South China Sea thoughts?

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
THE Dummy Strikes Again

1. Everyone was laughing at the Locsin’s Twitter indiscretion that gave Malaysia a chance to break ranks with ASEAN to refute his groundless Sabah claim — which of course benefits China (viz a viz South China Sea claims by the Philippines). Keeping in mind that in Feb 2019, Germany summoned the Philippines' ambassador to Berlin after Locsin's "extremely offensive comments" on the microblogging platform and in interviews defending Duterte's statements likening himself to Hitler in the conduct of the deadly drug war.

2. Weaker ASEAN member-states, like the Philippines, cannot afford division (as China continues its aggressive behavior in the South China Sea). On 29 Aug 2020, speech Duterte said that the 2021 defence allocation is intended to “address threats and combat terrorism”, a reference to the country’s two-pronged security challenge to protect territory in the South China Sea and tackle internal insurgency. Let me add points:
(a) Without a united ASEAN that can balance the two powers, tensions between the US and China in the region may more adversely affect the Philippines, as it has a Navy that is armed like a coast guard.​
(b) With a grossly inadequate 2021 defence budget of PHP209.1 billion (USD4.3 billion) in 2021 (which represents a rise of 11% over the original allocation for 2020) — of which only PHP33 billion is allotted for military procurement (in recent years this funding programme has received PHP25 billion a year). But if you look at monies allocated for 2021 military procurement, it is grossly inadequate to meet threats.​
(c) The Philippine Navy is so poorly funded that they still lack anti-ship missiles; and could not participate in the SINKEX part of RIMPAC 2020. They sent the BRP Jose Rizal for RIMPAC 2020 but their crew was fully not trained on surface warfare tactics, as they did not have the required anti-ship missiles to take part in the said weapons firing activity.​

3. Locsin’s Twitter remarks prompted Malaysia to summon the Philippine ambassador, and Malaysia issuing a note verbale in Aug 2020 (submitted before the United Nations) that it “categorically rejects” the excessive maritime claims arising from the Philippines’ claims over the Kalayaan Island Group (Spratlys) and also set out the valid grounds on why it disapproved Philippines' claim to Sabah.

4. There is still opportunity for Locsin THE Dummy to reel it back in. If Locsin continues, it has the possibility of straining ties but realistically, unless thoughtless military action or sanctions follows loose lips, the Philippines and Malaysia should be able to settle this. Even Duterte knows there is virtue in silence about Sabah. In his first meeting with Mahathir in July 2018, the thorny topic wasn’t even on the leaders’ agenda, despite Duterte vowing to pursue the claim as a campaign promise.
5. But it is sad to see Locsin so being stupid once again. In raising the Sabah issue on Twitter, Locsin not only publicly corrected the country's defense ally on an unofficial channel but also revived a dormant territorial and historical claim of the Philippines over the Malaysian state in the northern part of Borneo. To double down on stupid, the Philippines is reportedly planning to revive the Office of North Borneo Affairs in its Department of Foreign Affairs dedicated to efforts to reclaim Sabah. Pinoy Foreign Secretary Locsin claims that it had been receiving foreign campaign funds or bribes over the years to drop the claim.

6. The late ambassador Rodolfo Severino, in his book Where in the World is the Philippines?, said that while the Sabah dispute “has long receded into irrelevance,” Philippine leaders “have found it politically impossible to drop the Philippine claim to Sabah altogether.”

7. Dictator Ferdinand Marcos tried to drop this claim in August 1977. In a regional summit, Marcos declared that the Philippines is “taking definite steps to eliminate one of the burdens of ASEAN – the claim of the Philippine Republic to Sabah.” Severino, however, wrote: “As it turned out, neither Marcos nor any of his successors managed to take those ‘definite steps’ to abandon the claim to Sabah, at least not in terms acceptable to Malaysia. The political pressures to do so were just not enough; the pressures not to do so were too great.”
 
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Sandhi Yudha

Well-Known Member
Weren't there any plans for two more LPDs/Stategic Sealift Vessels? The first two Tarlac Class LPDs were bought from PAL Indonesia, but if im not wrong there were plans to order two more LPDs from Boustead Naval Shipyard.

Boustead Naval Shipyard has already problems with the construction of the 6 Gowind Class frigates, but looking to the deterioration of the Malaysian-Philippine relations, the chance it will ever happen will be even smaller.

Maybe Duterte and this minister of foreign affairs try to become popular with their eyecatching remarks and statements, but i dont think the people of the Philippines are waiting for a useless armed conflict with a neighbour.

Edit: Seems to be not Boustead but during the third bidding attempt on 26 November 2019, the lowest bidder was Megaship Builders Inc - Sing Kiong Hong Dockyards Sdn Bhd Joint Venture, which was Post-Disqualified. Second lowest bidder is PT PAL, Post Qualification Inspection completed and passed. Awaiting release of Notice of Award (NOA).


Btw, interesting to read: Greater Philippines - Wikipedia
 
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Blackshoe

Defense Professional
Verified Defense Pro
I would also like to point a few other things out. The first is that the current POTUS's term ends Jan. 20th, 2021, or ~5.5 months from now, and the US may very well have a new president on Jan. 21st, 2021 with a very different foreign and defence policy.
Slight necro, and not sure it's even really the thread for it, but I thought I've had for awhile and wanted to share, especially with the international members of DT. This should be understood as not being framed in a partisan politics (-D or-R) viewpoint but one guy's assessment of US politics and how it relates to our relations with other countries. I will do my best to keep it out of political lines.

But! Broadly speaking, even a change in administration might not change some US ideas that much. The US has been on a trend since 2008 of generally drawing down military commitments; this has been implemented at times with more or less success. But it is the trend. I expect it will continue (albeit in different ways).

Additionally, I can actually identify groups in America whose current existence is reliant upon the PRC's support, and will push for a more conciliatory tone with the Chinese for most scenarios. These groups-tech, academia, media/entertainment, to name the biggest ones-actually code out to the blue tribe, in political parlance (and the groups that would push for the hardest line against China code out red, but I don't think paleocons have much power in Washington anyway). For the foreseeable future (eg up to November), my opinion is that any ramp up towards hostilities towards the PRC would be more divisive than the Vietnam War. Even farther out than that and there would be enormous internal pressure on a President Biden to try to continuously de-escalate the situation (whatever the situation is) and maintain good relationships with China from those groups and others.

Finally, while I might think a hypothetical Biden administration would think differently about Chinese aggression, and absolutely agree that hypothetical President Biden would say things very differently than President Trump, budgetary realities on the ground might mean that their actions might not end up having much difference. As CDR Salamander once noted, we are in the Terrible Twenties, and that was before COVID hit. The US has been slowly moving towards a more European-style welfare state albeit without the tax structure to support it, and money will have to come from somewhere. Defense is the logical thing to get cut, and frankly, most of the things we care about are inside our borders. The end result is you might get the strong and loud support from a President Biden who provides you with a broken down ship with a demoralized crew and little ammo because there's no money for anything better.

Bottom Line at Bottom: while a change in administrations in Washington might lead to very different rhetoric from the White House, it might not end up changing the general course of isolationism that America has set itself out on.
 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
THE Dummy is a gift that keeps giving

1. This article is worth a read in the wake of the Trump administration stepping up its battle with China by further restricting the ability of Chinese diplomats to travel, hold meetings with academics and host cultural events in the United States.

2. Malaysia only claims 1 of the 9 Spratlys occupied by the Philippines: Commodore Reef. But the Philippines claims ALL 5 occupied by Malaysia as part of KIG.

3. Malaysia points out that UNCLOS only provides for 1 method of drawing straight lines around a whole island group: archipelagic baselines under Art. IV. Therefore, they have no basis in modern international law. And Filipino lawyers know this. The KIG lines are historical baggage, drawn by Tomas Cloma & associates in 1956 and revived by Marcos 20 years later. Attacking them, as Malaysia does, is easy because they have no clear legal underpinnings.
4. It is sad to see Locsin so being stupid. In raising the Sabah issue on Twitter, Locsin gave China a PR gift — with the Malaysians demonstrating that Pinoy claims in the KIG have no basis in international law too. My advice to the Philippines, the hole is deep enough. Stop digging further.
 
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Sandhi Yudha

Well-Known Member
"4. It is sad to see Locsin so being stupid. In raising the Sabah issue on Twitter, Locsin gave China a PR gift — with the Malaysians demonstrating that Pinoy claims in the KIG have no basis in international law too. My advice to the Philippines, the hole is deep enough. Stop digging further."

Is this step by the Philippines, completely their own initiative (pure greedyness), or pushed by china?
Maybe china "advised or suggested as a 'friend'" that the Philippines has to defend it rights and claim back the islands.

So with obeying china's advice, the Philippines is digging the grave of its own claims in the whole Spratly Sea.
 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
THE Dummy is a gift that keeps giving - Part 2

5. I am of the view that we cannot persuade the stupid to do the right thing — because they don’t know what is right. If the Philippines claim over Sabah is based on historical argument, Manila should be ready to concede to the fact, the Sultanate of Sulu is sovereign, thus pave a way for the revival of the Hashimite Kingdom of Sulu.
So with obeying china's advice, the Philippines is digging the grave of its own claims in the whole Spratly Sea.
6. Duterte and Locsin just want to look good to their irrational domestic supporters but not actually be good enough to pass the correct laws or do the right thing.

7. Interestingly, the Germans have take a stand on the Indo-Pacific. Germany has also told China to stop threatening Europe, a sign of its hardening approach toward Beijing. German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas warned his Chinese counterpart "threats have no place here" after Beijing threatened a Czech politician who this week visited Taiwan. Beijing wants to reclaim Taiwan, a self-governing country that broke away in the mid-20th century. Maas said China should expect Germany and European allies to represent their "interests more confidently."

8. Based on their track record, past and current Philippine governments:
(i) learns by sending people to die — as the SAF 44 demonstrated;​
(ii) seeks to unjustly justify the killing others in total disregard of their own laws — as the Guang Da Xing No. 28 incident demonstrated; and​
(iii) routinely disrespect the murdered—the Sulu Provincial Drug Enforcement Unit gunned down 4 Philippine Army intelligence unit members, chasing terrorists.​

9. Further, any attempt at a Pinoy claim on Sabah is an attempt to destroy ASEAN; but I think this sorry Locsin saga is unintentional.

10. It is only a matter of time that the truth of excessive KIG claims under Republic Act No. 3046 by the Pinoys become public knowledge — I have been silent on this point for years. Anyone with real or actual knowledge on UNCLOS will know the KIG baselines are as unreasonable as the 9-dash line. Accurate reporting on their greed is necessary, so that when the 1st Philippines government owned ship is sunk in enemy action, they can stand alone.
 
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Sandhi Yudha

Well-Known Member
THE Dummy is a gift that keeps giving - Part 2

5. I am of the view that we cannot persuade the stupid to do the right thing — because they don’t know what is right. If the Philippines claim over Sabah is based on historical argument, Manila should be ready to concede to the fact, the Sultanate of Sulu is sovereign, thus pave a way for the revival of the Hashimite Kingdom of Sulu.

6. Duterte and Locsin just want to look good to their irrational domestic supporters but not actually be good enough to pass the correct laws or do the right thing.

7. Interestingly, the Germans have take a stand on the Indo-Pacific. Germany has also told China to stop threatening Europe, a sign of its hardening approach toward Beijing. German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas warned his Chinese counterpart "threats have no place here" after Beijing threatened a Czech politician who this week visited Taiwan. Beijing wants to reclaim Taiwan, a self-governing country that broke away in the mid-20th century. Maas said China should expect Germany and European allies to represent their "interests more confidently."

8. Based on their track record, past and current Philippine governments:
(i) learns by sending people to die — as the SAF 44 demonstrated;​
(ii) seeks to unjustly justify the killing others in total disregard of their own laws — as the Guang Da Xing No. 28 incident demonstrated; and​
(iii) routinely disrespect the murdered—the Sulu Provincial Drug Enforcement Unit gunned down 4 Philippine Army intelligence unit members, chasing terrorists.​
Yes, for some reason many police/armed forces operations ended up not as expected and quite disappointing, like this one Manila hostage crisis (see: What happened to cops in Luneta hostage-taking crisis?) and sometimes even politicians were involved/the mastermind of the massacres, for example, the Maguindanao massacre.

That actually this could happen in the Zamboanga City crisis is also remarkable. A group of around 500 terrorists invaded a 860.000 inhabitants city and kept the Philippine security forces busy for almost a month.

Mod Edit: Removed wiki links as sources; as that is not accepted and have replaced some links with better sources.
 
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Sandhi Yudha

Well-Known Member
Seems that Thailand has delayed the purchase of chinese made military submarines until 2022 after public opposition sparked a reversal of a controversial funding decision.

In May 2017, the Royal Thai Navy and Thai Government signed a contract for one S26T (a downscaled Type 39A variant specially made for the export) in a $390 million deal. Orders for an additional two submarines was to follow in the coming years. The second and third Yuan-class S26T submarines are supposed to cost a total of 22.5 billion baht ($720 million) over seven years.

It is obvious that the acquisition of these S26Ts was a political choice, for that same amount of money Thailand could bought three of South-Korean's Type 209 Chang-Bogo class boats for example, instead of these submarines of Made-in-China-quality.

 

cdxbow

Well-Known Member
Seems that Thailand has delayed the purchase of chinese made military submarines until 2022 after public opposition sparked a reversal of a controversial funding decision.

In May 2017, the Royal Thai Navy and Thai Government signed a contract for one S26T (a downscaled Type 39A variant specially made for the export) in a $390 million deal. Orders for an additional two submarines was to follow in the coming years. The second and third Yuan-class S26T submarines are supposed to cost a total of 22.5 billion baht ($720 million) over seven years.

It is obvious that the acquisition of these S26Ts was a political choice, for that same amount of money Thailand could bought three of South-Korean's Type 209 Chang-Bogo class boats for example, instead of these submarines of Made-in-China-quality.

It's also put a hold on the canal the PRC were building. Thailand mulls replacing $28bn Kra canal idea with a railway - News - GCR
 

Sandhi Yudha

Well-Known Member
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Ananda

The Bunker Group

Even in Thailand it self, there's doubt the canal will be commercially viable. 1.5 - 2 days different is the most this canal can bring. Will not be enough to bring demand from big commercial ships to pay the canal fee.

Today, bigger ships with increased tonnage are used to transport goods across various oceans. The time -- one-and-a-half days -- and shipping costs saved are still insufficient to justify the project.
Thus, if this Canal can't provide enough return, then potentially China who build and finance it will continue control the Canal for long time.
China will not care on financial return of the Canal since for them, it's strategic project to by pass Malaca Strait.

So, what's for Thailand ?
 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
THE Dummy is a gift that keeps giving - Part 3
11. The Philippines needs to gain the trust and confidence of its ASEAN neighbors in its campaign against Chinese expansionism.

12. Underlining this Sabah claim at this time is not only counterproductive, the Philippines has fallen prey to the intrigues of Chinese operatives, who have been active through their trolls, to inject the Philippines’ Sabah claim to the South China Sea (SCS) dispute. The international community also recognizes Sabah as an integral part of Malaysian territory. Manila’s territorial claim is obviously antiquated and has no support beyond the uninformed Filipino irredentists who are willing to compromise SCS claims in favor of their own on Sabah.
10. It is only a matter of time that the truth of excessive KIG claims under Republic Act No. 3046 by the Pinoys become public knowledge — I have been silent on this point for years. Anyone with real or actual knowledge on UNCLOS will know the KIG baselines are as unreasonable as the 9-dash line. Accurate reporting on their greed is necessary, so that when the 1st Philippines government owned ship is sunk in enemy action, they can stand alone.
13. While the Philippines did claim under Republic Act No. 3046 straight baselines around its Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), the Philippines changed this by enacting in 2009 RA 9522 which classified the KIG as a “Regime of Islands.” Section 2 of RA 9522 expressly states that the baselines of the KIG “shall be determined as ‘Regime of Islands’ consistent with Article 121 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. This abandoned the straight baselines embodied in RA 3046.
(a) I note that the enactment of RA 9522 was immediately protested by China, Taiwan and Vietnam. RA 9522 does not identify whether the waters within the baselines are archipelagic waters or internal waters, and it did not specify the breadth of the territorial sea. Moreover, while it is a consequence of acquiring archipelagic status to designate archipelagic sea lanes passage, it has so far not submitted a proposal to the IMO designating archipelagic sea lanes passage.​
(b) Instead of joining the Vietnam-Malaysia joint submission, the Philippines issued a separate diplomatic protest on 4 Aug 2009 emphasizing their stance on KIG and North Borneo. In 2009, Indonesia, which often regards itself as a non-claimant State in the matter, also spoke out and rejected the validity of the Chinese nine dash line.​
(c) Vietnam's 2020 notes continue to oppose the application of archipelagic baselines to the Paracel and Spratly Islands, explicitly refuting Chinese straight baseline system around the Paracel Islands announced in 1996 and pre-empting same practice being used for the Spratlys. Vietnam considers that low-tide elevations or submerged features are not subject of appropriation and do not, in and of themselves, generate entitlements to any maritime zones. Maritime claims in the SCS that exceed the limits provided in UNCLOS, including historic rights, are unlawful.​

14. The Philippines informed the arbitral tribunal at The Hague of the enactment of RA 9522 in this manner: “The Philippine Supreme Court confirmed the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9522. In a decision handed down in 2011, the Philippine Supreme Court held that the Philippines had no alternative but to adopt the maritime claims reflected in the Act because this was ‘in conformity with UNCLOS III.”

15. In other news, Philippine President Duterte has pardoned an American soldier serving a 10-year sentence for murdering a Filipina transgender woman. The pardon has angered LGBTQ+ and human rights advocates and has fueled anti-American sentiment.
 
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Ananda

The Bunker Group

For Kompas Online. Another stand off between Indonesian Coast Guard and Chinese Coast Guard on Indonesian Natuna EEZ being call by Indonesian official as North Natuna Sea.

This's an example on how Chinese diplomacy work especially in SCS. In same time they talk with Indonesia on further Investment projects and COVID 19 Vaccines cooperation, but also still pressing on SCS dispute.
 

Sandhi Yudha

Well-Known Member

For Kompas Online. Another stand off between Indonesian Coast Guard and Chinese Coast Guard on Indonesian Natuna EEZ being call by Indonesian official as North Natuna Sea.

This's an example on how Chinese diplomacy work especially in SCS. In same time they talk with Indonesia on further Investment projects and COVID 19 Vaccines cooperation, but also still pressing on SCS dispute.
I can't find a CCG ship with the number 5204, or another number which is similar. So i dont know the size and armament of it, but luckily Bakamla had sent the 80 meter long KN Pulau Nipah 321 to Laut Natuna Utara, and not some miniature 40 meter boat or something...
 

tonnyc

Well-Known Member
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Ananda

The Bunker Group
So i dont know the size and armament of it, but luckily Bakamla had sent the 80 meter long KN Pulau Nipah 321
Based on the shiloute on the Kompas photo, seems it's Type 718 Cutter. It's smaller than Type 818 cutter which is based on Jiangkai Frigates Hull. In the attach photo non the less it shares same armament with Type 818, thus it's mean 76mm gun.

From local media, the info so far Bakamla as Indonesian Coast Guard ask for 4 110m and 10 80 m OPV's. So far they only got 1 110 m and 3 80 m. Those OPV's build on local Shipyards, thus it's quite economical cost to build.

However, seems the budget so far being hogged by the Navy to build their 44m coastal Patrol. Like I posted in Indonesian Navy thread, TNI-AL still doesn't want to fully relinquish coastal patrol duty to Bakamla.
 

Attachments

tonnyc

Well-Known Member
However, seems the budget so far being hogged by the Navy to build their 44m coastal Patrol. Like I posted in Indonesian Navy thread, TNI-AL still doesn't want to fully relinquish coastal patrol duty to Bakamla.
Well, yes, but this is not the right thread to discuss that. If we want to discuss that, the Indonesian Navy thread is the more suitable thread.
 

Ananda

The Bunker Group
Noted on the last paragraph should be in the Indonesian Navy thread. Just to post that Bakamla already have plans to provide Cutter/OPV's to meet Type 718 and 818 that Chinese Coast Guard put in SCS, as Sandhi put in his post.
 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Well, yes, but this is not the right thread to discuss that. If we want to discuss that, the Indonesian Navy thread is the more suitable thread.
To our Indonesian members in DT, thank you for keeping this threat sane and organised.

1. As the leader of ASEAN, I hope that the Indonesian Government and the TNI AL will continue to lead and help our less capable neighbours and navies, like that of the Philippines, in ADMM, take the moral high ground, and invoke rule of law principles, going forward.

2. Collectively, the navies within ASEAN should resist the urge to stir nationalist emotions, and focus on seeking greater practical cooperation through ADMM and ADMM plus exercises.
(a) If we become more united and cohesive over time, ASEAN will get to set the tone in the management of disputes in the South China Sea.​
(b) Overlapping EEZ claims are not local good against foreign evil, rather we should recognise that there are fisheries and natural resource disputes to be managed.​

3. Under TNI AL’s leadership, ASEAN navies should not see real world issues only through the lens of cynicism; but find a workable path forward — like the joint Malacca Straits patrols by the navies of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore.
(a) All states—Brunei, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines and Vietnam— are frustrated with Beijing’s bad behavior in South China Sea and the Natunas. The Philippines is the fourth and final stop of China's defense minister Gen Wei Fenghe's tour of Southeast Asia. He also visited Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei but skipped Vietnam (as they are too far apart on South China Sea issues).​
(b) While the Chinese ministerial visit is not a charm offensive, it provides much needed recalibration of China’s military-to-military relations with the ASEAN littoral states — so that we can avoid being sucked in by the Sino-American rivalry and continue to chart our own course.​

4. China’s inevitable recalibration of ties after antagonizing maritime counter claimants in their EEZs. China’s Coast Guard and the PLA(N)’s strategy is clear. Show strength and before going too far, open door to reconciliation. This is a very effective carrot and stick approach.

5. I see Locsin’s attempt to conduct populist foreign policy on twitter on Sabah as not only irrelevant to the real practical issues faced by the Philippine Navy but morally unsatisfactory and legally dubious. In February 2013, Malaysia was at a standstill. Approximately 200 armed personnel of the so-called Royal Sulu Force (RSF) from southern Philippines had invaded a small village in Lahad Datu, Sabah, with the purpose of reclaiming Sabah. The incident then led to several strategic moves by the Malaysian government including the establishments of the Eastern Sabah Security Command (ESSCOM) and the security zone called the Eastern Sabah Security Zone (ESSZONE).
(a) Thanks to RSF stupidity that resulted in the 2013 Lahad Datu standoff, the Malaysian Courts have sentenced 9 to death. Despite the death of Raja Muda Agbimuddin Kiram, who led the armed intrusion into Lahad Datu in 2012, the Malaysian Police still believe that the RSF group poses a threat to Sabah. In Jan 2015, Datuk Jalaluddin Abdul Rahman, the Police Commissioner of Sabah, stated that the Malaysian Police viewed the Sulu threat as a real possibility as they have successors and followers who still believed in the idea. The establishment of both ESSCOM and ESSZONE is seen as positive steps taken by the government towards ensuring the safety of these areas. However, the areas are also prone to being targeted by organised crime, terror groups and various kidnap for ransom groups (like the Muktadir brothers based in Tawi-Tawi and other areas in Southern Philipppines).​
(b) The 2013 Lahad Datu standoff also resulted in the loss of 10 Malaysian security personnel while 68 RSF members were killed in ESSZONE clearing operations. Meanwhile, 443 other individuals were arrested for various offences during the incident (see: "The Lahad Datu Incursion and its Impact on Malaysia's Security" (PDF). The Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT). National Library of Malaysia. pp. 17–19. ISBN 978-983-44397-8-1).​
(c) As a sign of growing deficit of trust, the Malaysian Army is spending RM14 billion (or US$3.37 billion) and getting more units in Sabah – one infantry brigade (with three infantry battalions), three artillery regiments, one armor regiment and one Air Wing squadron — to be progressively stood up and equipped in the next 10 years. The Sep 2020 announcement of the units was made by Defence Minister DS Ismail Sabri. The additional units have been in the works following the Lahad Datu incident in 2013, culminating with the standing up of 5 Division in Sep 2019. The division now have three Infantry brigades – the 13, 5 and the new 32 based in Kalabakan, Tawau. Apart from other support units, the new brigade will also have a new Royal Artillery regiment attached to it. Another artillery regiment in Lahad Datu is likely to be part of the 13 Brigade.​
 
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Ananda

The Bunker Group
TNI AL’s leadership, ASEAN navies should not see real world issues only through the lens of cynicism; but find a workable path forward — like the joint Malacca Straits patrols by the navies of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore.
@OPSSG I do see that using Navy in SCS will only bring more diplomatic points for PRC. That's why I always put importance for Bakamla development in Indonesia Navy Thread, as to play diplomatic games in SCS should be between coast guard to coast guard.

I believe this is begin to be seen also by all SCS neighboring nation, as such development of Coast Guards shown significant increase.

This incidence shown China play two faces diplomacy. They send the Defense Minister and soon after that they raise tensions again with coast guard. However in sense they can say, it is not military as we keep it on 'civilian' agency dispute.
Off course everyone knows that Chinese Coast Guard I'd a quasy military service. All coast guard are. However it's in diplomatic language to keep military from SCS dispute by PRC. Thus they don't want to be seen Internationally as the one who bring the tension toward military confrontation.

I do agree on more cooperation between Asean Navy, just like the way Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia Navies do in Malaca Strait is important. The trilateral co-op manage to say no to Indian Navy involvement in Malaca Strait security arrangements.

Still on SCS, I tend to see at this moment for Coast Guards cooperation and trust building. All the Navies should stay behind, as I see that PRC also keep PLAN farther behind from their nine-dash line.
 
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