House of Commons Defence Committee, 1. The Department has failed to develop viable Combat Identification solutions to counter the risks of friendly fire incidents, despite their devastating effects, and despite the recommendations made by the Committee of Public Accounts in both 1992 and 2002. Some improvements have been made, for example for air and naval operations, but the Department needs to address the outstanding areas without further delay.
2. Over half of the equipment programmes for Combat Identification have been delayed, deferred or re-scoped during the last four years. A Battlefield Target Identification System will not be available until early in the next decade. Equipments such as the Blue Force Tracker and Bowman communications system may improve situational awareness in the meantime, but the inevitable time-lag in analysing and collating information from these systems will restrict their potential for positive target identification. The Department therefore needs to develop a timetabled plan for introducing a credible target identification system.
3. Progress in procuring the Battlefield Target Identification System has been held up for six years awaiting allies' decisions. The Committee recommended in 2002 that the Department develop methods of co-operation with allies on Combat Identification, but preliminary decisions are yet to be made. The Department needs to reach agreement with allies on procuring a system, or introduce, as an interim, a more limited national programme, focusing on key risk areas such as ground to ground combat.
4. The Department's Senior Responsible Owner on Combat Identification has no budgetary or line management responsibility. The Department should identify what impact the Senior Responsible Owner has been able to make since the role was established in 2002, and determine whether giving greater management authority would increase the effectiveness of the role.
5. During Operation TELIC the Department produced 60,000 Aide Memoire cards to raise awareness of Combat Identification, but failed to distribute them to front-line troops. The Department regretted this failure, which it attributed to more general difficulties with supplies in Iraq. Cards are now given to personnel before deployment. The Department should determine how successful they have been in raising awareness among the troops concerned.
6. As the Committee recommended in 2002, the Department has developed a database on the fratricide incidents, but it does not collate data on the fratricide rates of our allies or on non-combatant casualties. The Department should update the database regularly and expand it to include data on allied fratricide rates and non-combatant casualties. The Committee also recommended in 2002 that the information gathered in the database be analysed and disseminated appropriately within the United Kingdom and to allies. The Department should share the database with our allies to promote greater joint interest in finding effective solutions.
7. It took between eight and 28 months to conclude the Boards of Inquiry investigations into the four friendly fire incidents during Operation TELIC, and in one case it was a further 27 months before the findings were made publicly available. There will inevitably be variations in the time taken to complete investigations due to differing levels of complexity and the possibility of criminal prosecutions. But once complete, the Department should make every effort to publish the findings of Boards of Inquiry within one month of the investigation being concluded.
8. It took the Department over six months to inform the Committee that it could not provide information on allied fratricide rates and non-combatant casualties requested at the hearing. The Department should in future provide promised information no later than four weeks after the hearing. Where more time is required, the Department should agree an appropriate timetable for delivery within a week of the hearing.
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