Australian Army Discussions and Updates

[MARKMILES77]

Opportunity cost isn't just money, it's people and more importantly suitably qualified and experienced personnel SQEP. Its also infrastructure, and industry capacity.

Right now there are five roles my skill set is desperately needed in and they have all been told they can't have me because my current project has priority. Pretty much everyone I work with is in the same boat.

We juggle multiple roles, coaching and mentoring as we go so we are able to get as much done as we can.

Good to have, very sensible and justifiable capability upgrades are being cut, not because they can't be afforded financially, but because there aren't enough people or infrastructure to do them in the required time, as well as doing higher priority stuff.

I'd rather see investment in something like this

Counter-Drone Systems | Electro Optic Systems

EOS' counter-drone systems are flexible and can be customised to meet the demands of military operations and security requirements.

eos-aus.com

An excellent system no doubt.
But the acquisition cost of 30 Slingers would be how much?
The acquistion cost of 30 RBS-70s for Australia is known precisely, it is exactly zero dollars.
We cannot afford to discard capabilities that we already have.
We should be expanding capability at every opportunity.

 

[Todjaeger]

An excellent system no doubt.
But the acquisition cost of 30 Slingers would be how much?
The acquistion cost of 30 RBS-70s for Australia is known precisely, it is exactly zero dollars.
We cannot afford to discard capabilities that we already have.
We should be expanding capability at every opportunity.

But what is the cost (both in terms of financials as well as facilities and personnel) to keep existing stocks of RBS 70 in service?

I could be mistaken but I have taken @Volkodav to mean that we do not have enough personnel with the right skillsets available to both keep RBS 70 in service as well as introduce some of the newer and more important/higher priority capabilities into service. IMO this would be particularly applicable if the RBS-70 was already something which was not being operated at the battalion level or lower. If Army is going to operate air defence capabilities at a fairly high level attached to something like a Brigade HQ, then I would want something in service which has a range greater than 5 km or less, otherwise only the HQ might get any protection. Not to mention that having something which can detect aerial threats at a distance would be good.

If Australia was presented with the choice (which is effectively what seemed to happen) of either staying with the RBS 70 and keeping them in service, or replacing the RBS 70 with a more capable system like NASAMS, then removing/donating RBS 70 to a country which could actually get some use out of them makes sense. Particularly given that I recall Australia had been looking at getting/fielding vehicle-mounted RBS 70 BOLIDE missile launchers with radar queuing options back in the 2000's, well before the 2017 announcement to seek a replacement for the RBS 70 which led to NASAMS getting selected in 2019.

Also, does anyone know/recall which version of versions of RBS 70 Australia owned when they were decommissioned? Was it the original version Mk 0, or the Mk 1, Mk 2, the BOLIDE or RBS 70 NG? I ask this for two reasons. The first reason being that the earlier the version, the less capable the system and missile with a Mk 1 or Mk 2 having a max range of ~6,000 m and a ceiling of 3,000 m vs. 9,000 m range and 5,000 m ceiling for the RBS 70 NG. The other reason, especially if Australian stocks had significant numbers of the earlier versions, is that most types of launched and guided ordnance has an effective service life, a "shelf life" if you will. If one were to then go and trying to use a munition that was service-life expired had not undergone inspection or remanufacture, it would be quite possible that the munition would do nothing/fail. If Australia had stocks of munitions that was approaching the end of their service life and would need to be inspected or remanufactured, then retiring/donating them does sound like a better option than paying to ensure the ordnance is still good, just so that it can stay behind on a shelf somewhere with newer capabilities getting delivered.

 

[old faithful]

An excellent system no doubt.
But the acquisition cost of 30 Slingers would be how much?
The acquistion cost of 30 RBS-70s for Australia is known precisely, it is exactly zero dollars.
We cannot afford to discard capabilities that we already have.
We should be expanding capability at every opportunity.

Talk to anyone who has actually used RBS 70.
You need to follow the target with the lazer to illuminate it, try that with a jet pulling manoeuvre's at 400 to 500 knots, you might only get a few seconds. IR is easier to lock on than lazer, however is easier to jam. RBS 70 is great for helos, drones etc but just not so good against fast moving, manurable targets.

 

[ADMk2]

Or phrased another way, the army has replaced an aging short range system with a much more capable modern, self propelled system.

It a bit like saying retiring the F/A-18A/B after the F-35 started entering service is a capability reduction.

Different systems for different roles.

NASAMS is a short ranged air defence system.

RBS-70 is a Very Short Ranged Air Defence System.

The difference is more akin to the differences between AIM-9x and AIM-120 or Carl Gustav and Javelin if you prefer. Different systems with different roles.

NASAMS doesn’t replace the capability lost with RBS-70 and Army has publicly acknowledged it now has a substantial capability gap in this area.

Army (and ADF) air defence (and counter UAS) now goes from small arms, to 5.56mm LSW, to 7.62mm Mag-58 to 12.7mm QCB to 30mm x 173mm guns to a 20k ranged radar guided, AMRAAM firing SAM system to F-35’s / Super Hornets. Maybe with an air defence capable RAN vessel sitting in the middle, some of the time, depending on where operations are planned…

Completely unbalanced and rather dangerous from a force protection POV…

 

[ADMk2]

But what is the cost (both in terms of financials as well as facilities and personnel) to keep existing stocks of RBS 70 in service?

I could be mistaken but I have taken @Volkodav to mean that we do not have enough personnel with the right skillsets available to both keep RBS 70 in service as well as introduce some of the newer and more important/higher priority capabilities into service. IMO this would be particularly applicable if the RBS-70 was already something which was not being operated at the battalion level or lower. If Army is going to operate air defence capabilities at a fairly high level attached to something like a Brigade HQ, then I would want something in service which has a range greater than 5 km or less, otherwise only the HQ might get any protection. Not to mention that having something which can detect aerial threats at a distance would be good.

If Australia was presented with the choice (which is effectively what seemed to happen) of either staying with the RBS 70 and keeping them in service, or replacing the RBS 70 with a more capable system like NASAMS, then removing/donating RBS 70 to a country which could actually get some use out of them makes sense. Particularly given that I recall Australia had been looking at getting/fielding vehicle-mounted RBS 70 BOLIDE missile launchers with radar queuing options back in the 2000's, well before the 2017 announcement to seek a replacement for the RBS 70 which led to NASAMS getting selected in 2019.

Also, does anyone know/recall which version of versions of RBS 70 Australia owned when they were decommissioned? Was it the original version Mk 0, or the Mk 1, Mk 2, the BOLIDE or RBS 70 NG? I ask this for two reasons. The first reason being that the earlier the version, the less capable the system and missile with a Mk 1 or Mk 2 having a max range of ~6,000 m and a ceiling of 3,000 m vs. 9,000 m range and 5,000 m ceiling for the RBS 70 NG. The other reason, especially if Australian stocks had significant numbers of the earlier versions, is that most types of launched and guided ordnance has an effective service life, a "shelf life" if you will. If one were to then go and trying to use a munition that was service-life expired had not undergone inspection or remanufacture, it would be quite possible that the munition would do nothing/fail. If Australia had stocks of munitions that was approaching the end of their service life and would need to be inspected or remanufactured, then retiring/donating them does sound like a better option than paying to ensure the ordnance is still good, just so that it can stay behind on a shelf somewhere with newer capabilities getting delivered.

Army’s former RBS-70’s employed the Bolide missile variant at time of disposal. The launcher had been upgraded from the base RBS-70 with the addition of the night fighting aid and cueing provided by PSTAR radar. As we have seen with Canada purchasing them new recently, they are still a capable system, but the training load for them was high, so not the best for a battalion level weapon system I wouldn’t have thought.

The arguments backwards and forwards are all very interesting, but the fact is they are all gone to Ukraine now and Army has acknowledged publicly that it has a capability gap with respect to VSHORAD and the capability it needs to protect it’s forces from air attack at close range. NASAMS provides a short ranged capability from 5 to +/- 25k range with guided AMRAAM missiles, but it’s in the 0 - 5k range that we are dangerously lacking.

There are opportunities however. If you look at 3 brigade we have a direct fire support weapons platoon in 3RAR employing (supposedly) MAG-58 GPMG in the sustained fire role to support what will soon be an armoured capability with more machine gun and anti-armour missile capability in each section than the entire DFSW and anti-armour platoons possess.

They undoubtedly have a role to play in weapons employment expertise, particularly in light infantry battalions, but the need for their ‘support’ of cannon armed IFV’s is a bit of a head scratcher…

There is a significantly pressing need for battalion force protection however especially with the modern drone / L-M threat and so I suspect Army will be looking closely at these platoons and perhaps evolving their capability for current and future battlefields…

 

[Volkodav]

Different systems for different roles.

NASAMS is a short ranged air defence system.

RBS-70 is a Very Short Ranged Air Defence System.

The difference is more akin to the differences between AIM-9x and AIM-120 or Carl Gustav and Javelin if you prefer. Different systems with different roles.

NASAMS doesn’t replace the capability lost with RBS-70 and Army has publicly acknowledged it now has a substantial capability gap in this area.

Army (and ADF) air defence (and counter UAS) now goes from small arms, to 5.56mm LSW, to 7.62mm Mag-58 to 12.7mm QCB to 30mm x 173mm guns to a 20k ranged radar guided, AMRAAM firing SAM system to F-35’s / Super Hornets. Maybe with an air defence capable RAN vessel sitting in the middle, some of the time, depending on where operations are planned…

Completely unbalanced and rather dangerous from a force protection POV…

RBS70 is hardly an effective solution to drone swarms. What would it be used for in any current or conceivable situation?

 

[Volkodav]

Army’s former RBS-70’s employed the Bolide missile variant at time of disposal. The launcher had been upgraded from the base RBS-70 with the addition of the night fighting aid and cueing provided by PSTAR radar. As we have seen with Canada purchasing them new recently, they are still a capable system, but the training load for them was high, so not the best for a battalion level weapon system I wouldn’t have thought.

The arguments backwards and forwards are all very interesting, but the fact is they are all gone to Ukraine now and Army has acknowledged publicly that it has a capability gap with respect to VSHORAD and the capability it needs to protect it’s forces from air attack at close range. NASAMS provides a short ranged capability from 5 to +/- 25k range with guided AMRAAM missiles, but it’s in the 0 - 5k range that we are dangerously lacking.

There are opportunities however. If you look at 3 brigade we have a direct fire support weapons platoon in 3RAR employing (supposedly) MAG-58 GPMG in the sustained fire role to support what will soon be an armoured capability with more machine gun and anti-armour missile capability in each section than the entire DFSW and anti-armour platoons possess.

They undoubtedly have a role to play in weapons employment expertise, particularly in light infantry battalions, but the need for their ‘support’ of cannon armed IFV’s is a bit of a head scratcher…

There is a significantly pressing need for battalion force protection however especially with the modern drone / L-M threat and so I suspect Army will be looking closely at these platoons and perhaps evolving their capability for current and future battlefields…

Light infantry btns would be the ideal application for small(ish) UGVs with sensors and effectors. The other thought that comes to mind is the underdevelopment 30mm grenade launchers Barrett Unveils New SSRS 30mm Automatic Grenade Launcher for US Army’s PGS Program

I don't think people realise just how tight we are on technical personnel in defence, well, to be honest, in the country overall.

 

[ADMk2]

RBS70 is hardly an effective solution to drone swarms. What would it be used for in any current or conceivable situation?

Drones aren’t the only threat in the battlespace, traditional threats still exist too. No-one said they are employing RBS-70 in the C-UAS space. Against Group 1 or 2 level drones it is not going to be a cost-effective solution.

However Group 3 drones are defined to a large degree by their speed and altitude capabilities and are going to require a missile capability to address. The turbojet powered Group 3 drones are flying at up to 500kph and up to 5000m ceilings. The US is using Coyote Block I/II type missiles, but such would also be well within the wheel-house of the RBS-70 and similar….

Our Project Land 156 - Counter UAS has a requirement to defeat the above spec Group 3 drones, so it will be interesting how they address it. From a SWAP point of view, no Group 3 drone is going to be carrying much of anything in the way of CM so the IR guided basic AD missile might come back into vogue for such threats…

 

[old faithful]

RBS70 is hardly an effective solution to drone swarms. What would it be used for in any current or conceivable situation?

Simply not having a shorads system allows a potential enemy not having to have a plan to counter or defeat one.

 

[Volkodav]

Drones aren’t the only threat in the battlespace, traditional threats still exist too. No-one said they are employing RBS-70 in the C-UAS space. Against Group 1 or 2 level drones it is not going to be a cost-effective solution.

However Group 3 drones are defined to a large degree by their speed and altitude capabilities and are going to require a missile capability to address. The turbojet powered Group 3 drones are flying at up to 500kph and up to 5000m ceilings. The US is using Coyote Block I/II type missiles, but such would also be well within the wheel-house of the RBS-70 and similar….

Our Project Land 156 - Counter UAS has a requirement to defeat the above spec Group 3 drones, so it will be interesting how they address it. From a SWAP point of view, no Group 3 drone is going to be carrying much of anything in the way of CM so the IR guided basic AD missile might come back into vogue for such threats…

AKPWS is making a comeback, it's been deployed on F-15s operating against Yemen's drone threat. This would be an effective, multi-role vehicle-mounted system. They were used on Tiger and certified for Romeo, it has also been integrated into various RWS by various nations and manufacturers.

We can't do everything all at once but there are options that can be rapidly deployed if the required resources haven't been used elsewhere.

We need to move away from like-for-like replacements and holding onto legacy systems. Sometimes extending the application and envelope of an existing system can be more effective and efficient than a bespoke system.

 

[ADMk2]

AKPWS is making a comeback, it's been deployed on F-15s operating against Yemen's drone threat. This would be an effective, multi-role vehicle-mounted system. They were used on Tiger and certified for Romeo, it has also been integrated into various RWS by various nations and manufacturers.

We can't do everything all at once but there are options that can be rapidly deployed if the required resources haven't been used elsewhere.

We need to move away from like-for-like replacements and holding onto legacy systems. Sometimes extending the application and envelope of an existing system can be more effective and efficient than a bespoke system.

Yep, would like to see 1 Armoured Regt for instance conduct some trials on some of these systems (for example APKWS) that ADF already operate and see how they can contribute to
the overall threat picture.

We will shortly introduce to service the M230LF cannon via our Apache -E attack helicopters and those weapons have a more than useful programmable munition round that are capable of defeating drones well beyond 800m and are being widely employed by others in this role, but not yet us. 1 Armoured again having some trial systems would go a long way to determining any potential use case.

No one ‘silver bullet’ is going to address these threats (such as a new MANPAD) but some of the threats may well require such capabilities deployed.