Except it’s not Russia’s manufacturing base vs Ukraine’s, it’s Russia’s vs the entire West. Which Russia can’t possibly win unless the Chinese get involved, which they won’t through fear of sanctions.
The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread
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Is the entire west willing to commit to total war industrially even through a Ukrainian proxy? Or is it Russia's manufacturing vs the level of aid the west is willing to commit? I would submit that even with Chinese involvement, a full economic mobilization for industrial war would still put the collective West ahead. But I don't think that's what's on the table.
1. Partially true at one level of analysis but I still have concerns about this political concept of a ‘win.’ The collective West & G7 (to which I include Australia), plus Germany included are no longer interested in talking to Putin — which pushes him to rant even more than usual — my concern is that he is getting some very poor read of Ukrainian resolve, at this stage.
(a) If Ukraine wants to fight and not talk, then this level of aid will keep flowing for the next 8 to 16 months.
(b) Reports about Ukrainian advances in Kherson and Luhansk are emerging. However, we can draw a couple of things from these ongoing campaigns. Ukrainian operational design playing out across the south and east of the country. While geographically separate, they are campaigns that are part of an integrated design — North of Lyman, Borova and Shyikivka are liberated by the Ukrainian Army.
2. Agreed. And objectively speaking Putin’s army is losing but that does not mean Ukraine is winning, yet. Given Putin’s finger on the nuclear trigger that worries me — not that Putin’s bluff has not been called multiple times — nor should Ukraine not be worried, in my view.
3. There is a sense of radical change for Putin. Michael Kofman says mobilisation is “uncharted territory”, not conducted since second world war. Adults in the room need to start looking at stocks of potassium iodide (KI) to be issued in Poland and Ukraine, should the need arise. KI is a salt that can help protect their population from radioactive iodine, as the thyroid gland is the part of the body that’s most sensitive to radioactive iodine.
4. Pynnoniemi said: “I think at the start of the war, Russia that we used to know was lost..we are not dealing with anything that we used to know exactly.”
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I don't think this is true. Partial mobilization was done for Afghanistan, the USSR called up reservists, Russia mobilized personnel for Chechnya as well. It's new for modern day Russia but the USSR was generally willing to send conscripts to war, and that includes reservist conscripts.
This raises a serious question. What does the end here look like for either side? What are they willing to pay to get there? I honestly don't know.
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I would say it is something like:
1. Fully Mobilised Ukraine < 2. Partly Mobilised Russia < 3. UKR + current Western support < 4. Fully mobilised Russia < 5. UKR + the limits of what the West are willing to give at the moment < 6. Fully mobilised Russia and China < 7. Fully mobilised West.
Key points to note are that the limits of 2, 3 and 5 are political rather than economic (and hence much less certain and far more subjective), and I don’t think that partial mobilisation of China is feasible given the impact of sanctions. If they’re in they’re all in I would guess.
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
KI can be used in an attempt to help protect the thyroid from certain isotopes of potassium. As a practical matter, ingesting KI is most useful/effective/important for children and teens, as the negative impact upon an adult thyroid is often not significantly greater than that of simple old age. It is not uncommon for adults to start having a hypoactive thyroid normally once they start getting into their mid-20's or later (genetics and other conditions come into play). For those with a underactive thyroid already, the utility of KI is less, simply because the thyroid has already been impacted.
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I'm not sold on 5. I agree with you on the rest. I think the limits of what the West are willing to give have yet to be found, and the current support is not enough to stop an all out conventional Russian war effort.
Agreed. Whether the West are willing to inflict the necessary economic pain (through inflation, interest rates and taxes) on their populations to provide the support Ukraine needs to prevail is the big unanswered question.
Part 3 of 3: Updates on Lyman & beyond
9. More good news on the Kherson front for Ukraine. This move, as Dr Mike Martin, says has been repeated now several times.
10. I have seen too many supporters wrongly call the quick Ukrainian advance at Kharkiv earlier a “thunder run”, when it was not. Likewise, when the initial offensive at Kherson met with little progress 3 weeks ago, Russian propaganda tried to present as a victory, when it was not.
7. Unless the Russians screw up, operationally, the picture on the Kherson front is complex and dynamic. In Kherson, Ukrainian forces are at risk from Russian artillery fire onto their positions. It can happen, but I suspect this will not be an easy rush through territory on the scale seen at Kharkiv. However, we can trace the general pattern—that is Ukraine dictating the operational tempo at the moment. Therefore, I suspect that Alexander Stubb is over optimistic in his thinking the medium-to-long term predictions from the war on Ukraine.
(a) I agree that with Alexander Stubb that in the short term, Russia’s strategy has not changed. The aim is to secure a land link to the Crimean peninsula and continue the weaponisation of energy. The referenda and annexation of semi-occupied regions, combined with the late partial mobilisation of troops, are expected of Putin.
(b) I strongly believe that it is at the medium term that the West will stumble. The key variable in the medium term is Western resilience. Is Europe able to stay united over the second half of 2023 or will Putin be able to split the pack of the Europeans in general vs the Eastern Europeans?
(c) I suspect that increasingly, US public interest in supporting the war in Ukraine will dim — certainly by 2024, if not earlier. If the war ends in 2024 orc” late 2025, the reconstruction and integration of Ukraine will entail so much money that both EU members and NATO members will begin to act in a manner to reflect their usual selfish desires.
8. While a potential short-term Russian tactical defeats in Ukraine raises many interesting questions. It becomes an opportunity to surmise on outcomes for EU, NATO and Russia. IMO, a tactical Russian defeat in the short-term does not automatically mean an Ukrainian victory in the long term.9. More good news on the Kherson front for Ukraine. This move, as Dr Mike Martin, says has been repeated now several times.
(a) In the latest move, the Ukrainian Army has broken though Russian positions and driven down the T-04-03 HWY. The terrain along T-04-03 Hwy down to Nova Kakhovka is flat with no cover. The fact that the Ukrainian Army has penetrated over 70km into Russian lines in Kherson Oblast, shows the degree of collapse.
(b) This move down T-04-03 HWY will get around the Russians in static defence and will mean that pockets in the future will collapse. Combat also reported in the urban areas of the town of Dudchny. I initially thought Dr Mike Martin was too optimistic but it turns out to be true.
(c) There are unconfirmed reports that Ukraine Forces advanced up to 70km along the Dnieper river and are advancing 'towards the direction of Beryslav'. They have also managed earlier, to arrive at Zolota Balka, Leninske, Khreschenivka (visual confirmation that Ukrainian troops have entered the town) and Liubymivka (contested since middle of Aug 2022).
10. I have seen too many supporters wrongly call the quick Ukrainian advance at Kharkiv earlier a “thunder run”, when it was not. Likewise, when the initial offensive at Kherson met with little progress 3 weeks ago, Russian propaganda tried to present as a victory, when it was not.
(a) Early Ukrainian success at Kharkiv drained Russian ability to conduct a full scale counter attack in Kherson — which is why the Ukrainian Army can nibble at the edges of a strong static Russian defence, to make their initial determination at Kherson Oblast meaningless. The 70km advance towards the direction of Beryslav' rather than the city itself, is a sign of the Russians in trouble.
(b) Russian military bloggers confirming previous information that Ukrainians used widespread deception — including using Russian identifying marks Z and V on vehicles — to penetrate deep behind Russian lines in Kherson. IMHO, the Russians have lost both air superiority and fires superiority at at Kherson Oblast (with Ukraine’s FSCL moving forward faster than Russian sense and strike)— if not the Russians would have killed this squeeze play.
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But does Russia actually have the capability to defeat Ukraine (including its western support at current levels) with an all out conventional war effort? If you asked me 12 months ago I would've said 100% yes, but now I have my doubts given the performance of the military so far. It's been fighting this war for seven months now and doesn't appear to have learned any major lessons yet.
Where's the VVS in all this? They failed in their SEAD right from the start and that was a very costly error Ukraine air war examined: A glimpse at the future of air warfare. The Ukrainian AF is flying SEAD now but we still don't see the VVS doing that. Ukrainian MiGs Firing American Missiles Are Hunting Down Russian Air-Defenses. It appears that the Ukrainians have an air denial strategy that's rather effective and whilst it wasn't preplanned it was a necessity planned on the fly, that is resulting in preventing Russian airborne ISR and a reduction of Russian tactical strike packages etc., Success denied: Finding ground truth in the air war over Ukraine. If they can't see it, they can't find it and can't strike it. Maybe the Ukrainians have been reading the naval strategist Corbett and taken his sea denial theories into the air domain In Denial About Denial: Why Ukraine’s Air Success Should Worry the West - War on the Rocks. It's definitely an interesting concept and worth investigating.
Video report on Ukrainians undertaking basic training in the UK.
UK Forces News video on Russian conscripts having to provide their own equipment.
The air war is a classic example of one side performing effective but limited air denial [we saw this in Kosovo; albeit on a much smaller and less effective scale] but my question is did the Ukrainians plan for a limited air denial strategy from the start or was it something adopted out of sheer necessity once the war erupted? I really doubt that they planned to go head to head against the Russians in the air. To be fair the Russians too have achieve limited air denial; Ukrainian planes are very wary of Russian AD.
They no doubt have been taught various lessons but whether they can actually implement those lessons is another matter. There is also the question of how well the Russians or any army in the midst of war; is able to innovate or adapt.
Apart from effective SEAD strikes made possible by HARM; are the Ukranians really deploying air power more effectively than the Russians? HARM strikes have been well publised but how effective have they really been?
It's also often overlooked that quite a bit of what the Ukrainians have managed to do was helped by Western intel. I've long questioned the claim that this war teaches us many new things; as opposed to reminding us or validating things we already knew.
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I would think that Ukraine has already shown this point. It has adapted very well for a force outmatched in sheer firepower to one that can depending on the situation either use limited numbers to win a battle to a full combined armed formation to do so. Its not a matter of if the troops them selves can adapt but rather if the leadership can. Ukraine has been able to do that even when many at the start thought it impossible, I dont think anyone expected the Ukrainian air force to still be combat capable 7 months in to a conflict with a nation once considered one of the most powerful armies.
If you look at it in simple numbers, Russia has more aircraft, more advanced aircraft, Ukrain does not. To date so far losses are most part even and that is with a good number of Ukrainian aircraft lost on the ground in opening days while in recent weeks Russian aircraft losses have been steadily increasing... For a smaller force to acheive that and be combat capable then they bloody well have to be far more effective or sheer numbers would have rendered Ukranian air force done for months ago.
The question was not whether the Ukranians have adopted an effective air denial strategy; whether they have done a good job; including asset preservation and sustaining an air arm in being against an opponent which had a numerical and qualitative advantage or whether the Russians have underperformed but whether the Ukrainians at present; given the circumstances they face; are able to deploy air power in a more effective manner compared to the Russians? Are Russians operations being constrainted by Ukrainian air power? Have Russians ops been impacted by HARM strikes? Are they generating less sorties as a result of Ukrainian action?
In order to get a balance narrative we need to look not only and what the Russians can or can't do but also at the Ukrainians.
In order to get a balance narrative we need to look not only and what the Russians can or can't do but also at the Ukrainians.
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The river Oskil hasn't been much of a barrier to the Ukrainian advance. They seem to be advancing fairly steadily towards Luhansk oblast in both Kharkiv & northern Donetsk oblasts, while the Russians have been attacking Bakhmut for 3 months.
For Russian troops north of the dam at Nova Kakhovka, Ukrainian advances threaten to trap them against the Dnipro reservoir, with no supply or retreat route except by boat. That might trigger withdrawals to try to escape encirclement.
I think a lot of what has happened so far in this war will rewrite the books as far as warfighting is concerned. Russia clearly has greater fire power than the Ukraine. However having more tanks, artillery, bombs and bullets hasn't been able to get the job done.
It will take years for experts to pore over all of the data collected from this war. Bad logistics, poor leadership, poor intelligence, precision weapons, training, unmanned systems have probably contributed to Russia's problems. I can't see any of this being fixed anytime soon.
If Ukraine reports are to be believed then Russian soldiers are retreating or surrendering on first contact. I just don't see how Russia can turn that around.
It will take years for experts to pore over all of the data collected from this war. Bad logistics, poor leadership, poor intelligence, precision weapons, training, unmanned systems have probably contributed to Russia's problems. I can't see any of this being fixed anytime soon.
If Ukraine reports are to be believed then Russian soldiers are retreating or surrendering on first contact. I just don't see how Russia can turn that around.
No doubt but how much of the so called lessons are stuff we already knew?
Like various other armies which had an overmatch over their enemies but ultimately did not achieve their objectives.
Given that we're still learning new things about WW1 and 2; it'll be a long while before we get the whole picture on this war.
Bad logistics, poor leadership, poor intelligence, precision weapons, training, unmanned systems have probably contributed to Russia's problems
It was a combination of various things which should also serve as a wake up call to other armies who might find themselves in a similar position but against an opponent which - unlike Russia - has trained to conduct a high tech; high intensity protracted war.
Would We Do Better? Hubris and Validation in Ukraine - War on the Rocks
The hapless Russians are flailing in Ukraine. Their poorly prepared, unprofessional soldiers are incapable of modern combined arms warfare. Even if
warontherocks.com
Well if they can't and the Ukrainians are able to sustain this tempo indefinitely; then the Russians will be out of the Ukraine eventually. Personally I don't see that happening anytime soon. Sooner or later things will slow down until they resume in intensity again and by that time the Russians hope they'll be in a better position.
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Some updated maps of the Kherson area from Russian sources.
The salient at Sukhoi Stavok is alive and well. It appears Ukrainian forces backed off of Kostromka, but continue to hold Sukhoi Stavok itself, and have drastically expanded the base of the salient, making it much more sustainable. There are reports that Ukrainian forces are attacking Davydov Brod again, this time with troops available on both sides of the river.
Reportedly Ukrainian troops are continuing attacks towards Dudchany with additional forces, Russian troops are so far hanging on, but the question is far from decided.
EDIT: Russia has replaced the commander of West MD. Their units have done rather poorly in this war (especially when compared to East MD and South MD. The new commander is apparently Roman Berdnikov, former East MD commander and former commander of Russian Forces Grouping in Syria.
vk.com
Interesting fragment of an interview with a Russian or rebel soldier about the withdrawal from Liman. He complains about inadequate air and artillery support.
vk.com
Footage has surfaced of Russia training recently mobilized personnel on BMP-3s, T-80BVs, and T-90Ms. It's likely Russia will be fielding a mix of whatever can be reactivated relatively quickly from storage and of what's coming off of factory lines literally right now. It mirrors the situation where the DON Cossack irregulars are riding T-62Ms from storage and newly upgraded BMP-2Ms with Berezhok, leading to the paradoxical situation where their MBTs have 50 year old FCS technology, and the IFVs have a modern computerized FCS. I suspect we will see some units on BMP-1, T-62Ms, etc. and others on BMP-3s, BMP-2Ms, BTR-82As and T-90Ms.
vk.com
gurkhan.blogspot.com
EDIT2:
The salient at Sukhoi Stavok is alive and well. It appears Ukrainian forces backed off of Kostromka, but continue to hold Sukhoi Stavok itself, and have drastically expanded the base of the salient, making it much more sustainable. There are reports that Ukrainian forces are attacking Davydov Brod again, this time with troops available on both sides of the river.
Reportedly Ukrainian troops are continuing attacks towards Dudchany with additional forces, Russian troops are so far hanging on, but the question is far from decided.
EDIT: Russia has replaced the commander of West MD. Their units have done rather poorly in this war (especially when compared to East MD and South MD. The new commander is apparently Roman Berdnikov, former East MD commander and former commander of Russian Forces Grouping in Syria.
VK.com | VK
vk.com
Interesting fragment of an interview with a Russian or rebel soldier about the withdrawal from Liman. He complains about inadequate air and artillery support.
VK.com | VK
vk.com
Footage has surfaced of Russia training recently mobilized personnel on BMP-3s, T-80BVs, and T-90Ms. It's likely Russia will be fielding a mix of whatever can be reactivated relatively quickly from storage and of what's coming off of factory lines literally right now. It mirrors the situation where the DON Cossack irregulars are riding T-62Ms from storage and newly upgraded BMP-2Ms with Berezhok, leading to the paradoxical situation where their MBTs have 50 year old FCS technology, and the IFVs have a modern computerized FCS. I suspect we will see some units on BMP-1, T-62Ms, etc. and others on BMP-3s, BMP-2Ms, BTR-82As and T-90Ms.
VK.com | VK
vk.com
Российские мобилизованные получили новейшие танки Т-90М (видео)
gurkhan.blogspot.com
EDIT2:
Looking again at that map, the salient at Sukhoi Stavok was never this deep to the best of my knowledge. I think this exaggerates it quite a bit. I think what's shown here is the intent, of two Ukrainian salients to push on Berislav and threaten the Russian crossing point at Novaya Kahovka, where the massive dam makes it a lot easier to set up additional crossings. I'm open to evidence suggesting that this map is the accurate one.
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Russia was involved in the Vostok games with approaching 50,000 troops and" five thousand pieces of equipment"
Russia and China launch Vostok war games - but with far smaller numbers amid Ukraine invasion | Daily Mail Online is it known if these forces and their equipment are being or have been sent to the Ukraine as you would expect these troops to be highly trained
Russia and China launch Vostok war games - but with far smaller numbers amid Ukraine invasion | Daily Mail Online is it known if these forces and their equipment are being or have been sent to the Ukraine as you would expect these troops to be highly trained
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Media coverage of Vostok-22 is significantly less then you would normally expect, obviously due to the war. So I honestly don't know. I suspect that, unless someone tells us in an interview, we won't know. Even if a brigade took part in the war, we don't know if the btln in the exercises is the same one that deployed to Ukraine.