Verified Defense Pro
Putting all the relevant questions from OPSSG in one
As far as EABO (and its naval-y cousin, Distributed Lethality), that's a good overview of what they are supposed to operationally (although like most of our proposals, they always seem more geared towards an SCS scenario than Taiwan per se, ignoring that Taiwan is an SCS claimant as well). I'm not sure that's how it will work out, but that's the plan. However, in a broader point, I'm not sure that they provide anything strategically. It always seems to re-orient back to "Return to Phase 0", which I don't think is a viable plan. In fairness, and to riff off a comment I made in another thread, no one seems to have any idea of exactly how you defeat Red 1.6. Agreed. It seems that the issue is really to create uncertainty for the PLA second artillery via the conduct of Expeditionary Advance Base Operations (EABO) within the island chains. EABOs take targeting pressure off the US bases in Japan and in Guam. Is that correct?
7. EABOs will also take pressure off Taiwanese air bases that are presumed attacked (and kept suppressed by part renewal of rocket attacks) —irregardless of the aspirational aspects of the plan (meeting budget reality), the US naval services gain a systems level benefit of giving the enemy too many targets to seek in the island chains.
I agree with all of the above, but I often wonder how much things like DL and EABO are less geopolitical chess games than Pentagon chess games, where services propose the best plan that takes advantage of their capabilities, and lock down the associated budget stream. Whether it amounts to anything that can win a war is another question. We've been really good at the operational level over the last 20 years; hasn't won too many wars, lately.8. With respect to the cross strait missile arms race, Taiwan’s National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST) is said to have fired some medium-range missiles in Apr 2020 at Jiupeng. The tests are believed to have included the Yun Feng missile, a supersonic land-attack cruise missile that has a range of 1,500 kilometers. The missile, fitted with a ramjet engine, can carry a semi-armor piercing high explosive and fragmentation warhead. The surface-to-surface missile could be deployed to weaken China’s combat capability. The weapon is believed to be able to attack strategic targets including airports, harbors, and command bases located in central China. Land-based missile systems including Yun Feng and other cruise missiles are a vital asset of Taiwan’s arsenal when engaging in asymmetric warfare against China. As the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) poses the greatest threat to Taiwan in the event of a military conflict, the island country would be able to better defend itself if it could launch attacks on China’s air bases.
9. Agreed. The conduct of an Indian Ocean or such other potential future blockade elsewhere, is a form of American CATOBAR carrier battlegroup’s escalation dominance, viz-a-viz, the STOBAR equipped carriers (namely, CV16 Liaoning and CV17 Shandong) of the PLA(N). But given the technological advances the PLA(N) has made, China can no longer be regarded as a green-water navy.
10. The launch and subsequent operational deployment of CV16 Liaoning signalled Beijing’s aspirations to become a naval power and to match the USN in the Indian-Pacific region. The 26 April 2017 launch of CV17 Shandong and the 12 Jan 2020 commissioning of the first of 8 Type 055Ds to form the nucleus of future PLA(N) SAGs are further evidence of this intention. The CATOBAR Type 003 carrier to follow after Shandong will mark a change in naval aviation capability.
Q: Would you agree to the above or is there more flavour to add in this geopolitical chess game?