The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

wittmanace

Active Member
Interesting. Nice for a change to hear something from the Ukrainians; apart from what they normally release which says little to nothing about various issues they face. They too have suffered high losses.



The type was designed as a long range high altitude interceptor to replace the MiG-25. Curious as to why it's being used in the conflict and what added value it can provide over the Su-30.
Regarding the Mig-31, this has been covered a few times by Stronk and RUSI. Interestingly it is performing very well and is behind a number of Russian Airforce successes, and Ukrainian Airforce problems. I dont have much time right now, but there are the below, as well as a few videos of these and similar sources analysing this and finding the same. Its part fo the strategy that has seen the airforce coming back into play and seeing the ukrainians go back up in the sky but to increased losses and diminishing returns.

a small recap. Those 31s are the ones doing CAPs.
Warning Russian air force could become 'major factor' in Ukraine war - YouTube
There were further pieces on the problems the Mig-31s create for the ukrainian airforce. speed, the radars, and so forth introduce big issues.

The Russian Air War and Ukrainian Requirements for Air Defence (rusi.org)

"However, these patrols have proven highly effective against Ukrainian attack aircraft and fighters, with the Mig-31BM and R-37M long-range airto-air missile being especially problematic " p18
"The long range of the R-37M, in conjunction with the very high performance and high operating altitude of the Mig-31BM also allows it significant freedom to menace Ukrainian aircraft near the frontlines from outside the range of Ukrainian defences. The VKS has also started employing the R-37M from at least a few of its Su-35S fighters, which not only increases the reach of the latter in combat but may also suggests Russian stocks of the R-37M are in little danger of running out.77 "

", Russian high-altitude fighter CAPs with Su-35S and more recently with Mig-31BM interceptors are continuing to shoot down significant numbers of Ukrainian ground attack aircraft near the frontlines from distances that render them all but immune to return fire. " p 20

"In addition to the radar performance and missile range advantages that have always been a factor, the VKS Su-35S and Mig-31BM fleets can now draw on a lot of live air-to-air combat experience from conducting continuous CAPs close to Russia’s own borders. As such, the underwhelming VKS fighter performance during the first days of the invasion is unlikely to be repeated if Ukrainian SAMs are starved of ammunition to the point that they can no longer deter Russian fixed-wing incursions. F " p 37-38
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Regarding the Mig-31, this has been covered a few times by Stronk and RUSI. Interestingly it is performing very well and is behind a number of Russian Airforce successes, and Ukrainian Airforce problems. I dont have much time right now, but there are the below, as well as a few videos of these and similar sources analysing this and finding the same. Its part fo the strategy that has seen the airforce coming back into play and seeing the ukrainians go back up in the sky but to increased losses and diminishing returns.

a small recap. Those 31s are the ones doing CAPs.
Warning Russian air force could become 'major factor' in Ukraine war - YouTube
There were further pieces on the problems the Mig-31s create for the ukrainian airforce. speed, the radars, and so forth introduce big issues.

The Russian Air War and Ukrainian Requirements for Air Defence (rusi.org)

"However, these patrols have proven highly effective against Ukrainian attack aircraft and fighters, with the Mig-31BM and R-37M long-range airto-air missile being especially problematic " p18
"The long range of the R-37M, in conjunction with the very high performance and high operating altitude of the Mig-31BM also allows it significant freedom to menace Ukrainian aircraft near the frontlines from outside the range of Ukrainian defences. The VKS has also started employing the R-37M from at least a few of its Su-35S fighters, which not only increases the reach of the latter in combat but may also suggests Russian stocks of the R-37M are in little danger of running out.77 "

", Russian high-altitude fighter CAPs with Su-35S and more recently with Mig-31BM interceptors are continuing to shoot down significant numbers of Ukrainian ground attack aircraft near the frontlines from distances that render them all but immune to return fire. " p 20

"In addition to the radar performance and missile range advantages that have always been a factor, the VKS Su-35S and Mig-31BM fleets can now draw on a lot of live air-to-air combat experience from conducting continuous CAPs close to Russia’s own borders. As such, the underwhelming VKS fighter performance during the first days of the invasion is unlikely to be repeated if Ukrainian SAMs are starved of ammunition to the point that they can no longer deter Russian fixed-wing incursions. F " p 37-38
And this after the type was frequently considered to be nearly useless compared to other jets. Of course the opponent in this war is not by any stretch of the imagination a modern air force. It might even be more the missile then the jet, other then the very powerful radar. If not for economic difficulties, the current performance of the type might help push the PAK-DP project forward. At the very least I think it needs a bigger upgrade then what it's received if they're to remain in service.

EDIT: An interesting close-out regarding the S-300s abandoned in Kherson region. It's apparently ex-Ukrainian S-300s from the 50th air defense rgt, that was based in Crimea pre-14. The systems were in awful condition, and apparently Russia never took them into service, instead dragging them to Kherson region and using them as dummy targets for Ukrainian SEAD/DEAD efforts. Hilariously, having abandoned them in the retreat, Russian loitering munition operators subsequently mistook them for Ukrainian SAMs and struck them.

 
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Vivendi

Well-Known Member
The UK will announce a new package soon that will include supply of "hundreds of thousands of rounds of artillery ammunition next year" UK to Announce Major New Artillery Package for Ukraine (voanews.com)

This is clearly not enough -- however one should keep in mind that:

1. The US will increase production to 20,000 per month early next year: Army plans ‘dramatic’ ammo production boost as Ukraine drains stocks (defensenews.com)

2. Most European producers have small capacities but they are many so it adds up, e.g.:
2a. Czech republic is producing 80,000-100,000 shells per year, and in the process of expanding to 150,000 per year Ukrajině docházejí zásoby munice. NATO chce rozjet továrny v ČR a na Slovensku - Echo24.cz

2b. I did not find any figures for Bulgaria however the production capacity should be larger than Czech republic. Ammo and equipment for more than EUR1 billion was exported through intermediaries to Ukraine in 2022. Military Production - DEZAMET S.A. medium-calibre ammunition, mortar and artillery ammunition

2c. Slovakia also has ammo factories -- for instance one in Snina is currently producing 19,000 shells per year, with plans to expand to 100,000 per year Snina plant to produce ammunition for Ukraine and NATO countries - spectator.sme.sk

2d. Poland also has ammunition production capacity, e.g., Military Production - DEZAMET S.A. medium-calibre ammunition, mortar and artillery ammunition

2e. Several Western European countries have various ammo production capacities, including Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland* (and probably several others that I have missed)

*Switzerland will not allow transfer to Ukraine however a European country can donate their own ammo to Ukraine and backfill their own stocks with ammo from Switzerland -- (this is also being done with ammo from South Korea btw).

It's impossible to get a clear picture, however, looking at the above incomplete list I suspect lack of ammo may not be the biggest issue for Ukraine moving forward.
 

SolarisKenzo

Well-Known Member
The point is that, while being many, european producers have some issues in high numbers and infrastructure.
French, German or italian producers are companies that have extremely high-quality products and a vast catalogue, but they are really struggling to produce enough ammo to replenish those sent from the stocks to Ukr.
Bulgaria, Romania and Albania should still have many " soviet calibre " products in their companies catalogue.
I think they should focus in producing shells for AFU while phasing out their soviet-era equipments ( which is still the vast majority in many eastern european countries ).
The amount of soviet era equipment still used by those countries is immense, and only a small part was sent to Ukraine.
Wise choice, of course ( no one wants to give their weapons to someone else ) but NATO should really focus more on the transition to western-made equipments.
We can continue supplying Ukrainian armed forces with those weapons and vehicles, without having to send modern equipment.

Also, as Vivendi was correctly and wisely saying, not every country wants to support Ukraine.
And it is extremely understandable.
Countries like Cyprus, Malta, Switzerland, Serbia, Bosnia... have close ties with Russian economy and are home of many russian-born citizens. Its really not a surprise that Switzerland doesnt want to support one side, I do understand their position.
 

swerve

Super Moderator
The UK will announce a new package soon that will include supply of "hundreds of thousands of rounds of artillery ammunition next year" UK to Announce Major New Artillery Package for Ukraine (voanews.com)

This is clearly not enough -- however one should keep in mind that:

1. The US will increase production to 20,000 per month early next year: Army plans ‘dramatic’ ammo production boost as Ukraine drains stocks (defensenews.com)

2. Most European producers have small capacities but they are many so it adds up, e.g.:
2a. Czech republic is producing 80,000-100,000 shells per year, and in the process of expanding to 150,000 per year Ukrajině docházejí zásoby munice. NATO chce rozjet továrny v ČR a na Slovensku - Echo24.cz

2b. I did not find any figures for Bulgaria however the production capacity should be larger than Czech republic. Ammo and equipment for more than EUR1 billion was exported through intermediaries to Ukraine in 2022. Military Production - DEZAMET S.A. medium-calibre ammunition, mortar and artillery ammunition

2c. Slovakia also has ammo factories -- for instance one in Snina is currently producing 19,000 shells per year, with plans to expand to 100,000 per year Snina plant to produce ammunition for Ukraine and NATO countries - spectator.sme.sk

2d. Poland also has ammunition production capacity, e.g., Military Production - DEZAMET S.A. medium-calibre ammunition, mortar and artillery ammunition

2e. Several Western European countries have various ammo production capacities, including Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland* (and probably several others that I have missed)

*Switzerland will not allow transfer to Ukraine however a European country can donate their own ammo to Ukraine and backfill their own stocks with ammo from Switzerland -- (this is also being done with ammo from South Korea btw).

It's impossible to get a clear picture, however, looking at the above incomplete list I suspect lack of ammo may not be the biggest issue for Ukraine moving forward.
You can add the UK to that list. There's a factory in NE England which makes shells, & another (in Wales IIRC) which fills them. Production capacity is currently limited by manpower: more workers would be needed to run extra shifts. Manufacturing capacity for fuses might also be a limit.
 

vonnoobie

Well-Known Member
The UK will announce a new package soon that will include supply of "hundreds of thousands of rounds of artillery ammunition next year" UK to Announce Major New Artillery Package for Ukraine (voanews.com)

This is clearly not enough -- however one should keep in mind that:

1. The US will increase production to 20,000 per month early next year: Army plans ‘dramatic’ ammo production boost as Ukraine drains stocks (defensenews.com)

2. Most European producers have small capacities but they are many so it adds up, e.g.:
2a. Czech republic is producing 80,000-100,000 shells per year, and in the process of expanding to 150,000 per year Ukrajině docházejí zásoby munice. NATO chce rozjet továrny v ČR a na Slovensku - Echo24.cz

2b. I did not find any figures for Bulgaria however the production capacity should be larger than Czech republic. Ammo and equipment for more than EUR1 billion was exported through intermediaries to Ukraine in 2022. Military Production - DEZAMET S.A. medium-calibre ammunition, mortar and artillery ammunition

2c. Slovakia also has ammo factories -- for instance one in Snina is currently producing 19,000 shells per year, with plans to expand to 100,000 per year Snina plant to produce ammunition for Ukraine and NATO countries - spectator.sme.sk

2d. Poland also has ammunition production capacity, e.g., Military Production - DEZAMET S.A. medium-calibre ammunition, mortar and artillery ammunition

2e. Several Western European countries have various ammo production capacities, including Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland* (and probably several others that I have missed)

*Switzerland will not allow transfer to Ukraine however a European country can donate their own ammo to Ukraine and backfill their own stocks with ammo from Switzerland -- (this is also being done with ammo from South Korea btw).

It's impossible to get a clear picture, however, looking at the above incomplete list I suspect lack of ammo may not be the biggest issue for Ukraine moving forward.
Not to mention Australia which has had two factories start actively producing 155mm shells this year in Benalla VIC and Maryborough QLD. Hard to actually get numbers though one article (though it doesnt indicate its source https://www.theaustralian.com.au/sp...s/news-story/634788501d744eb5f9aaed960af76af2) states Maryboroughhas a capcity of 100,000 shells a year at full capacity... and allegedly most modern and advanced 155mm plat in the world.
 

STURM

Well-Known Member
The non-relenting efforts made by Zelensky is inspiring -- a true war time leader!
Indeed. He has emerged as exactly the type of leader his country requires. The fact that he has the full backing of various countries also plays a part: unlike some other wartime leaders who had to beg, cajole or convince others that assistance was needed. Eventually this war will end [we hope it doesn't end with a nuclear exchange which will see the end of Europe] and Zelensky will have to make hard choices; some of which might not be palatable for the Ukrainian public [,unlike his counterpart in Moscow he's answerable to ordinary citizens] and he will have to make the transition from a wartime to a peacetime leader.

Yes I'm fully aware that the West should back the Ukrainians as long as they intend on fighting; that nobody should force the Ukrainians to make any hard decisions or concessions and that the war can end the minute Russia decides it has to end [heard all this numerous times]. Ultimately however the reality is that unless the Russian military collapses as it did in WW1 or a new Russian leader takes over and decides to end hostilities the war will continue and certain concessions will have to be made by both sides: that is the major hindrance or challenge.

Unfortunately we have not reached the stage where there are indications of how and when the war will end.
 
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Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
It appears Russia is dead set on a continued and protracted war effort. Some truly napoleonic plans have just been announced. The armed forces will be scaled up to 1.5 mln men. So the mobilization isn't the last increase in size. West MD is being split up into the Moscow and Leningrad MDs. 3 new motor-rifle divisions are to be formed, and an army corps in Kareliya (presumably combining the 80th and 200th Arctic Motor-Rifles). 7 motor-rifle brigades are to be converted into divisions across West and Center MD (a reminder current bdes are about 1/3rd the size of a Soviet MRD or 40% the size of a Russian Shoygu-era MRD, though their size varies so this is a generalization), two new para-assault divisions in the VDV, all 5 Marine bdes to be upgraded to divisions, and 3 new air divisions with 8 new bomber regiments (Russia classifies Su-24/34 units as bomber rgts), 1 new fighter rgt, and 6 brigades of army aviation. Each MD is to get an artillery division, so 5 total, and a "high-power artillery bde" (this likely means a super-heavy artillery bde, probably consisting of 1 btln each of 2S4s and 2S7s).

I have some serious questions about this. In principle Russia can produce the equipment, but not quickly. Even optimistically Russia can't put out more then ~2500 light armor vehicles per year, and this is everything, BMPs, BMDs, BTRs, armored trucks, Tigr armored cars, etc. I suppose with a significant mobilization effort production of simpler armored trucks can be increased beyond that point, but their value would be increasingly questionable. But where does one get this many tanks? Let's take the lightest possible variant, a new-style MRD with two MRRgts and no armored rgt. That's 2 tank btlns per division. And let's assume these are Soviet-era tank btln ORBATs, so 31 tanks. 3 new divisions is 6 new tank btlns, upgrading 7 bdes into divisions means adding a second tank btln to each. That's 13 tank btlns, or ~400 tanks. Russia hasn't even replaced losses of tanks in existing units... and it gets trickier when you consider that in principle Marine bdes currently have one tank btln each. Upgrading to a division would presumably involve either decoupling the tank btln from the marine regiments and forming a division-level tank rgt, or adding a second tank btln since at least two rgts per division would be needed. To me it seems almost guaranteed that most if not all of this equipment would have to come from storage. Now we've seen significant quantities of early-variant T-72s on trains, but basically none on the front line. We've also seen a new T-72B3 variant, we're calling the T-72B3mod'22 for the time being. Of course T-90M production is continuing and has even increased, though I'd be surprised if it's more then 100 per year at this point. Overall we're likely to see formations with increasing numbers of older vehicles, especially in the IFV category, and even with increasing numbers of lighter armored vehicles, namely armored trucks*, as primary transports instead of the typical IFVs/APCs. Towed guns are likely going to be the norm too. 2S19M2 (Msta-SM) production does exist and 2 btlns a year has been the norm. This could probably be increased, but not to the tune of 3 new MRDs, 7 MRDs converted from MRBdes, and 5 Marine Divs converted from Bdes. Even so there's an open question whether Russia has the artillery tubes available. The super-heavies should be the easiest, since barely any were being used pre-war and considerable Soviet-era inventory exists, but the rest is questionable. They didn't send D-1s to the LNR because of how plentiful their stockpiles are.

Now on to the aircraft. In the collapse of the Soviet Union tens of thousands of pieces of fairly complex military equipment were "put in storage". I place that in quotation marks because often storage simply meant parking them in some field, near or on a military base (current or former) and then simply leaving them there. Entire national armies could be armed with the equipment that was essentially abandoned across Russia (just Russia, we're ignoring the rest of the USSR) after the collapse. Armored hulls are pretty sturdy, so you can take a BTR-60/70 or BMP-1 hull that's been sitting on an abandoned base for 30 years, and potentially return the vehicle to service. Doing this with aircraft is significantly more problematic. To be fair many aircraft were at least partially prepared for storage, more-so then ground vehicles, with engines and electronics often removed and stored separately. But overall it's far more problematic. Looking at the numbers, we can see only one fighter rgt. This is likely partially a response to the lack of enemy aircraft. But I suspect it's mostly because there aren't very many fighters to return to service available. Are there bombers to return to service? Well.... yes. The Su-34 production is over 120 aircraft, and continuing at a steady pace. Initially they were phasing out the Su-24Ms. These aircraft were not retired during the chaos and collapse of the USSR. They were retired mostly over the past 10 years, and many are still in working condition. They were also allegedly stored much better. Is there 8 rgts** worth of them? Possibly, when you consider the Naval Aviation replaced their Su-24s with Su-30SMs. However in terms of capabilities this is definitely a major step back. What about helos? 6 new army aviation brigades of 80-100 helos? Russia peaked helicopter production at 350 units per year in the early 2010s, but it's unclear if Russia can still produce this many. On the other hand Russia has mass produced late-model Mi-17 variants to replace most of the Soviet Mi-8 inventory, and has replaced a significant portion of their Mi-24s with 28s and Ka-52s. Presumably many of the helos for the new brigades would come from those. Russia actually had a problem for the helicopter manufacturing sector before the war; not enough orders. Russia's traditional customers had replaced most of their transport fleets with the admittedly excellent Mi-8/17 family. Russia's newer attack helos, the Ka-52s and Mi-28s, weren't doing as well on the market as the ubiquitous Mi-24 once did. In principle the helicopter portion is the least problematic piece. But either way for aircraft we're looking at an effort that will likely take the better part of a decade, and will probably drain resources from both the continuing development of more advanced aircraft and procurement of the Su-57***.

To sum this up, this is a massive effort, that drastically increases the size of the military. Something of this nature was to be expected and it's likely some of these units already exist. 300k mobilized personnel weren't just there to replace losses, Russia's entire grouping in Ukraine was less then 300k by a significant margin (MoD specifically likely less then 150k). This is all in principle possible, but some serious compromises will have to be made when forming these units. Questions of comms, and UAS come to mind. Logistics are likely going to be a nightmare. I don't see any news of MTO Bdes**** being formed. I also have to question the utility of pulling a bunch of jets out of storage. Russia can't even fully utilize it's existing inventory, while simultaneously losing jets at a problematic rate. I would argue that investing more heavily into EW, AEW, ELINT, and SEAD/DEAD kit would give far greater return on investment, but inertia is hard to fight. Now for the economic pieces, can Russia afford this? Sure. But the cost is going to be "unpleasant" and will cause serious problems for Russian economic and societal development for years if not decades to come. A choice has been made, and a price will be paid. Will this win the war? No. The war can't be "won" in the conventional manner, short of total mobilization followed by a massive drive on Kiev.

*Please don't confuse armored trucks with MRAPs, they're not the same. One is a purpose built military vehicle designed to some very stringent specifications, the other is an existing military truck, modified with armor. It can be relatively well protected especially compared to a typical BTR-80, but it's no MRAP
** Russian aviation regiments are typically 24-36 combat jets with 1-3 trainers (two-seaters), so closer to a western squadron in size
*** One Russian fighter regiment has begun training for the Su-57 conversion so the program is continuing and production is still ongoing
**** MTO Bdes are Бригада Материально-Технического Обеспечения , or Material-Technical Support Bdes, Russia's largest logistics formations, pre-war each combined arms army got one of these

 

Vivendi

Well-Known Member
Yes I'm fully aware that the West should back the Ukrainians as long as they intend on fighting; that nobody should force the Ukrainians to make any hard decisions or concessions and that the war can end the minute Russia decides it has to end [heard all this numerous times]. Ultimately however the reality is that unless the Russian military collapses as it did in WW1 or a new Russian leader takes over and decides to end hostilities the war will continue and certain concessions will have to be made by both sides: that is the major hindrance or challenge.

Unfortunately we have not reached the stage where there are indications of how and when the war will end.
I agree that unless the Russian military collapses or a new Russian leader that decides to end hostilities takes over the war will continue. However I strongly disagree that Ukraine or "the West" should make concessions. This is definitely not a situation where one should make any concessions. I recommend you to read the following: Target Russia’s Capability, Not Its Intent | Institute for the Study of War (understandingwar.org)

Hopefully European countries, and the Biden administration soon understand the gravity of the situation. Ukraine should get what they ask for, ASAP. Including ATACMS, fighter jets, more artillery, Western tanks, more air defence systems, more missiles, more ammo, more training, etc. Whatever it takes, "the West" should and must deliver. And sooner rather than later. There are no good options for "the West" in this situation. However the least bad option is to make sure Ukraine regains full control of their territory, and make sure they will get the military resources to deter Russia from further aggression in the future.
 

STURM

Well-Known Member
However I strongly disagree that Ukraine or "the West" should make concessions. This is definitely not a situation where one should make any concessions..
Somehow I knew you would disagree.

As it stands; unless we have a situation of unconditional surrender or one side collapsing; most wars end with a concessions being made as a condition for peace being achieved... It would be naive to believe that this war will end with absolutely no concessions being made by both sides.
 

Vivendi

Well-Known Member
As it stands; unless we have a situation of unconditional surrender or one side collapsing; most wars end with a concessions being made as a condition for peace being achieved... It would be naive to believe that this war will end with absolutely no concessions being made by both sides.
Some quotes from the articles I linked to above:

Putin’s goals in Ukraine always exceeded countering NATO or forcing Ukraine into neutrality. Despite Western assumptions, Putin has never been content with the territorial gains he made in Ukraine in 2014 because control of Ukraine, not its territory, has been his goal. The Kremlin has made clear in word and action over the past 20 years that it will accept nothing less than full control over Ukraine.
[...]
The inflexibility of the Kremlin’s intent goes beyond Ukraine. Russia’s goal to completely subordinate the Belarussian military likewise remains unchanged. This effort has been impeded by Russian setbacks in Ukraine, which provided Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko room to maneuver. If Russia solidifies its gains in Ukraine, the Kremlin will most certainly try to complete the absorption of Belarus and—critically—link its military gains between Ukraine and Belarus. Moldova has been also high on the Kremlin’s list for years. Over the long term, the Kremlin could try to link its territorial gains beyond Ukraine by integrating other territories that Russia illegally occupies, such as Transnistria. This would impose dramatically different military posture requirements on NATO, which would be especially challenging if the US is required to act in the Pacific.

Putin’s goals regarding the United States have not changed either. Putin made clear in a recent speech that he still intends to "collapse the Western hegemony." Stabilizing Russia’s gains in Ukraine would provide the Kremlin with additional bandwidth to pursue this goal.


The recently announced massive expansion of Russian armed forces just underlines the gravity of the situation. Unfortunately Russia still makes a lot of money from sales of oil and gas and can therefore fund the aggression.

One should also consider that the situation can become much worse. Iran and Russia have already started a military collaboration. A "nightmare scenario" would be if China started aggressive actions in Asia, and teamed up with Russia and Iran in a new "axis powers" arrangement.
A DW item on the spend up including interview with a former advisor to former Japanese PM Abe. What he has to say is quite interesting.
In the interview linked to above, the Professor mentions not only North Korea and China as potential threats to Japan, but also Russia is mentioned. Clearly, it's not only Europe and the US that are concerned about Russian aggression.
 

SolarisKenzo

Well-Known Member
...

Hopefully European countries, and the Biden administration soon understand the gravity of the situation. Ukraine should get what they ask for, ASAP. Including ATACMS, fighter jets, more artillery, Western tanks, more air defence systems, more missiles, more ammo, more training, etc. Whatever it takes, "the West" should and must deliver. And sooner rather than later. There are no good options for "the West" in this situation. However the least bad option is to make sure Ukraine regains full control of their territory, and make sure they will get the military resources to deter Russia from further aggression in the future.
I disagree.
The west should provide enough equipment to Ukraine to maximize russian losses.
It is not in the interest of the west to see Ukraine becoming a military power thanks to their leased equipment.
Instead, western countries should transition to new military equipment and in the meanwhile send their dismissed stocks to Ukraine.
In addition to that, we should give Ukraine modern missile systems, to help them protect their energetic infrastructures and cities from russian terroristic bombings.
But long-range weapons, modern fighter jets or cruise missiles should be out of question.
Luckily, thats not only my idea, but the idea of every single military leader in NATO.

Oh, I'm not scared they could launch a cruise missile and hit a bridge in Volgograd.
I couldnt care less about that.
My point is that giving advanced weapons to an unstable country, which is not NATO or EU, is a risk no one wants to take.
We will not see long-range weapons given to Ukraine anytime soon, I'm quite confident about that...
 

swerve

Super Moderator
Somehow I knew you would disagree.

As it stands; unless we have a situation of unconditional surrender or one side collapsing; most wars end with a concessions being made as a condition for peace being achieved... It would be naive to believe that this war will end with absolutely no concessions being made by both sides.
But making concessions to an aggressor means conceding defeat & rewarding aggression. Do you think we should reward Putin for invading Ukraine? What will the future consequences of that be? It would encourage more aggression, & not only by Russia.

BTW, what concessions do you think Ukraine should make to Putin?
 

Vivendi

Well-Known Member
Good news from the North:

Finland is preparing the 11th package of defence materiel to be delivered to Ukraine, with a value of EUR 28.8 million. The combined value of all defence materiel packages submitted to Ukraine from Finland is now EUR 189.2 million. In addition, the Finnish Defence Forces will continue to provide training support to the Ukrainian armed forces in Great Britain until the end of 2023. Finland continues to support Ukraine - Puolustusministeriö (defmin.fi)

Sweden will provide additional 200 million SEK (19.2 million USD) to fund Ukrainian military equipment purchases and training. Kristersson: Stöd på 200 miljoner till Ukraina (di.se)

Denmark is providing additional 300 million DKK (43 million USD) to fund Ukrainian military equipment purchases and training. Danmark bevilger ytterligere 300 millioner til innkjøp av våpen til Ukraina – Siste nytt – NRK

Norway intends to also deliver more -- however, due to the urgency, and the long manufacturing times, Norway is considering to also deliver military equipment that is "used daily" by Norwegian armed forces. Mer militær støtte til Ukraina: – Vi må strekke oss lenger - VG


These are minor contributions compared to what the US is providing, nevertheless, it helps, and "it all adds up" when a large number of countries make contributions.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
But making concessions to an aggressor means conceding defeat & rewarding aggression. Do you think we should reward Putin for invading Ukraine? What will the future consequences of that be? It would encourage more aggression, & not only by Russia.

BTW, what concessions do you think Ukraine should make to Putin?
Negotiations require concessions. Either the war continues until the bitter end, and it might be bitter for more then one party, or concessions have to be made. If you're willing to give nothing, you get nothing.

EDIT: There is contradictory information coming out about Kremennaya. Pro-Russian sources are reporting a minor Russian advance, but others claim that Ukraine is advancing towards the town. Specifics are currently lacking, though each side has some footage to back up their claim. Warning footage of corpses.

 

STURM

Well-Known Member
Do you think we should reward Putin for invading Ukraine? What will the future consequences of that be?
I call it realpolitik and practicality rather than reward. Do you think this war will end with the Ukraine achieving all of its aims and the Russians agreeing to cease hostilities in exchange for nothing? Short of a situation where we have unconditional surrender or one side breaking apart can you point me to one major war which ended without any form of concessions by either side?

The notion that the Ukraine should not or won't make any concessions is centered on the premise that the overall situation continues to be favorable but things might change; then again they might not but there will reach a point where both sides would desire a cessation of hostilities.

BTW, what concessions do you think Ukraine should make to Putin?
It's not what concessions I think the Ukraine should make but certain concessions I think they will make as part of any peace settlement. Are you suggesting that if there was a chance for a ceasefire and that Zelensky and his foreign backers felt it could succeed; that Zelensky wont budge an inch?

Personally; I find the notion that Russia will willingly give up the Crimea and all other areas willingly to be far fetched. I will also not assume that tonnes of assistance from the West and Ukrainian grit will result in the Russians being totally ejected from the Ukraine.

As part of any peace deal Russia will have certain conditions and certain conditions will have to be met in order for a peace deal to be realised; not a reward but a hard reality. Similarly; Russia too will be expected to make certain concessions as the price for peace; whether or not any peace deal is temporary is another question but the fact remains that the war ultimately has to end. Another question is despite announcements that the West will not pressure the Ukraine to do anything it doesn't want to do [of course the West would say that]; will this actually hold true in the future in the dynamics have been altered? History is ripe with examples of smaller powers being sacrificed on the alter of big power politics and self interests.
 
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STURM

Well-Known Member
One should also consider that the situation can become much worse.
'One should also consider' that it's still early days and that conditions might change; despite their current favourable position the Ukrainians have been badly hit; despite huge losses and a bad economy the Russians still have a lot of fight left in them; despite all the aid granted to the Ukrainians the Russians are still not defeated; it might not be in the interests of the West for it to drag on indefinitely and that irrespective of how much they want the Ukranians to win and see Russia weakened and humbled that the West has a limit to how far it will push things.

Iran and Russia have already started a military collaboration. A "nightmare scenario" would be if China started aggressive actions in Asia, and teamed up with Russia and Iran in a new "axis powers" arrangement.
Russia and Iran have had various forms of collaboration for decades and the only difference is that things have been taken to a new level. As for China; irrespective of whether Russian was bogged down in the Ukraine or not it would still undertake military operations in the Asia Pacific if it felt it had no choice. The main role Russia occupies in this regard is that it keeps the U.S. focused and tied down in the West.

The prospect of a new "axis powers" arrangement is unlikely as although Russia, China and Iran have similar concerns and interests there is a limit to t how all 3 will go with regards to cooperation as all 3 also have very different aims

Clearly, it's not only Europe and the US that are concerned about Russian aggression.
This is hardly a revelation; even China is worried about Russian aggression" in the Ukraine because it's bad for business and may lead to nukes flying.
 
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tonnyc

Well-Known Member
BTW, what concessions do you think Ukraine should make to Putin?
I am not the guy you asked but my own two cents is that the concessions that Ukraine may find palatable is not pursuing the extradition of Russians involved in war crimes and allowing anyone within Ukraine who wishes to leave and become a Russian citizen to do just that. Maybe with the possibility of recognizing the Russian language as an official dialect of Ukrainian.

Prior to February it might be possible to concede Crimea, but today longer politically feasible. Too much blood now.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Update. Nov 29th-30th

Kherson-Nikolaev-Odessa.

A look at a Ukrainian D-20 hit by a loitering munition in Kherson region.


LDNR Front.

DNR forces assaulting Ukrainian positions, exact location and context unclear.


DNR 100th Bde dropping grenades on an abandoned Ukrainian tank near Nevel'skoe. The village itself is partially contested.


DNR 100th Bde strikes a Ukrainian tank. Location unclear.


More DNR copter-grenade footage. Location and context unclear.


LNR 2S1s firing on Ukrainian positions near Severnoe.


DNR strikes Ukrainian infantry near Vodyanoe. After the initial advance, rebel forces there appear to be stalled.


DNR sniper using thermals, exact location unclear.


Allegedly Ukrainian vehicles near Bogoyavlenka, near Ugledar, getting hit.


Ukrainian forces operating an American 60mm mortar, Artemovsk/Bakhmut.


Russian/rebel shelling of Ukrainian positions near Artemovsk/Bakhmut.


A destroyed Ukrainian KrAZ armored truck near Nevskoe.


A knocked out/destroyed Ukrainian BTR-4 being pulled out of the mud, near Artemovsk/Bakhmut.


Shelling of Donestk continues. We see HARMs used again.


Ukraine stuck a transformer in Lugansk region using commercial UAVs converted into loitering munitions.


Chechen fighters at the Bakhmut-1 rail station.


Reportedly Kudryumovka, south of Bakhmut, remains contested.


Allegedly Ukrainian jets in the sky near Bakhmut. We have two Su-25s, likely a strike package, accompanied by a MiG-29, their escort.


Russian T-90Ms near Artemovsk/Bakhmut.


Russian T-90M in Lugansk region.


Russian Ka-52 and Mi-28N in the sky over Donetsk.


Russia.

A fuel storage in Bryansk got hit.


Russian air defenses firing over Belgorod region.


Russian mobilized personnel training with ATGMs in Kaliningrad region.


Misc.

Russian loitering munition takes out a Ukrainian MT-LB, location and context unclear.


A Ukranian Novator armored car destroyed by a Russian tank shell.


A Ukrainian Mamba Mk2 EE destroyed, allegedly belonging to Kraken.


A damaged Ukrainian BTR-4 moving on deflated tires. Location and context unclear.


Russian Su-25s over the Donbas.


A scarce Russian thermobaric hand grenade has show up in Ukraine.


Russian fighters with a BMP-2M in Ukraine. Given the uniforms this suggests that we're looking at Cossack irregulars, that were spotted with BMP-2Ms earlier.


A column of Ukrainian Kipri MRAPs, 35th MarBde, possible near Artemovsk/Bakhmut.


NATO/EU.

Estonia will deliver 14 THeMIS unmanned platforms to Ukraine under a contract with Germany.


French M270 variants have apparently arrived in Ukraine.


Slovakia reportedly handed over 30 BMP-1s to Ukraine.


Italian FH-70s seen towed by an Iveco Astra truck for the first time.


European Commission president Ursula von der Leyden stated that 100 000 Ukrainian military officers had been killed. Obviously 100k officers haven't been killed, but 100k total KIA? Russia's figure is ~135K Ukrainian KIA. Of course this figure was quickly back pedaled. In my assessment this figure is not outside the realm of possibility but it seems high.

 
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