ADF General discussion thread

[Goknub]

The relationship with China is definitely a double-edged sword and can just as easily end in disaster. The point was more that we face little in the way of a large scale threat and the politicians/public understand this.

I don't get the logic here.

Apologies, I was actually trying to establish the opposite by using the logic of a politician. If the Army wants to build itself into a heavier force it needs to be able to convince the civilian leadership that it will have utility outside of training exercises and marching straight on Anzac day.
It is in the longer-term interests of the Army to prioritise building up a sizeable amphibious fleet, even at the expense of other capabilities in the meantime. The LHDs are a great start but from my experience will still fall short of what we should be aiming for.

It is frustrating that we still lack assets like SPG and MLRS that were standard issue by the end of World War 2. My view is that the Army will only be able to win funding for these once the ADF has the amphibious fleet to both deploy and sustain them.

 

[Raven22]

If the Army wants to build itself into a heavier force it needs to be able to convince the civilian leadership that it will have utility outside of training exercises and marching straight on Anzac day.

I'm not that cynical. I'm pretty sure the government understands that army has utility outside ANZAC Day since it has constantly deployed the army on ops for the last 16 years.

I still think the the biggest problem is that all the niche capabilities of army are hard to explain and hard to understand, and getting a champion in government is difficult. Explaining the utility of, say, JSF is easy. Explaining the utility of, say, an armoured breach capability is far more difficult.

I think one way to improve this is to make army programs that go through the approval process larger and more holistic. Instead of having small programs for each discrete capability and having to go through the pain of justifying each one and getting it approved, collect them together and get them all approved at once. Land400 is an example of that - one very large program that essentially replaces the entire mounted combat capability of army. Of course this method has its own significant risks, but the risk is no longer the attention span of personalities in government.

 

[vonnoobie]

Without getting into a debate about one branch of the service getting more then another, Now that the RAAF and RAN are at decent or well onto there way of having decent logistical capability to deploy a sizable force over seas what in people's opinion is the optimal Army make up?

I don't imagine troop number's growing beyond the 32,000 give or take that we currently have but looking at it on a purely statistic's basis we have a very poor number of tanks and helicopters and absoulutely zero SPG's, MRL's etc and I don't imagine that our logistics fleet is that much better.

So what number's of what equipment do we need? Preferably stuff that is OTS.

 

[Volkodav]

Without getting into a debate about one branch of the service getting more then another, Now that the RAAF and RAN are at decent or well onto there way of having decent logistical capability to deploy a sizable force over seas what in people's opinion is the optimal Army make up?

I don't imagine troop number's growing beyond the 32,000 give or take that we currently have but looking at it on a purely statistic's basis we have a very poor number of tanks and helicopters and absoulutely zero SPG's, MRL's etc and I don't imagine that our logistics fleet is that much better.

So what number's of what equipment do we need? Preferably stuff that is OTS.

All the services have traditionally had difficulty explaining the need for support capabilities, just look at the gutting of engineering and logistics during the 80s and 90s under successive governments in the name of efficiency. Look how long it took the RAAF to get in flight refueling, airborne early warning and strategic airlift, while the RAN actually went backwards in ASW, air defence and amphibious capability compared to the 60s and 70s.

There was this completely misguided belief that the tail needed to be cut back and the teeth beefed up, the rhetoric sounded good but without the tail the teeth couldn't do, or even get to where their job was, let alone be sustained there. In the end a lot of the lost in-house support was replaced by private contracts that were more expensive and less effective than the previous organic capability that also required a substantial increase in bureaucracy and contract management just to coordinate the complex mess. So much for greater efficiency, reduced cost and more"teeth".

As Raven said it is difficult to explain the need for a breaching capability and I fear that we may now struggle to retain and replace the RANs LCHs and the Army's LCM8s as well as the same lack of understanding could easily lead to the political classes believing the LHDs, Choules and LCM1Es cover all the bases. Maybe a good investment would be to move the LCH capability back to the RAE as well as creating a proper armoured engineering capability.

Perhaps we need an engineer brigade to kick in the door move and support the Beersheba brigades. I say brigade because of the need to concentrate the capabilities for training with regimental, squadron, or troop strength elements attached to the Beersheba brigades as required. There would be a Boat or landing craft regiment with LCH, or LSV, LCMs and CB90s (or similar) maybe even HSVs and LCAC or other hover craft, as well as BARVs. An armoured engineering regiment with breachers, bridge layers, AEVs , modified MBTs (in place of AVREs) and other specialised vehicles and an enhanced construction capability to build or repair ports in addition to roads, bridges, airfields, defences an buildings. It would be a very hard sell because it wouldn't be cheap but would be a massive force multiplier.

 

[Goknub]

I still think the the biggest problem is that all the niche capabilities of army are hard to explain and hard to understand, and getting a champion in government is difficult. Explaining the utility of, say, JSF is easy. Explaining the utility of, say, an armoured breach capability is far more difficult.

I think one way to improve this is to make army programs that go through the approval process larger and more holistic.

I think that is certainly accurate that larger programs have advantages, Land400 and Land121 in particular are great examples. I'm not familiar if there is a combat engineer component with Land400 but it looks like a good opportunity if there isn't for these niche capabilities. There is a danger of becoming too large, the US army FCS program is a good example to avoid.
Procurement for Army may become easier now that DMO has been scrapped.
The RAAF's ability to circumvent DMO and embrace FMS has been to their great advantage. The speed that Land400 is moving is a great indicator that Army is learning. The fact even AGLs are taking this long to enter service is just sad.

 

[Raven22]

Perhaps we need an engineer brigade to kick in the door move and support the Beersheba brigades. I say brigade because of the need to concentrate the capabilities for training with regimental, squadron, or troop strength elements attached to the Beersheba brigades as required. There would be a Boat or landing craft regiment with LCH, or LSV, LCMs and CB90s (or similar) maybe even HSVs and LCAC or other hover craft, as well as BARVs. An armoured engineering regiment with breachers, bridge layers, AEVs , modified MBTs (in place of AVREs) and other specialised vehicles and an enhanced construction capability to build or repair ports in addition to roads, bridges, airfields, defences an buildings. It would be a very hard sell because it wouldn't be cheap but would be a massive force multiplier.

The problem with that plan is it goes completely against the entire justification for Plan Beersheeba, which is about putting all the elements of the combined arms team in the brigades to enable sustainable collective training and force generation. Its probably worth pointing there already is a brigade that includes the specialist engineering elements (6 Bde). As it is, the engineering capability to support the manoeuvre force will remain in the combat brigades. In fact, it will become even more devolved as the heavy armoured engineering vehicles of the future will likely reside in the ACR and not the engineering regiment.

I'm not familiar if there is a combat engineer component with Land400 but it looks like a good opportunity if there isn't for these niche capabilities.

The 'engineering component of Land 400' is largely the MSV, which is one of the three broad vehicle types to be bought. Army is trying to back door an armoured breach capability before that though. Land 907 Phase 2 is the upgrade to the MBT capability. Army is trying to justify this project buy some AEVs/ABVs etc to support the tank force (using strategic guidance as justification). It will be interesting to see what happens with this.

The fact even AGLs are taking this long to enter service is just sad

The AGL saga is an excellent demonstration of the problem. Army has no problem identifying the capability they want and buying it, the problem is the program is just not big enough to get any attention at the strategic level. With only four hours or so a quarter to get decisions by government on new capabilities, it is no surprise the powers that be put the big ticket items in front of them, with the small fish like Land 40 getting left by the wayside.

 

[Goknub]

aybe a good investment would be to move the LCH capability back to the RAE as well as creating a proper armoured engineering capability.

Perhaps we need an engineer brigade to kick in the door move and sMupport the Beersheba brigades. I say brigade because of the need to concentrate the capabilities for training with regimental, squadron, or troop strength elements attached to the Beersheba brigades as required.

While a full dedicated Brigade might be too far I do believe an intermediate sized Amphibious Operations Regiment (or some other name) could be sold to the government. This could also give 2RAR a longer-term role. The requirements that need to be met are:

Landing zone establishment and coordination
Reception zone establishment and coordination
Immediate security

It would need to be sustainable so a standard 3 sub-unit structure could be established. Duplicating existing capabilities is pointless so this is where the larger LSV can be utilised. As mentioned elsewhere I believe 6 of these should be the goal. The force would look something like:

(x 3)
2 x LSV (80m landing ships)
1 x Engineer Company
1 x Combat Engineer Company
1 x Logistics Company
1 x Rifle Company

This fully utilises 2RAR, albeit as naval equivalent of Air Defence Guards (they'd hate that comparison), sustainable and clear and logical enough to sell to the public/politicians without breaking the bank. It would also a joint Army-Navy force so both Services would have reason to fight for it

 

[vonnoobie]

In regards to a discussion ongoing on the RAN thread I think It would be safer to post here as it is starting to get off topic to an extent.

Talk in regards to M1 MBT's and Australia needing more...

Tank's in urban warfare not that great an idea, Sure they can knock out the odd hard point but over all a tank in urban warfare has never really worked out well before. They can be adapted for the role but there are better asset's more suited to the task then having MBT's driving down city streets and through the suburbs.

We should get M104's and possibly even M1 Panthers and ABV's but other's have made a valid case that MBT's aren't that important to us. They serve a role but a limited one at that, Any large massing of them would only be to defend the Australian main land and realistically who actually has the logistical capacity to invade Australia? Those that are close don't have it and those that do have it are too far away thus lacking air cover leaving the RAAF to rip apart there supply line.

What we really are more M88A2's, Having only 7 (Possible 6 extra soon) is a woefully small fleet when you take into account not only our current heavy vehicle/combat fleet but also our future acquisitions that are almost certainly going to be getting larger heavier IFV's, APC,s etc

 

[Raven22]

Tank's in urban warfare not that great an idea, Sure they can knock out the odd hard point but over all a tank in urban warfare has never really worked out well before. They can be adapted for the role but there are better asset's more suited to the task then having MBT's driving down city streets and through the suburbs.

We should get M104's and possibly even M1 Panthers and ABV's but other's have made a valid case that MBT's aren't that important to us. They serve a role but a limited one at that,

Tanks no good in urban warfare? I don't know what you've been reading, but that is just nonsense. Unsupported tanks in urban is a bad idea, but there is no better weapon known to mankind for urban warfare than the tank-infantry team.

Anyone who states that tanks aren't that important is ignorant as to how modern armies (in fact, how all mechanised armies throughout history) fight. The tank is the largest concentration of combat power on the battlefield, and nothing has changed that since it was invented a hundred years ago.

If you don't think tanks are needed for Australia I urge you to read up on the battle of Hamel in WWI, the use of armour in New Guinea in WWII, the use of US armour in support of 3 RAR at the battle of Kapyong and the post-operational report of every single RAR battalion CO in Vietnam from 1968 to 1971.

It's all about combined arms.

 

[Goknub]

Tank's in urban warfare not that great an idea,

A Moderator way want to clean up the naval thread. That was getting messy.

More recently, the American Thunder Runs have shown how urban can be done well. The "urban is bad for tanks" comes often from Russian experience in the same way "tanks are bad in Afghanistan" did. It's better to use them as an example of what not to do.

I'd personally like to see a ratio of a Troop of M1s for each rifle Company.
-----------------

Regarding Kokoda, I wasn't stating it was a defeat but that it was a poorly executed operation. The state of equipment with Australian forces in SE Asia, during a time of "Forward Defence" was abysmal. The unwillingness of the general public to take a harsher look at that period lets the politicians and generals off the hook.

 

[vonnoobie]

Tanks no good in urban warfare? I don't know what you've been reading, but that is just nonsense. Unsupported tanks in urban is a bad idea, but there is no better weapon known to mankind for urban warfare than the tank-infantry team.

Anyone who states that tanks aren't that important is ignorant as to how modern armies (in fact, how all mechanised armies throughout history) fight. The tank is the largest concentration of combat power on the battlefield, and nothing has changed that since it was invented a hundred years ago.

If you don't think tanks are needed for Australia I urge you to read up on the battle of Hamel in WWI, the use of armour in New Guinea in WWII, the use of US armour in support of 3 RAR at the battle of Kapyong and the post-operational report of every single RAR battalion CO in Vietnam from 1968 to 1971.

It's all about combined arms.

Oh I have no doubt that tank's have there role in combat but it is hardly what it used to be and there success in urban warfare is far from stellar. Even supported in urban warfare they are at there most vulnerable. One need's to be careful about using history to justify the future entirely, If history was the sole reasoning for what to have in the future then we would never have advanced beyond sticks and stones.

 

[vonnoobie]

A Moderator way want to clean up the naval thread. That was getting messy.

More recently, the American Thunder Runs have shown how urban can be done well. The "urban is bad for tanks" comes often from Russian experience in the same way "tanks are bad in Afghanistan" did. It's better to use them as an example of what not to do.

I'd personally like to see a ratio of a Troop of M1s for each rifle Company.
-----------------

Regarding Kokoda, I wasn't stating it was a defeat but that it was a poorly executed operation. The state of equipment with Australian forces in SE Asia, during a time of "Forward Defence" was abysmal. The unwillingness of the general public to take a harsher look at that period lets the politicians and generals off the hook.

In that context I can agree, Currently reading a book "Jungle Warriors" by Adrian Threlfall that gives a good idea on the situation, Australian ground forces stationed in Malaya had already adapted there tactics from the top command all the way down, Even worked out what equipment/weapons they needed and even jungle fatigues and put in the requisitions for the stuff, No one back home seemed to pay attention. When the Japanese invaded they still had the desert fatigues so stood out like sore thumbs.

 

[Volkodav]

Heavy armour saves lives in set battles, tanks can over run defences that would stop anything else and when combined with appropriate engineering assets even defences designed to stop tanks will fail. That is why I say they are useful for urban warfare.

Raven would know more on this than me but tanks are a game changer, their only real limitation being strategic mobility, in that they can't self deploy in the same way a wheeled AFV can.

 

[Raven22]

Oh I have no doubt that tank's have there role in combat but it is hardly what it used to be and there success in urban warfare is far from stellar. Even supported in urban warfare they are at there most vulnerable. One need's to be careful about using history to justify the future entirely, If history was the sole reasoning for what to have in the future then we would never have advanced beyond sticks and stones.

Out of interest, how has the role of the tank changed? In Australia the role of the tank is to close with and destroy the enemy with firepower, manoeuvre and shock action. I can't think of how that role has changed in the last 100 years.

I agree that tanks in urban (ie, complex physical terrain) are at their most vulnerable, but so is everything. The alternative to using tanks in urban combat is NOT to use tanks in urban combat. If you think tanks are vulnerable in urban, imagine how vulnerable the humble dismounted infantryman is. I've never understood how people point out the vulnerabilities of armour in complex terrain, but seem only too happy to still send unprotected soldiers into the same terrain. I certainly wouldn't want to be the officer explaining to my soldiers that they don't have tanks supporting them because the tanks are too vulnerable. I might get some disbelieving stares. Combined arms is the way to go, and you can't do combined arms without tanks (armour).

Regarding history, I urge you to read the use of tanks in Vietnam at the battle of Binh Ba or during the bunker clearances (which is analogous to urban terrain). At the start, all the COs were extremely skeptical about tanks and their worth, but after using tanks reduced casualties by an incredible amount (I can't remember the exact statistics off hand), suddenly every CO wanted their own squadron of them. History is useful because it avoids us repeating mistakes, such as believing that tanks aren't useful.

 

[old faithful]

I actually remember reading that after Binh Ba, US commanders were impressed with Australian use of armour in the J.

Nothing is more vulnarable than unsupported infantry in urban environments. Thats why the NVA made good use of tanks during the Tet offensive.

Isreali, s make great use of tanks in every operation in urban, there really is no argument for not useing armour.
AFV, s are great, love em, but if I was a section commander, pinned down in a built up area, when I called for help, I would love to see a 120mm gun coming my way with a mobile pil box to cover my move out.

 

[Volkodav]

Out of interest, how has the role of the tank changed? In Australia the role of the tank is to close with and destroy the enemy with firepower, manoeuvre and shock action. I can't think of how that role has changed in the last 100 years.

I agree that tanks in urban (ie, complex physical terrain) are at their most vulnerable, but so is everything. The alternative to using tanks in urban combat is NOT to use tanks in urban combat. If you think tanks are vulnerable in urban, imagine how vulnerable the humble dismounted infantryman is. I've never understood how people point out the vulnerabilities of armour in complex terrain, but seem only too happy to still send unprotected soldiers into the same terrain. I certainly wouldn't want to be the officer explaining to my soldiers that they don't have tanks supporting them because the tanks are too vulnerable. I might get some disbelieving stares. Combined arms is the way to go, and you can't do combined arms without tanks (armour).

Regarding history, I urge you to read the use of tanks in Vietnam at the battle of Binh Ba or during the bunker clearances (which is analogous to urban terrain). At the start, all the COs were extremely skeptical about tanks and their worth, but after using tanks reduced casualties by an incredible amount (I can't remember the exact statistics off hand), suddenly every CO wanted their own squadron of them. History is useful because it avoids us repeating mistakes, such as believing that tanks aren't useful.

I remember reading that when Sir Donald Dunstan, a retired Lt General, was commander of the Australian Task Force in Vietnam he insisted on the operational use of Centurions during the Battle of Fire Base Coral / Balmoral, against the prevailing opinion of the infantry, based on his personal experience in Bougainville during WWII. During the actions of this battle defending against large scale NVA attacks as well as the clearance of NVA bunkers without loss, the sceptical infantry came to appreciate the capability of tanks. During the early 2000s Lt General Peter Cosgrove successfully argued for the replacement of the Army's Leopard 1 MBTs based on his experience including as a platoon commander in Vietnam, that tanks save lives.

For a small army armour and tanks in particular are critical, as for that matter are artillery, aviation and engineers, yet in peacetime the lessons of war are forgotten by the political classes and and the popular image of an Aussie Digger with his rifle becomes the model of the idealized army. Post WWI the recommendation that a regular army be created and that it be motorised was ignored in favour of the romantic image of the bronzed citizen soldier and the indomitable Aussie Infantry even though the 1st AIFs greatest successes' were combined arms and cavalry (in the Middle East) operations with extensive use of vehicles, armoured cars, tanks, artillery and aircraft, often provided by allies often being critical to success. Our politicians believed that Australians were natural soldiers and that an army could be raised in short order and carry the day. We remember Gallipoli, Kokoda and Long Tan with many oblivious to many other pivotal battles, the involvement of corps other than infantry, the desire of those on the ground for more support. It is perhaps the incorrect perception of success without supporting arms that leads to hollow, light formations, where when armies have been over run and have lost more questions are asked and the political classes may become more invested in listening and learning. ,

 

[Raven22]

I actually remember reading that after Binh Ba, US commanders were impressed with Australian use of armour in the J.

The irony is the initial use of armour at Binh Ba was terrible. Initially they just bumbled into the town with no plan, no orders and no mutual support, and it wasn't until the tanks were isolated and had their ass handed to them and forced to withdrawal that a coherent plan was formed. The second clearance with armour being used in direct support of dismount teams was as good an example of tank infantry cooperation as you can get.

Binh Ba is an excellent example of why Plan Beersheeba came about. The infantry and armour didn't know how to work together very well, and it wasn't until lessons were learnt on the battlefield that they got it sorted. The idea of Beersheeba is to allow the combined arms team to work together in training, so hard lessons such as this don't have to be learnt on ops.

 

[vonnoobie]

You all make a good case, Tanks do work in urban warfare usually but only when supported by infantry etc. Guess the only question know is how many do we actually need?

With limited fund's as it is is it worth while spending more money on extra tanks that we may never use rather then buying equipment that we do actually need but lack at the moment? For the time being in my view 59 M1A1's is enough, And realistically should we need extra quickly the US has a bloody s**t load of them sitting around gathering dust.

 

[Volkodav]

It depends entirely on what you are doing, what is important is that you have both a sufficient quantity of vehicles available and those running the show know how to use them. The issue we have had for years was we had too few tanks to even provide for realistic training most of the time as well as way to few to ever even consider using them overseas. In Vietnam they were not deployed until veterans of battles in Borneo and Bougainville where armour was used to good effect insisted on having them and even then the most we could send was a squadron when a full regiment would have made more sense but would have been unsustainable.

We are meant to have three identical brigades each with an ACR, yet we only have two squadrons of tanks, that is not enough. We have no armoured engineering support and if we were to develop such a capability it would need almost as many AEVs (which are basically engineer operated tanks) as well as more specialised vehicles, as we can currently provide tanks to the ACRs. To me a bare minimum would be a squadron for each ACR and another, in addition to training vehicles, at the school of armour, as well as theAEV rolled vehicles, which is more than twice what we have now.

 

[vonnoobie]

It depends entirely on what you are doing, what is important is that you have both a sufficient quantity of vehicles available and those running the show know how to use them. The issue we have had for years was we had too few tanks to even provide for realistic training most of the time as well as way to few to ever even consider using them overseas. In Vietnam they were not deployed until veterans of battles in Borneo and Bougainville where armour was used to good effect insisted on having them and even then the most we could send was a squadron when a full regiment would have made more sense but would have been unsustainable.

We are meant to have three identical brigades each with an ACR, yet we only have two squadrons of tanks, that is not enough. We have no armoured engineering support and if we were to develop such a capability it would need almost as many AEVs (which are basically engineer operated tanks) as well as more specialised vehicles, as we can currently provide tanks to the ACRs. To me a bare minimum would be a squadron for each ACR and another, in addition to training vehicles, at the school of armour, as well as theAEV rolled vehicles, which is more than twice what we have now.

I can see where it does start to add up that we are lacking in tanks, Bad enough that our tank squadrons are smaller then others but that we have less of them in the regiment (Australian 2 x squadrons of 14 tanks vs UK 3 x squadrons of 18 tanks).

If the fund's could be made available I wouldn't be against expanding the armored force to 3 regiments of 3 squadrons each (126 x M1A1's) plus associated training vehicles, On top of all the specialized vehicles we require.