The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

seaspear

Well-Known Member
With Russia announcing a potential increase in the size of its army to levels not seen in over thirty years certainly the levels of equipment back in 1990 was impressive
Russia Military Size 1992-2022 | MacroTrends
Russian Military Announces Plan to Expand, Create New Units | Military.com
Soviet Army | Military Wiki | Fandom
This article citing Orynx states Russia has lost over five thousand confirmed military vehicles and over a quarter of available tanks and production of new tanks has slowed if not stopped due to sanctions
Russia Has Lost 5,000 Military Vehicles in Ukraine War: Analysis (newsweek.com)
This Orynx article from earlier details losses of equipment donated to Ukraine
How Is Russia Faring Against NATO Equipment In Ukraine? A Tally - Oryx (oryxspioenkop.com)
Russia according to this author is changing the nature of its economy to a military economy taking over from the private sector avoiding a recession with the large increase in military spending
Deeper Troubles for Russia’s Economy in 2023 - Raam op Rusland
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
There are reports that Russia may be preparing a major offensive into western Ukraine from Belarus, and has massed 90 000 troops there. The goal is speculated to be to cut off the current front line from the western border. It strikes me as pretty fantastical and if true unlikely to succeed. If such troops are really available and offensives are really intended, a push on Kharkov or Zaporozhye would probably be better use of these troops. Russian sources keep stating that about ~150 000 of the mobilized personnel are in the war zone, and the rest are not. It's possible they're the forces sitting in Belarus for this offensive. Dates are speculated to be Dec 25-26th, so we're probably going to find out soon if this is happening or not.

 

Sycarion

New Member
Hi guys, I'm new here and this is my first ever post/question since I usually just lurk and read.

I tried to search before asking this question but I can't seem to find the answer.

Since Zelensky's recent visit to the US, ATACMS (and the US' continued refusal to giving it to Ukraine) has been a hot topic in the news again. Especially, when framed in relation to stopping russian missile strikes on the ukrainian power grid. My question is: will ATACMS even stop these strikes?

ATACMS has a 300 km range, Kalibr and other russian cruise missiles used in these strikes, especially when air launched, outrange this. I mean sure, it could be used to strike airbases within 300 km from the border and make them unusable, but couldn't Russia just move the launch platforms (bombers, fighters, etc.) further back and launch from there?

I know that ATACMS could technically be used for other purposes (like striking the Kerch bridge), but I'm more interested in how it would affect the missile strikes since a lot of media coverage is going with that angle. Thanks!
 

tonnyc

Well-Known Member
ATACMS can't stop long range missile strikes. Your deduction is correct. The media is often erroneous or overly simplistic, so we all have to filter the information. I don't mean that we should dismiss them outright, because sometimes they will get it right and even the wrong ones may give us insight or raw data.

ATACMS will complicate the logistical burden on the OPFOR and this may indirectly reduce the intensity and tempo of the missile strikes. After all, if Russia has to move their missile launchers back a few hundred km, that's an extra burden. And the hundred or two hundred km means extra warning time, which will allow more air defenses to get readied to intercept the missiles. But these and other effects are all indirect effects.
 

seaspear

Well-Known Member
I have tried to find an accurate determination of the amount of equipment Russia still has to deploy as there are wildly different assessments, ready to come out of storage ,I am referring of course to tanks armoured personnel carriers even artillery systems and what these hundreds of thousands new Russian recruits will be using
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Update. Dec 1st-4th

Kherson-Nikolaev-Odessa.

Russia is striking Chernobaevka, Kherson region.


Russian strikes landed in Kherson, power outages are being reported.


Ukrainian soldier in Kherson complains that parts of the city are easily reached by sniper fire and 120mm mortars.


Russian Amur military train and railroad troops scouting the tracks and repairing damage, Kherson region.


A power transformer blew in Odessa due to overload.


Zaporozhye-Dnepropetrovsk.

A Russian strike landing in Zaporozhye. One of the targets was a transformer factory. Note this is a series of strikes between Dec 1st and 4th.


Russian Buk-M2 unit in Zaporozhye area.


An S-300 missile booster stage, in Dnepropetrovsk area.


The North.

Ukrainian Stormer and Stinger air defenses around Kiev.


In Chernigov Ukraine is apparently removing some high-voltage power lines.


Civilians in Kiev are being advised to dig outhouses to prevent overloading the sewers. Presumably this is due to damage from Russian strikes.

 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Oskol Front.

Apparently Ukraine's 25th Para-assault Bde attempted to attack Russian positions east of Krasniy Liman, but failed and lost as 13 POWs.


There are reports that Russia hit the 125th btln of the 113th Territorial Defense Bde killing 36 service members, WIAs unclear.


Russian UCAV strike on a Ukrainian checkpoint and Ukrainian vehicles near Volchansk. It's labeled Forpost but this might be a Mohajer.


Ukrainian UAV allegedly brought down by Russian EW near Kremennaya.


The Kupyansk-Uzlovaya rail station stands in ruins.


LDNR Front.

Footage of a failed Ukrainian attack near Peski, where a mobile team consisting of 2 MBTs, a BMP-2, and a Shilka, covered by helos, attacked DNR 11th Rgt positions, but ultimately failed. We can see the BMP-2 burning.


The same spot but filmed from a different angle, we can see the burning BMP.


Russian tank fires in Mar'inka.


LNR 4th Bde taking out a Ukrainian BMP near Spornoe.


Some footage of Russian troops assaulting Vodyanoe. Note, it's unclear if this is old or current. The village may or may not still be contested. Prior to this we had footage of Ukrainian positions north of Vodyanoe getting hit but it was always by UAVs.


Some footage of continuing combat in Pervomayskoe, DNR 11th Rgt.


Russian Su-25s near Pervomayskoe/Nevel'skoe area. Note, one effect of the Russian air war against Ukrainian power infrastructure is that many air defenses had to be pulled back from the front line to protect cities.


Fires burn in Kramatorsk, after Russian strikes against the industrial area of town, and against a Ukrainian munition storage.


Some footage of Ukrainian forces in Artemovsk/Bakhmut, including a look at an HQ.


The sound of gunfire, Opytnoe south of Artemovsk/Bakhmut remains contested.


Russia lost an Su-34 near Artemovsk/Bakhmut.


Russian 2S4 firing on Artemovsk/Bakhmut.


Footage of Artemovsk/Bakhmut from the skies. The city is slowly being reduced to rubble.


A Ukrainian T-72M after an ATGM hit, near Artemovsk/Bakhmut. Presumably it survived, probably due to the ERA working as intended.


Ukrainian WIAs in Artemovsk/Bakhmut, warning graphic footage.


Apparently a failed Ukrainian counter-attack against Wagner positions in Kudryumovka, an M113 burns. Warning footage of corpses.


Wagner fighters captured a knocked out M113 in Kudryumovka.


DNR artillery fires towards Avdeevka.


Russian infantry near Ugledar on BMP-2s, with an MBT (T-72B?), allegedly attempting an attack, when the front BMP hits a land mine. They then rapidly withdraw. Note, the tank isn't moving the entire time. Unclear why.


Shelling from Donetsk continues. HARM missiles were used, among other munitions. Warning footage of corpses.


Air defenses firing over Donetsk.


A college dormitory in Alchevsk got hit by reportedly a HIMARS strike.


Fuel storage in Shahtersk got hit, possibly HIMARS.


Wagner fighters near Kudryumovka and Ozaryanovka.


Wagner fighters in Zolotarevka and Verkhnekamenka, near Seversk.


A Ukrainian crossing near Artemovsk/Bakhmut, a knocked out BREM-1, YPR-765, and tractor.

 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Russia.

Russian air defenses firing, Belgorod region.


Belgorod region, Shebekino area, illumination rounds, possibly searching for Ukrainian infiltrators.


Mobilized VDV personnel preparing to ship to Ukraine.


Wagner fighters training in Mol'kino.


In Kazan mobilized personnel left their unit to visit friends and family because they were being kept in garrisons without any days out.


Mobilized personnel shipping out from Stavropol'.


More Russian volunteers are preparing to head to Ukraine.


Reportedly Russia has had to upgrade the software on Pantsyrs to better engage HIMARS.


There are unconfirmed reports of military deliveries from China to Russia.


Misc.

Ukrainian armored car gets a grenade dropped in the roof hatch, Russian/rebel quadcopter. Location unclear.


Allegedly a Russian Ka-52 getting shot down, location and context unclear.


Ukrainian 2S3 getting hit by a loitering munition. Possibly from November, location unclear.


Russian munition resupply vehicle comes under fire, soldiers take cover, one moves the burning truck away. All in all they got very lucky, if the ammo had cooked off, they would have all been killed.


Ukrainian machinegunners have a friendly fire incident in combat, due to a negligent discharge.


Russian recon unit from the 25th Motor-rifles in action. Location, context, and exact time unclear (note the lack of snow and green grass).


Russian Orlan-10 operations, Ukraine.


Ukrainian M101s firing, unclear if combat or training. Someone gets a Caesar howitzer. Someone gets a WWII-era towed gun.


Ukrainian Skif (Scythian) UAV downed. Note the production date, it's from 2016.


A captured T-90M, allegedly the second one. But again, green foliage, and a wooded area similar to what we saw the 30th Mech Bde in before. This might be the same one.


A Russian Pantsyr with battle damage from what appears to be small arms fire. It's an interesting reminder that it has an armored cabin.


Russian POWs returned. One of the recent exchanges, 50 for 50.


Ukrainian forces training, with a captured BMP-3 and multiple YPR-765s. The Right Sector flag is a nice touch.


A Ukrainian MT-LB/BRDM-2 hybrid.


Russian ATGMs teams, mobilized from South MD, training somewhere in Ukraine.


NATO/EU.

The 7th Zuzana-2 howitzer is heading to Ukraine.


Protests in Rome against supplying weapons to Ukraine.


Reportedly Spain supplied Ukraine their first MIM-23 Hawks.


Two more repairs PzH-2000s are coming back from Lithuania to Ukraine.

 

swerve

Super Moderator
The Economist recently interviewed generals Zaluzhnyi (head of armed forces) & Syrsky (army head). Paywall, I'm afraid, but one interesting point is that they said the Russians aren't idiots, & aren't attacking out of inertia, but have a purpose, & suggested they could be trying to fix Ukrainian forces in order to ease an attack elsewhere. They think the Russians are preparing an offensive.

An interview with General Valery Zaluzhny, head of Ukraine’s armed forces
“Anyone who underestimates Russia is headed for defeat”
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
The Economist recently interviewed generals Zaluzhnyi (head of armed forces) & Syrsky (army head). Paywall, I'm afraid, but one interesting point is that they said the Russians aren't idiots, & aren't attacking out of inertia, but have a purpose, & suggested they could be trying to fix Ukrainian forces in order to ease an attack elsewhere. They think the Russians are preparing an offensive.

An interview with General Valery Zaluzhny, head of Ukraine’s armed forces
“Anyone who underestimates Russia is headed for defeat”
There's a few things to talk about here.

1) Russia has been pushing on Artemovsk/Bakhmut for what 4-5 months now? And this entire time has been a fixing action? For what? In the time this has been going on Russia had a catastrophic retreat from Kharkov and an ordered withdrawal from Kherson, has lost Izyum and Krasniy Liman, and therefore lost the positions needed to exploit a withdrawal from Artemovsk/Bakhmut to attack Kramatorsk-Slavyansk. Russia has also given Ukraine plenty of time to build secondary defense lines at Chasoviy Yar. All of this to fix? Russia has begun and completed their mobilization all while Wagner has been pushing on Artemovsk/Bakhmut.

2) Russia has mobilized 300k troops, about half of which are deployed and the other half aren't yet. It's pretty obvious they're going to be used for some sort of offensive, they have to be. Fresh troops arriving on the front lines have allowed Russia to gain ground in several areas, including a push around Donetsk, through Peski, into the villages beyond, in Mar'inka gaining a few blocks at a time in this urban environment, in Pavlovka. None of these are decisive offensives, rather all appear to be opportunistic and likely a result of having the forces available. Obviously a major offensive is coming. It has to be. But if the fight at Artemovsk/Bakhmut is a fixing fight, it became that fairly recently, not as part of some clever plan.

3) Wagner is clearly fighting a private war. They broke through Ukrainian lines south of Artemovsk/Bakhmut earlier. This would have been a great time to throw reserves into the mix, threaten Chasoviy Yar or even attack it and force a withdrawal from Artemovsk/Bakhmut. But no reserves were available. Instead a few villages changed hands, and the offensive then stopped. This doesn't look like they have a bigger purpose.

I fully allow that this may end up having this effect but I don't buy the idea that this was the intent all along or part of some clever plan. It would make sense to execute in this manner now. But for the past 3+ months it's definitely been a combination of inertia and Prigozhin fighting his private war.


EDIT: It's looking like Russia is preparing its first T-14 btln. This has been my gut feeling since we first saw them getting used actively at the training ground in Kazan'. We are likely going to see some of them on the front lines though probably initially on a secondary axis like we did with the T-90Ms in Kharkov region.

 
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ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
There are reports that Russia may be preparing a major offensive into western Ukraine from Belarus, and has massed 90 000 troops there. The goal is speculated to be to cut off the current front line from the western border. It strikes me as pretty fantastical and if true unlikely to succeed. If such troops are really available and offensives are really intended, a push on Kharkov or Zaporozhye would probably be better use of these troops. Russian sources keep stating that about ~150 000 of the mobilized personnel are in the war zone, and the rest are not. It's possible they're the forces sitting in Belarus for this offensive. Dates are speculated to be Dec 25-26th, so we're probably going to find out soon if this is happening or not.

Yes there are reports elsewhere about a supposed Russian offensive from Belarus at some stage.
Hi guys, I'm new here and this is my first ever post/question since I usually just lurk and read.

I tried to search before asking this question but I can't seem to find the answer.

Since Zelensky's recent visit to the US, ATACMS (and the US' continued refusal to giving it to Ukraine) has been a hot topic in the news again. Especially, when framed in relation to stopping russian missile strikes on the ukrainian power grid. My question is: will ATACMS even stop these strikes?

ATACMS has a 300 km range, Kalibr and other russian cruise missiles used in these strikes, especially when air launched, outrange this. I mean sure, it could be used to strike airbases within 300 km from the border and make them unusable, but couldn't Russia just move the launch platforms (bombers, fighters, etc.) further back and launch from there?

I know that ATACMS could technically be used for other purposes (like striking the Kerch bridge), but I'm more interested in how it would affect the missile strikes since a lot of media coverage is going with that angle. Thanks!
The reason ATACMS hasn't been released to Ukraine is purely political and the reasoning given is in my opinion flawed. It appears that the White House are dead scared that providing such capabilities to Ukraine will provoke Putin, but jeez what about those dying in Ukraine from Putin's provocations. With its range ATACMS would like @tonyc has said force Russia to move it's ground based missile launchers back further from the front line.

However it would also give the Ukrainians the ability to strike at legitimate Russian logistics and military targets inside of the Russian border and it is my opinion that Ukraine should be given that ability. Is it an offensive action? I would classify it as defensive; defensive in depth and the Ukrainians are entitled to that. At present they are basically fighting with one hand tied behind their back because they don't have the tools to do unto the enemy what the enemy is doing unto them. I think it's time that the White House put its big girl panties on and faced down Putin properly by supplying Ukraine with ATACMS, tanks and aircraft; what it needs to win the war and evict Russia from its territory. It's time to cause some pain on Russian soil.

The second point is that Russia sits inside the relative safety of Belarus and attacks Ukraine. Maybe it's time that Lushenko is given a real warning and told in no uncertain terms what the price will be for him personally and for Belarus if the Russians launch another offensive from Belarussian territory. There are ways that word of such a warning could be disseminated to and amongst the Belarussian population.
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
There's a few things to talk about here.

1) Russia has been pushing on Artemovsk/Bakhmut for what 4-5 months now? And this entire time has been a fixing action? For what? In the time this has been going on Russia had a catastrophic retreat from Kharkov and an ordered withdrawal from Kherson, has lost Izyum and Krasniy Liman, and therefore lost the positions needed to exploit a withdrawal from Artemovsk/Bakhmut to attack Kramatorsk-Slavyansk. Russia has also given Ukraine plenty of time to build secondary defense lines at Chasoviy Yar. All of this to fix? Russia has begun and completed their mobilization all while Wagner has been pushing on Artemovsk/Bakhmut.

2) Russia has mobilized 300k troops, about half of which are deployed and the other half aren't yet. It's pretty obvious they're going to be used for some sort of offensive, they have to be. Fresh troops arriving on the front lines have allowed Russia to gain ground in several areas, including a push around Donetsk, through Peski, into the villages beyond, in Mar'inka gaining a few blocks at a time in this urban environment, in Pavlovka. None of these are decisive offensives, rather all appear to be opportunistic and likely a result of having the forces available. Obviously a major offensive is coming. It has to be. But if the fight at Artemovsk/Bakhmut is a fixing fight, it became that fairly recently, not as part of some clever plan.

3) Wagner is clearly fighting a private war. They broke through Ukrainian lines south of Artemovsk/Bakhmut earlier. This would have been a great time to throw reserves into the mix, threaten Chasoviy Yar or even attack it and force a withdrawal from Artemovsk/Bakhmut. But no reserves were available. Instead a few villages changed hands, and the offensive then stopped. This doesn't look like they have a bigger purpose.

I fully allow that this may end up having this effect but I don't buy the idea that this was the intent all along or part of some clever plan. It would make sense to execute in this manner now. But for the past 3+ months it's definitely been a combination of inertia and Prigozhin fighting his private war.
Wagner.
We may have to consider that Wagner is fighting two, possibly three wars:
  1. The first against Ukraine.
  2. The second against the Russian army.
  3. The third against Prigozhin's political enemies.
The first war is self explanatory.

The second and third wars are driven by Prigozhin's political ambitions and his positioning for the post Putin era when there will be a power vacuum. Both he and Kadyrov have their own PMCs (Private Military Company's) in the field and have built up powerbases. When Putin dies or is removed there will be a vacuum because he has no known designated successor and therein lies the problem. But does Prigozhin want Putin's job or is he after something else? It is suggested that he might formally enter politics and could become Putin's successor.
What the rise of Prigozhin and Kadyrov tell us about Russia

Prigozhin bears a grudge against the military especially against Minister of Defence Shoigu who fired his Deputy Minister in 2014. This deputy Minister was responsible for Prigozhin obtaining highly lucrative defence contracts. As he and Kadyrov have gained influence in Putin's inner circle and the Russian army has performed a tad poorly, the PMCs have come to the fore appearing to be better than the military due to propaganda and in Prigozhin's case by his control of information. But this has the potential to lead to alienation of the military and provoke an internecine struggle for control within the Russian Federation, with the possible collapse of the state. And that would be a nightmare.

Wagner have a very harsh discipline and infamously one of their members was executed by sledgehammer for desertion to the enemy.

An interesting interview with an ex Wagner mercenary who's now on their wanted list for opening his mouth about them.

IF and that's a big if, Prigozhin succeeds in discrediting the Russian military in the eyes of both Putin and the Russian public, he will have created a situation where the state is in serious danger of collapse; in extremis. Who does Putin nuke then? Does Prigozhin work with Kadyrov or are they to be enemies?

And that brings us back to Bakhmut. Maybe this is the reason why Wagner are so stubborn about Bakhmut. It's not so much about victory against Ukraine but a long term plan back in Moscow. Yes they lose many men as cannon fodder, but the smart, lucky, ones who survive become stronger, experienced fighters. Napoleon knew the value of luck in a soldier or an officer. He was reputed to have said when promoting generals, yes they are very good at strategy and logistics, but are they lucky? Napoleon viewed luck as being an important factor in a general.

Next Russian offensive.
There are the claims that the Russians have fielded another 300,000 troops, however there are some issues:
  1. Where did they get them from?
  2. How well trained are they beyond basic entry training?
  3. How are they going to equip them?
  4. What era of weaponry will they be equipped with?
  5. What about their logistics?
  6. What are the validity of these reports?
    1. Is this some form of maskirovka?
Many questions and logically on available open source evidence it does appear that this is close to fantasy. However, it would pay to be cautious because just as the Ukrainians sprung a nasty surprise on the Russians in eastern Ukraine last September, it is possible that the Russians might be a position to return the favour elsewhere.

EDIT UPDATE.
Does Wagner have a conflict of interest that may have an important bearing upon their Ukrainian operations and more importantly, potentially the outcome of the war for Russia?

 
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seaspear

Well-Known Member
Re the usage of Wagner forces ,Im not aware of any breakdown in the type of "recruits" used by Wagner but understanding that the Russian military do not count their losses because they are "private" but also that Wagner has deployed many ex-convicts to the front line as expendable it could be that the usage of regular forces in the assault on Bahkmut are because of the high casualties
Russia's infamous Wagner Group is throwing prisoners who 'have nothing to lose' on the frontlines, Ukrainian advisor says (businessinsider.nl)
Wagner intimidated recruited prisoners with execution videos, BBC reports (yahoo.com)
Certainly this article suggests high levels of Ex prisoners have died on the front line going into the thousands
Using conscripts and prison inmates, Russia doubles its forces in Ukraine - The Washington Post
I would add that Ukraine has also released prisoners with combat experience to fight in this war
Ukraine Releases Prisoners With Combat Experience To Fight In ‘Struggle For Our State’ Against Russia | The Daily Wire
 
Next Russian offensive.
There are the claims that the Russians have fielded another 300,000 troops, however there are some issues:
  1. Where did they get them from?
  2. How well trained are they beyond basic entry training?
  3. How are they going to equip them?
  4. What era of weaponry will they be equipped with?
  5. What about their logistics?
  6. What are the validity of these reports?
    1. Is this some form of maskirovka?
Many questions and logically on available open source evidence it does appear that this is close to fantasy. However, it would pay to be cautious because just as the Ukrainians sprung a nasty surprise on the Russians in eastern Ukraine last September, it is possible that the Russians might be a position to return the favour elsewhere.
Given the pressure on the Russian training infrastructure and the increased difficulty of training for Brigade or larger scale offensive actions, rather than the new troops participating in an offensive - would it instead make sense for the Russian Armed Forces to rotate out existing troop formations, rest and refit those as quickly as possible, and then utilise those formations - with their more established institutional knowledge, to conduct an offensive?

Rather than rely on the new formations meeting operational and logistical requirements for a major offensive, my guess was that next year we might witness new formations performing local fixing actions, while the ugly surprise comes from an attack performed by more experienced army groupings.
 

seaspear

Well-Known Member
A question might be on what armoured vehicles will be available to these troops ,would these troops have fifty year old tanks and ifv,s to transport and lead ? depending on the source you read Russia has either deployed nearly all of this resource in Ukraine with significant losses or has many thousands more in storage , that's without going into resourcing from Iran and North Korea everything from ballistic vests drones and artillery shells for present operations ,I can't imagine North Korea selling all of its artillery shells to Russia and relying on its nuclear capabilities
Russia scrambles to increase weapons production for Ukraine war | Russia-Ukraine war News | Al Jazeera
Certainly the rhetoric has ramped up
Russia Boosts Production Of Weapons For 'Most Powerful Means Of Destruction': Medvedev (ibtimes.com.au)
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Given the pressure on the Russian training infrastructure and the increased difficulty of training for Brigade or larger scale offensive actions, rather than the new troops participating in an offensive - would it instead make sense for the Russian Armed Forces to rotate out existing troop formations, rest and refit those as quickly as possible, and then utilise those formations - with their more established institutional knowledge, to conduct an offensive?

Rather than rely on the new formations meeting operational and logistical requirements for a major offensive, my guess was that next year we might witness new formations performing local fixing actions, while the ugly surprise comes from an attack performed by more experienced army groupings.
Some of both volunteer formations and mobilized personnel are going into existing units. So some of that is clearly happening.

A question might be on what armoured vehicles will be available to these troops ,would these troops have fifty year old tanks and ifv,s to transport and lead ?
Russia can put out 400-600 BTRs per year without issue. That's 13-19 btlns worth of. Russia can also put out 2 btlns of BMDs, and 4 of BMPs per year. Again these are pre-war figures, without any extra effort. This doesn't include the various armored cars (Tigr, Vystrel, etc.), the MRAPs (Typhoon and Patrul' family), and just regular armored trucks (Federal-M anyone? Or Z-STS). So quite a few will get equipment on par with Russian Army regulars, for what it's worth. As for tanks... the T-72B is from 1985, so 37 years old. But with upgrades you get a T-72B3 mod'16 or '22, i.e. a modern tank, essentially. Ditto for the T-80BVM, and T-90Ms are getting delivered regularly. So at least some of the units will get something better then "50 year old tanks and ifvs". Of course plenty will go to war with BMP-1s and T-62Ms, possibly upgraded, many not. On the other hand Ukraine has been using BMP-1s this entire time, and the T-72M is arguably not much better then a T-62M (being a downgraded export model with inferior armor and FCS).

depending on the source you read Russia has either deployed nearly all of this resource in Ukraine with significant losses or has many thousands more in storage , that's without going into resourcing from Iran and North Korea everything from ballistic vests drones and artillery shells for present operations ,I can't imagine North Korea selling all of its artillery shells to Russia and relying on its nuclear capabilities
Russia scrambles to increase weapons production for Ukraine war | Russia-Ukraine war News | Al Jazeera
Certainly the rhetoric has ramped up
Russia Boosts Production Of Weapons For 'Most Powerful Means Of Destruction': Medvedev (ibtimes.com.au)
The correct answer is many thousands more in storage. The question is what condition those items are in and how quickly they can be brought online. We're still not seeing any T-72s from storage, (As or Urals) unless the T-72B3mod'22 is actually an upgraded T-72A (with or without replacing the armor fillings).

EDIT: In case anyone is wondering why I bring up armored trucks, this is what production of them looks like at a non-specialized facility in Bashkiriya. Their quantitiy realistically is only limited by the availability of welders and military-grade truck chassis.

 
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Sycarion

New Member
Yes there are reports elsewhere about a supposed Russian offensive from Belarus at some stage.

The reason ATACMS hasn't been released to Ukraine is purely political and the reasoning given is in my opinion flawed. It appears that the White House are dead scared that providing such capabilities to Ukraine will provoke Putin, but jeez what about those dying in Ukraine from Putin's provocations. With its range ATACMS would like @tonyc has said force Russia to move it's ground based missile launchers back further from the front line.

However it would also give the Ukrainians the ability to strike at legitimate Russian logistics and military targets inside of the Russian border and it is my opinion that Ukraine should be given that ability. Is it an offensive action? I would classify it as defensive; defensive in depth and the Ukrainians are entitled to that. At present they are basically fighting with one hand tied behind their back because they don't have the tools to do unto the enemy what the enemy is doing unto them. I think it's time that the White House put its big girl panties on and faced down Putin properly by supplying Ukraine with ATACMS, tanks and aircraft; what it needs to win the war and evict Russia from its territory. It's time to cause some pain on Russian soil.

The second point is that Russia sits inside the relative safety of Belarus and attacks Ukraine. Maybe it's time that Lushenko is given a real warning and told in no uncertain terms what the price will be for him personally and for Belarus if the Russians launch another offensive from Belarussian territory. There are ways that word of such a warning could be disseminated to and amongst the Belarussian population.
Thanks for your input! I did think of the points that you made about striking logistics and military targets both in Russia and areas in Ukraine that were previously untouchable (e.g. Crimea) with GMLRS alone. Also the effect it would have both for the missile strikes and the war in general by complicating russian logistics even further.

I was interested specifically only in the truth behind the claims made in the media and especially on sites like Reddit that ATACMS will stop the missile strikes. Thus by not giving Ukraine ATACMS, the US is letting ukrainian civilians suffer/die for its own interest (avoid further escalation with Russia). The claim didn't entirely make sense to me but I was wondering if I had missed something so I decided to ask here since I know you guys know far more than random redditors.

If I have to make a guess why the US keeps refusing ATACMS for Ukraine, it would have to be to avoid further escalation (which is purely political as you said). In the sense that the US saw that Ukraine is already successfully retaking territories (which is the main goal of both Ukraine and NATO) even without ATACMS. The US probably also knew that ATACMS won't necessarily stop the missile strikes. Plus, if Ukraine really wants to fire warning shots, it already can using the modified Tu-141s. The european partners except maybe Poland and the Baltics also probably don't want to risk any unnecessary escalation, which could affect their economy. So the US decided that it is better to just send Ukraine Patriots to defend the ukrainian power grid.

This way Ukraine (and NATO) is without a doubt the defensive side since they only operate within Ukraine. This avoids giving the anti-west crowd and russian propaganda any amunition to paint the war as the result of Ukraine and NATO's "aggression". This ensures a good guy image for Ukraine in the international stage as part of the soft power battle. Which I think is also important since this good image got Ukraine some T-72Bs from Morocco. This also ensures a united front in Europe by adressing the concerns of european partners, which is critical since EU member countries also provide a significant amount of aid to Ukraine. A united Europe is also good since it disproves russian propaganda.

Btw I agree with you that Ukraine striking legitimate logistics and military targets within Russia is still defensive. It's just not everyone thinks that way, including people in far away neutral countries where a decent chunk of their population is already western-sceptic for historical reasons like India and Indonesia. In these countries russian propaganda machines like RT are still operating freely and to some extent, this war is a struggle between the West and Russia to influence neutral countries to their side. So, I can understand if the US thinks that it is necessary that Ukraine will be seen as the good guys by as many countries as possible and that the West is supporting this good guy in their eyes.
 
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ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Thanks for your input! I did think of the points that you made about striking logistics and military targets both in Russia and areas in Ukraine that were previously untouchable (e.g. Crimea) with GMLRS alone. Also the effect it would have both for the missile strikes and the war in general by complicating russian logistics even further.

I was interested specifically only in the truth behind the claims made in the media and especially on sites like Reddit that ATACMS will stop the missile strikes. Thus by not giving Ukraine ATACMS, the US is letting ukrainian civilians suffer/die for its own interest (avoid further escalation with Russia). The claim didn't entirely make sense to me but I was wondering if I had missed something so I decided to ask here since I know you guys know far more than random redditors.

If I have to make a guess why the US keeps refusing ATACMS for Ukraine, it would have to be to avoid further escalation (which is purely political as you said). In the sense that the US saw that Ukraine is already successfully retaking territories (which is the main goal of both Ukraine and NATO) even without ATACMS. The US probably also knew that ATACMS won't necessarily stop the missile strikes. Plus, if Ukraine really wants to fire warning shots, it already can using the modified Tu-141s. The european partners except maybe Poland and the Baltics also probably don't want to risk any unnecessary escalation, which could affect their economy. So the US decided that it is better to just send Ukraine Patriots to defend the ukrainian power grid.

This way Ukraine (and NATO) is without a doubt the defensive side since they only operate within Ukraine. This avoids giving the anti-west crowd and russian propaganda any amunition to paint the war as the result of Ukraine and NATO's "aggression". This ensures a good guy image for Ukraine in the international stage as part of the soft power battle. Which I think is also important since this good image got Ukraine some T-72Bs from Morocco. This also ensures a united front in Europe by adressing the concerns of european partners, which is critical since EU member countries also provide a significant amount of aid to Ukraine. A united Europe is also good since it disproves russian propaganda.

Btw I agree with you that Ukraine striking legitimate logistics and military targets within Russia is still defensive. It's just not everyone thinks that way, including people in far away neutral countries where a decent chunk of their population is already western-sceptic for historical reasons like India and Indonesia. In these countries russian propaganda machines like RT are still operating freely and to some extent, this war is a struggle between the West and Russia to influence neutral countries to their side. So, I can understand if the US thinks that it is necessary that Ukraine will be seen as the good guys by as many countries as possible and that the West is supporting this good guy in their eyes.
No probs. ATACMS wouldn't be able to reach Engels from anywhere in Ukraine so it isn't going to be a threat to that base. Engels would have to be a high priority target for Ukraine and to reach there they require a SRBM - MRBM, or some LACM which they don't currently have. Whilst their UAVs have reached Engels, penetrating the base air defence and done damage, it would not be advisable to presume that SRBM, MRBM, or LACM would be able to so easily penetrate the regional Air Defence System. That AD system is most likely an IADS and it's been designed to protect against missile and manned aircraft attacking the bomber bases at Engels. So it's scanning for telephone pole sized and larger go fast air vehicles, whereas the UAVs that Ukraine have been using, probably are smaller and a lot slower, so probably don't register on the search and fire control radars.

The media around the western world are still talking up the possibility of a second Russian attack against Kyiv, being launched out of Belarussian territory. If this does come to pass it raises interesting questions and one would be a big what if. What if Putin has finally managed to get Lushenko to agree to Belarus participating fully in the war? The Belarussian forces would be well trained and fresh, lead by probably quite competent generals who will have definitely taken note of the Russian failures and mistakes, along with the Ukrainian successes. The Belarussian involvement as a combatant in the war would create real problems for Ukraine, but every cloud has a silver lining. At least they would finally be able to go after Russian forces and logistics targets inside Belarus. BUT, the big question is whether or not the Belarussian military would be willing to participate in the war as a combatant on the Russian side? Then there is the Belarussian population and Lushenko isn't exactly universally adored by his subjects. If the population decides that Lushenko has taken a step to far, will they let it lie? If they, don't where will the military sit? Will they side with the people or Lushenko?

IF Lushenko caves into Putin and agrees that Belarus will enter the war as a combatant, AND the military refuse AND the people back the military what happens next? IF the Russians were not in Belarus in force, I would suggest that Lushenko would be on a plane to Moscow with part of the Treasury in the hold, giving Putin another headache. However with Russian forces there in strength, Putin may decide just to attempt to overthrow the new Belarusian govt and military, returning Lushenko to power with the backing of Russian armour and guns. But this time Belarus will be a Russian Oblast in all but name, because it will be occupied by Russian forces with the FSB subordinating the Belarussian KGB and suppressing the local population and remnants of the Belarussian military.

Then again Putin might not be in a position to do that because his forces maybe busy defending themselves and can't be reinforced. That has to be one of his worst nightmares; a turncoat Belarus and fighting a war within Belarus against the Belarus military and local population. If the Ukrainians decided to cross the border to help evict the Russians from Belarus and show solidarity with the new Belarus govt, then that has to be a large part of Putin's goose cooked. That would for all intents and purposes be equivalent to a to front war and Putin doesn't really have the capabilities to fight a two front war.

So what's a Putin to do? I suppose that we'll have to wait and see.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
No probs. ATACMS wouldn't be able to reach Engels from anywhere in Ukraine so it isn't going to be a threat to that base. Engels would have to be a high priority target for Ukraine and to reach there they require a SRBM - MRBM, or some LACM which they don't currently have. Whilst their UAVs have reached Engels, penetrating the base air defence and done damage, it would not be advisable to presume that SRBM, MRBM, or LACM would be able to so easily penetrate the regional Air Defence System. That AD system is most likely an IADS and it's been designed to protect against missile and manned aircraft attacking the bomber bases at Engels. So it's scanning for telephone pole sized and larger go fast air vehicles, whereas the UAVs that Ukraine have been using, probably are smaller and a lot slower, so probably don't register on the search and fire control radars.
A Tu-141 is an LACM but with the warhead replaced. Un-replace the warhead and you're home free.

The media around the western world are still talking up the possibility of a second Russian attack against Kyiv, being launched out of Belarussian territory. If this does come to pass it raises interesting questions and one would be a big what if. What if Putin has finally managed to get Lushenko to agree to Belarus participating fully in the war? The Belarussian forces would be well trained and fresh, lead by probably quite competent generals who will have definitely taken note of the Russian failures and mistakes, along with the Ukrainian successes.
Are you sure about this? From what I've read, in joint exercises the Belorussians looked rather poor compared to Russian forces. And the Belarussian army is tiny.

The Belarussian involvement as a combatant in the war would create real problems for Ukraine, but every cloud has a silver lining. At least they would finally be able to go after Russian forces and logistics targets inside Belarus. BUT, the big question is whether or not the Belarussian military would be willing to participate in the war as a combatant on the Russian side? Then there is the Belarussian population and Lushenko isn't exactly universally adored by his subjects. If the population decides that Lushenko has taken a step to far, will they let it lie? If they, don't where will the military sit? Will they side with the people or Lushenko?
This sounds like a good reason for Belarus not to get involved. Apart from the fact that they don't bring all that much to the table.
 
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