Middle East Defence & Security

Perun

New Member
The Tel Aviv hospital that was struck with shock wave is the main one that receives IDF casualties from Gaza. Is this legitimate target then? What does says IDF RoE in the ghetto Gaza and their experiance with destroying all hospitals there and executing medical staff?
 
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seaspear

Well-Known Member
Is there information known on where the I.D.F refuels its aircraft obviously the closer to the target the more reach these aircraft have into western Iran also saying that the I.D.F would not admit to having such aircraft in a vulnerable position unless the security of the aircraft was secure
This is an article claiming significant loss to the launchers , certainly bias may be claimed but if true significant launches of missiles would be seen as per some above articles
 

seaspear

Well-Known Member
The Tel Aviv hospital that was struck with shock wave is the main one that receives IDF casualties from Gaza. Is this legitimate target then? What does says IDF RoE in the ghetto Gaza and their experiance with destroying all hospitals there and executing medical staff?
as per some claims not evacuated
 

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
Is there information known on where the I.D.F refuels its aircraft obviously the closer to the target the more reach these aircraft have into western Iran also saying that the I.D.F would not admit to having such aircraft in a vulnerable position unless the security of the aircraft was secure
This is an article claiming significant loss to the launchers , certainly bias may be claimed but if true significant launches of missiles would be seen as per some above articles
There was one documentation of aerial refueling conducted over Syria from the first 1-2 days of the war. Nothing since then.
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
If you say you do not wish to discuss further the reasons, how do you expect the conclusion to be accepted?
Have I not provided enough to go on here? It is not my prerogative for you to accept my conclusions or reason because I know to begin with they will not be accepted, which is completely fine.

I do not see it as simple logic because I see 2 possibilities.[…]
The reality is that there are other sides than Israel to the negotiations. One of them is Iran and others include everyone else in the world. Bilateral implies two parties, by definition. Just like Iranian enrichment is not acceptable to Israel, no enrichment is not acceptable to Iran. So it seems there is an impasse here. However, the purpose of the negotiations from the very beginning was to find the solution acceptable to most, not just Israel or/and Iran.

I also cannot accept your proposition if I cannot rule out other logical possibilities:
  1. Israel and US coordinated so Israeli action would be the stick to the American carrot.
  2. Similar coordination to enforce western demands for no enrichment which Iran reportedly rejected.
    1. Coordination emphasizing Israeli solo action to portray the US as the exhausted diplomat.
  3. Negotiations being a facade to eliminate a nuclear program and/or a regime that had lost their deterrent beforehand.
Maybe there are more, but these are possible explanations I could think of within less than a minute.
Sure, all possible. However, all three refer to the same point, number three in your list (and it circles back to my point of “best timing”).

In essence, Israel had never had a negotiating position here. It has a stance and a demand: no enrichment in Iran period. And they do everything to achieve that goal. That’s not what the rest of the world was negotiating though. The rest of the (western) world has their own goals and interests, which, frankly, greatly diverge from Israeli demands. One being to deprive Iran of possessing nuclear weapons (but not enrichment, nullifying which would be the ideal state, but not reasonably achievable). Another being not to have an active war in Iran (or elsewhere in the middle east or elsewhere generally, really) because they (Europe in particular) really don’t want another wave of immigration which would without a doubt happen if Iran is wrecked. And I am not talking only about Iran here, but migration in the middle east as a whole in this case. We have been through that a few times now. Merz showed himself to be a dummy again with his comment of “Israel is doing everyone’s dirty work”. The current events are categorically against the European interests at their very core. That’s why there never were multilateral negotiations until tomorrow, where Europeans will probably try to convince Iran to give up on the enrichment program (but more likely than not they will not succeed). Note that Iran had already chosen to get wrecked over their stance because everything I argued so far is not a secret. Whether they expected for things to unfold the way they did is very questionable (they didn’t), but the fact remains.

Everyone, including Euros, Russians, Chinese, and Americans, but Israel (I can’t speak for the Arabs, but they have little to no say anyway) found the JCPOA to be an acceptable resolution. When Trump came to office, the never previously exacting opportunity opened up for Israel: they had to convince one man (who is generally sceptical of common sense) to exit the agreement, which he did. It’s been a clusterfuck, pardon my language, ever since.

To the professional negotiations point you made. The negotiations that preceded the JCPOA were, in fact, professional. It was a multi-state solution that involved very intensive work and expertise. Sure, Israel did not want to have any of it because, like I said before, they do not have a negotiating position, but a demand and no flexibility (this is an understandable position, btw; whether it is entirely rational can be argued though).

The negotiations that preceded the current developments, on the other hand, were anything but professional. First of all, the negotiations were between Iran and Israel (via the United States - or Trump, to be more precise - because it is almost entirely representing Israeli interest here, not their own, definitely not since the kinetic action began at the very least). While I already expressed my opinion on the Israeli negotiating terms (they don’t exist), for this very reason there was no one else involved, no other states, no experts, nothing of substance, but contradictory statements from the main negotiator (Witkoff) and the boss (Trump). The likely outcome was predictable, but definitely not certain had the negotiations continued. See my other post for the rest of the story.

It IS a point of argument. Media reports about the negotiations are inconclusive and obviously self-contradictory (report and anti-report tactic).
Most contradictory were the statements made by the people involved on the American side. These were not media interpretations, but direct statements by the individuals.

It is impossible to tell with certainty that the US would agree to enrichment. In fact, its likelihood was very low.
I agree and I stated as much.

Why? One, because as I said earlier, Israel is also party to these negotiations, and it insists on no enrichment. Two, when Iran passed the deadline for reaching a nuclear deal and remained adamant on enrichment, it got bonked.
Put this way (and your one and two are the same thing), there was no deal to be made because enrichment is the bottom line that is not going to be crossed by Iran even now, in my opinion, but we shall see.

You are building your argument entirely from the Israeli perspective. There is an entire world out there that have their own interests that, in most cases, do align with yours, to put it simply. I believe we had very briefly discussed something similar in the “unity” or whatever thread.

There have been multiple points in time when action would be ideal as well. 2010 for example. The conventional threat was minimal, but the capabilities to strike were there.
This is simply not true and you argue aginst it yourself:

It is a common misconception among Americans and even some foreigners in general that Israel would go rogue, but that's why it's called a MIS-conception. Strong relations with the US are of immense strategic importance to Israel, and a strike campaign that could seriously upset that, could yield more loss than gain.
2010 was certainly far from ideal - quite the opposite, in fact. Due to the one reason you described yourself. The same reason that makes it ideal today. There was no chance any of this would be acceptable under Obama and (heavily) Democrat-dominated Congress of 2010.

It seems you are taking Trump's statements too literally.
You would have to trust me on this, but your assertion could not be further from reality.

Trump's coherence should be observed through actions, not words.
Sure, I agree. His actions are way weaker than his words. Be it his first term or second. I don’t want to touch politics, so I will settle on the relevance to the forum. His negotiating skills have so far proven to be beyond subpar. The strategy of seeding chaos to increase/demonstrate leverage has not worked (it is a failure, really) in trade negotiations; good effing luck using the same strategy in geopolitical context, especially as it relates to the “existential” issues, or otherwise major issues that have a great effect on the entire world. So far, his failure is quite obvious. I am going to stop here (and risk you not accepting my argument or conclusion, ha).

Netanyahu recited the conclusions in the video. The conclusions refer to a breakout time. You cannot understand that so long as you refuse to learn what nuclear breakout is.
You keep insisting that I (and others) do not understand what nuclear breakout is. I can’t speak for others, but I can assure you that I personally understand the meaning and the general process behind it (I would argue that my understanding is better than that of an average person). The point you seem to be intentionally missing is the fact that Benjamin talked about “very quickly” in 2018; “weeks away” in 2015; “six months away” in 2012; “Iran is gearing up to produce 25 atomic bombs a year, 250 in a decade” in 2006; “three to five years” in 1995. This is not even a complete list, at that.

There is a valid reason to be at least sceptical of Benjamin’s claims. However, I would suggest that his claims now are closest to reality than ever before because of his very own efforts.

IMG_0864.png

Source as indicated on the image.

Flat earthers at least believe in a revised concept of gravity or could not believe in one at all. For gravity to act on an object, there must be a center to that gravitational pull. If the earth is flat, there is no such center. Else they'd be smeared across the earth's surface.
Yes, I am aware of how gravity works. I was just curious how the flat-earthers explain it.
 

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
Have I not provided enough to go on here? It is not my prerogative for you to accept my conclusions or reason because I know to begin with they will not be accepted, which is completely fine.
The only reason to believe a case would not be accepted in a test of logic is if the case is wrong.
You based your argument on reasons you wished not to discuss but the reasons are non factual.
You argued for example that the US withdrew unilaterally from JCPOA. But it was not unilateral. It was bilateral. Iran violated it, the US+IAEA gave it time to explain said violations. Iran refused, and the US then later withdrew.
Your wording also suggested the JCPOA was positive for the US and Israel. But this is also counter-factual. The intent of the JCPOA was to delay, not prevent an Iranian nuclear weapon, in exchange for allowing Iran to massively invest in its conventional capabilities across the region to deter an attack.
From the perspective of a US president for whom "long term" is 4-8 years, a "kicking the can down the road" solution is often optimal. It was an agreement between two parties that did not include the most affected - Israel. But it is impossible to debate the JCPOA while actively refusing to learn its core subject - breakout time.

It's fine if you refuse to continue talking about your reasons, but then you shouldn't use the conclusion as a basis for other things, or assert it thinking it would not be challenged.

The reality is that there are other sides than Israel to the negotiations. One of them is Iran and others include everyone else in the world. Bilateral implies two parties, by definition. Just like Iranian enrichment is not acceptable to Israel, no enrichment is not acceptable to Iran. So it seems there is an impasse here. However, the purpose of the negotiations from the very beginning was to find the solution acceptable to most, not just Israel or/and Iran.
Sure. When it comes to negotiations, it's often better to be inclusive, rather than exclusive. The JCPOA involved more than just the US and Iran. It involved other industrious nations. Perfectly fine. Just not a good strategy to exclude the one nation that could object via a military strike. Similarly here, in the 2025 negotiations. Though I do believe Israel was involved, via multiple possible scenarios.
I disagree on there being an impasse. Iran insisted on enrichment while it had actual enrichment infrastructure. It lost most of it, now down to just Fordow. If Israel and the US succeed in persuading the Fordow facility to un-exist, then the negotiations can resume with the enrichment topic resolved.

Sure, all possible. However, all three refer to the same point, number three in your list (and it circles back to my point of “best timing”).
My point #3 and your theory of best timing seem mutually exclusive.
To remind us, my point #3 theorizes the negotiations were a facade, i.e. coordinated by Israel and US to eliminate the program, or be pleasantly surprised with voluntary Iranian surrender.
Your theory, as I understand it, accepted the negotiations as sincere, with Israel torpedoing them to capitalize on operational conditions.

In essence, Israel had never had a negotiating position here. It has a stance and a demand: no enrichment in Iran period. And they do everything to achieve that goal. That’s not what the rest of the world was negotiating though. The rest of the (western) world has their own goals and interests, which, frankly, greatly diverge from Israeli demands. One being to deprive Iran of possessing nuclear weapons (but not enrichment, nullifying which would be the ideal state, but not reasonably achievable).
Again, this conflicts with the fact that if you negotiate over someone's head, you won't get the outcome because that other party will enforce its own reality.

Another being not to have an active war in Iran (or elsewhere in the middle east or elsewhere generally, really) because they (Europe in particular) really don’t want another wave of immigration which would without a doubt happen if Iran is wrecked.
I do not see a basis for this claim. First, many Iranians have fled Iran long before the war. The Iranian diaspora is >4 million according to Wikipedia (2021). But they are not to be compared with Arab immigrants. The Iranian diaspora is western-minded, hard working, and a quality population wherever they go. I have also seen no evidence of Persians increasing local crime rates.
Arabs typically flee their states, e.g. Syria and Libya, to flee a local civil war. But what happens in Iran is not a civil war. It is bombardment of IRGC assets and persons, something they view very positively and as a sign of potential relief and increase to quality of life. So I see many factors that are directly opposite to factors of Arab immigration.
And I am not talking only about Iran here, but migration in the middle east as a whole in this case. We have been through that a few times now.
Why would a war in Iran cause migration elsewhere?

Merz showed himself to be a dummy again with his comment of “Israel is doing everyone’s dirty work”. The current events are categorically against the European interests at their very core.
I disagree. I think he meant that in a positive way, i.e. Israel doing what benefits Europe.
I can find several benefits to Europe:
  1. Reduced nuclear threat.
  2. Reduced conventional threat.
    1. From Russia.
    2. And directly from Iran.
  3. Invalidation of Europe-based Iranian activities.
  4. Elimination of the main immigration driver (IRGC-initiated wars e.g. Syria).
  5. Elimination of trade blocking entity.
    1. Realized in Red Sea.
    2. Threatened in Persian Gulf.

And I can find one downside to Europe:
  1. Energy prices temporarily increased.
  2. For Axis-affiliated nations (e.g. Spain, Ireland, Norway) - loss of an ally.
Sounds to me like an excellent deal.

That’s why there never were multilateral negotiations until tomorrow, where Europeans will probably try to convince Iran to give up on the enrichment program
I find that hard to believe. Europe as a whole is quite antagonistic to Israel and historically also antagonistic to the idea of security.

To the professional negotiations point you made. The negotiations that preceded the JCPOA were, in fact, professional. It was a multi-state solution that involved very intensive work and expertise. Sure, Israel did not want to have any of it because, like I said before, they do not have a negotiating position, but a demand and no flexibility (this is an understandable position, btw; whether it is entirely rational can be argued though).
Israel had the strongest position. But the agreement eventually failed because said position was not taken into account. As the sole western military power in the middle east in the Obama era, Israel alone could easily negate the agreement with a strike. A lot depended on its good will with the US.

You are building your argument entirely from the Israeli perspective. There is an entire world out there that have their own interests that, in most cases, do align with yours, to put it simply. I believe we had very briefly discussed something similar in the “unity” or whatever thread.
Israel's position is in the best interest of the west. It's not something I say as an Israeli, but something I say as someone who understands the impact of doing the opposite.
I am an ethnic Ukrainian born in Israel. My family is split between both states. That means every part of my family lives in a nation that is under fire, and which has to employ a "peace through strength" mindset to survive.
Europe, Canada, UK and others in the west, live under no threat, and can afford decadence and whinyism. The policies they try to dictate to the normal nations are contrary to what they need to survive. They are anti-security. Hence it makes a lot of sense to simply ignore them, and implement policies that benefit them in the hope that they will grow out of the nonsense.

2010 was certainly far from ideal - quite the opposite, in fact. Due to the one reason you described yourself. The same reason that makes it ideal today. There was no chance any of this would be acceptable under Obama and (heavily) Democrat-dominated Congress of 2010.
There is a spectrum to things. I do not subscribe to the idea of binari thought. Israel is not a rogue nation, but it can be pushed to take unilateral action if it deems the threat severe. IIRC Former cabinet officials testified that in 2010 there was a majority opinion to strike in Iran and that Netanyahu vetoed it.
The strikes in Iraq and Syria were independent action against US wishes, but they turned out right in the end.
There is a balance between maintaining good relations with the US and taking independent action when the US is compromised.
 

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
The point you seem to be intentionally missing is the fact that Benjamin talked about “very quickly” in 2018; “weeks away” in 2015; “six months away” in 2012; “Iran is gearing up to produce 25 atomic bombs a year, 250 in a decade” in 2006; “three to five years” in 1995. This is not even a complete list, at that.
You give this example, but it is an example of what exactly? What is your point?
I believe in all these cases he was either right, or no reason to believe he wasn't. What is your point?

There is a valid reason to be at least sceptical of Benjamin’s claims. However, I would suggest that his claims now are closest to reality than ever before because of his very own efforts.
What is your point with this graph?
 
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