ADF General discussion thread

[Volkodav]

Yanked from the RAN thread....



YES!!!!

/rant on. There are a few RAA officers who need to be escorted off Russell ASAP. The over-complication of long range strike is killing us / rant off

There are two hard parts about land-based long range strike:

The first is targeting. You need SMEs for that (a bunch of which we have - they wear blue uniforms). That can be built at anytime and don't need launchers. Start putting RAA and Int on the RAAF courses, into 460 Sqn, pay them more - whatever. Fundamentally this is a Joint problem anyhow - so it's ready to go

The second is the missile. Its technically, full of bang and 1s and 0s. Designing it will take time. But..... that's not a RAA problem! Just buy ones that fit the launcher holes and connect to the C2 systems. Pass the maintenance bill to RAEME or the RAAF or industry - but you can hand wave that log away.

What's left is some trucks! With DG placards. That's it! They receive the targeting data over AFATADS (or whatever BMS). They drive to the firing point, park the specified direction, take cover and watch fireworks. Then, when all the noise is done, they drive the trucks to a reload point. All that is as complex as a Pizza Hut delivery - and 17 yr olds do that.

When we stood up 8113, the Centre strongly recommended that the HiMARs units be ARes units. Simply capabilities, easily maintained skills, the ARes get to hold it over the ARA for being more important; it was win:win. Unfortunately..

*le sigh*

100% an ideal reserve capability.

Most training can be undertaken on simulators. The equipment, although very advanced, is not difficult to use or maintain.

 

[old faithful]

i agree 100% on this, the A Res needs to be used in the best possible way, and Fire and forget systems that are easily maintained, easy to train with and have a real purpose are perfectly suited to A Res. MANPADS would be useful in that area as well, as long as the right system is selected.
I am sure some form of anti drone units could be A res as well, along with some reserve cyber geeks for ECM.

 

[swerve]

No - we assessed that based on the air defences in the region, its location and the size of our foot print it wasn't worth putting a GBAD det in. Noting that even when we had RBS-70 and Rapier it never went over there. We have minimal resources; it just doesn't justify it. Like they don't have AFVs or artillery

I'd argue that it made sense at the time, and may still do. There have been multiple strikes on Iran and by Iran in the past two decades, with no threat to the Gulf States. I'd even argue that Tehran's decision to strike things like AMAB, Akrotiri and the French base (plus a bunch of other targets) reflects a level of insanity that you wouldn't forecast. They've gone from Paris and London stepping back to supporting force; likewise they have turned Saudi and the Gulf States from publicly neutral to actively involved. Launching most of these strikes makes no sense logically

For all the course of action analysis we do - we usually can't afford to spend much time on genuinely irrational threat decision making.

I imagine the thinking might be that attacking them would show those countries the folly of allying themselves with the USA, or hosting US troops. I suspect that if that is what they thought, it's not working

 

[spoz]

No - we assessed that based on the air defences in the region, its location and the size of our foot print it wasn't worth putting a GBAD det in. Noting that even when we had RBS-70 and Rapier it never went over there. We have minimal resources; it just doesn't justify it. Like they don't have AFVs or artillery

I'd argue that it made sense at the time, and may still do. There have been multiple strikes on Iran and by Iran in the past two decades, with no threat to the Gulf States. I'd even argue that Tehran's decision to strike things like AMAB, Akrotiri and the French base (plus a bunch of other targets) reflects a level of insanity that you wouldn't forecast. They've gone from Paris and London stepping back to supporting force; likewise they have turned Saudi and the Gulf States from publicly neutral to actively involved. Launching most of these strikes makes no sense logically

For all the course of action analysis we do - we usually can't afford to spend much time on genuinely irrational threat decision making.

The other thing is - count the numbers deployed, and understand the reality of dealing with host countries. We do not really have combat forces in the ME/Gulf, we have log elements and a bunch of scattered observers/peacekeepers these days (and I’m, some intel). And for any foreign country, that country needs to agree forces we wish to locate there. They have an absolute veto on what we do. And it’s one thing to locate support bases and non combat elements in a country, quite another to locate combat elements. That is particularly so if you are wanting to locate air defence elements in the air space of other countries - they are very reluctant because of their resulting de facto inability to control that airspace with all the consequent potential for a blue on blue or blue on green incident.

 

[ADMk2]

No - we assessed that based on the air defences in the region, its location and the size of our foot print it wasn't worth putting a GBAD det in. Noting that even when we had RBS-70 and Rapier it never went over there. We have minimal resources; it just doesn't justify it. Like they don't have AFVs or artillery

I'd argue that it made sense at the time, and may still do. There have been multiple strikes on Iran and by Iran in the past two decades, with no threat to the Gulf States. I'd even argue that Tehran's decision to strike things like AMAB, Akrotiri and the French base (plus a bunch of other targets) reflects a level of insanity that you wouldn't forecast. They've gone from Paris and London stepping back to supporting force; likewise they have turned Saudi and the Gulf States from publicly neutral to actively involved. Launching most of these strikes makes no sense logically

For all the course of action analysis we do - we usually can't afford to spend much time on genuinely irrational threat decision making.

Ah, but AFV’s or arty aren’t the type of system that is going to be providing force protection against the type of threats we are now facing and the incoming we are receiving.

Whether there are basing rights or not, unless we park a DDG in Dubai harbour we have literally nothing to protect our own forces
against the threat they face, either at the low end or the high end.

We’ve been watching Group 3 drone strikes in Ukraine for longer than Marles etc have been in office and we STILL can’t do diddly squat about them…

 

[ADMk2]

The other thing is - count the numbers deployed, and understand the reality of dealing with host countries. We do not really have combat forces in the ME/Gulf, we have log elements and a bunch of scattered observers/peacekeepers these days (and I’m, some intel). And for any foreign country, that country needs to agree forces we wish to locate there. They have an absolute veto on what we do. And it’s one thing to locate support bases and non combat elements in a country, quite another to locate combat elements. That is particularly so if you are wanting to locate air defence elements in the air space of other countries - they are very reluctant because of their resulting de facto inability to control that airspace with all the consequent potential for a blue on blue or blue on green incident.

I’ve no doubt that’s exactly what they are like when there are no ballistic missiles and group 3 drones raining down on them…

I suspect that reality has a way of smoothing off the “what can we do to help” issues…

I’m quite certain for one thing, any previous prohibition on Israeli aircraft using their airspace has for the time being been “muted” as but one example of how things change when your cities and bases are getting splashed..,

 

[OldTex]

The Modern War Institute (West Point) has an interesting article providing insight into the range of considerations for defending deployed personnel. With regard to the ADF in Al Minhad the following comment from the article is relevant:

"Despite all the expensive technology involved in defeating drone threats, some of the simplest and cheapest options—like sandbags and concrete—are still among the best protection measures. Bunkers remain an essential component to static defenses."

 

[downunderblue]

The Modern War Institute (West Point) has an interesting article providing insight into the range of considerations for defending deployed personnel. With regard to the ADF in Al Minhad the following comment from the article is relevant:

"Despite all the expensive technology involved in defeating drone threats, some of the simplest and cheapest options—like sandbags and concrete—are still among the best protection measures. Bunkers remain an essential component to static defenses."

Sober thinking when reflecting on RAAF Darwin and Tindal without IAMD or defensive structures of resilience. I can just see those exposed B52's at Tindal being big targets out in the open.

I know this is being looked at but where is the hurry up? Clearly a Integrated Air and Missile Defence capability solution will not be up prior to the Davidson window which leaves us very vulnerable and very reliant on our partners to defend our airspace, which is poor form IMO.

 

[Wombat000]

It’s also interesting to observe recent significant losses of naval assets whilst docked in port, both from subsurface and I’m guessing from air strikes.
The notion of safety whilst in port is demonstrably false.

 

[Volkodav]

Anyone questiining why the Hunters have both high end ASW and AEGIS only need to look at the last couple of days.

Basically without Hunters capability Hobarts, Mogamis and the LHDs are dead.

 

[Takao]

Ah, but AFV’s or arty aren’t the type of system that is going to be providing force protection against the type of threats we are now facing and the incoming we are receiving.

Whether there are basing rights or not, unless we park a DDG in Dubai harbour we have literally nothing to protect our own forces
against the threat they face, either at the low end or the high end.

We’ve been watching Group 3 drone strikes in Ukraine for longer than Marles etc have been in office and we STILL can’t do diddly squat about them…

Yes, it's unlikely we could deploy significant AD to AMAB today. More than one would think, especially at the cUAS level, but very little against IRBM or the like. We would either rely on allies or passive defence. I was protected under a reasonable dome of IAMD when I deployed last, with most provided by the US but us and allies also contributed. But I'd also point out, in this case, Tehran striking UAE is so stupid that it wouldn't feature on a planners likely events. Even assuming that we had 100% knowledge as to the time and location of US/Israel strikes, I'm not sure I could justify deploying eNASAM or cUAS beyond what was in theatre.

Now, will that change going forward? I'd be surprised if there wasn't a reasonable cUAS built in to almost every deployment. But I wouldn't expect automatic eNASAM deployment. I especially wouldn't see a MRGBAD or ABM unit deploy (they will be focused on Australia). I think we will still leverage (especially) US and allied air defence.

The Modern War Institute (West Point) has an interesting article providing insight into the range of considerations for defending deployed personnel. With regard to the ADF in Al Minhad the following comment from the article is relevant:

"Despite all the expensive technology involved in defeating drone threats, some of the simplest and cheapest options—like sandbags and concrete—are still among the best protection measures. Bunkers remain an essential component to static defenses."

Passive protection reduces casualties by ~8x more than active defences in a reasonable sized strike against a target in the north with civilian population around. It can also cover more spaces. Obviously passive + active is better; but in the short-medium term its generally more cost effective to pursue passive. Of course, you should always use passive (because active hasn't got a 100% success rate), but I was surprised at the casualty difference.

Sober thinking when reflecting on RAAF Darwin and Tindal without IAMD or defensive structures of resilience. I can just see those exposed B52's at Tindal being big targets out in the open.

le sigh - yup. It's frustrating.

The frustrating bit is that you can link it straight to deterrence (which is hard enough for us to do in the first place). Lets say it takes 6 missiles to kill 75 Sqn. One hits between 4 hangars, one hit the fuel farm, then another two on the maintenance hangars or accommodation. That's not too bad - lets say a MAJ can authorise that (putting aside striking another nation etc).

Now, lets put a 2nd fuel farm in, spread each one out a bit (that's 2, maybe 4 missiles now). Add in bunkers for people and build some additional nodes (that's now 4 - 6 missiles) and a HAS for each aircraft (that's gone from 3 to 12 missiles). Now the strike has to be 22+ missiles. No MAJ can approve that - it has to be escalated, possibly to COL. Add in dispersed ops (75 Sqn operating from 3 locations), add in decoys and deceptions - you could be talking 60 odd missiles. That's a BRIG or MAJGEN call.

Now - they may shoot. And 60 missiles will kill 75 Sqn. But, we've injected delay into the decision cycle. For a MAJ to approve to a BRIG to approve may take 2 - 4 hours. Maybe even longer. With modern tempo, what can BLUEFOR do in that 'free' 4 hour window. 75 Sqn could strike a target, defend some strategic air, conduct a deception task to support allied operations - lots of things. All of which will influence that BRIG thinking process - maybe they can't afford to strike Tindal now.

Giving BLUEFOR 1 - 6 hours for a few million in peacetime? That's cheap. Do that across the north, across FBW and FBE and now instead of a 40 missile strike knocking out the ADF you need to commit 500 missiles - even the deepest magazines is going to blink at that escalation in need.

I know this is being looked at but where is the hurry up? Clearly a Integrated Air and Missile Defence capability solution will not be up prior to the Davidson window which leaves us very vulnerable and very reliant on our partners to defend our airspace, which is poor form IMO.

I can't think of anyone who doesn't acknowledge its importance. There are a number of structural delays with purchasing active defences and there are.... challenges... in convincing people dressed in blue and others who might look after estate of the importance of passive.

Also, in all seriousness, passive can cost a fair chunk. Bunkers for people are easy. HAS a little harder. Duplicating a fuel farm? Ooof. Duplicating, say, HMAS Coonawarra or RAAF Darwin? Double oof. So there are some practical challenges.

It’s also interesting to observe recent significant losses of naval assets whilst docked in port, both from subsurface and I’m guessing from air strikes.
The notion of safety whilst in port is demonstrably false.

/rant on. When you say that AUKUS Pillar 1 is the main pillar of your deterrence by denial strategy then it becomes the #1 target! Which isn't in the north!! /rant off

Yes. You are 100% right.

Look, I get that fighters are cool. But SSNs are hard to find (I think every Navy and Air Force agrees with that). So why would you strike some fighters that might carry some GBU and (maybe in the future) an anti-ship weapon when you can kill SSN in the port and their logistics?

In my view, since the announcement of SSNs, HMAS Stirling is the priority ADF base requiring IAMD. No where in the north.

 

[downunderblue]

Anyone questiining why the Hunters have both high end ASW and AEGIS only need to look at the last couple of days.

Basically without Hunters capability Hobarts, Mogamis and the LHDs are dead.

I don't want to be pedantic, and I'm not in the anti Hunter bandwagon, but are you saying we need the CAEFAR 2 kitted Hunter because the AWD Hobart class can't effectively secure a battle space similar to the Gulf States over the last couple of days?

Whilst they didn't deploy, I assume the Hobart's would perform in a similar fashion to the USN AB's which operated in the Red Sea against the Houthis? So in effect relatively well?

Yes the CAEFAR 2 kit seems be be the Rolls Royce equivalent (if it all works- think of the Danish Ivan Hutveld (sic) class) but I see no reason to discredit the capability of Hobart's capability- on paper at least.

Apologies re any typos as am on the phone without the glasses.

 

[Volkodav]

I don't want to be pedantic, and I'm not in the anti Hunter bandwagon, but are you saying we need the CAEFAR 2 kitted Hunter because the AWD Hobart class can't effectively secure a battle space similar to the Gulf States over the last couple of days?

Whilst they didn't deploy, I assume the Hobart's would perform in a similar fashion to the USN AB's which operated in the Red Sea against the Houthis? So in effect relatively well?

Yes the CAEFAR 2 kit seems be be the Rolls Royce equivalent (if it all works- think of the Danish Ivan Hutveld (sic) class) but I see no reason to discredit the capability of Hobart's capability- on paper at least.

Apologies re any typos as am on the phone without the glasses.

Its more a quedtion of the multi spectrum threat. Submarine, air, surface, missile and drone.

 

[downunderblue]

See below for a quick summary on the first USN submarine kill since 1945.

It wasn't a fair fight, but I have put it here because it was likely a Virginia and it reminds us again of the awesome and somewhat scary threat from a SSN.

I feel sorry tbh for those 80 who perished. Poor soda were likely conscripts who never saw it coming

It reminds me of HMS Conqueror in 1982. A SSN is the undisputed apex predator of the the ocean and clearly invokes fear and uncertainty into the opposing operational decision maker.

No one wants to go back into the water after a shark attack, and this has a similar feeling for your opponent.

Not a bad sales promotion for the Virginia's and AUKUS too.

 

[ADMk2]

Sober thinking when reflecting on RAAF Darwin and Tindal without IAMD or defensive structures of resilience. I can just see those exposed B52's at Tindal being big targets out in the open.

I know this is being looked at but where is the hurry up? Clearly a Integrated Air and Missile Defence capability solution will not be up prior to the Davidson window which leaves us very vulnerable and very reliant on our partners to defend our airspace, which is poor form IMO.

There is also the not inconsiderable risk that should be considered by our planners, that with the current expenditure rate, the demand for and geographically dispersed theatres requiring coverage, our main ally may not be in a position to defend our airspace for us. Certainly none of our other allies have any capability whatsoever to help protect us...

As only one example, the US only has 8x THAAD batteries in total and needs them in the Middle East, Europe, North America and across the Indo-Pacific.

What’s the likelihood they will have the capability or the inclination to provide a spare such battery for us?

 

[downunderblue]

What’s the likelihood they will have the capability or the inclination to provide a spare such battery for us?

They'll have to deploy it regardless if they want their kit and people relatively protected, but they shouldnt have to as its clearly our responsibility.

 

[OldTex]

It might be that the individual services provide their own SHORAD/VSHORAD, using where possible common systems and effectors, whilst the RAAF is responsible for MRAD, LRAD/ABM and the IAMDS is a joint responsibility. RAN would have the MRAD, LRAD/ABM responsibility for deployed MFUs.
The SHORAD/VSHORAD manning would be a combination of regular and reserve forces (as currently reserves can only be deployed under specific conditions).