F-15 Eagle
New Member
Others have said it better than I can, 1 Nimitz is still better than 2-3 smaller America class carriers.
US Navy News and updates
- Thread starter AegisFC
- Start date
What it really comes down to is flexability and cost per vessel in my belief.
Its cheaper to operate 1 nimitz size carrier than 3 smaller carriers. Also cheaper to refuel and supply. Also a larger vessel has more flexability.
Then there is the shere size of the things. Remember the first rule of war. LOOKING like you can kill anybody can get you out of more fights than looking weak.
Also never bring a knife to a sword fight. Bring a shotgun.:type
Its cheaper to operate 1 nimitz size carrier than 3 smaller carriers. Also cheaper to refuel and supply. Also a larger vessel has more flexability.
Then there is the shere size of the things. Remember the first rule of war. LOOKING like you can kill anybody can get you out of more fights than looking weak.
Also never bring a knife to a sword fight. Bring a shotgun.:type
I can accept that a super carrier is vastly superior operationally and in terms of flexibility, crew cost, and even cost per vessel given their longevity. I would go further and say that it is a no brainer. That was why I was kind of taken aback by the VDH/JA discussion.
But,.... how do you mitigate against the threat of mission failure of entire task force due to the loss of a single (albeit huge) vessel. Is it a matter of having more than one task force available for every crisis? Is a USN task force picket truly impenetrable? Will the LCS be able to eliminate the threat of keel-breaker robotic mines?
The US navy has an impressive history of countering every posed threat since some planters refused to pay His Majesty's Customs and Excise. I have no doubt they will continue to get it right. However, everyone was surprised early on in WW2 when the Bismarck, Prince of Wales etc were so vulnerable to air attack and capital ships proved not particularly useful given the amount of resources they consumed. What's to stop us being surprised about super carriers?
The true problem is you CANT counter every threat. However the shear size of a super carrier and its design makes it more resistant to dammage than a smaller carrier.
Plus all the money you dont spend on those extra smaller carriers and save using th big nuke ships means you can build more escorts.
Grand Danois
Entertainer
Question is if you don't also have a [task force] mission kill if just one of the three America Class carriers is hit.
You also need more screening forces for three Americas than for one Super.
You also need more screening forces for three Americas than for one Super.
The real political agenda in building smaller carriers is for the lower price. Those who advocate the smaller carriers have no intentions of building three smaller carriers for one large supercarrier. As noted, you would end up spending more for ships, aircraft, and maintenance, much less operations... What they want to do is build ten smaller carriers for ten supercarriers...
t68
Well-Known Member
If the US wanted to cut down the size of an aircraft carrier the smallest they could go IMO would be a Queen Elizabeth class, not quite half the current size of a Nimitz class carrier and only half the number of aircraft available, so in theory the USN would require two ships in the task force to have the same capability. But i would imagine doubling the screening escorts will be needed as both ships would have to be some distance away from each other for safe air operation‘s.
You also have to factor in the USMC will have a light carrier task force in the Wasp/America class ,so effectively they already do have the smaller light carrier fleet, free up the super carriers for strategic/power projection tasking.
It would be interesting to see if the Queen Elizabeth class would be of more flexible design than an America class for the USMC, and see a joint venture between the USMC and the RN.
You also have to factor in the USMC will have a light carrier task force in the Wasp/America class ,so effectively they already do have the smaller light carrier fleet, free up the super carriers for strategic/power projection tasking.
It would be interesting to see if the Queen Elizabeth class would be of more flexible design than an America class for the USMC, and see a joint venture between the USMC and the RN.
It should be far more as it can easily be switched to CTOL and has more deck space and smaller island's its also far more beamer than the Americas. Its also got a more modern power system in IFEP which is very high tech and allows a huge amount of versatility and could potentially allow fitting of an extra GT.
Well it could be the Queen Elizabeth class isnt a amphib ship.
[ame="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/America_class_amphibious_assault_ship"]America class amphibious assault ship - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia@@AMEPARAM@@/wiki/File:US-carrier_template.png" class="image"><img alt="Stub icon" src="http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/e/e8/US-carrier_template.png/40px-US-carrier_template.png"@@AMEPARAM@@commons/thumb/e/e8/US-carrier_template.png/40px-US-carrier_template.png[/ame]
LHA-6 America
[ame="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Queen_Elizabeth_class_aircraft_carrier"]Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carrier - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia@@AMEPARAM@@/wiki/File
a2_uk.svg" class="image"><img alt="Pa2 uk.svg" src="http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/9/94/Pa2_uk.svg/250px-Pa2_uk.svg.png"@@AMEPARAM@@commons/thumb/9/94/Pa2_uk.svg/250px-Pa2_uk.svg.png[/ame]The elizabeth class are true aircraft carriers the America class isnt.
Dont get cocky we still have the ford.
Though that flight deck does look nice.......
t68
Well-Known Member
The America class is being called an amphibious assault ships but it does not have the well docks of the Wasp/Tarawa class which are true amphibious assault ships.she was designed as a light carrier from the start to accommodate more aircraft and larger bunker/ordnance storage.
I am just looking at if the Queen Elizabeth would be more flexible design than the America class i.e. more aircraft self sustaining for longer period’s of time, the only problems i can see which might affect the Queen Elizabeth is the draught is 11metres, i can’t find the draught for either the America or Wasp class if this has a bearing on USMC operation i have no idea in the littorals where they both would be operating together i.e. Wasp/America.
Also i am not saying it saying it a bad ship design which i quite like, ideally i would like to see either two America ore one Queen Elizabeth in the RAN plus an extra Canberra class if Queen Elizabeth was selected with the reconstituted FAA in a mixed RAAF/RAN colours
I am just looking at if the Queen Elizabeth would be more flexible design than the America class i.e. more aircraft self sustaining for longer period’s of time, the only problems i can see which might affect the Queen Elizabeth is the draught is 11metres, i can’t find the draught for either the America or Wasp class if this has a bearing on USMC operation i have no idea in the littorals where they both would be operating together i.e. Wasp/America.
Also i am not saying it saying it a bad ship design which i quite like, ideally i would like to see either two America ore one Queen Elizabeth in the RAN plus an extra Canberra class if Queen Elizabeth was selected with the reconstituted FAA in a mixed RAAF/RAN colours
The well deck is out but it has a deck for launching LCAC's still so.......
But yea the Brits are more interested in having a carrier than a Amphib carrier. Royal Navy dont do as much assualting as it used to.
Now if we can only get japan to take that stupid pacifist clause out of there constitution and start up there own super carriers (look im just brain storming here but....USN, JSDF, AN joint super carrier design seriously they already have the same DDG's as us practicaly so.....) We would be in buisness.
Yes but i think the americas will still be able to launch the LCACs.
I don't see how. An LCAC would either need a well deck (which we know LHA-6 doesn't have), or a stern ramp. Looking at the official image here, I can't see a stern gate. Nor is there any mention of a stern gate in any of the published descriptions or schematics, except those that describe it as 'deleted'.
t68
Well-Known Member
I have come across LHA-6 America - Plans / Schematics with a small well deck, but also say that the stern gate and machinery have been deleted.
LHA-6 America / LHX / LHA(R) - Schematic
Also came across plans for LH(X) with a different top deck profile but with a well deck for three LCAC,i presume these were early design drawings. Also does not say about size and displacement.
LHA-6 America / LHX / LHA(R) - Schematic
LH(X) Amphibious Assault Ship
Appears LH(X) to be a more of a forward thinking design for the future to bring a more advanced design which incorporates the well deck with enhanced aircraft operations.
LHA-6 America / LHX / LHA(R) - Schematic
Also came across plans for LH(X) with a different top deck profile but with a well deck for three LCAC,i presume these were early design drawings. Also does not say about size and displacement.
LHA-6 America / LHX / LHA(R) - Schematic
LH(X) Amphibious Assault Ship
Appears LH(X) to be a more of a forward thinking design for the future to bring a more advanced design which incorporates the well deck with enhanced aircraft operations.
I believe you are misunderstanding the diagram. Without a stern gate & machinery, there can be no well deck. I believe the ''well deck subdivided' note on those plans refers to a change from the previous proposal, which had a well deck, & is not meant to indicate that the version depicted has a well deck.
The image I linked to is from the US navy site, & is an official depiction of what is actually building.
US Army cancels NLOS-LS Missile System.
Army Cancels NLOS-LS Missile System; LCS Implications Could Be Big
The Army has finally canceled the problem plagued Non Line of Sight Launch System (NLOS-LS), one of the leftovers of the many bits and pieces of the failed FCS program. As we’ve reported, the NLOS-LS failed miserably in its most recent series of tests, carried out earlier this year. This story was first reported by InsideDefense.com.
In 2004, the Army signed a six year, $1.1 billion development contract for the NLOS-LS with Raytheon and Lockheed Martin. That same year, the Navy signed a memorandum of understanding with the Army to buy the missiles for it’s Littoral Combat Ship (LCS).
The Army’s cancellation of the program could have serious implications for the LCS program as the NLOS-LS was to substitute for the ship’s lack of vertical launch system cells — which can handle anti-ship, anti-aircraft or land attack missiles — carried on larger surface ships, if in a smaller package. The only weapon the LCS currently carries is a single 57mm rapid fire cannon that can range out to nine miles.
Analysts have pointed to the LCS’ lack of organic fires as a serious shortcoming that might limit its operational effectiveness. One of the primary missions of the LCS is to screen the battle fleet’s larger ships and fight off fast attack boat “swarms.” That’s where the NLOS-LS was supposed to come in, ith a Loitering Attack Missile that could range out to 124 miles.
Update: Asked to comment on the missile’s cancellation, a spokesperson from Lockheed Martin’s LCS office said: “By design, LCS is a flexible, reconfigurable ship, able to accept other weapons the Navy might want to integrate.”
http://defensetech.org/2010/04/23/ar...issile-system/
could have quite big implications for the LCS program perhaps they have an alternate plan. Fireshadow perhaps
Army Cancels NLOS-LS Missile System; LCS Implications Could Be Big
The Army has finally canceled the problem plagued Non Line of Sight Launch System (NLOS-LS), one of the leftovers of the many bits and pieces of the failed FCS program. As we’ve reported, the NLOS-LS failed miserably in its most recent series of tests, carried out earlier this year. This story was first reported by InsideDefense.com.
In 2004, the Army signed a six year, $1.1 billion development contract for the NLOS-LS with Raytheon and Lockheed Martin. That same year, the Navy signed a memorandum of understanding with the Army to buy the missiles for it’s Littoral Combat Ship (LCS).
The Army’s cancellation of the program could have serious implications for the LCS program as the NLOS-LS was to substitute for the ship’s lack of vertical launch system cells — which can handle anti-ship, anti-aircraft or land attack missiles — carried on larger surface ships, if in a smaller package. The only weapon the LCS currently carries is a single 57mm rapid fire cannon that can range out to nine miles.
Analysts have pointed to the LCS’ lack of organic fires as a serious shortcoming that might limit its operational effectiveness. One of the primary missions of the LCS is to screen the battle fleet’s larger ships and fight off fast attack boat “swarms.” That’s where the NLOS-LS was supposed to come in, ith a Loitering Attack Missile that could range out to 124 miles.
Update: Asked to comment on the missile’s cancellation, a spokesperson from Lockheed Martin’s LCS office said: “By design, LCS is a flexible, reconfigurable ship, able to accept other weapons the Navy might want to integrate.”
http://defensetech.org/2010/04/23/ar...issile-system/
could have quite big implications for the LCS program perhaps they have an alternate plan. Fireshadow perhaps
Juramentado
New Member
It's always interesting to read the key "shield phrases" for LCS - flexibility and modularity - being bandied about.
Of note, the Lexington Institute study on LCS Modularity (their sympatico to the platform is well-known given they host the Naval Strike Forum) points out that there has to be discipline in the process for the program to be successful.
Lexington Institute
The Naval Research Advisory Committee report on science and
technology for modular systems concluded that the process of
implementing modular systems required that a taxonomy of modularity
be defined and that, in particular, the Navy needs to develop a systems
analysis capability for complex, interactive capabilities. It is not clear
whether sufficient capability is resident in both the Navy and the
private sector.
and
In the medium and long term, the LCS program will only be successful
operationally and in terms of impact on acquisition and sustainment, if
exacting configuration control is maintained.
On those points, the SuW package is a failure. Partial or full is besides the point - there is a large gaping hole in the mission package that will likely not be filled, tested and approved by IOC milestone of 2013. Given that the procurement schedule calls for a committed purchase of 23 ships by 2015 and the historic plodding rate of R&D to op deploy cycles, we are looking at a very short gap in which to bridge this operational shortfall. Flexibility and Modularity cannot help cover an accelerated requirement when they are not present to begin with.
Also, in the heavily quoted GAO March 2010 Report on selected weapons procurement programs (where RMS is noted as not meeting capabilities), there is a small paragraph titled "Other Program Issues."
U.S. GAO - Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
In essence, it states that program management could continue to test mission modules on both seaframes even after the winning contractor and design is selected.
Is there a reason (other than one-offs or BAU) to worry about two legacy seaframes when you have up to 20+ to consider? At the time that the first mission modules should have been fully build out and integrated (ASW and SuW), and you've already monetarily committed to having built 42 percent of the fleet as planned, we're still worried about interoperability? This definitely is not Modularity and Flexibility showing it's robustness.
The scary point is really this - by 2015 when DoN is to commit to building half this fleet, will we still have an incomplete LCS? Given what's happened right now and what we know of institutional practices and history, it's entirely possible that we will have a low-end mixed fleet of gelded frigates awaiting retirement (OHP) as well as minehunters, and a new batch of essentially high-speed gunboats that we paid a premium for but are incomplete.
Of note, the Lexington Institute study on LCS Modularity (their sympatico to the platform is well-known given they host the Naval Strike Forum) points out that there has to be discipline in the process for the program to be successful.
Lexington Institute
The Naval Research Advisory Committee report on science and
technology for modular systems concluded that the process of
implementing modular systems required that a taxonomy of modularity
be defined and that, in particular, the Navy needs to develop a systems
analysis capability for complex, interactive capabilities. It is not clear
whether sufficient capability is resident in both the Navy and the
private sector.
and
In the medium and long term, the LCS program will only be successful
operationally and in terms of impact on acquisition and sustainment, if
exacting configuration control is maintained.
On those points, the SuW package is a failure. Partial or full is besides the point - there is a large gaping hole in the mission package that will likely not be filled, tested and approved by IOC milestone of 2013. Given that the procurement schedule calls for a committed purchase of 23 ships by 2015 and the historic plodding rate of R&D to op deploy cycles, we are looking at a very short gap in which to bridge this operational shortfall. Flexibility and Modularity cannot help cover an accelerated requirement when they are not present to begin with.
Also, in the heavily quoted GAO March 2010 Report on selected weapons procurement programs (where RMS is noted as not meeting capabilities), there is a small paragraph titled "Other Program Issues."
U.S. GAO - Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
In essence, it states that program management could continue to test mission modules on both seaframes even after the winning contractor and design is selected.
Is there a reason (other than one-offs or BAU) to worry about two legacy seaframes when you have up to 20+ to consider? At the time that the first mission modules should have been fully build out and integrated (ASW and SuW), and you've already monetarily committed to having built 42 percent of the fleet as planned, we're still worried about interoperability? This definitely is not Modularity and Flexibility showing it's robustness.
The scary point is really this - by 2015 when DoN is to commit to building half this fleet, will we still have an incomplete LCS? Given what's happened right now and what we know of institutional practices and history, it's entirely possible that we will have a low-end mixed fleet of gelded frigates awaiting retirement (OHP) as well as minehunters, and a new batch of essentially high-speed gunboats that we paid a premium for but are incomplete.
Last edited: