Honestly what comes to mind is the late 90's into early 2000's US Army transformational plan which led to the Stryker family of vehicles. As the theory was found to be somewhat lacking when confronted with real world situations, I strongly suspect that the USMC if it insists on adopting such a theoretical force construct will encounter similar problems.More agile in a peer fight - against a threat that has tanks and significant artillery. Something there doesn't make sense. Especially as missiles / rockets are easier to intercept, harder to resupply and larger than 155 mm shells. Plus all the drones being used by ground forces are either very limited or easy to intercept, so what does that grant?
No bridging units or AVLB (because of no armour)? Hope there are no obstacles just behind the beachhead. Obviously the USN CB's are there. but they'll be slower than an AVLB with tank support.
F-35B from 24 jets / Sqn to 10? Ha! Sucks to be those maintainers. Watch availability plummet, and the F-35C's are going to be too busy fighting to defence the fleet.
So this is a light infantry force with limited fire support. And this is to fight a peer? Hmmmm.....
But it gets better. A light infantry force with less air lift! That's hilarious. 'Agile"....
Still not really convinced that land-based AShM are feasible either. I think the targeting problem is under-estimated by most.
At a higher level, I'd also beg the question - support USN operations? In modern times, the USMC has rarely (never?) done that. Guadalcanal, Iwo Jima, Okinawa - that was all to support air operations. Olympic, Inchon - that was to support land operations. Plus, sea control isn't really possible by land forces, it's too amorphous and just plain big.