Post 2 of 2: Let the facts speak
6. While the US and Japan seek to address the China challenge, Japan has also sought to distance itself from several of Trump’s China policies. While Trump was in office, for example, then PM Abe sought to improve Japan-China relations, easing some of the historic tension between the two countries.
(a) At a Sino-Japan bilateral level the two countries began reengaging in high-level dialogue and created a
military hotline to prevent escalation in the East China Sea. Chinese President Xi Jinping was even scheduled for a state visit to Japan until the trip was
postponed due to the pandemic.
(b) Although reduced tension between Japan and China is a positive development, it is worth noting that Trump’s systematic weakening of the US—Japan alliance and American leadership in Asia has pushed even Japan—which has long advocated a tougher line against Beijing—to start hedging when it comes to China.
(c) The Trump administration also treated most ASEAN member states as pawns in a game against China and focused on narrow interests such as trade deficits rather than shared challenges. Meanwhile, Japan has continued improving its relationships with ASEAN countries. According to a recent poll,
84 % of ASEAN respondents viewed Japan as a reliable partner. In some ASEAN countries such as Indonesia, the US only had a
42 % favorability rating. Indonesia was one of the first countries that the newly elected Prime Minister Suga visited, and the two countries
agreed to work together on a variety of security, economic, and military issues.
7. During calls with counterparts in Vietnam and the Philippines, new US Secretary of State Antony Blinken made clear the US was not backing off its rejection of excessive Chinese claims of maritime rights and that the US was committed to maintaining a rules-based order in the South China Sea.
(a) Blinken said the US rejected China’s maritime claims in the South China Sea “to the extent they exceed the maritime zones that China is permitted to claim under international law as reflected in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention,” according to a statement from State spokesman Ned Price. It also made clear the U.S. would defend against attacks on Philippines military or government assets.
(b) “Secretary Blinken stressed the importance of the Mutual Defense Treaty for the security of both nations, and its clear application to armed attacks against the Philippine armed forces, public vessels, or aircraft in the Pacific, which includes the South China Sea,” in a State Department statement reads.
8. China is rapidly replacing the US as the top source of investment and final demand for Asian exports, thus becoming the economic reference point and as of 2020, Southeast Asia, rather than the US or Europe, is China's larger trading partner; in the battle for influence in ASEAN, China has won.
9. I will be interested in seeing the level and size of China’s delegation at the upcoming Shangri-La Dialogue (to be held on 4–6 June 2021), for a clue on the Chinese response to a Biden administration. I speculate that US Secretary of Defense, Lloyd Austin III will not be presenting an Obama Pivot 2.0, as that has been discredited under Trump.
10. Australia, and China and the US, all engage in coercive diplomacy, at times. And at various times, a member state of ASEAN, like the Philippines, Indonesia or Myanmar are subject to their efforts. Being subject to coercive diplomacy sucks but it is a fact of life for many third world nations. In the real world, a weak state gets to maneuver from a weak position into another weaker position.
(a) The weaker a state is, the more likely continued escalation becomes the choosing of its enemies — as India discovered in its border dispute with China that has been resolved in China’s favour. Fearing conflict with China, we see the rise of the China choice block within ASEAN. This has occurred with Philippine President Duterte being prominent in having shifted and aligned themselves with Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar as 4 of the weakest ASEAN states that are especially beholden to China. See this 2013 thread on
Weak state diplomacy for details.
(b) As Bilahari Kausikan said: "We are an inter-state and not supra-national organisation. No member is required to give up its sovereign right to define its national interests as it chooses. Cambodia's right to make its own political choices was never at issue. What was at issue was whether Cambodia had in any degree taken the regional interest into account when making that political choice."
(c) Diplomacy is a tool of state power. Coercive diplomacy is but a sub-set of a tool of state power - where a government can take a multi-track approach to a particular problem. Led by US Secretary of Defense, Lloyd Austin III, American diplomatic efforts at giving more choices to other states will once again be display at the Shangri-La Dialogue (to be held on 4–6 June 2021). Many members of ASEAN are more accurately described as client states of China, while some are engaged in active hedging. Within these range of responses is the policy space for decisions by regional leaders to make, with regard to the rise of China.
(d) Deterrence is a function of hard power and diplomacy is not a good substitute for hard power, as power defines the starting position of negotiations between countries — which is why India has the option to bomb Pakistan (over border issues) but not China. To Indian credit, they are engaging in active resistance and they can do so due to the Indian Army’s capabilities, to enable disengagement without firing a shot.
However, across Europe and the USA it wasn't the case.
