South China Sea thoughts?

oldsig127

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
An article suggesting how to stop China from taking over the SCS. Whether it would work or not is another story.

The strategy of escalation. Wait and see who blinks first, and if no-one does, fight over the embers. Stop the train, I want to get off, because I seriously doubt the capacity of the USA to manage any such diplomatic effort based on their recent successes in North Korea, Syria and, well, everywhere. Just for starters it needs a high percentage of US allies to cooperate. Good luck with that given the ongoing isolationist, anti-coalition policies.

oldsig
 

tigerstripes

New Member
The strategy of escalation. Wait and see who blinks first, and if no-one does, fight over the embers. Stop the train, I want to get off, because I seriously doubt the capacity of the USA to manage any such diplomatic effort based on their recent successes in North Korea, Syria and, well, everywhere. Just for starters it needs a high percentage of US allies to cooperate. Good luck with that given the ongoing isolationist, anti-coalition policies.

oldsig
Diplomatically under the current administration the US, I would suspect is a spent force, even before Trump took over they had a shocking rate of Foreign policy failures.
 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Post 1 of 2: The Greater Context
Diplomatically under the current administration the US, I would suspect is a spent force, even before Trump took over they had a shocking rate of Foreign policy failures.
1. Above is a link to an Atlantic Council interview with the Prime Minister of Singapore which also talks about tensions between China and the US — where the areas of disagreement has become a dangerous cancerous mess between the two most powerful nations in the world (that has real consequences for countries in the Indo-Pacific region). At many points over the past 18 months, this trend line has accelerated —starting with Vice President Mike Pence’s October 2018 speech to the Hudson Institute – senior figures of the Trump administration have all, in different ways, articulated a hardline posture towards China and as Pompeo put it, he sought “to put it all together for the American people”.

2. The shortcomings of current US Asia policy is that it dials up the rhetorical temperature to no great advantage.
(a) America's allies are living through the first global catastrophe in which the US has abdicated its role as world leader, and China's own aggressive international diplomacy has filled the void. In his speech, US Secretary of State, Pompeo called for an "alliance of democracies" to face China; the US already has exactly that system and has worked to undermine it at every turn.​
(b) Mike Pompeo, has been calling on countries, including Australia, to follow Washington’s lead in fundamentally repudiating its current relationship with China. Payne said plainly that Canberra would not do that.“The relationship we have with China is very important, and we have no intention of injuring it,” she said in a joint press conference. She said that the values we share with America are important. “But most importantly from our perspective, we make our own decisions, our own judgments in the Australian national interest and about upholding our security, our prosperity, and our values.​
(c) If Washington continues to embrace reckless unilateralism in this desperate hour, the system that once kept it on top will be trampled in its own fitful stumbles. There are legitimate questions about where US troops should be deployed for the likely threats we might face. But the way Trump handled this troop withdrawal from Germany is purely destructive and vindictive; which gives Asian allies pause to find common cause with the Americans.​
(d) Australia and ASEAN, can’t just blindly follow the Americans — the economic risks are not the only factors to consider. There are also big strategic risks. Is it is smart to launch a new cold war against an adversary as formidable as China? China is a country that is far more formidable in some key ways than the Soviet Union ever was — without a much clearer idea of the American end game, especially on how the struggle can be waged and won — supporting the US is a wrong move.​
3. Indeed, for many allies and partners this needless escalation is counterproductive, as this kind of unsubtle statecraft narrows their strategic room for manoeuvre, to no benefit for anyone. While there is common ground between US and Australia on the legal status of ‘rocks’ in the South China Sea, Australia’s Foreign Minister Payne reportedly told Pompeo that Australia has not intention of injuring its important relationship with China.
 
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OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Post 2 of 2: Thinking about contesting the Second Island Chain — beyond the SCS

4. In March 2020, US Marine Corps commandant, Berger published "Force Design 2030" a plan to trim aircraft numbers, dump most cannon artillery and cut heavy armor, including all its tanks, and create "Marine Littoral Regiments" equipped with missiles and drones that could deny an adversary control of contested areas by threatening their ships.
(a) Reflecting the importance of the new formation, the 3rd Marines headquarters will be re-designated the 3rd Marine Littoral Regiment headquarters. The first Hawaii-based unit is expected to have 1,800 to 2,000 Marines carved out mainly from units already there, including one of three infantry battalions at Kaneohe Bay, according to Maj. Joshua Benson, a spokesman for Marine Corps Combat Development Command.​
(b) The three-year setup plan for the Hawaii Marine Littoral Regiment foresees the use of the Navy Marine expeditionary ship interdiction system, or NMESIS, with Naval Strike Missiles that have a range greater than 115 miles launched from joint light tactical vehicles, including unmanned vehicles.​

5. In his proposal, Gen. Berger pointed to a shift in focus to "great power competition and a renewed focus on the Indo-Pacific region." He said the Marine Corps will have an operational littoral regiment in Okinawa by 2027, with another in nearby Guam and a third in based in Hawaii. The changes is Okinawa will not, however, mean an increase in troop numbers and will be carried out within the terms of the current U.S. military alliance with Japan, added the US Marine commandant, who said he will travel to Japan when coronavirus travel restrictions are lifted.


6. PRC scholars and PLA military thinkers converge on the understanding of what PLA(N) carriers and task groups east of First Island Chain will have to confront. In this case, the Chinese think the PLA(N) will face the US Navy under unfavourable conditions, due to USAF ability to project power to support the US Navy’s 7th Fleet. This Feb 2020 Chinese naval exercise is a start to enable PLA(N) to fight and survive in these contested waters, should war break out between the two powers. Beijing-based military expert Wei Dongxu told the Global Times on that the naval drills demonstrated the Chinese Navy's capability of joint fleet air defense in the waters of Pacific Ocean.

7. Vietnam’s threat to litigate against China comes amid ongoing multilateral negotiations involving ASEAN and China over a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea (CoC). Negotiations on a CoC have been under way for two decades as an upgrade to an initial agreement—the Declaration of Conduct for Parties in the South China Sea—that was seen as a stopgap measure when it was created in 2002.

8. From a military perspective, the surface navies of Indonesia and Vietnam, even if they could be combined as cohesive fighting units, are nothing but a speed bump to the 335-ship PLA(N) fleet. Capt (retd.) James Fanell has estimated that by 2030, the Chinese fleet will have a surface force of over 450 ships and a submarine force of about 110 boats.
(a) The deterrence that many ASEAN countries are striving for by 2030 is to make a hostile 450 ship PLA(N) think that incursions into the South China Sea (SCS) are either not worth the trouble, or at least expensive enough to give the PLA(N) pause.​
(b) Therefore, the deterrence value of Indonesian (2 older Cakra-class Type 209/1300 vessels and 3 Nagapasa-class Type 209/1400 vessels) and Vietnamese submarines (6 Kilo class) to enable sea denial in the face of a capable enemy navy should not be understated; and this stands in sharp contrast to the small and poorly equipped regional air forces that are of no real threat to the PLA(N) air wing. These light weight air forces serve as trip wires to buy time and hopefully support, from more countries with tertiary air forces.​
(c) The presence of regional submarines make things tough enough for the PLA(N) to require a huge logistical effort to protect China’s SLOCs in the SCS and beyond.​
 
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Boagrius

Active Member
I thought this was an interesting piece, and puts PRC assets in the SCS in context:
Naval theorist Milan Vego opens a chapter on chokepoint control with a quote from British Admiral Sir John Fisher, who stated that there are “five keys to the world. The Strait of Dover, the Straits of Gibraltar, the Suez Canal, the Straits of Malacca, and the Cape of Good Hope. And every one one of these keys we hold.”1 Fisher spoke from an Anglo-centric view, but his point is evident that control of key chokepoints equated to control of national strategic interests. But a century later, with the technological advances in weapons and sensors, and the interconnectedness of the global economy, can such a claim be made today?

There are over 100 straits where international interest in the free flow of trade transcends the interests of the nearby littoral states. Not all of these maritime chokepoints are of equal importance. Military strategists often speak as Fisher did of strategic chokepoints, believing them to have significant geopolitical value and act as epicenters for maritime strategy, where the control of which is considered vital for success in maritime conflict. But are these chokepoints truly strategic? Does the success of a nation’s maritime strategy actually hinge on the control or loss of control of these narrow seas?..

...Today, a resurgent China lays claim to the South China Sea (SCS) as its own internal waters. As discussed above, the Strait of Malacca has traditionally been a key to control of the SCS and, therefore, strategically important for trade between Europe and Asia. But the Strait of Malacca is not the only access route to the SCS, which can also be accessed through the much larger Luzon Strait and numerous passages through the Indonesian and Philippine archipelagos. The PRC recognizes this and has adopted control mechanisms that do not depend on control of the chokepoints, but instead focuses on long-range anti-access, area-denial (A2/AD) weapons and redundant fortified islands within the SCS.11

China’s A2/AD strategy in the SCS is important for two reasons. First, the assumption that physical control of a chokepoint guarantees use of the chokepoint is invalid in the face of PRC A2/AD weapons and sensors. Although the United States and its partner states may possess the land on either side of the Strait of Malacca, and have sufficient naval forces to patrol the strait, the PRC could nonetheless prevent free transit of the Strait of Malacca using ASBM and long-range anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM). Furthermore, these long-range weapons based on the Chinese mainland or in the central SCS can contest the other straits leading into the SCS. Conversely, the reduced reliance of predictable trade routes for maritime traffic – both merchant and military – means they can easily bypass the Strait of Malacca if it were to be “controlled” by an opposing power.12 Chokepoints can be replaced.
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
It's an interesting read but I don't agree that practice of maritime trade warfare is confined to the dustbin of history as some theorists suggest. I agree with the author that in today's world it will be somewhat complicated because of the nature of modern shipping practices, but it can still be prosecuted to the detriment of the enemy. Whilst some argue that in the modern context choke points no longer apply, I would argue that is a fallacy because whilst shipping companies will divert around a war zone, it comes at a cost both in time and money. With modern day logistics practices of just in time delivery, such delays have an ongoing impact throughout the supply chain. If it is military related then those delays can have impacts upon operations. Also some combatants may not have scruples about sinking neutral flagged ships as well. It's happened before and will happen again.

Yes some freight can be diverted through other modal links but using the rail example in the paper if, for example, the PRC was to start importing 200,000 tonnes of oil per shipment by rail. Well that's one very tempting target, for example, the Indian Air Force to interdict and it doesn't even have to go looking for it because you can't hide train tracks. Build a pipeline - that can be attacked by air or ground forces.

So I think that maritime trade warfare is very much still in the toolbox.
 

Ananda

Well-Known Member
Yes some freight can be diverted through other modal links but using the rail example in the paper if, for example, the PRC was to start importing 200,000 tonnes of oil per shipment by rail. Well that's one very tempting target, for example, the Indian Air Force to interdict and it doesn't even have to go looking for it because you can't hide train tracks. Build a pipeline - that can be attacked by air or ground forces
That's when Pakistan come to play. This is where China will support Pakistan whatever they can. US influence on Pakistan day by day, bit by bit being replaced by China.

India can't attack China Sea and Land routes (road and belt routes) in Arabian sea and Central Asia without have to pacified Pakistan first.
Despite all the talk on Indian analysts and fan boys, they can't pacified Pakistan without committing most of their Armed Forces, which left them open to China.

As long as Pakistan in China's camp, there's not much India can do to attack China's route in Arabian sea and Central Asia.
China's with Pakistan can also circumstances Malaca strait. All they have to do it's get Iranian oils through Central Asia and Pakistan ports. India can't do anything without all out attack to Pakistan with the risk left their northern borders with China open for Invasion.
 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
That's when Pakistan come to play. This is where China will support Pakistan whatever they can. US influence on Pakistan day by day, bit by bit being replaced by China.

India can't attack China Sea and Land routes (road and belt routes) in Arabian sea and Central Asia without have to pacified Pakistan first.
Beyond the fact that Pakistan’s rail system can be disrupted by India, the Indian Air Force and Navy faced off with Pakistan during:
(a) Operation Safed Sagar by the Indian Air Force; and​
(b) Operation Talwar by the Indian Navy​
both in May and July 1999.​

Operation Talwar was a demonstration of Indian Naval capability that involved the largest ever deployment of Indian combatant ships. The Pakistan Navy was forced avoid the Indian Navy and it was later revealed that the blockade of Karachi and interruption of oil supply, caused an operational pause by Pakistan that aided Operation Vijay by the Indian Army. It has been chronicled that Pakistani PM Nawaz Sharif indicated after the conflict that — the Indian Navy blockaded Karachi — Pakistan had fuel supplies only for six days of conventional combat due to the blockade.
Yes some freight can be diverted through other modal links but using the rail example in the paper if, for example, the PRC was to start importing 200,000 tonnes of oil per shipment by rail. Well that's one very tempting target, for example, the Indian Air Force to interdict and it doesn't even have to go looking for it because you can't hide train tracks. Build a pipeline - that can be attacked by air or ground forces
Forgive my off topic reply on this thread — with a different take on shipping that I hope adds to the discussion.

1. In Asia, trade is strategy. Nothing unites North East Asian (NE Asian) interests like a threat to their shipping — which is why, both Korea and Japan have deployed naval ships to the Persian Gulf.

2. Just because India has a border dispute with China it does not mean that the Indian Navy is free to escalate in any manner it likes. China is not at war with Japan, Korea, Taiwan or Singapore; and in a capitalistic society, businesses will seek profit, even if that profit is from moving China’s cargo in the Indian Ocean to get round an Indian blockade. Just as the South China Sea is not a Chinese lake, the Indian Ocean is not an Indian lake.

3. Three points to note: One, attempts by Indian strategists to talk about disrupting Chinese (aka NE Asian) trade routes in the Indian Ocean is not credible. Two, as a non-aligned state (free of alliance responsibilities), Indian attempts to get more than lip service sympathy from ASEAN members with regards to its border issues, with China or Pakistan, is doomed to failure. Three, China’s 3,700 plus merchant ships carry cargo from not just China but for NE Asia, and vice versa for the Japanese, Korean and Taiwanese merchant ships in these interlinked economies. Any Indian Navy attempt to disrupt commercial shipping will make it a pariah state.
(a) A simple way for China to avoid Indian Navy attempts to do so, would be to reflag 15% to 30% of Chinese flagged merchant ships to another flag (eg. Singapore, Panama, Marshall Islands, and Hong Kong to name 4 of the top 5 flag states). About 8,600 ships fly the Panamanian flag. By comparison China has just over 3,700 registered vessels. From decision to the massive reflagging (for 550 to 1,100 ships), this administrative task can be done in about 3 to 4 weeks. In the event of an Indian blockade, the PLA(N), wil just escort some of their own remaining merchant ships, with higher value cargos in convoys — in 2019, China had a 335-ship naval fleet, according to a US Congressional Research Service report — the PLA(N) is also well rehearsed in forming counter piracy escort groups for the last 12 years. The PLA(N) has the capability to conduct convoy escorts for its own merchant ships on the scale of Operation Earnest Will, conducted by the Americans, in 1987.​
(b) If the Indian Navy plays its cards wrongly, and their dispute with the PLA(N) affects innocent merchant traffic, the RAN, JMSDF, ROKN, ROCN and RSN could end up running escorts to convoy NE Asian and Oceania cargo routes transiting through the Indian Ocean — esp container liner trade that is currently controlled by:​
(i) Mitsui OSK Lines, NYK and Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha;​
(ii) Hyundai Merchant Marine, CK Line, Dongjin Shipping, Don Woo Shipping, Dong Young Shipping, Hansung Line, Heueng-A Shipping, KMTC, Namsung Shipping, Pan Continental Shipping, Pan Ocean, Sinokor Shipping, SM Line and Tai Young Shipping;​
(iii) Evergreen Line and Yang Ming Marine Transport; or​
(iv) Pacific International Line.​
(c) Japanese, Korean, Indonesian and Singaporean owned or flagged cargo ships would just enjoy high cargo usage — from a multi-modal transport cost point of view, cargo moved by sea is much cheaper than rail.​
(d) For the energy trade, to evade an Indian Navy blockage, Chinese SOEs could also buy a portion of its supply from other trading hubs (eg. Singapore) or from sources that do not need to sail through the Indian Ocean. The LNG and oil will be owned by MNCs importing it into a port outside the reach of the Indian Navy — the Chinese would buy it there — thereafter, their merchant ships pick it up from the trading hub — by-passing an useless Indian Ocean blockage.​
4. Just because India has a border dispute with China it does not mean that the Indian Navy is free to escalate in any manner it likes. China is not at war with Australia, Japan, Korea, Taiwan or ASEAN members (like Indonesia and Singapore) and the businesses of these countries will seek profit, even if that profit is from moving container cargoes, bulk cargoes, oil and LNG cargoes that are ultimately destined for China, at a later stage, and transiting through the Indian Ocean. The reverse is also true, just because China has a border dispute with India, it does not mean that the PLA(N) is free to escalate in any manner it likes.

5. Like the Koreans and Japanese, Chinese anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden have directly supported PLA(N) modernization goals and provided invaluable experience operating in distant waters. Lessons learned have spawned PLA(N) innovations in doctrine, operations, and international coordination. Many of the insights gleaned during deployments are applicable to security objectives closer to home; some officers enjoy promotion to important positions after returning. Anti-piracy operations have been a springboard for China to expand considerably its maritime security operations, from evacuating its citizens from Libya and Yemen to escorting Syrian chemical weapons to their destruction and participating in the search for Malaysia Airlines Flight 370. So great are the benefits to China’s global maritime presence and enhanced image at home and abroad that when Gulf of Aden anti-piracy operations finally wind down, Beijing will have to develop new means to address its burgeoning overseas interests.

6. As I said earlier, trade in strategy. IMHO, SLOCs are part of the global commons that capable navies exist to protect.
 
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tonnyc

Active Member
I want to add that a Chinese-Indian conflict will not necessarily result in Pakistan giving their all-out effort to attack India. Pakistan is not a vassal state of China. There isn't even a mutual defense treaty obligating Pakistan to aid China or vice versa.

For Pakistan to pick a fight with India, even if India is distracted by a conflict with China, is a major risk. India may decide to concede some land to China and then turning around to crush Pakistan for good. China may call Pakistan batie, but this relationship fundamentally is based on realpolitik and realpolitik can easily see China deciding that they've gotten what they want and let Pakistan to fend themselves, calling for "peace in the region" and offering mediation but not lifting a single finger in terms of military assistance. After all, despite sharing a border, China can't easily use those mountain passes to invade India. The logistics are tough. On the other hand, the Indian-Pakistani border is wide open.

Pakistan knows this, or at least their higher ups do. So rather than an all out support for China in a Chinese-Indian conflict, I expect a more measured and cautious reaction.
 

ngatimozart

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Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
I want to add that a Chinese-Indian conflict will not necessarily result in Pakistan giving their all-out effort to attack India. Pakistan is not a vassal state of China. There isn't even a mutual defense treaty obligating Pakistan to aid China or vice versa.

For Pakistan to pick a fight with India, even if India is distracted by a conflict with China, is a major risk. India may decide to concede some land to China and then turning around to crush Pakistan for good. China may call Pakistan batie, but this relationship fundamentally is based on realpolitik and realpolitik can easily see China deciding that they've gotten what they want and let Pakistan to fend themselves, calling for "peace in the region" and offering mediation but not lifting a single finger in terms of military assistance. After all, despite sharing a border, China can't easily use those mountain passes to invade India. The logistics are tough. On the other hand, the Indian-Pakistani border is wide open.

Pakistan knows this, or at least their higher ups do. So rather than an all out support for China in a Chinese-Indian conflict, I expect a more measured and cautious reaction.
Yep, but China also regard the Pakistani ports as quite important for their access to the Indian Ocean. One could almost classify them as strategic Chinese assets in that sense. So I wouldn't necessarily dismiss the idea of China not militarily supporting Pakistan against India.
 

tonnyc

Active Member
Yep, but China also regard the Pakistani ports as quite important for their access to the Indian Ocean. One could almost classify them as strategic Chinese assets in that sense. So I wouldn't necessarily dismiss the idea of China not militarily supporting Pakistan against India.
Yes, but that's two different scenarios there. If India attacks Pakistan, China will help Pakistan because it is in their strategic interest to do so. But if China and India got into a dispute, well, what's in it for Pakistan? A long standoff between India and China sapping Indian strength may be more beneficial to Pakistan strategically.
 

Ananda

Well-Known Member
want to add that a Chinese-Indian conflict will not necessarily result in Pakistan giving their all-out effort to attack India. Pakistan is not a vassal state of China. There isn't even a mutual defense treaty obligating Pakistan to aid China or vice versa.
True, but I think the scenario being talk about here for Pakistan involvement based on scenarios on China by passing Malaca Strait and used land transport through Central Asia and Sea Lane toward Pakistan ports to transport oil imports to China Interior.

The safety on that routes can be compromise by India, but for Indian to compromise that route will means they have to pacified Pakistan first.
India can pacified Pakistan, there's no doubt in there. However to do that, they have to commit most of their forces.
As India pretext to pacified Pakistan in this scenario is for compromising Chinese routes, then China will come to equation. India simply can't afford to take both Pakistan and India in same time.

Thus if we back to topic of SCS, with China road and belt policies to open trade routes through Central Asia and Pakistan Ports, China in my opinion already open another safe route that basically quite safe from other potential opposition except US.

But I agree there's no guarantee that Pakistan will involve conflict with India only on China benefits and vice versa. They will involve only if India try to compromise China's routes in their territory or the ones that India has to reach over their territory.
 
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ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
True, but I think the scenario being talk about here for Pakistan involvement based on scenarios on China by passing Malaca Strait and used land transport through Central Asia and Sea Lane toward Pakistan ports to transport oil imports to China Interior.

The safety on that routes can be compromise by India, but for Indian to compromise that route will means they have to pacified Pakistan first.
India can pacified Pakistan, there's no doubt in there. However to do that, they have to commit most of their forces.
As India pretext to pacified Pakistan in this scenario is for compromising Chinese routes, then China will come to equation. India simply can't afford to take both Pakistan and India in same time.
If India looked like it was going to overrun Pakistan, the Pakistanis would probably go nuclear. What's the point of having a nuclear arsenal if you aren't going to use it when your country is in military and strategic extremis with the survival of the nation at the it's most perilous.
 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
1. Philippines’ baseless claims over Sabah hurts ASEAN unity and is a clear example of the hypocrisy of the Philippine government.

2. Under President Rodrigo Duterte, the Pinoy cowards do not dare to insist on its valid Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) claims in the South China Sea, where China is the antagonist, but insist on its illogical claims on Sabah against Malaysia. It’s EEZ claims are supported by the 12 July 2016, an arbitral tribunal at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague issued its ruling in Manila’s case against Beijing’s claims in the South China Sea. Part of the reason for Pinoy cowardice in enforcing its EEZ claims must be PLA(N)’s Xian H-6G and Xian H-6J strategic bombers staging drills in the South China Sea. These exercises include nighttime operations, long-range sorties and simulated attack on sea targets, China’s Defence Ministry announced on 30 Jul 2020. For details see: PLA Navy’s new bomber debuts in South China Sea drills (Global Times).
3. Why is China being treated like as a country to be appeased, while the Pinoys like to act "tough" on other countries like Malaysia?

4. Teddy Locsin Jr. has got to be the dumbest diplomat in ASEAN, for making such an irresponsible statement that cannot be defended. The other 9 ASEAN members, the US and the UN itself, all recognise that Sabah is part of Malaysia.

5. The current Philippines Foreign Secretary is the pariah of ASEAN diplomatic community thanks to his country’s illogical claims in Sabah that have no basis in law. The Philippine government may have a foreign policy, but defining it by anything other than tweeted insults from Foreign Secretary Teodoro Locsin is baffling its neighbors and supposed allies.

6. Locsin’s extraordinary attacks on Malaysia and on the United States while claiming to be protecting the 2016 award by the Hague-based Permanent Court of Arbitration of the Spratly Islands to the Philippines under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), shows ASEAN that the Philippines is not to be trusted.

(i) Locsin re-emphasized the Philippine Spratly claims, which partly overlap those of Malaysia and Vietnam. But these island rock claims, which do not qualify for EEZ are relatively minor matters compared with the EEZs of the littoral states — such as Philippine rights to exploit the Reed (Recto) Bank northeast of the Spratlys which is rich in hydrocarbon deposits.​
(ii) Despite disagreements on island ownerships, Vietnam and Malaysian have cooperated on EEZ issues. Instead of taking Malaysia’s statement as support for Philippine’s arbitration award, Locsin, embarked on attacking both Malaysia and the US for not accepting the Philippine claim to Sabah.​
(iii) Referring to a US statement on another topic, Locsin tweeted “Sabah is not in Malaysia if you want to have anything to do with the Philippines”. He also accused Malaysia of stirring rebellion in the Muslim area of the Philippines.​

7. In the meantime, China is solidifying sovereignty assertion over the waters.
 
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Ananda

Well-Known Member
Philippines’ baseless claims over Sabah hurts ASEAN unity and is a clear example of the hypocrisy of the Philippine government.
This is the danger if World community ever allowing China claim on SCS based on their own claim of Historical/Traditional rights. No country in this world ever allowed to claim any territory based on Historical rights.

This kind of Philippines claim based on stupid claim from decendents of Sultanate Sulu. This is dangerous ground if ever being allowed. Pinoy should know their standing on International stage is going to be heavily eroded if they are stuck to pursue this kind of historical claim.

No nation in Southeast Asia build on their long lost ancestors land. The nations of SEA except Thailand basically build based on colonials boundaries. Philippines only can claim on area that belong to US Philippines, Malaysia can only claim what's belong to British Malaya (except Singapore which both has mutually agreed divorce), and Indonesia can't claim more than what's belong to Dutch East Indies. Even Brunai can only claim the area that basically British agree on.

This is due to the fact that those countries build on foundation of colonials states. Accepting some nation to claim based on their historical ancestorial land is simply can't be done because those nation's came to be from either colonials creation or what borders they're recognized Internationally and not what their ancestors used to have.

If this can ever be allowed/entertain by global communities then chaos of claim and counter claim can run on International relations.
If that happen, Indonesia can claim half of Malayan Peninsula since once upon a time they belong to Riau Sultanate or if wants to trace back more, the Peninsula were under control of Srivijaya Empire.

So how far do you want to reach back to your ancestorial claim ? Can Italy claim most of Europe based on Roman Empire (as Mussolini's dream) ? Can German reach back to Prussian time to claim all Baltic states and half of Poland (like Hitler wants) ?
Can Mongolia claim most of Northern China as part of Mongol inheritance ? (Something that most Chinese forumers stating rediculous while they're in Internet promoting China rightfully owned SCS as part of historical inheritance rights).

Ancestorial claim or historical claim can't be ever allowed to happen. This is where most war coming from. Each modern nation's should stick with whatever International boundaries being set when they're created. No more no less.
 
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cdxbow

Active Member
This is the danger if World community ever allowing China claim on SCS based on their own claim of Historical/Traditional rights. No country in this world ever allowed to claim any territory based on Historical rights.

This kind of Philippines claim based on stupid claim from decendents of Sultanate Sulu. This is dangerous ground if ever being allowed. Pinoy should know their standing on International stage is going to be heavily eroded if they are stuck to pursue this kind of historical claim.

No nation in Southeast Asia build on their long lost ancestors land. The nations of SEA except Thailand basically build based on colonials boundaries. Philippines only can claim on area that belong to US Philippines, Malaysia can only claim what's belong to British Malaya (except Singapore which both has mutually agreed divorce), and Indonesia can't claim more than what's belong to Dutch East Indies. Even Brunai can only claim the area that basically British agree on.

This is due to the fact that those countries build on foundation of colonials states. Accepting some nation to claim based on their historical ancestorial land is simply can't be done because those nation's came to be from either colonials creation or what borders they're recognized Internationally and not what their ancestors used to have.

If this can ever be allowed/entertain by global communities then chaos of claim and counter claim can run on International relations.
If that happen, Indonesia can claim half of Malayan Peninsula since once upon a time they belong to Riau Sultanate or if wants to trace back more, the Peninsula were under control of Srivijaya Empire.

So how far do you want to reach back to your ancestorial claim ? Can Italy claim most of Europe based on Roman Empire (as Mussolini's dream) ? Can German reach back to Prussian time to claim all Baltic states and half of Poland (like Hitler wants) ?
Can Mongolia claim most of Northern China as part of Mongol inheritance ? (Something that most Chinese forumers stating rediculous while they're in Internet promoting China rightfully owned SCS as part of historical inheritance rights).

Ancestorial claim or historical claim can't be ever allowed to happen. This is where most war coming from. Each modern nation's should stick with whatever International boundaries being set when they're created. No more no less.
I fully expect Chinese researchers to claim they have found evidence of 1000BC Zhou dynasty pottery in the Pilbara and now have a historical claim on the region! This article from Modern diplomacy US hegemony in crisis, rise of China & Middle Power Coalition talks about a 'middle power' coalition (+US) , the article talks a little about the history of post WWII US East Asia diplomacy.

Some of it seems so long ago. I've read a couple of articles recently suggesting current times parallels the periods before WW1 or WW2. Perhaps that's why I'm feeling maudlin. I think there are things to be learned, however our times are unique. The old truism says history repeats, but I think I'm more with the folks who suggests it doesn't repeat, but it does rhyme.
 

swerve

Super Moderator
...
Yes some freight can be diverted through other modal links but using the rail example in the paper if, for example, the PRC was to start importing 200,000 tonnes of oil per shipment by rail. Well that's one very tempting target, for example, the Indian Air Force to interdict and it doesn't even have to go looking for it because you can't hide train tracks. Build a pipeline - that can be attacked by air or ground forces.
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There's no prospect of a railway from Pakistan to China at present, nor a pipeline. Too expensive. The terrain is a nightmare. If China wants to import oil overland it'd be much more sensible to ignore Pakistan & import oil directly from Central Asia. Azerbaijan, Russia & Iran could feed directly into that. India wouldn't be able to do much to interdict that.
 

OPSSG

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This is the danger if World community ever allowing China claim on SCS based on their own claim of Historical/Traditional rights. No country in this world ever allowed to claim any territory based on Historical rights.

This kind of Philippines claim based on stupid claim from decendents of Sultanate Sulu. This is dangerous ground if ever being allowed. Pinoy should know their standing on International stage is going to be heavily eroded if they are stuck to pursue this kind of historical claim.

No nation in Southeast Asia build on their long lost ancestors land. The nations of SEA except Thailand basically build based on colonials boundaries. Philippines only can claim on area that belong to US Philippines...
1. Agreed. The ICJ does not recognize right of sovereignty based on historic title after exercise of self-determination — which would apply to Sabah (North Borneo) and Sarawak. For background, I note that the Cobbold Commission released its findings, report and recommendations on 1 Aug 1962. It concluded that the formation of Malaysia should be implemented.

2. Further on 5 Aug 1963, the UN ascertained, prior to the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia, the wishes of the people of Sabah (North Borneo) and Sarawak and their wishes have been recognised by the UN, through a report to the UN Secretary General.

3. The heirs of Sultan of Sulu receive cession money, not a lease. And the best joke is that the Philippines does not recognize the Sultan of Sulu.

4. Bill Hayton also says that there is nothing ‘historic’ about China’s ‘historic rights’ claim” in the South China Sea.

5. Brunei has ended its silence on issues relating to the South China Sea with a statement reflects the country’s complicated – and possibly conflicted –strategic outlook. It wants to present itself as a trustworthy member of ASEAN, while also keeping its robust economic relations with China. At the same time, it is also secured by the British presence in the area, which, with the threat of tipping over into a wider conflict, acts as a deterrent to China.

6. While reaffirming Brunei's commitment to maintain stability in the region, Brunei’s foreign ministry urged countries to discuss issues bilaterally and underscored that negotiations should be based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and international law.
“Specific issues should be addressed bilaterally by the countries directly concerned through peaceful dialogue and consultations. Brunei Darussalam emphasizes that such negotiations on the South China Sea should be resolved in accordance with the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and the rules and principles of international law,”​

Brunei's foreign ministry said in a statement on 20 July 2020. The meaning of the statement is important to consider as Brunei looks to take regional leadership with the ASEAN chairmanship in 2021. Moreover, the launch of its long-overdue defence white paper in 2021 will project just how Brunei intends to position itself in Southeast Asia in line with its strategic objectives. Within the Southeast Asian security environment, while there has been the continued presence of a range of threats including terrorism, piracy, and territorial and maritime disputes, there are important shifts as well, including the increasing constraints faced by ASEAN as an institution and rising U.S.-China tensions. And with respect to Brunei itself, though the broad contours of its defense policy may be quite similar. With of the pending arrival of the white paper, it is anticipated that Brunei’s foreign and defence policies will synchronise in time for its ASEAN chairmanship.

7. Beyond just empty words unlike the cowards in the Philippines, Brunei’s Navy engages in a multinational group sail en route to Hawaii for RIMPAC 2020 to show the country’s resolve — KDB Darulehsan’s 67-day deployment demonstrates its capability to operate in a task group.

8. This multinational group sail is also good way for the navies of Australia, Singapore and the US to show solidarity with Brunei’s small but capable navy.
 
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