it's been part of the role of armour/the tank regiment since time immemorial.
What complete and utter nonsense. Do you have any evidence to support this? I dare say every generation of diggers/officers that have served would violently disagree with you (I'm sure the irony isn't lost). That the government didn't bestow the army with fleets of tanks and artillery is not a symptom of a pacifist army.
Actually doctrine remained relatively steady and unchanged until after Timor. This was a good thing, as the Division In Battle series of doctrine was really good. It might have been a little out of date in parts, but it was solid coherent doctrine that told you how every part of the army worked together and just plain made sense.
After Timor, and particularly after we entered Iraq/Afghan, doctrine went to hell. Different organisations kept trying to update it to take into account changing missions, circumstances and equipment, but none of it worked together. One piece of doctrine would tell you the opposite of the next piece of doctrine. Entire series of doctrine were taken out of circulation without being replaced, such that at times entire regiments had no tactical level doctrine to work from (which wasn't unwelcome, believe me).
It's only been since the army has taken a pause after Afghan, and with the advent of Beerhseeba, that steps have been taken to address the problem. The army is going through an 'intellectual pivot' and working out how we want to fight in the future (or, perhaps, how we can fight), and the doctrine is starting to catch up. The new doctrine starting to be released now for how a Beersheeba brigade is supposed to fight still isn't very good, but at least it is coherent and makes sense. At least everyone is complaining about it instead on simply ignoring it, which is a step in the right direction I suppose. With time it will develop into something useful.
Rereading that paragraph of mine, it could have been much better presented. It may be better if I explain my cynicism.
That period of doctrine hell is when I came in and got my reality check. I had been on these military-type forums since the "War and Politics" forum of the 90's and had an idealistic view of the ADF.
The Army I got to know had none of the previously mentioned support weapons (SPG/MLRS/Hvy Mtrs/etc), Vietnam-era M113s, Leo 1s and aviation assets and barely half a dozen understrength infantry battalions. That equipment list had more in common with your typical Third World army than an apparent First World nation like Australia.
While the quality of Army personnel has always been high, the often repeated slogans of "Our people are our most important capability" seemed more like an excuse for crap gear by politically-aware senior leadership.
Each of the separate Corps and units seemed to inhabit different worlds for the most part. My first MRE included watching an exasperated US Army LTCOL chastising AUST command staff that "combined-arms warfare" meant more than just being in the same tent together, you actually had to talk to each other.
Each Brigade having it's own structure and role also seemed illogical and poorly designed for sustaining a force overseas.
My first hand experience was that the Army was badly understrength, poorly designed, using obsolete equipment and lead by amateurish commanders, basically a clusterf**k. But so long as everyone marched straight on ANZAC Day the senior leadership in Canberra didn't seem to give a damn. Not all of that was accurate or fair, and in hindsight that was a chaotic period. Things have improved out of sight since then but it's left a hell of a bitter taste in my mouth.
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Beersheeba puts the army in a very good place, particularly the ability to now compare like Brigades against each other. Improvements will now be more easily replicated between units along with identifying what works and what doesn't.
The presence of the Marines will also help things. Hopefully some of their ideas and concepts rub off on the army. Although not all of them, I don't think cadence running will be part of PT just yet.
Bluey 006
Member
Should the government in Australia place a higher importance on commercial development of strategic resources and Australian innovation?
In this case Titanium - see links
CSIRO Titanium A
CSIRO Titanium B
What impact would it have on our aerospace and defence industries if Titanium could be produced economically in mass in Australia?
In light of geo-political alignments in the post 9-11 world, could and should Australia attempt to establish itself as a titanium exporter?
Many of the worlds largest producers of Titanium are risky propositions. Could Australia be a stable and suitable alternative globally - if the new process can be effectively developed
Does the government need to incentive business to an increase the value adding our raw minerals to counter the end of the mining boom?
In this case Titanium - see links
CSIRO Titanium A
CSIRO Titanium B
What impact would it have on our aerospace and defence industries if Titanium could be produced economically in mass in Australia?
In light of geo-political alignments in the post 9-11 world, could and should Australia attempt to establish itself as a titanium exporter?
Many of the worlds largest producers of Titanium are risky propositions. Could Australia be a stable and suitable alternative globally - if the new process can be effectively developed
Does the government need to incentive business to an increase the value adding our raw minerals to counter the end of the mining boom?
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wookie (defprof) and I were working with CSIRO on titanium tech 9 years ago, they had developed ways to use Ti in complex shapes years before anyone else. They were 3d printing in Ti before a lot of companies even knew what 3d printing was.
the article is a bit "old"