I think he is confused between the IA-58 Pucara and the IA-63 Pampa. The S211 does look similar to the Pampa.
Philippine Air Force Discussions and Updates
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I think he is confused between the IA-58 Pucara and the IA-63 Pampa. The S211 does look similar to the Pampa.
weasel1962
New Member
Re:
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flanx
New Member
Correct... locals wont be going to support it if this happen.. just like some US-Philippines joint exercise here attracts massive demonstration..
Yup you are right MILF isnt known to have AA... but I'm just sick of the PAF donated fighters such as OV10 Broncos... who supposed to be in the museum..
I'm just wondering why they can't purchase decent fighters.. neighbors such as Malaysia and Vietnam already have Migs and Sukhois..
Mr Ignorant
New Member
Nothing is for free or rather there's no such thing as a free lunch, and commissioning implies that the PAF is limited, in thinking and in capability.
In reality there is no need for the PAF to purchase and operate sophisticated and now near obsolete Fighter aircraft. The Americans are pressing for more basing in the Phillipines, and so it makes political sense to suggest a visit of say 6 months by the USMC Marine Aircraft Group 13 for example, and that would be deterrence enough to any hostile neighbour in the region. That could be done tomorrow, given the right political conditions.
Of immediate threat now is the various groups under the MILF banner going rogue, and breaking the peace process. The S211s and OV10 Broncos are more than enough for Counter insurgency purposes. And even then, these aircraft is used in a limited manner. COIN operations in Mindanao has so far been successful, and evidence of that is MILF's proxies (NGOs) crying foul over military operations in the region. Suffice to say, the Phillipines could muster the political will to end the southern insurgency, if all the key figureheads are politically neutralised or bought off. With the insurgency over, then the PAF can do what they do best.
However, I share adroth's pov on this thread. Given the limited budgets now, if ever the Phillipines need to deploy an air deterrent against anyone of it's hostile neighbours (and there are a few), then the Americans are only to happy to help.
Malaysia on the other hand doesn't enjoy that kind of military fraternity beyond the fpda. And Indonesia is too preoccupied with further balkanization. So Vietnam's and China's movements skirting around the Phillipines tolls in the Spratly Islands could generate flashpoints in the region. Then again, that all depends on the Pinoy political class, when dealing in the dragon's lair. Sometimes I think Gloria Arroyo has a handful negotiating with the Chinese and Americans, and I must say, the Phillipinos enjoy a relationship with the US beyond what other countries in the region could hope to have.
In reality there is no need for the PAF to purchase and operate sophisticated and now near obsolete Fighter aircraft. The Americans are pressing for more basing in the Phillipines, and so it makes political sense to suggest a visit of say 6 months by the USMC Marine Aircraft Group 13 for example, and that would be deterrence enough to any hostile neighbour in the region. That could be done tomorrow, given the right political conditions.
Of immediate threat now is the various groups under the MILF banner going rogue, and breaking the peace process. The S211s and OV10 Broncos are more than enough for Counter insurgency purposes. And even then, these aircraft is used in a limited manner. COIN operations in Mindanao has so far been successful, and evidence of that is MILF's proxies (NGOs) crying foul over military operations in the region. Suffice to say, the Phillipines could muster the political will to end the southern insurgency, if all the key figureheads are politically neutralised or bought off. With the insurgency over, then the PAF can do what they do best.
However, I share adroth's pov on this thread. Given the limited budgets now, if ever the Phillipines need to deploy an air deterrent against anyone of it's hostile neighbours (and there are a few), then the Americans are only to happy to help.
Malaysia on the other hand doesn't enjoy that kind of military fraternity beyond the fpda. And Indonesia is too preoccupied with further balkanization. So Vietnam's and China's movements skirting around the Phillipines tolls in the Spratly Islands could generate flashpoints in the region. Then again, that all depends on the Pinoy political class, when dealing in the dragon's lair. Sometimes I think Gloria Arroyo has a handful negotiating with the Chinese and Americans, and I must say, the Phillipinos enjoy a relationship with the US beyond what other countries in the region could hope to have.
I agree that the Philippine Air Force ought to buy a few average cheaper fighter jets even made in China (F1). Russia used to accept barter trade, and the AFP or DND should check on this so PAF maybe can acquire the SU27 or Mig 29, cheaper than US or better than used donated aircrafts from the US that will only kill Filipino pilots. These can at least provide cover in case of scramble in the skies. Its a pity for the AFP and the nation to suffer on this state of their military readiness. The Philippines also have the technology to built fast patrol boats and ships, assault rifles and other military industries that will even create jobs and revenues for local and export. The Danao gun makers should not be outlawed but organized and recruited by the DND for commercial gun production. Why the government is not focusing on this is really lack of vision and long range plans. I mean, they cannot just depend on the US to defend them in case of an attack or natural disaster. I served in the Philippine Army 25 yrs ago and just by reading the news there about the AFP modernization sometimes frustrates me, its too slow. The country also has vasts coastlines and 7000 islands, so it needs a larger Naval strength and capabilities to secure its coastlines from terrorists, smugglers and dynamite and cyanide fishing that is destroying the environment.
Use paragraphing.
- SABRE
Use paragraphing.
- SABRE
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FPDA successfully dealt with both an internal insurgency and an external threat without committing any of the participants to mutual defence. It allowed the participants to improve compentences. Would the Phillipines be open to requesting a regional assistance operation, limited to specific areas that may be of asistance? Instability in any country in SEA is not in the benefit of any of the countries in the region.
I agree with Mr Ignorant that nothing is for free. IMHO, there is a over dependence on US support (i.e. get things free) by the armed forces in Philippines. This results in a dependence mentality, which has unintentional and harmful systematic consequences for the country's long term development.
With Uncle Sam around there is no need to take a long hard look at corruption and reform. The people need to tell the armed forces to change and to root out corruption. Without addressing the issue of corruption, the sources of support for COIN will remain, because there is no effective development.
Further, it is a common misconception that the air force is not important in a COIN operation. CAS is important to many coin operations. It would be more accurate to say that an air force is an expensive supplement to military capabilities in a COIN operation. So I should think that the PAF needs to look at some second hand F16A/Bs, with modern targetting pods (rather than Soviet or Chinese fighters) that are going to be phased out as CAS aircraft (rather than new items).
For example it has been announced that the Chileans are negotiations with the Dutch government to acquire a second lot of Royal Netherlands Air Force F-16AM/BMs (please see other thread in DT).
I disagree with 2ID. It is the lack of proper maintenance (and corruption) that kills Filipino pilots. Even the retired Singapore planes can fly. For example, 4 Singapore Hueys were activated for a mission in East Timor.
Other ASEAN countries want the Philippines to succeed. However, for the Philippines to succeed it needs to take a long hard look at itself. What the Philippines sees in the mirror today may not be pretty. However, if there is discipline in military planning and a demand for clean government, then the future will be bright.
With Uncle Sam around there is no need to take a long hard look at corruption and reform. The people need to tell the armed forces to change and to root out corruption. Without addressing the issue of corruption, the sources of support for COIN will remain, because there is no effective development.
Further, it is a common misconception that the air force is not important in a COIN operation. CAS is important to many coin operations. It would be more accurate to say that an air force is an expensive supplement to military capabilities in a COIN operation. So I should think that the PAF needs to look at some second hand F16A/Bs, with modern targetting pods (rather than Soviet or Chinese fighters) that are going to be phased out as CAS aircraft (rather than new items).
For example it has been announced that the Chileans are negotiations with the Dutch government to acquire a second lot of Royal Netherlands Air Force F-16AM/BMs (please see other thread in DT).
I disagree with 2ID. It is the lack of proper maintenance (and corruption) that kills Filipino pilots. Even the retired Singapore planes can fly. For example, 4 Singapore Hueys were activated for a mission in East Timor.
Other ASEAN countries want the Philippines to succeed. However, for the Philippines to succeed it needs to take a long hard look at itself. What the Philippines sees in the mirror today may not be pretty. However, if there is discipline in military planning and a demand for clean government, then the future will be bright.
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Bluesaphirro
New Member
I Agree there is always hope..
I always know that there is hope for our Philippine Air Force next year is 2010 and 2011 is just another year away and by that time the philippine economy wil progress and funding for our Armed Forces of the Philippines will be available especially for our Phil Air Force and Phil Navy both these branches despeartely needs new state of the art high technology equipments that can help fulfill our defense needs..
I always know that there is hope for our Philippine Air Force next year is 2010 and 2011 is just another year away and by that time the philippine economy wil progress and funding for our Armed Forces of the Philippines will be available especially for our Phil Air Force and Phil Navy both these branches despeartely needs new state of the art high technology equipments that can help fulfill our defense needs..
They should buy UAVs
Like Global Hawks, Predators or Reapers
They provide very accurate air strikes
Drones: America's New Air Force - 60 Minutes - CBS News
Like Global Hawks, Predators or Reapers
They provide very accurate air strikes
Drones: America's New Air Force - 60 Minutes - CBS News
Given that the PAF is currently engaged in COIN operations down south and there is a disaster relief requirement, wouldn't refurbished C-130s or smaller transports like the C-27 [a more affordable option than the C-27would be CN-235s from Indonesia] be more useful than fighters [if I'm not mistaken there is only 1 C-130 flying at the moment?]
Cash might be available for surplus F-16s in the near future but whether enough cash can be found to cover operating costs and training is the question. No doubt figters are a vital element in COIN operations but in the case of the AFP I don't see how fighters will contribute to its present COIN operations in the south in a way the Hueys or Defenders haven't. I believe the reason there is still a problem in the south is not because of a lack of firepower, precision strike capabilities or fixed wing CAS assets but more to do with politics and socio enonomic reasons.
Off topic I know but apart from transports for the PAF, I think that any available funding should also be used for a number of small newly built LSTs for the PN, given the huge potential for disaster relief operations and logistics.
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The local dynamics of Philippines is hard to explain and perhaps Filipino members of the forum could provide better insight. One of the things to note is that conventional and simple solutions don't work if we do not understand the systematic and endemic problems of the Philippines as a weak state.
Simply put the Philippine state does not have a monopoly over violence. This situation has created attendant social ills that most Malaysians or Singaporeans cannot understand (as we have much more capable governments by comparison). And I cannot understand why Malaysians like Mr Ignorant would even want to make such comparisons in another thread (the Malaysian state and armed forces are way more capable and less politicized by comparison). For example, as a Singaporean, I don't really have to worry about military coups in Malaysia. Malaysia is so stable and the military and civilian divide so well established that it won't happen.
In biz contingency planning, we need to worry about military coups in many Southeast Asian countries (but not in Malaysia or Singapore). And in the Philippines is one of the countries where this may occur when a regime change occurs (eg. during Estrada's corrupt regime and his time in office). Only time will tell if the Philippines has become more stable after Arroyo's term of office.
IMO, it would be more accurate to say that the country has been plagued by insurgencies throughout its modern history. The longest running insurgencies in the country are being waged by the Communist Party of the Philippines - New People’s Army (CPP-NPA) and it’s affiliate groups that are mainly based in the whole islands and the Southern Philippines Secessionist Movements operating in Mindanao. Both insurgent groups continue to operate and engage in criminal and terrorist activities that threaten the country’s internal security and hamper nation building.
For the above reasons, I would say that Philippines is a weak state. IMHO, what the Philippine government says and what it can do are totally not connected.
In fact, I'm not surprised by the horrific massacre at Ampatuan in Maguindanao province and this massacre is a symptom of the many problems the country faces as a weak state. In my personal assessment, it's such a weak state that I would prefer to go to Malaysia or Indonesia (post-Bali bombings) for a family holiday than in the Philippines.
Yes, they are fighting multiple insurgencies, where the insurgents in the South are able to move in large numbers with impunity. With regards to the Muslim insurgencies, it is necessary to facilitate insurgent cooperation against terrorists by addressing substantive political grievances, including by committing to resume talks with the MILF on the basis of the right to self-determination of the Bangsamoro people; and resume Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) tripartite talks to review implementation of the 1996 Jakarta peace agreement with the MNLF.
Edit: Given that the Philippine Army and Marines have the doctrine and are capable of operational maneuver under fire, it is a pity that they are not given better tools for operational maneuver by their Congress (via the allocation of more funds - beyond the recently acquired 2,019 manpack radios, 6,540 squad automatic weapons, 2,501 grenade lannchers and various sniper rifles, NVGs and so on). Eg. Greater investments heli-lift with the recent plans to acquire another 8 utility helicopters may possibly enable the West Mindanao Command to set up a heli-borne quick reaction force (QRF). The existence of a heli-borne QRF change the resource equation for troops in contact with insurgents.
In short (despite the new buys), on the whole, I don't think the Philippine Congress is resourcing their armed forces sufficiently to greatly decelerate the potency of the various insurgent groups. Rather, they are resourcing the armed forces at a level only sufficient to maintain the current political stalemate and keep their armed forces capabilities at a 1980s technological level. However, IMO, times have changed and the insurgent groups are continually adapting and learning. Without persistent security first (via the commitment of sufficient resources) Southern Philippines cannot have either stability or development.
It is also the fact that their air force is inadequately resourced to provide the necessary mobility and combined arms combat capability to effectively encircle and destroy concentrations of insurgent groups in large portions of their own sovereign territory.
Yes, the political will to properly resource the Philippine armed forces is lacking.
I disagree. They need to grow their current limited capabilities by a significant margin if they are to provide the necessary incentive for the insurgent groups to come to the bargaining table and to get these armed groups to negotiate with the Philippine government in good faith.
Let me use a hypothetical example to illustrate. 12 F-16s flying three sorties a day can potentially destroy up to 72 targets daily (of subversive infrastructure and military targets) if each carried two precision-guided munitions. Over a period of 10 days such a hypothetical force can hit 720 targets. I believe that the possession of this level of destructive capability (if supported by appropriate ISR) is enough to get these armed groups to want to negotiate before recourse to continued violence. IMO, the air combat arm of their air force is a big stick (when re-established) and the future acquisition of such capabilities are complimentary to their existing Hueys, OV-10A Broncos and other recently proposed acquisitions.
I would take any proposed re-establishment of an air combat arm for the Philippines after 2011 as a symbol of political will to change the resource equation to end the political stalemate with the various insurgencies. For such a move to be effective, it must be accompanied by other initiatives to increase the spectrum of capabilities of which ISR and targeting are necessary skill sets. When I say that I would like to see F-16s with targeting pods in Philippine colours, I mean it in this context.
I recognise that tactical responses provided by F-16s can only "win battles", and these sort of investments by themselves cannot "win wars". IMO, counter-insurgency requires a careful blend of military, political, and psychological efforts including pro-government propaganda, mobilisation of the state's political resources, attacks on the subversive infrastructure, re-conquest of liberated zones, isolation and destruction of insurgent military forces, and diplomatic efforts.
They are now working hard to keep basic equipment operational and they critically need ship lift between islands (to that end they have acquired 20 new watercraft for the army and 3 small Multi-purpose Attack Craft). Even the US military in providing aid are aware of the structural limitations of the Philippines and are doing so in a targeted manner, where they have to verify that the aid given is used effectively. There is a small contingent of Americans deployed in Joint Special Operations Task Force - Philippines (JSOTF-P) and they are providing resources and aid to the Philippine military.
Simply put the Philippine state does not have a monopoly over violence. This situation has created attendant social ills that most Malaysians or Singaporeans cannot understand (as we have much more capable governments by comparison). And I cannot understand why Malaysians like Mr Ignorant would even want to make such comparisons in another thread (the Malaysian state and armed forces are way more capable and less politicized by comparison). For example, as a Singaporean, I don't really have to worry about military coups in Malaysia. Malaysia is so stable and the military and civilian divide so well established that it won't happen.
In biz contingency planning, we need to worry about military coups in many Southeast Asian countries (but not in Malaysia or Singapore). And in the Philippines is one of the countries where this may occur when a regime change occurs (eg. during Estrada's corrupt regime and his time in office). Only time will tell if the Philippines has become more stable after Arroyo's term of office.
IMO, it would be more accurate to say that the country has been plagued by insurgencies throughout its modern history. The longest running insurgencies in the country are being waged by the Communist Party of the Philippines - New People’s Army (CPP-NPA) and it’s affiliate groups that are mainly based in the whole islands and the Southern Philippines Secessionist Movements operating in Mindanao. Both insurgent groups continue to operate and engage in criminal and terrorist activities that threaten the country’s internal security and hamper nation building.
For the above reasons, I would say that Philippines is a weak state. IMHO, what the Philippine government says and what it can do are totally not connected.
In fact, I'm not surprised by the horrific massacre at Ampatuan in Maguindanao province and this massacre is a symptom of the many problems the country faces as a weak state. In my personal assessment, it's such a weak state that I would prefer to go to Malaysia or Indonesia (post-Bali bombings) for a family holiday than in the Philippines.
Yes, they are fighting multiple insurgencies, where the insurgents in the South are able to move in large numbers with impunity. With regards to the Muslim insurgencies, it is necessary to facilitate insurgent cooperation against terrorists by addressing substantive political grievances, including by committing to resume talks with the MILF on the basis of the right to self-determination of the Bangsamoro people; and resume Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) tripartite talks to review implementation of the 1996 Jakarta peace agreement with the MNLF.
Edit: Given that the Philippine Army and Marines have the doctrine and are capable of operational maneuver under fire, it is a pity that they are not given better tools for operational maneuver by their Congress (via the allocation of more funds - beyond the recently acquired 2,019 manpack radios, 6,540 squad automatic weapons, 2,501 grenade lannchers and various sniper rifles, NVGs and so on). Eg. Greater investments heli-lift with the recent plans to acquire another 8 utility helicopters may possibly enable the West Mindanao Command to set up a heli-borne quick reaction force (QRF). The existence of a heli-borne QRF change the resource equation for troops in contact with insurgents.
In short (despite the new buys), on the whole, I don't think the Philippine Congress is resourcing their armed forces sufficiently to greatly decelerate the potency of the various insurgent groups. Rather, they are resourcing the armed forces at a level only sufficient to maintain the current political stalemate and keep their armed forces capabilities at a 1980s technological level. However, IMO, times have changed and the insurgent groups are continually adapting and learning. Without persistent security first (via the commitment of sufficient resources) Southern Philippines cannot have either stability or development.
It is also the fact that their air force is inadequately resourced to provide the necessary mobility and combined arms combat capability to effectively encircle and destroy concentrations of insurgent groups in large portions of their own sovereign territory.
Yes, the political will to properly resource the Philippine armed forces is lacking.
I disagree. They need to grow their current limited capabilities by a significant margin if they are to provide the necessary incentive for the insurgent groups to come to the bargaining table and to get these armed groups to negotiate with the Philippine government in good faith.
Let me use a hypothetical example to illustrate. 12 F-16s flying three sorties a day can potentially destroy up to 72 targets daily (of subversive infrastructure and military targets) if each carried two precision-guided munitions. Over a period of 10 days such a hypothetical force can hit 720 targets. I believe that the possession of this level of destructive capability (if supported by appropriate ISR) is enough to get these armed groups to want to negotiate before recourse to continued violence. IMO, the air combat arm of their air force is a big stick (when re-established) and the future acquisition of such capabilities are complimentary to their existing Hueys, OV-10A Broncos and other recently proposed acquisitions.
I would take any proposed re-establishment of an air combat arm for the Philippines after 2011 as a symbol of political will to change the resource equation to end the political stalemate with the various insurgencies. For such a move to be effective, it must be accompanied by other initiatives to increase the spectrum of capabilities of which ISR and targeting are necessary skill sets. When I say that I would like to see F-16s with targeting pods in Philippine colours, I mean it in this context.
I recognise that tactical responses provided by F-16s can only "win battles", and these sort of investments by themselves cannot "win wars". IMO, counter-insurgency requires a careful blend of military, political, and psychological efforts including pro-government propaganda, mobilisation of the state's political resources, attacks on the subversive infrastructure, re-conquest of liberated zones, isolation and destruction of insurgent military forces, and diplomatic efforts.
They are now working hard to keep basic equipment operational and they critically need ship lift between islands (to that end they have acquired 20 new watercraft for the army and 3 small Multi-purpose Attack Craft). Even the US military in providing aid are aware of the structural limitations of the Philippines and are doing so in a targeted manner, where they have to verify that the aid given is used effectively. There is a small contingent of Americans deployed in Joint Special Operations Task Force - Philippines (JSOTF-P) and they are providing resources and aid to the Philippine military.
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What they need to do is grow their current capabilities to deal with current threats that threaten the stability of the nation. No point in allocating scarce funds for fighters when the AFP has not enough fixed wing transport assets and LSTs [both of which have peacetime applications unlike fighters]. Introducing fighters at present would be highly symbolic in nature but would probably have no effect on deterring groups like Abu Sayaf.
I would go further than that and say the Philipines is close to being a failed state. No offence to any Philippinos here.... It''s sad, but way back in the 60's and 70's, the Philippines was way ahead of its neighbours in many aspects. There was time when PAF F-86s used to violate East Malaysia air space with total immunity.
But I wont go far as saying I wouldn't holiday in the Philippines for safety reasons. I've been to the Philippines on a few occasions, and I have to say that despite the poverty and abundance of pistols, Manila is still a lot safer than many parts of first world capitals,
London included.
: I get what you're saying. But the problem is not the lack of a 'big stick' or insufficient strike assets. Your point would work if Abu Sayaf had any fix installations [unlike the MILF] to hit or if the conflict has clear demarcation lines between the warring parties. As it is, Abu Sayaf moves in small groups with nothing heavier than M-60's and mingles with the local population. Bad enough its hard to find them under triple canopy jungle from a Huey at 500feet let alone from a fast moving jet. The problem is in finding and conering them. In the past there have been several instances of groups of Aby Sayaf being trapped and yet still managing to escape. IMO, in line with long term social/economic moves to win the population, what is really needed is better pay, medical and training for the troops, and better officers. Even amongst locals who have no ties with Abu Sayaf or the MILF, many see the presence of the army as that of a Christian dominated force on a traditionally Muslin environment. A major problem is that in common with many third world and developing countries, the Philippino army has dedicated, experienced soldiers led by inept officers.
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Thanks for the thoughtful reply.
I have had to travel for work and I have made trips to the Philippines. Don't get me wrong, not all parts of Philippines is unsafe. Just some parts. Given the potential danger of kidnapping in many parts (especially in the South), it deters tourism and I am deterred from taking further holidays there - despite having previously sailed and dived in their waters.
I think you misunderstand me. Please read what I wrote earlier again:
Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia all have air combat aircraft. Just because the JI is not deterred by our air forces and it does not mean that the air combat arm of our air forces are not useful. They are useful if they can be utilized (I shall not elaborate further on how they can be utilized). The same would apply for the Abu Sayyaf (whose operations has more in common with tribal criminal elements and terrorists). And Abu Sayyaf's legitimacy problem is their reliance on criminal activities to boost their resources.
Air power is a tool in an arsenal of tools. It is not intended to be the be all or end all of tools.
In the case of the Philippines, having a strong air force would definitely help against the MILF (in reducing collateral damage) and the Philippines have used S211 jets and OV 10 Bronco for air strikes in Mindanao as a tool of combined arms warfare. BTW, Sri Lanka used air power against the Tamil Tigers. If the resource equation for the Philippines arms forces change, the MILF knows that they have to come to the negotiating table if the Philippine government has the resolve to meet them force on force (if they don't want to lay down arms).
BTW, I DO NOT believe that the Philippine army is lead by inept officers (on the whole). I believe that they have reformed the procurement process (to weed out corruption) and their current problem is the relative poverty of financial resources allocated to their military (given the scale of problems they face). Further, with help from the American Joint Special Operations Task Force - Philippines (JSOTF-P), they are currently taking systematic steps to address current weaknesses within the current resources allocated. Click here to read a Sept 2009 JDW article on the matter [h/t to spiderweb6969].
I have had to travel for work and I have made trips to the Philippines. Don't get me wrong, not all parts of Philippines is unsafe. Just some parts. Given the potential danger of kidnapping in many parts (especially in the South), it deters tourism and I am deterred from taking further holidays there - despite having previously sailed and dived in their waters.
I think you misunderstand me. Please read what I wrote earlier again:
OPSSG said:
Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia all have air combat aircraft. Just because the JI is not deterred by our air forces and it does not mean that the air combat arm of our air forces are not useful. They are useful if they can be utilized (I shall not elaborate further on how they can be utilized). The same would apply for the Abu Sayyaf (whose operations has more in common with tribal criminal elements and terrorists). And Abu Sayyaf's legitimacy problem is their reliance on criminal activities to boost their resources.
Air power is a tool in an arsenal of tools. It is not intended to be the be all or end all of tools.
In the case of the Philippines, having a strong air force would definitely help against the MILF (in reducing collateral damage) and the Philippines have used S211 jets and OV 10 Bronco for air strikes in Mindanao as a tool of combined arms warfare. BTW, Sri Lanka used air power against the Tamil Tigers. If the resource equation for the Philippines arms forces change, the MILF knows that they have to come to the negotiating table if the Philippine government has the resolve to meet them force on force (if they don't want to lay down arms).
BTW, I DO NOT believe that the Philippine army is lead by inept officers (on the whole). I believe that they have reformed the procurement process (to weed out corruption) and their current problem is the relative poverty of financial resources allocated to their military (given the scale of problems they face). Further, with help from the American Joint Special Operations Task Force - Philippines (JSOTF-P), they are currently taking systematic steps to address current weaknesses within the current resources allocated. Click here to read a Sept 2009 JDW article on the matter [h/t to spiderweb6969].
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I'm not disputing the vital role played by airpower in COIN operations nor am I saying it's the means to an end. If air power were a means to an end, U.S. troops would no longer be in Iraq and Afghanistan .... It's just my opinion that fighters would not deter Abu Sayaf or any armed group thats threatens the nation, anymore than the S211s, Broncos and Marine 155mm guns already have. Indeed the the SLAF did use fast jets against the LTTE and so did many other countries with counter insurgeny efforts. The problem is the situation in Mindanao is somewhat different, than say Sri Lanka or Chechnya.
Anyway, I believe when faced against groups like Abu Sayaf or the MILF which have probably no AA defences apart from HMGs, the way to go is with slow moving air assets as opposed to fast movers. I understand and appreciate the points you've made but I honestly can't see how fast movers will make any difference.
All due respect but how do you explain that for the past few years the Philippines army and Marines have unable to eradicate the Abu Sayaf on relatively small islands? There have been a number of allegations made by local NGO's about Philippine officers sharing the ransom from kiddnappings with Abu Sayaf, in turning a blind eye and even providing them with small arms and ammo. There was an incident a few years back, when the top cadre of Abu Sayaf was totally surrounded and trapped. Yet by some miracle they escaped through an ''unguarded'' fence. In 'Hog Pilots, Blue Water Grunts'', by Robert Kaplan, the author visited U.S. and Philippines troops in Basilan and cited an inccident whrere an operation to trap Abu Sayaf was delayed because a General couldn't get out of bed. According to a Green Beret officer quoted in the book, the soldiers wouldn't maneuver and get in closer during a firefight because they didn't trust their officers.
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Like I said, they have used S211 and OV 10 Bronco for air strikes in Mindanao as a tool of combined arms warfare.
The S211 are used to supplement the OV-10s. S211 numbers have gone up through a local refurbishment program, with the assistance of Singapore Technologies and availability rates have come up somewhat. Maintenance of the S211s are being done through local private industry with some participation from the air force. Technical expertise, supplies, and technology being supplied by the contractor. Funding has also been increased to bring a large number of grounded aircraft back into service after putting them through extensive overhauls. I believe that even 2nd hand F-16s would be more effective than the S211s in their current role.
If the resource equation for the Philippines arms forces change, the Muslim insurgencies like the MILF and MNLF (which according to the FAS is the larger organisation) will have to come to the negotiating table via decreasing the military potency of the insurgent groups. The current situation is not in anybody's interest. Click here for more background info on the lack of a political settlement.
I can understand your skepticism. From my perspective, if properly utilized, fast movers have a role to play too and their air force is using S211s too to supplement their OV 10 Broncos. The problem with effective use of fast movers, is the need for more ISR (partly aided by the American resources via JSOTF-P). And they need to address this at a systematic level.
Edit: The ability of an air force to deploy sustained air power is crucial if you are to deny the Philippine insurgents the ability of reinforcing their fighting positions or preventing the remnants from melting away into the jungle after losing a fight. In other words, precision munitions delivered by air power restrict insurgent mobility and reduces their ability to reinforce fighting positions. This has the potential to force the insurgents to fight and die in place once the fight begins (instead of escaping and living to fight another day). This will have important psychological effects on the insurgents and can make a huge difference both at tactical and strategic levels.
Air power can also enable shaping operations and have dislocating effects on insurgent forces, in particular, insurgencies that make the strategic mistake of holding territory to protect important internal sanctuaries in the South. Insurgencies by their very nature are fractious affairs, and the stress and discord generated by decisions at strategic junctures can bring to the fore internal disagreements. Recognising and then leveraging insurgent strategic mistakes in COIN should not be viewed as a short-cut or gimmick, but rather it is part of the “thinking man’s war”.
I'm sure Adroth would have more details that I'm not aware of. I can't and I don't intend to defend them for the mistakes they made. BTW, have you looked at the terrain at Basilan? Some things are harder than it seems (especially given their resource limitations).
We have a difference in perspective. Like I said I don't intend to defend them for the mistakes they made. It's more important to me that they learn from their mistakes and that wrong doers are punished (in this case I understand that no one senior was 'punished' and hence, it is a source of concern).
My concern is that they must demonstrate a commitment to improving their capabilities (which I have no doubt is occurring under their current AFP Modernization Programme). I believe that on the whole, their officers have demonstrated a commitment to improving but are coming up a little short in the resource side of the equation. Hence, I'm not so harsh about the existence of 'black sheep' as 'black sheep' exist in every large organization (especially one that is poorly resourced).
I love reading Robert Kaplan.
The S211 are used to supplement the OV-10s. S211 numbers have gone up through a local refurbishment program, with the assistance of Singapore Technologies and availability rates have come up somewhat. Maintenance of the S211s are being done through local private industry with some participation from the air force. Technical expertise, supplies, and technology being supplied by the contractor. Funding has also been increased to bring a large number of grounded aircraft back into service after putting them through extensive overhauls. I believe that even 2nd hand F-16s would be more effective than the S211s in their current role.
If the resource equation for the Philippines arms forces change, the Muslim insurgencies like the MILF and MNLF (which according to the FAS is the larger organisation) will have to come to the negotiating table via decreasing the military potency of the insurgent groups. The current situation is not in anybody's interest. Click here for more background info on the lack of a political settlement.
STURM said:
I can understand your skepticism. From my perspective, if properly utilized, fast movers have a role to play too and their air force is using S211s too to supplement their OV 10 Broncos. The problem with effective use of fast movers, is the need for more ISR (partly aided by the American resources via JSOTF-P). And they need to address this at a systematic level.
Edit: The ability of an air force to deploy sustained air power is crucial if you are to deny the Philippine insurgents the ability of reinforcing their fighting positions or preventing the remnants from melting away into the jungle after losing a fight. In other words, precision munitions delivered by air power restrict insurgent mobility and reduces their ability to reinforce fighting positions. This has the potential to force the insurgents to fight and die in place once the fight begins (instead of escaping and living to fight another day). This will have important psychological effects on the insurgents and can make a huge difference both at tactical and strategic levels.
Air power can also enable shaping operations and have dislocating effects on insurgent forces, in particular, insurgencies that make the strategic mistake of holding territory to protect important internal sanctuaries in the South. Insurgencies by their very nature are fractious affairs, and the stress and discord generated by decisions at strategic junctures can bring to the fore internal disagreements. Recognising and then leveraging insurgent strategic mistakes in COIN should not be viewed as a short-cut or gimmick, but rather it is part of the “thinking man’s war”.
STURM said:
I'm sure Adroth would have more details that I'm not aware of. I can't and I don't intend to defend them for the mistakes they made. BTW, have you looked at the terrain at Basilan? Some things are harder than it seems (especially given their resource limitations).
STURM said:
We have a difference in perspective. Like I said I don't intend to defend them for the mistakes they made. It's more important to me that they learn from their mistakes and that wrong doers are punished (in this case I understand that no one senior was 'punished' and hence, it is a source of concern).
My concern is that they must demonstrate a commitment to improving their capabilities (which I have no doubt is occurring under their current AFP Modernization Programme). I believe that on the whole, their officers have demonstrated a commitment to improving but are coming up a little short in the resource side of the equation. Hence, I'm not so harsh about the existence of 'black sheep' as 'black sheep' exist in every large organization (especially one that is poorly resourced).
STURM said:
I love reading Robert Kaplan.
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No but having spent some time in the wilds of East Malaysia I can imagine how hard the terrain in Basilan is.
I love reading Robert Kaplan.
Same. Though I don't always agree and understand everything he writes abot, I'm a big fan.
Do you read any Robert Fisk? If you haven't already done so, I strongly recommend getting 'Arabs At War' by Ken Pollack.
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flanx
New Member
The only dangerous area in the Philippines is in the south which is in Mindanao. I been living in Mindanao for the first 15 years of my life then move out to Cebu. The rebels & armed groups bothers me a lot, they will knock on your door asking for some cash.
Hilarious! Do you know what is a failed state? care to elaborate?
I said the Philippines is close to being a failed state NOT a failed state. My statement was in context of a discussion I was having with OPSSG and was in no way intended to put down the Philippines. But to answer your question...
*Despite a large workforce with a good command of English, the economy leaves a lot to be desired, several decades after independance
*The poverty levels and large unemployment
*A weak central governance, the inability of successive governments after several decades of independance and living under the U.S. security umbrella to make life more liveable for the majority of its population
* What other countries are there in ASEAN apart maybe Myanmmar, where there are warlords mantaining private armies who owe loyalty to their clan or benafactors rather than the central government and who who couldn't give a hoot about what their local governers, let alone what the leadership in Manila says?
*How many countries are there in ASEAN where popular night clubs have gun detectors and security guards have fully automatic weapons?
*How many armies are there in which officers send orders through SMSs whilst on ops?
*How many other navies operate a fleet in which the vast majority of its vessels are on average 40 years old?
I just feel that the people of the Philipinnes deserve better than what their leaders have done for them given that the country has vast potential and was way ahead of its neighbours until the early 70's.
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