Asia Pacific NATO?

[ngatimozart]

A recent article in the Washington Times suggests that the current PRC military build up and aggressive foreign policy could be the impetus for the creation of an Asia Pacific version of NATO. Although the article states Asia, I have used the term Asia Pacific because it better describes the region.

This has been tried before with SEATO (South East Asia Treaty Organisation) which fell off its perch from asphyxiation. Whilst the US, Australia and NZ were keen participants, the rest of the region weren't, having a different viewpoint. I believe that they didn't see communism as a clear and present danger in the way that the US, Australia, and to a lesser degree NZ did, because of cultural differences and different world views. That is still seen in ASEAN today.

So what has changed? The PRC has become more assertive and built up the PLA technically from a peasant army to a high technological and capable multi domain force. But I do not think that the mindset of ASEAN has changed to the point where it would be comfortable with a military alliance similar to NATO. Also India is non aligned and for it to entertain joining such an alliance is a major foreign policy shift that would create domestic political problems for whatever political Party that proposed such a shift.

If it is indeed NATO pushing this proposal, what's in it is for them? Secondly why are they considering it's a geographical area well outside their area of responsibility or interest?

China military might spur talks of ‘Asian NATO’

China’s growing military prowess and increasingly aggressive foreign policy have revived talk among U.S. and European officials of creating an “Asian NATO” of regional powers to contain communist Beijing’s expansionist ambitions.

washingtontimes.com

 

[StingrayOZ]

NATO itself is having a bit of an identity crisis. What does NATO look like with out the US, and how should NATO look if Russia isn't the primary threat. Russia isn't the primary threat, any more. Western Europe is more likely to find itself at the harsh end of China than some sort of Soviet tank charge.

Asia is full of non-aligned nations. India, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Nepal and a few countries that are meant to be aligned but who honestly are a bit of guess, Thailand, Philippines, Pakistan.

I am not sure the traditional NATO model will work in Asia, we tried that, it failed. It might work better to have layered or shelled approach, where people can choose something along a spectrum, and decide to upgrade their membership. But it still provides a framework (and is less US dependent?), but it all fits together.

 

[OPSSG]

A recent article in the Washington Times suggests that the current PRC military build up and aggressive foreign policy could be the impetus for the creation of an Asia Pacific version of NATO.

American politicians like Trump can’t understand Asia and are generally too stupid to bother to learn more. Trump does not even understand NATO or EU, and I would expect less understanding of ASEAN.

Although the article states Asia, I have used the term Asia Pacific because it better describes the region.

Valid, if you look at it from an island chain perspective.

This has been tried before with SEATO (South East Asia Treaty Organisation) which fell off its perch from asphyxiation.

If you don’t mind, let me explain with a view to explaining my areas of disagreement.

Headquartered in Bangkok, Thailand, SEATO had only a few formal functions. It maintained no military forces of its own, but the organization hosted joint military exercises for member states each year. As the communist threat appeared to change from one of outright attack to one of internal subversion, SEATO worked to strengthen the economic foundations and living standards of the Southeast Asian States. It sponsored a variety of meetings and exhibitions on cultural, religious and historical topics, and the non-Asian member states sponsored fellowships for Southeast Asian scholars — SEATO will never work; and therefore an Asian NATO will also not work.

I believe that they didn't see communism as a clear and present danger in the way that the US, Australia, and to a lesser degree NZ did, because of cultural differences and different world views.

I disagree.

Tricky point is that communism in not only an external threat but an internal security issue up till the early 1980s for ASEAN states.

When Vietnam invaded Cambodia in Dec 1978, the original ASEAN 5 were just as alarmed — going as far as to supply arms to rebel groups in Cambodia.

That is still seen in ASEAN today.

China is not a military threat to ASEAN but it does factor in defence planning for many countries in Asia, including India, Japan, Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Vietnam and Myanmar. Depending on your view point, China can also be a potential security partner to Korea, its usual client states and other non-aligned states (eg. Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and Singapore).

 

[Ananda]

Tricky point is that communism in not only an external threat but an internal security issue up till the early 1980s for ASEAN states.

Just add, for the original ASEAN Five, just like OPSSG state, communism mostly internal threat. However unlike in Indo China, in the ASEAN Five communism can provide significant internal threat but not big enough to topple Government power and make them rule.

Look what happened to PKI (Indonesian Communist Party), that once talked to have third largest member after Chinese Communist Party and Soviet Communist Party. Still it can be destroy and eliminate almost completely within a year by Indonesian Army helped by the Communist conservative rivals (mostly Islamist but in several area also include other religious organization).

Shown that communism not really gain much widespread grass roots support, due to different other grass roots base that opposed them. In the case of Indonesia is the Islamist factions, or Thailand the monarchist has better grass roots support that any potential communism can ever gain. The same thing happen to Malaysia, Singapore. Even in Philippines where Communist insurgency taking place much longer than the other ASEAN five, the Catholic Church influence in the grass roots manage to stay off Communist gain in many areas.

Few in ASEAN Five still see potential resurgence of Communist as internal threat. Indonesia especially so, with no Administration in Indonesia so far dare to take out or step away from official possition on out law communism ideology. Still the direction for those who opposed Communists this days also directed to those with anything with Leftist /Socialist /Liberals agenda, as communism supporters.

In such, just like position to China this days. Several ASEAN country used Chinese excuse to gain political support on further rearming them selves. On other hand also see China as part of Trading and Investment partner. In sense like saying to China, we are open for business with you, but we also arming our selves to keep away your Military at Bay.

 

[Musashi_kenshin]

China is not a military threat to ASEAN

On what basis do you think China isn't a military threat to ASEAN? Because it only has territorial disagreements with some of its neighbours, or because its ambitions are currently limited to maritime disputes and not occupying annexing ASEAN states in part or whole?

 

[ASSAIL]

Just add, for the original ASEAN Five, just like OPSSG state, communism mostly internal threat. However unlike in Indo China, in the ASEAN Five communism can provide significant internal threat but not big enough to topple Government power and make them rule.

Look what happened to PKI (Indonesian Communist Party), that once talked to have third largest member after Chinese Communist Party and Soviet Communist Party. Still it can be destroy and eliminate almost completely within a year by Indonesian Army helped by the Communist conservative rivals (mostly Islamist but in several area also include other religious organization).

Shown that communism not really gain much widespread grass roots support, due to different other grass roots base that opposed them. In the case of Indonesia is the Islamist factions, or Thailand the monarchist has better grass roots support that any potential communism can ever gain. The same thing happen to Malaysia, Singapore. Even in Philippines where Communist insurgency taking place much longer than the other ASEAN five, the Catholic Church influence in the grass roots manage to stay off Communist gain in many areas.

Few in ASEAN Five still see potential resurgence of Communist as internal threat. Indonesia especially so, with no Administration in Indonesia so far dare to take out or step away from official possition on out law communism ideology. Still the direction for those who opposed Communists this days also directed to those with anything with Leftist /Socialist /Liberals agenda, as communism supporters.

In such, just like position to China this days. Several ASEAN country used Chinese excuse to gain political support on further rearming them selves. On other hand also see China as part of Trading and Investment partner. In sense like saying to China, we are open for business with you, but we also arming our selves to keep away your Military at Bay.

Communism was a threat to ASEAN states in the colonial and immediate post colonial era.
It served as a focal point for transition to independence but once gained its economic and social constraints became less attractive.
SE Asia is a region whose citizens practise widespread entrepreneurial commerce on all levels from village vendors to multinational commerce and communism is an anathema when it constrains that activity.
Vietnam is the standout example where their brand of communism seems far removed from the rigid Soviet model and freedom of society and the economy is widely tolerated.
In the cases where communism has become and is a local threat it is usually combined with other causes such as religious intolerance or unfair land tenure practices.
ASEAN economies have developed to a level where I think the attractiveness of communism has faded and it no longer poses a threat.
The one caveat is however the possibility that a strong arm dictator could act and justify those actions under the false flag of “communism”.

 

[OPSSG]

Understanding ASEAN as a non-traditional security community — Part 1

On what basis do you think China isn't a military threat to ASEAN?

1. On what basis do you think China is a military threat to all of ASEAN or at a collective level to all 10 member states? It is a fact that China does not feature in the defence planning of each and every individual ASEAN state. Go ahead try and string coherent sentences to make your argument — on the China military threat to ASEAN — I am interested in how you intend to make your point. IMHO, the onus is on you to prove your point.

2. Taiwan has the same extensive maritime claims that has no basis in international law as China. And Taiwan has in May 2013 used its military and economic power to coerce the Philippines in the Guang Da Xing No. 28 incident.

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(i) Is Taiwan a military threat to all of ASEAN? Please explain your seemly pro-Taiwan stance across 2 threads.​

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(ii) From an ASEAN point of view, Taiwan has no standing to conduct negotiations over its claims on the South China Sea. Without a valid legal basis for its maritime claims there is no need for ASEAN to give Taiwan a seat at the table, or even allow it an observer status given our One China policy.​

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(iii) If Taiwan was willing to be reasonable and give up its historic claims, China would be more isolated.​

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1302377650325983233

Taiwan’s former Defense Minister Cheng Wei-yuan's response to the 1988 Johnson Reef clash between Beijing and Hanoi, was to suggest that Taipei would help Beijing defend the islands if asked. Cheng Wei-yuan was Taiwan’s Defence Minister from 1987 to 1989 under the KMT government. It is normal for Taiwanese politicians to engage in the politics of distraction and in the past took the side of China. Taiwan is always part of the problem, never a part of the solution.​

Because it only has territorial disagreements with some of its neighbours, or because its ambitions are currently limited to maritime disputes and not occupying annexing ASEAN states in part or whole?

3. It is true that not all of ASEAN has maritime delineation issues with China. I see these maritime disputes as an issue of overlapping EEZ claims.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1305448116888330240

Indonesia for example has renamed as the waters northeast of the Natuna Islands, at the far southern end of the South China Sea, as the 'North Natuna Sea'. These moves indicate a tougher posture only on Indonesia's narrow territorial and economic interests around Natuna and not on the broader issue of Chinese activities in the rest of the South China Sea, where its violations of international law are more egregious. Indonesia is unlikely to take a leadership role in pushing back on these activities, both because Jokowi has little interest in the mantle of diplomatic leadership that his predecessor Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono coveted, and because Jokowi believes that it will be more difficult to attract Chinese capital for his signature infrastructure projects if Indonesia were to speak out.

4. ASEAN is a security community (under the ADMM Plus initiative) but it is not a military alliance. ADMM-Plus is a key component of an open regional security arrangement that contributes to trust and confidence building as well as practical defence and security cooperation between ASEAN Member States and Plus Countries in response to common security threats in the region while upholding ASEAN Centrality and unity. In many cases, it is not in the national interest of a country to enter into a formal alliance with another ASEAN country — as their current leader is either a nutcase or an idiot.

5. For many ASEAN countries, it’s immediate neighbours are the ones that are a direct military or security threat — that their armed forces must plan for and failure to do so, can result in deaths. For example:

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https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1309757184993947649

(i) The Philippines has exchanged nasty diplomatic notes with Malaysia on its stupid and illogical claims on Sabah. Further, in 2013, armed members of the Royal Sulu forces conducted the Lahad Datu incursion, which resulted in the deployment of Malaysian security forces on an attempt to destabilise East Malaysia that came from the Philippines.​

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1311410408746434560

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(ii) Thailand and Cambodia exchanged artillery fire over a border dispute began in June 2008 as the latest round of a century-long dispute between Cambodia and Thailand involving the area surrounding the 11th century Preah Vihear Temple. And in Cambodia was invaded by Vietnam on 25 Dec 1978. Does Cambodia plan to fight China? Or does Cambodia plan to fight Vietnam?​

6. The onus is on you to answer your own questions. I suspect you know more than what you say here. Please educate me on why you think this way, with your lucid response.

 

[Musashi_kenshin]

The onus is on you to answer your own questions. I suspect you know more than what you say here. Please educate me on why you think this way, with your lucid response.

It appears to be a matter of perspective. You seem to be taking the approach that because China would be unlikely to attack all members of ASEAN it's not a threat to the organisation, which is one way to look at it. ASEAN members may not be obliged to come to the rescue of their neighbours militarily, but for example refusing to agree to sanctions against China could lead the organisation to start fracturing with recriminations - although it would depend on how significant the attack by China was. In that way China could be a threat.

Also just to set the record straight, I think it's fair to remember that Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia helped stop the Cambodian Genocide, even if the war happened because Pol Pot attacked first. I think its unlikely China attacking an ASEAN member would have such a positive spin-off.

 

[OPSSG]

Understanding ASEAN as a non-traditional security community — Part 2

It appears to be a matter of perspective. You seem to be taking the approach that because China would be unlikely to attack all members of ASEAN it's not a threat to the organisation,

7. Appreciate your long sentence to explain why you agree with me and that China is not a military threat to ASEAN.

ASEAN members may not be obliged to come to the rescue of their neighbours militarily....

8. Glad that you recognise basic facts. ASEAN is not a military alliance. The region’s members have signed a Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) and a non-binding Declaration on the Conduct of Parties (DOC).

9. Why does ASEAN need a TAC and DOC?

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1303553323795054592

10. Because without a peace treaty and DOC among Southeast Asian countries, many of us will be at war with each other, for varied and complex reasons. ASEAN is diverse messy and complex region — but the TAC helps manage the scope of Intra-ASEAN grey zone conflict within certain boundaries. The TAC also helps manage relations between ASEAN claimant states and China, as shown by Vietnam’s complex relationship and hedging strategy viz-a-viz China.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1311279761121894400

11. Let me give 3 unconventional examples, to illustrate that people who advocate for ASEAN’s hostility against China ignore. The fact is that:

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(i) the greatest military threat to Brunei is Malaysia — while Brunei tries to keep its military-to-military relations with Malaysia on a good footing, their number 1 military threat is Malaysia. And their number 2 concern is instability in the Southern Philippines, spilling over;​

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(ii) the greatest source of instability to Sabah is the Southern Philippines; and​

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(iii) the most likely source of military threat to Singapore is Malaysia; as their ships have intruded in our port waters in 2018. In a Dec 2018 statement on the intrusions by Malaysian government vessels into Singapore territorial waters off Tuas, Singapore’s then Transport Minister, Mr Khaw Boon Wan said that as at 6 Dec 2018, there was 14 such intrusions — these hostile acts resulted in mobilisation exercises for the SAF to show resolve and the deployment of naval ships to guard our port waters.​

refusing to agree to sanctions against China could lead the organisation to start fracturing with recriminations -

12. Nuts. You can’t just ignore the ASEAN–China Free Trade Area. IMHO, the leader of ASEAN, Indonesia sets the tone. No ASEAN member will consider sanctions against China because we need China to invest and trade with the region. International relations expert Teuku Rezasyah told CNA: “I think Indonesia is quite confident in stating its position to the UN … This is the peaceful way of expressing concern, this is a diplomatic way of Indonesia’s positioning. “Secondly, Indonesia needs to inform China that it is consistent … And to show its consistency, it is dealing with this issue on various levels, at the unilateral level, at the bilateral level, regional level and also global level," said the scholar from the University of Padjajaran in Bandung city.

although it would depend on how significant the attack by China was. In that way China could be a threat.

13. Unlike your scenario, China has signed the TAC which is a peace treaty. Breaking a peace treaty has real and negative consequences for China. The scope of the current grey zone dispute is up to ramming by coast guard ships, with a potential for minor escalation but not all out war — which is why phase zero military planning for a shooting incident in South China Sea (SCS) has occurred in Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam — with support from American, Australian and Japanese navies via task force deployments in the SCS. Can you come back to Earth?

I think its unlikely China attacking an ASEAN member would have such a positive spin-off.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1311704932916113408

14. ASEAN will persistently hold onto its principled position, emphasizing self-restraints, peaceful settlement of all disputes on the basis of international law, including 1982 UNCLOS, promoting inter and intra-ASEAN dialogues, strengthening confidence building, non-militarization, and refrain from further complicating the situation." It was agreed that negotiations between ASEAN countries and China over a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea will resume no later than Nov 2020 during ASEAN virtual meeting.

15. ASEAN is working on the Code of Conduct with China and remains hopeful it will be signed.

 

[Musashi_kenshin]

Unlike your scenario, China has signed the TAC which is a peace treaty. Breaking a peace treaty has real and negative consequences for China.

China had also signed a treaty with the UK over Hong Kong's future, and they broke it less than 50 years into the agreed transitionary period - they couldn't even wait until 2047 when legally they'd have been entitled to do whatever they wanted. China respects treaties as long as it thinks it gets an advantage from them.

I agree that all-out war is unlikely right now, but when most people here discuss potential military conflicts they remain hypothetical. Russia v NATO is a good one. Most people will say such a conflict would be unlikely - until it happens. No one expected Russia annexing the Crimea when it did, given the US and Russia had signed a treaty that was supposed to protect Ukraine's territorial integrity. As with China breaking its treaty with the UK over HK, there were virtually no consequences for Russia over breaking its treaty concerning Ukraine.

ASEAN is working on the Code of Conduct with China and remains hopeful it will be signed.

Until China declared it a "historic document" and "void".

China isn't going to simultaneously declare war on all ASEAN members. It has no reason to. But I think it's a bit blase to say China poses no threat to ASEAN. Its aggressive foreign policy means that things can change quickly, and until it starts to respect other countries rather than see them in the frame of the old Imperial vassal-tribute system, it will remain a threat to certain ASEAN members and potentially the internal harmony of the organisation. That's just my opinion, of course, and I'm comfortable with you disagreeing with me.

If you'd asked me 10 years ago I wouldn't have been so pessimistic, but since Xi has made himself President-for-life and started throwing his weight around I'm much less certain China can be trusted in the long term.

 

[OPSSG]

Understanding China and its impact on regional dynamics — Part 1

China had also signed a treaty with the UK over Hong Kong's future, and they broke it less than 50 years into the agreed transitionary period - they couldn't even wait until 2047 when legally they'd have been entitled to do whatever they wanted.

1. UK made the deal they did on Hong Kong because they wanted to withdraw. It’s up to the UK to sue China. To be fair, much of the international response has acknowledged China’s commitment to “one country, two systems”. A common observation is that the people of Hong Kong actually had less democracy during its colonial days. The blame for the protests arguably lies with Hong Kong’s own authorities, not Beijing per-se, says Mr. Chris Patten, the last British governor of Hong Kong, who oversaw its handover to China in 1997. He is now Chancellor of the University of Oxford.

2. The HK authorities have gravely miscalculated what their citizens will accept, and also given false assurances to the central government in China. As far as ASEAN is concerned, Hong Kong is part of China and it is under their control.

3. I have no sympathy as HK authorities who acted for Chinese intelligence to seize Singapore military vehicles on 23 Nov 2016, while they were transit on a container ship. They were eventually returned after Singapore lodged protests through diplomatic channels.

But I think it's a bit blase to say China poses no threat to ASEAN. Its aggressive foreign policy means that things can change quickly, and until it starts to respect other countries rather than see them in the frame of the old Imperial vassal-tribute system, it will remain a threat to certain ASEAN members and potentially the internal harmony of the organisation.

4. No, I have always been cognisant of China’s ability to undermine ASEAN unity; just as the US can do the same — since 2016 my biggest change is my attitude towards the Malaysians. In 2016, I saw the Malaysians as a potential security partner within the FPDA framework; but by Dec 2018 my hopes of cooperation were dashed. IMO, you can make the case that the Pinoys are vassals of both the Chinese and the Americans but not the Indonesians, Vietnamese or Singaporeans who do speak up at regular intervals.

5. IMO, the IISS Asia Security Summit or better known as The Shangri-La Dialogue hosted by Singapore is helpful for small states affected by Great Power competition to air their concerns on an international stage with regard to security matters.

That's just my opinion, of course, and I'm comfortable with you disagreeing with me.

6. Thanks for explaining your view. ASEAN’s goal with managing China’s rise is to be firm but not stupid (like Taiwan, who have mismanaged Cross-Straits relations), given the huge disparity in power. In comparison to NE Asian countries, the military capability of ASEAN member states are much weaker.

If you'd asked me 10 years ago I wouldn't have been so pessimistic, but since Xi has made himself President-for-life and started throwing his weight around I'm much less certain China can be trusted in the long term.

7. No disagreement there. But I don’t think the CCP can be trusted even in the short run, unless their interest is aligned with yours. Watching China grow more powerful is a worrisome thing for its neighbours — but even within ASEAN certain neighbours are very untrustworthy. Malaysia for example can not afford to trust the Philippines and Singapore can not afford to trust Malaysia. Further, in the Sino-Indian border dispute, CCP hardliners feel entitled to kill or create a mass casualty event to suit their narrative. An Indian Army patrol was attacked by the PLA with nail-studded rods on 16 June 2020 has suffered 20 deaths and 76 injured in the clash with China in the Galwan Valley along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1273478468919951361

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(i) The PLA intrusions into Ladakh is not a localised event, being spread across 2,000 km. That suggests centralised coordination at the higher military and political levels. For many in India, Modi stoked national pride by talking very tough on Pakistan, India's rival by daring to conduct the 2019 Balakot airstrike. To the uninformed in India, this is seen as a success, despite losing a MiG-21 and having the pilot captured. But this tough talk narrative cannot be sustained against a more powerful county like China, as Indian think tanks also point out.​

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(ii) If the Indians escalate the border dispute with China, it will play right into CCP hands and the outcome will not be acceptable to the average Indian, as the PLA has spent years planning for a fight. For details, see: China-India border dispute.​

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https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1309520220034347008

(iii) Both Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi have built public support in large part on hyper nationalism and a promise of future greatness. This often translates into jingoism and aggressive rhetoric, particularly when playing to a domestic audience. Such an approach was evidenced in Chinese coverage of the PLA maneuvers in the Himalayas — which has reinvigorated Indian interest in the Quad 2.0 — an informal strategic forum between the United States, Japan, Australia and India that is maintained by occasional summits, information exchanges and limited military exercises.​

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1312187410604724226

 

[Musashi_kenshin]

UK made the deal they did on Hong Kong because they wanted to withdraw. It’s up to the UK to sue China.

I think that the UK would have paid China for another 99 year lease on the New Territories, but China wouldn't allow it. So withdrawing from HK Island and Kowloon in exchange for Chinese guarantees was reasonable at the time.

As for suing China, well that's obviously a joke. Chinese courts don't even fairly decide domestic cases, and China doesn't care about international arbitration if it's in the stronger position on the ground. If China occupied the border regions of northern Vietnam "because Imperial China", I doubt Vietnam would get any redress through the courts.

The blame for the protests arguably lies with Hong Kong’s own authorities, not Beijing per-se

I agree in part, but the only reason the HK government does anything these days is because Beijing is ordering them to do it. Regarding the Singapore military vehicles, it's almost certain the CCP was behind that. Carrie Lam doesn't have the courage to do something like that on her own.

There's no reason to have sympathy with the HK government because it's not directly elected and willingly does what Beijing wants, but as I'm sure you'll agree HK people clearly don't deserve what they're getting given they'd prefer to be able to choose their own leaders directly and ditch the functional constituencies.

A common observation is that the people of Hong Kong actually had less democracy during its colonial days.

Only because it was a colony on the other side of the world. Had Hong Kong been fully under British sovereignty with no reason to strike a deal with China, full democratic reform would have come to the city by now.

Also, it's pretty clear that Carrie Lam and the CCP are turning HK into a police state now. They postponed the elections for a whole year "because we can" (compare to Singapore, the ROK, etc who pulled off elections), they're disqualifying popular opposition candidates because they're scared of losing the election, protesting against the CCP or HK government is now effectively against the law and they've even said that voting against government policy in LegCo could be a crime. I think most HK residents would accept a return to British rule if it meant ending the current nightmare.

(But that's for another discussion.)

 

[OPSSG]

Understanding China and its impact on security dynamics — Part 2

My view - this is turning into a self fulfilling prophecy.

5 years ago there was a prevailing perspective that this would get ugly 2025-2030 - i think quite a few would be advancing that to 2020-2025 now

1 year after the more positive assessment (2030) the chinese ramped up their posturing in region

Its basically gone to custard since 2010

8. Members of DT have clearly expressed grave concern since June 2014, where gf0012-aust wrote the above. In March 2016, I even offered a 15 year perspective (till 2026) on South China Sea (SCS) developments. — which looked at the then trajectory combat power of the FPDA to serve as deterrence to conflict.

A 15 Year Perspective on Developments in the South China Sea (Post 2 of 2)
...
8. ...Likewise the Japan Air Self-Defense Force, the ROKAF, the RAAF and the RSAF would have started operating F-35s at that time, over and above an increased pace for developments in maritime domain awareness.

9. Beyond the respective FPDA navies providing an enduring naval presence, the recent additions and announced plans for the RAAF (Super Hornets, the addition of 12 Growlers, Wedgetails, 7 A330 MRTTs, the upcoming acquisition of P-8As, along with the MQ-4C Triton combo for maritime domain awareness and so on) and RSAF (an increase of the number of F-15SGs to 40, G550 AEWs, Fokker-50 MPAs, along with the Heron-1 UAVs for maritime domain awareness and upcoming acquisition of 6 A330 MRTTs, and so on) the combat power available in theatre and force multipliers of these two air forces to boost to the capabilities of the FPDA, to be superior in any fight for control of the air, in preparation of the upcoming round 2 in the 2017 to 2021 time frame (who have the option of operating out of air bases in Butterworth or Singapore). This will be of interim comfort to a budget constrained RMAF, who have limited ability to make new air power related acquisitions in the next few years.

9. China's emerging military capability development and island building efforts in the SCS during round 2: 2017 to 2021 exceeded all my prior 2016 expectations. What I predicted in 2016, does not hold true from a deterrence perspective as Malaysia from Dec 2018 onwards is willing to be hostile to its more capable FPDA partners, like Singapore. I don’t understand the Malaysian desire to seek trouble with Singapore in Dec 2018 but downplay its current and persistent problems with China’s coast guard and the PLA(N).

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1309408456021913602

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(i) While it is possible to argue that without unity of purpose, FPDA cannot be an effective deterrence tool viz-a-viz China, I hold the view that the FPDA still has some value. 3 of the 5 FDPA members as tertiary air forces operate F-35As (Australia), F-35Bs (UK & Singapore), AWACs, A330MRTTs, MPAs, and naval vessels capable of high end ASW operations and regionally superior submarines. Australia and Singapore will conduct combined AAR between a RAAF KC-30A and RSAF MRTTs, with the overall intent being to improve the interoperability of refuelling fleets.​

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1311712309912494080

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(ii) Despite concerns about intermittent Malaysian hostility towards Singapore, as Peter Ho, Singapore’s former Permanent Secretary of Defence has articulated, ‘the FPDA is like a chameleon, constantly adapting to the changing environment. Its physical avatar — IADS — has transformed itself from an air defence system to an area defence system, the only standing multilateral defence system in the region;” which complicates the plans of any potential aggressor.​

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(iii) Another key difference between FPDA and ASEAN is the level of intelligence sharing to maintain domain and threat awareness — with Australian and Singaporean military personnel stationed in Butterworth.​

10. For more up to date details, see my 2 part post in 2019. Deal verification is always needed for matters related to China. Less astute regional and American politicians with short time horizons think that polarization is a choice. Some ASEAN member states think that being on one-side is a win (eg. Cambodia, Laos and the Philippines) who are firmly Chinese client states under China's sphere of influence. Smarter members of ASEAN have a different view. The reality is not about binary choices. There should not be a false dichotomy between doing nothing or standing with fellow frontline ASEAN states.

11. In certain cases, the actions of our ASEAN neighbours may not be defendable and they have to bear the conseqences of their irrational choices. Just picking a side is so wrong (for any ASEAN member state that is not a US ally by treaty), at so many levels. From my perspective, having to choose a side, means we all lose.

12. As I have said before, ASEAN member states:

(i) are finding a way to move on to manage the issue with China (including the crucial task of keeping the lines of communications open between China and the FPDA or ASEAN member states). Most ASEAN members seek to improve their relationship with the US and China at the same time with some more beholden to aid from one side; and​

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(ii) have given voice to concerns at numerous international events, to assist member states in voicing its concerns.​