The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

[Ananda]

Negotiations require concessions. Either the war continues until the bitter end, and it might be bitter for more then one party, or concessions have to be made. If you're willing to give nothing, you get nothing.

Somehow some mainstream western media keep the 'delusional' thinking Russia will collapse soon. While the independent media are more accepting the realities that condition already reach stalemate for sometimes. Recent Ukranian gain also related more to Russian consolidation and not Russian line collapsing. This is in the end already become war of attrition since at least May.

Any historical record can shown war attrition will be long and costly. End game will only be decide by concessions middle ground. Only WW1 and WW2 where war of attrition result on complete collapse of one side. I don't think any sides (Collective West and Russia) want to escalate this toward WW3. But no sides want to give concession first move yet.

So I do see in the end negotiated concession will come, but after more blood being spilled in the ground. All sides will going to find better possitioning by more blood. Just looking on Biden speach on Zelensky visit and Putin speach before in Belarus. This is still going to be long war.

 

[STURM]

Russia's traditional customers had replaced most of their transport fleets with the admittedly excellent Mi-8/17 family. Russia's newer attack helos, the Ka-52s and Mi-28s, weren't doing as well on the market as the ubiquitous Mi-24 once did

With regards to the losses both types have suffered; is this because both are being employed in a less permissive environment compared to the
Mil-24 in various conflicts or because of other reasons?

I first had a close look at the Ka-50/52 in 1993 when it was exhibited at an airshow; it was then marketed as the Werewolf at a time when it wasn't yet in Russian service.

 

[Dead Money]

It appears Russia is dead set on a continued and protracted war effort. Some truly napoleonic plans have just been announced. The armed forces will be scaled up to 1.5 mln men. So the mobilization isn't the last increase in size. West MD is being split up into the Moscow and Leningrad MDs. 3 new motor-rifle divisions are to be formed, and an army corps in Kareliya (presumably combining the 80th and 200th Arctic Motor-Rifles). 7 motor-rifle brigades are to be converted into divisions across West and Center MD (a reminder current bdes are about 1/3rd the size of a Soviet MRD or 40% the size of a Russian Shoygu-era MRD, though their size varies so this is a generalization), two new para-assault divisions in the VDV, all 5 Marine bdes to be upgraded to divisions, and 3 new air divisions with 8 new bomber regiments (Russia classifies Su-24/34 units as bomber rgts), 1 new fighter rgt, and 6 brigades of army aviation. Each MD is to get an artillery division, so 5 total, and a "high-power artillery bde" (this likely means a super-heavy artillery bde, probably consisting of 1 btln each of 2S4s and 2S7s).

I have some serious questions about this. In principle Russia can produce the equipment, but not quickly. Even optimistically Russia can't put out more then ~2500 light armor vehicles per year, and this is everything, BMPs, BMDs, BTRs, armored trucks, Tigr armored cars, etc. I suppose with a significant mobilization effort production of simpler armored trucks can be increased beyond that point, but their value would be increasingly questionable. But where does one get this many tanks? Let's take the lightest possible variant, a new-style MRD with two MRRgts and no armored rgt. That's 2 tank btlns per division. And let's assume these are Soviet-era tank btln ORBATs, so 31 tanks. 3 new divisions is 6 new tank btlns, upgrading 7 bdes into divisions means adding a second tank btln to each. That's 13 tank btlns, or ~400 tanks. Russia hasn't even replaced losses of tanks in existing units... and it gets trickier when you consider that in principle Marine bdes currently have one tank btln each. Upgrading to a division would presumably involve either decoupling the tank btln from the marine regiments and forming a division-level tank rgt, or adding a second tank btln since at least two rgts per division would be needed. To me it seems almost guaranteed that most if not all of this equipment would have to come from storage. Now we've seen significant quantities of early-variant T-72s on trains, but basically none on the front line. We've also seen a new T-72B3 variant, we're calling the T-72B3mod'22 for the time being. Of course T-90M production is continuing and has even increased, though I'd be surprised if it's more then 100 per year at this point. Overall we're likely to see formations with increasing numbers of older vehicles, especially in the IFV category, and even with increasing numbers of lighter armored vehicles, namely armored trucks*, as primary transports instead of the typical IFVs/APCs. Towed guns are likely going to be the norm too. 2S19M2 (Msta-SM) production does exist and 2 btlns a year has been the norm. This could probably be increased, but not to the tune of 3 new MRDs, 7 MRDs converted from MRBdes, and 5 Marine Divs converted from Bdes. Even so there's an open question whether Russia has the artillery tubes available. The super-heavies should be the easiest, since barely any were being used pre-war and considerable Soviet-era inventory exists, but the rest is questionable. They didn't send D-1s to the LNR because of how plentiful their stockpiles are.

Now on to the aircraft. In the collapse of the Soviet Union tens of thousands of pieces of fairly complex military equipment were "put in storage". I place that in quotation marks because often storage simply meant parking them in some field, near or on a military base (current or former) and then simply leaving them there. Entire national armies could be armed with the equipment that was essentially abandoned across Russia (just Russia, we're ignoring the rest of the USSR) after the collapse. Armored hulls are pretty sturdy, so you can take a BTR-60/70 or BMP-1 hull that's been sitting on an abandoned base for 30 years, and potentially return the vehicle to service. Doing this with aircraft is significantly more problematic. To be fair many aircraft were at least partially prepared for storage, more-so then ground vehicles, with engines and electronics often removed and stored separately. But overall it's far more problematic. Looking at the numbers, we can see only one fighter rgt. This is likely partially a response to the lack of enemy aircraft. But I suspect it's mostly because there aren't very many fighters to return to service available. Are there bombers to return to service? Well.... yes. The Su-34 production is over 120 aircraft, and continuing at a steady pace. Initially they were phasing out the Su-24Ms. These aircraft were not retired during the chaos and collapse of the USSR. They were retired mostly over the past 10 years, and many are still in working condition. They were also allegedly stored much better. Is there 8 rgts** worth of them? Possibly, when you consider the Naval Aviation replaced their Su-24s with Su-30SMs. However in terms of capabilities this is definitely a major step back. What about helos? 6 new army aviation brigades of 80-100 helos? Russia peaked helicopter production at 350 units per year in the early 2010s, but it's unclear if Russia can still produce this many. On the other hand Russia has mass produced late-model Mi-17 variants to replace most of the Soviet Mi-8 inventory, and has replaced a significant portion of their Mi-24s with 28s and Ka-52s. Presumably many of the helos for the new brigades would come from those. Russia actually had a problem for the helicopter manufacturing sector before the war; not enough orders. Russia's traditional customers had replaced most of their transport fleets with the admittedly excellent Mi-8/17 family. Russia's newer attack helos, the Ka-52s and Mi-28s, weren't doing as well on the market as the ubiquitous Mi-24 once did. In principle the helicopter portion is the least problematic piece. But either way for aircraft we're looking at an effort that will likely take the better part of a decade, and will probably drain resources from both the continuing development of more advanced aircraft and procurement of the Su-57***.

To sum this up, this is a massive effort, that drastically increases the size of the military. Something of this nature was to be expected and it's likely some of these units already exist. 300k mobilized personnel weren't just there to replace losses, Russia's entire grouping in Ukraine was less then 300k by a significant margin (MoD specifically likely less then 150k). This is all in principle possible, but some serious compromises will have to be made when forming these units. Questions of comms, and UAS come to mind. Logistics are likely going to be a nightmare. I don't see any news of MTO Bdes**** being formed. I also have to question the utility of pulling a bunch of jets out of storage. Russia can't even fully utilize it's existing inventory, while simultaneously losing jets at a problematic rate. I would argue that investing more heavily into EW, AEW, ELINT, and SEAD/DEAD kit would give far greater return on investment, but inertia is hard to fight. Now for the economic pieces, can Russia afford this? Sure. But the cost is going to be "unpleasant" and will cause serious problems for Russian economic and societal development for years if not decades to come. A choice has been made, and a price will be paid. Will this win the war? No. The war can't be "won" in the conventional manner, short of total mobilization followed by a massive drive on Kiev.

*Please don't confuse armored trucks with MRAPs, they're not the same. One is a purpose built military vehicle designed to some very stringent specifications, the other is an existing military truck, modified with armor. It can be relatively well protected especially compared to a typical BTR-80, but it's no MRAP
** Russian aviation regiments are typically 24-36 combat jets with 1-3 trainers (two-seaters), so closer to a western squadron in size
*** One Russian fighter regiment has begun training for the Su-57 conversion so the program is continuing and production is still ongoing
**** MTO Bdes are Бригада Материально-Технического Обеспечения , or Material-Technical Support Bdes, Russia's largest logistics formations, pre-war each combined arms army got one of these

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Hi Feanor,

What would your view be on the ability of Russia to train soldiers and logistics staff for the above expansion? My understanding particularly on the aviation side was that trained personnel are in short supply as is - let alone during a planned major expansion in military size. Setting aside the question of hardware, the question of training knowledge and capacity seems like a possible bottleneck to effective combat power.

I recall rumours of Russian training battalions being thrown into combat earlier this year (sorry mods, I will source this later when I get the chance) - if there is any truth to that, what is Russia's capacity to effectively expand military size without pulling a large portion of front line fighters back to facilitate training?

Thanks either way, appreciate the insights,

Dead Money

 

[swerve]

Negotiations require concessions. Either the war continues until the bitter end, and it might be bitter for more then one party, or concessions have to be made. If you're willing to give nothing, you get nothing.

So point out that Putin claimed to be defending the Russian-speakers of Ukraine & offer face-saving sops in that area, plus referenda on local autonomy in Donbas, & the like. I.e. things which would be reasonable anyway.

Rewarding the invasion by conceding any of Putin's demands on territory & Ukraine's sovereignty would be counter-productive. They'd be setting the scene for more aggression in the future.

This is a situation where the only reasonable end points have been declared unacceptable by Putin. He's the one refusing to negotiate, by refusing to talk about any terms except surrender. He has to give before any offer of concessions makes any sense at all.

That's the problem: one side is unequivocally bad & wrong, & its demands are unequivocally wrong. They cannot be given in to. Until that side resiles from at least some of its demands, & offers some sign of good faith (of which there has been absolutely none so far: exactly the opposite), how is negotiation possible? Putin's demanding more than he's got. He's doing the exact opposite of offering concessions. Where's the possible starting point for negotiating?

 

[Feanor]

Hi Feanor,

What would your view be on the ability of Russia to train soldiers and logistics staff for the above expansion? My understanding particularly on the aviation side was that trained personnel are in short supply as is - let alone during a planned major expansion in military size. Setting aside the question of hardware, the question of training knowledge and capacity seems like a possible bottleneck to effective combat power.

Can it be done in principle? Yes. Will it be done? I'm not sure.

I recall rumours of Russian training battalions being thrown into combat earlier this year (sorry mods, I will source this later when I get the chance) - if there is any truth to that, what is Russia's capacity to effectively expand military size without pulling a large portion of front line fighters back to facilitate training?

Thanks either way, appreciate the insights,

Dead Money

If you can provide the source I'd be interesting to see what exactly is meant by "training btln".

 

[Feanor]

So point out that Putin claimed to be defending the Russian-speakers of Ukraine & offer face-saving sops in that area, plus referenda on local autonomy in Donbas, & the like. I.e. things which would be reasonable anyway.

Ukraine is currently dead-set against any of this. These would be examples of concessions, something you explicitly excluded above.

Rewarding the invasion by conceding any of Putin's demands on territory & Ukraine's sovereignty would be counter-productive. They'd be setting the scene for more aggression in the future.

One could recognize the loss of Crimea in exchange for the return of occupied territories in Kherson-Zaporozhye area (plus some sort of water arrangement). That would be an example of what I would consider reasonable. Some give, some take.

This is a situation where the only reasonable end points have been declared unacceptable by Putin. He's the one refusing to negotiate, by refusing to talk about any terms except surrender. He has to give before any offer of concessions makes any sense at all.

I'm not sold that this is his actual position. But the position of "withdraw to the borders of Feb 24th or nothing" won't fly without something to offer.

That's the problem: one side is unequivocally bad & wrong, & its demands are unequivocally wrong. They cannot be given in to. Until that side resiles from at least some of its demands, & offers some sign of good faith (of which there has been absolutely none so far: exactly the opposite), how is negotiation possible? Putin's demanding more than he's got. He's doing the exact opposite of offering concessions. Where's the possible starting point for negotiating?

Ok, so don't give in to Putin's demands. But be prepared to put something on the table. Otherwise no negotiations are possible. If the word "concessions" is the problem, that's a separate story. But I don't see anything significant being offered at all. Only the expectation of one-sided withdrawal on Russia's part.

 

[Dead Money]

If you can provide the source I'd be interesting to see what exactly is meant by "training btln".

Of course, here is the article I was thinking of, from May:

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2022/05/28/to-replenish-its-army-in-ukraine-russia-plans-to-strip-its-training-units-it-can-only-do-this-once/

Which sources this twitter thread from CIT (eng)

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1530217529678995456

"Every brigade and regiment in the Russian army forms at least two BTGs for combat, both with professional contract soldiers. A so-called “third battalion” oversees a brigade or regiment’s conscripts—who, by law, aren’t supposed to deploy to a combat zone—and handles training and constabulary tasks.

The mobilization order requires the higher units to strip their third battalions of all legally deployable manpower in order to form an extra BTG. The open-source analysts at Conflict Intelligence Team believe the army can squeeze another 30 or 40 BTGs from the existing third battalions."

War on the rocks made some similar claims a week later in an article explaining the BTG, but their source was the same twitter thread regarding using officers and NCOs from the 'third battalion' to form additional combat groups.

Not Built for Purpose: The Russian Military’s Ill-Fated Force Design - War on the Rocks

 

[Feanor]

Of course, here is the article I was thinking of, from May:

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2022/05/28/to-replenish-its-army-in-ukraine-russia-plans-to-strip-its-training-units-it-can-only-do-this-once/

Which sources this twitter thread from CIT (eng)

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1530217529678995456

"Every brigade and regiment in the Russian army forms at least two BTGs for combat, both with professional contract soldiers. A so-called “third battalion” oversees a brigade or regiment’s conscripts—who, by law, aren’t supposed to deploy to a combat zone—and handles training and constabulary tasks.

The mobilization order requires the higher units to strip their third battalions of all legally deployable manpower in order to form an extra BTG. The open-source analysts at Conflict Intelligence Team believe the army can squeeze another 30 or 40 BTGs from the existing third battalions."

War on the rocks made some similar claims a week later in an article explaining the BTG, but their source was the same twitter thread regarding using officers and NCOs from the 'third battalion' to form additional combat groups.

Not Built for Purpose: The Russian Military’s Ill-Fated Force Design - War on the Rocks

Thanks. Yeah, so there's definitely a big push to squeeze extra staff, but in addition to units with conscripts, there are also regional training centers that can do training. It's also not clear that they can pull all personnel. The officers aren't being sent as line infantry to the front lines, so they must still be in garrison. It's hard to say for sure, but we've seen mobilized personnel doing training at various training centers, so it's probably not impossible for them to train and generate additional units, certainly harder though. On the flip side we've had cross-agency training, like the National Guard training people for the MoD, and even private contractors being utilized, which didn't really happen previously.

 

[seaspear]

I cant help but speculate that if the ethnic Russians living in Ukraine were offered a very large sum of money to go to Russia to live very comfortably much of this war would not have occurred and this may have been cheaper than what has

 

[Stuart M]

I cant help but speculate that if the ethnic Russians living in Ukraine were offered a very large sum of money to go to Russia to live very comfortably much of this war would not have occurred and this may have been cheaper than what has

True, but the obvious response to that would be something along the lines of 'why should we have to leave the land that we and our ancestors were born in to provide an expediant solution to the political problems of politicians today?' Which is also essentially the responce of Falkland Islanders when the same proposition was/is put to them.

 

[Feanor]

I cant help but speculate that if the ethnic Russians living in Ukraine were offered a very large sum of money to go to Russia to live very comfortably much of this war would not have occurred and this may have been cheaper than what has

Many, both Russians and Ukrainians, were opting to go to Russia pre-war for not so very large sums of money. In some industries there was an entire pipeline where when you graduated a Ukrainian college you worked a certain amount of time in Ukraine but with a view to transfer to Russia for similar work. However there are more complex issues here. Ukraine was demographically in disastrous shape pre-war so from a Ukrainian stand point this certainly wasn't good. And people in the former Soviet Union tend to be fairly attached to what we call the "little homeland" or the specific area you're from. In some places this matters less, but in places like the Donetsk Basin this can be a big deal. If you're a Terek Cossack you might not be willing to get up and move for anything, but you might be willing to go to war to keep your region as part of Russia. Overall the solution here, I think, was much simpler. Ukraine wanted to be a "European" country. Why not act like one and respect minority ethnicity's rights? Grant Russian regional language status, and don't peddle virulent nationalism as a state ideology. From a good governance standpoint it's so simple. From an internal Ukrainian politics stand point, much more complex.

But this is a separate story. Like I said, if I was in charge, I don't know that I would even have taken Crimea. I would likely have opted for decoupling economically from Ukraine, and leeching their population, while letting them slowly turn into a third world country. Nobody was going to accept them into the EU or NATO in the pre'14 world.

 

[Rob c]

I cant help but speculate that if the ethnic Russians living in Ukraine were offered a very large sum of money to go to Russia to live very comfortably much of this war would not have occurred and this may have been cheaper than what has

This gets very complicated quickly as I would say that a significant portion of so called ethnic Russians would in fact class them selves as Russian speaking Ukrainians, this also includes their current president, who was born as a Russian speaking Ukrainian, who learnt Ukrainian later. My opinion is that the language you speak dose not define you.

 

[seaspear]

My muse was not to suggest that those who spoke Russian would be the main recipient of this largesse but those who identified as primarily Russian who may be interested to moving back to mother Russia with a large incentive this incentive may work in other countries where these issues occur
Certainly there are stories of Cossacks and their ambitions which seem very similar to Kadyrov's Chechnya in how Russia has used a onetime undesirable people and turned them into state thugs
Cossacks Face Grim Reprisals From Onetime Allies in Eastern Ukraine - The New York Times (nytimes.com)
Why I Was Attacked by Cossacks for Reporting in Crimea | Pulitzer Center
Russia deploys Cossacks to police Crimea – CounterVortex

 

[Ananda]

Ian Bremmer is one of Western Academics that had and has doing long term research on Ukrainian ethics devide, including Russian ethics in Post Soviet Republics (outside Russian Federation).

Ethnic Russians in Ukraine: A look back

Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: I started my PhD work back in 1989. And as you can imagine, the most interesting thing in the world was that the Wall came down and the Soviet empire was collapsing, and the nationalities of the former Soviet Union were starting to explode. I did my research on...

www.gzeromedia.com

Already put it sometime ago, but put it back to stress out there're large part of Ethics Russian (not Ukrainian speaking Russian) that already live and some part of Ukraine is used to be part of Russian World.

And yet what I found, specifically in Crimea and Southeast Ukraine, in the part of Ukraine where the Russians were a large percentage of the population, they had lived there for a long time, and historically they viewed it as a part of a greater Russian nation, that they really saw it as Russian. And they saw it as not Ukrainian. And that identity was very strong.

So suggesting those Ethics Russian to be paid then and move away from that part of Ukraine (Crimea and Southeast Ukraine) is not much different then ethics cleansing. Even though it's masked by financial incentives.

Ukrainian should recognize and accept those parts Russian Identity, accept Russian language as prime language in that part. Just as Ukrainian identity and languages as primary ones in Western part. That's what supposed happen with Minsk Accord.

I know many already put in mind everything is Russian/Putin faults. However Ukranian has opportunity to embrace Russian Ethnics concerned. Instead sidelines Russian Ethnics political parties, and silences them as National threat. Simply because push from Western part for more 'Ukranisation' of Eastern parts.

They (Ukrainian Nationalist) just open and volunteer to play within Putin ambitions.

 

[seaspear]

This article though seven years old brings some light to the origins of some of the tensions ,its also worth considering that members of the Russian speaking population are fighting for Ukraine that certainly even in regions that allegedly voted for integration with Russia the population was identified mostly as Ukrainian
Ethnic and Social Composition of Ukraine's Regions and Voting Patterns (e-ir.info)
Are the Russian speakers in Ukraine on Putin’s side? > Air University (AU) > Wild Blue Yonder (af.edu)

 

[tonnyc]

I think the assumption in seaspear's scenario is that Russia would be the one offering monetary inducements to Russian-speaking Ukrainians to emigrate to Russia. That would help Russia mitigate their population decline and if they are being selective enough they can get more educated and skilled workforce.

Ukraine doesn't want to kick Russian-speaking Ukrainians out. And they don't have the money to offer to people to leave anyway.

Russia's insistence that they are protecting the Russian-speaking people is just propaganda. It's the same type of reasoning as Anchsluss.

 

[Larry_L]

John Kirby has announced that The Wagner group has purchased, and received delivery of rockets and missiles from north Korea. Other interesting items in the report are: Wagner has about 50,000 Personnel in Ukraine, 40,000 of which are estimated to be former convicts. In some cases Russian troops are serving as subordinates to Wagner commanders. The group’s mercenaries have been involved in some of the most intense fighting in Bakhmut, he said, where about 1,000 fighters have been killed in recent weeks. Wagner is spending more than $100 million (£82 million) each month in Ukraine.

North Korea delivered weapons to Russia's Wagner mercenaries, U.S. says

The private military group, which has about 50,000 fighters in Ukraine, is run by a Putin ally and has been recruiting from Russian prisons, the National Security Council spokesperson said.

www.nbcnews.com

US believes Wagner mercenary group is expanding influence and took delivery of North Korean arms | CNN Politics

Newly downgraded US intelligence suggests the Russian mercenary group Wagner has assumed expanded influence and is recruiting convicts -- including some with serious medical conditions -- from prisons to supplement Moscow's flagging military.

www.cnn.com

The BBC reports much the same thing, except the Brits estimation of Wagner personnel in Ukraine to be about 20,000.

North Korea sold arms to Russia's Wagner group, US says

The White House says North Korea provided missiles and rockets to be used in Ukraine, which Pyongyang denies.

www.bbc.com

 

[seaspear]

I think the assumption in seaspear's scenario is that Russia would be the one offering monetary inducements to Russian-speaking Ukrainians to emigrate to Russia. That would help Russia mitigate their population decline and if they are being selective enough they can get more educated and skilled workforce.

Ukraine doesn't want to kick Russian-speaking Ukrainians out. And they don't have the money to offer to people to leave anyway.

Russia's insistence that they are protecting the Russian-speaking people is just propaganda. It's the same type of reasoning as Anchsluss.

I am not suggesting the Ukraine government fund a very generous offer to move but Europe and the U.S , would of been cheaper than what has been spent ,but I would believe that Russia's goal is expansion of territory and certainly of keeping N.A.T.O out of Ukraine, why would it be interested in the rights of citizens of other countries when it does not protects the rights of its own citizens within mother Russia

 

[tonnyc]

Then I misunderstood @seaspear . On the other hand such a move is a political impossibility for both US and EU anyway.

 

[ngatimozart]

But making concessions to an aggressor means conceding defeat & rewarding aggression. Do you think we should reward Putin for invading Ukraine? What will the future consequences of that be? It would encourage more aggression, & not only by Russia.

BTW, what concessions do you think Ukraine should make to Putin?

Give Putin a 12 hour head start before they start hunting him.