Australian Army Discussions and Updates

Bob53

Well-Known Member
Article in todays Australian quoting disappointment from Hanwah and questioning whether their new Geelong factory will be viable and by consequence their interest in building in Australia. Given the lengthy process they went through and short listing around Oct 21 both finalists would be within their rights to feel aggrieved where we still don’t know who the winner of L400P3 is.

Extracts and then link following..IMG_4302.pngIMG_4303.png

 

knightrider4

Active Member
Article in todays Australian quoting disappointment from Hanwah and questioning whether their new Geelong factory will be viable and by consequence their interest in building in Australia. Given the lengthy process they went through and short listing around Oct 21 both finalists would be within their rights to feel aggrieved where we still don’t know who the winner of L400P3 is.

Extracts and then link following..View attachment 50468View attachment 50469

@knightrider4 You appear to have forgotten something, or push the button to soon.

Ngatimozart
 
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Reptilia

Well-Known Member
Article in todays Australian quoting disappointment from Hanwah and questioning whether their new Geelong factory will be viable and by consequence their interest in building in Australia. Given the lengthy process they went through and short listing around Oct 21 both finalists would be within their rights to feel aggrieved where we still don’t know who the winner of L400P3 is.

Extracts and then link following..View attachment 50468View attachment 50469


TBD 129 REDBACK IFVs
30 AS9 HUNTSMAN SPHs
15 AS10 HUNTSMAN AARVs
Export opportunities
What else could they manufacture in Geelong that would make sense?
unmanned land systems?
 

Oldbeagle

New Member
Hanwha‘s Geelong factory seems like a particularly bad investment for the Federal Government, the Victorian State Government and the Company unless it’s future is secured by the awarding of the contract of the Land 400 phase 3 for the production of the Redback IFV.
It will be particularly embarrassing for the Defence Minister even though he has disavowed himself from the decision over the selection of the IFV, as this factory is being built in his electorate.
Like some others, I would prefer that production of the 2nd batch of the SPH vehicles proceed as originally planed and the remaining M777 stocks be divided into storage and donations to Ukraine. While I fully appreciate that this forum is about defence not politics, retaining trust with trading partners and allies forms an integral element to any defence policy. On the other hand, with the budget about to be handed down is the Federal Government really in position to reverse its decision on the cuts to IFVs and SPHs when there will be funding cuts in other sensitive portfolios ?
 

buffy9

Well-Known Member
Article in todays Australian quoting disappointment from Hanwah and questioning whether their new Geelong factory will be viable and by consequence their interest in building in Australia. Given the lengthy process they went through and short listing around Oct 21 both finalists would be within their rights to feel aggrieved where we still don’t know who the winner of L400P3 is.

Extracts and then link following..View attachment 50468View attachment 50469

First Japan, then France, now South Korea. It seems defence industry is a regular fuel for burning international relations with our biggest partners. I would hope that this is just the ROK applying pressure to choose their vehicle, though it was probably always the case that cuts to the number of vehicles would be damaging.

We went from two SPH regiments and three IFV battalions, built at one factory, to one SPH regiment and one IFV battalion. If I was the company/country pushing for this, I'd be frustrated also.

While I agree with prioritisation, this recommendation to cut close combat as it is seems ill thought-out. While we are still procuring systems at the end of the day and setting up factories, we are giving industry great uncertainty and leaving some units in Army with equipment that should have been replaced years ago.
 
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Morgo

Well-Known Member
First Japan, then France, now South Korea. It seems defence industry is a regular fuel for burning international relations with our biggest partners. I would hope that this is just the ROK applying pressure to choose their vehicle, though it was probably always the case that cuts to the number of vehicles would be damaging.

We went from two SPH regiments and three IFV battalions, build at one factory, to one SPH regiment and one IFV battalion. If I was the company/country pushing for this, I'd be frustrated also.

While I agree with prioritisation, this recommendation to cut close combat as it is seems ill thought-out. While we are still procuring systems at the end of the day and setting up factories, we are giving industry great uncertainty and leaving some units in Army with equipment that should have been replaced years ago.
I think you’re jumping to conclusions that the Redback was / is going to be selected, no?

Given greater commonality between the Boxer and an IFV and the reduced but I would say that Rheinmetall’s unit cost for a reduced production run would have improved relative to Hanwha’s.
 

buffy9

Well-Known Member
I think you’re jumping to conclusions that the Redback was / is going to be selected, no?

Given greater commonality between the Boxer and an IFV and the reduced but I would say that Rheinmetall’s unit cost for a reduced production run would have improved relative to Hanwha’s.
Not predicting, it is more along the lines of we are cutting potential contract numbers. I imagine Rheinmetall would also be less than pleased, though to some extent the blow is softened by the fact MILVEHCOE is already up and running with Boxer and truck works.

Having two factories established would have been more ideal for scale as well. If any vehicle projects were looked at in future, there are two large facilities capable of AFV production - which gives competition and flexibility. That is my personal preference, though either vehicle is capable and I imagine Army has tested them to find which is most relevant. Either is also, ultimately, a leap ahead over the M113, which appears as though it will continue to equip two battalions - barring some program to replace them with PMVs, which although good, are still not suited for the close combat mission.

In theory, Rheinmetall and Hanhwa (Germany and South Korea) entered a competition where one would get a contract and one wouldn't. They would understand this. On the other hand, doing this with the understanding of 450 vehicles and X contract value is different from 129 vehicles. For Hanhwa it may particularly sting, considering the additional vehicles as part of the SPH regiment have been recommended to be cut. So they've gone from some 500 vehicles with assosciated contract value down to about 170. That upends the entire pitch and makes the company question whether it is even viable.

Not to mention with the Australian small industry component, as previously mandated, that many small businesses have been affected as a result. The scale is gone, and with it the viability of producing some components. If it was viable to produce X amount of road wheels, considering the size of the contract, is it still viable to do so with Y? Can my company sustain that? By all means if it is unsustainable for future projects to do that to the same extent, then can it - but this affects companies that have already done their work and entered contracts.

I don't care for the individual vehicle so much - either works - but the cost this does to our international relations, our small businesses and our capability to fulfill the close combat role.
 
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Takao

The Bunker Group
This then leads me to what becomes of the role for the army? If they don’t look after land based AAM, we have only a small Shore based ASM missile capability and a significantly reduced IFV and SPH numbers … the Army starts to look like an after thought.
And here we hit a significant professional frustration of mine. I should be able to provide you a link to the Army's answer to this, complete with linkages, thoughts and colourful pictures. Unfortunately...we haven't done that actual work. Personally I think that we should have because half the arguments about kit go away - because between strategy and role there is a clear plan...

Anyhows...

Straight up - my apologies to anyone I'm telling to suck eggs. And this isn't aimed at @Bob53 at all, I'm simultaneously using his question as a springboard and semi-professionally venting. And, because they complicate everything and not part of the ADF, I'm ignoring nukes.

The role of the Army, on the surface, is quite simple. Fight and win the land battle. Easy. Any questions? :D

Ok, there are two that need to be answered. What and why. Starting with the harder one...

Why? Why have a land battle? It's an excellent question, the casualties and destruction are brutal. The cost in every definition is high. The reason boils down to something really simple, humans live on land and are supported by the land. To understand that you need to go back to basic definitions - what is the purpose of war? That, again, is inherently simple: to compel the enemy to our will. There are two ways to guarantee this, the complete annihilation of the enemy or putting a force into their cities and villages to force them to our will. The first is unacceptable (and arguable), the second requires a land force.* And the key to a nation is the people. Look at our troubles in Iraq and Afghanistan - large parts of which boil down to us ignoring the population and focusing on 'leadership'. In a simple analogy, does Collingwood draw its support from the general population or a collection of elites like McGuire?

Now, we are a free, fun loving democracy. Do we need the power to compel an enemy? Frankly, yes. Because our will (rules-based global order (I know...)) conflicts with others. That conflict could be major (Japan in 1941) or minor (Somalia in 1992) but it's wherever our Government of the day decides. That's where the critical strategic documentation starts - it lays out our national interests, what and where we draw lines and what we expect in the world. It is also multi-departmental; compelling the will of another nation needs more than an occupying force (Afghanistan in 2020).

So what is the what? If the why to have a land battle is to compel the will of a nation, well, what is a battle? Immediate answer is something like Kursk in 1943. Tanks, air support, artillery, infantry all attacking with lots of noise and explosions. Except, that's at one end. A battle is simply a conflict between two opposed forces. It certainly is Kursk in 1943, but it's also Fallujah in 2004. Or Kibeho in 1995. It's what we do to push the 'enemy' out of the towns to enable us to compel the populous. And that's where it gets hard for an Army. Because sometimes the enemy doesn't fight, or at least doesn't fight us. Timor Leste in 1999, the Solomon's in 2000, Cambodia in 1994 - the peacekeeping/making and low-level war is tricky. Sometimes, our will and the foe's is really similar. Hussein and Bush both wanted peace in Iraq and no security threats. separating those two often requires more than simply guns (remember, annihilation is not an option), it requires time, understanding and presence. Hence why very few shots have been fired in Timor-Leste/Solomons, but the Army has been there for years.

The critical part here, and where the what links to the why, is persistence. Humans are stubborn beasts - you don't have zero Nazi's in Germany in Jul 45 despite the destruction of their nation. Hell, you still have Nazi's today. To influence the will you need to be there. Lots. To be there you need to seize and hold the ground. That last part is vital - if you don't hold you don't compel. By definition there is only one thing that can do that, and that's the infantry. Now, they are adorable critters, but very squishy, so they need help.

While simple on the surface, it's the very breadth that complicates matters. An Air Force or Navy cannot influence a population** like an Army can. And that's regardless of intensity. We could have all the SSN and F-35 in the world, they cannot go into Dili and stop the gangs. They cannot go into Honiara and escort an election monitoring team. They cannot seize and hold Villers-Bretonneux and prevent German schools/banks/post offices. They can help for sure, I want RAN SSNs sinking every bloody supply ship and I want to fight in the shade RAAF F-35s make, but they cannot seize and hold. They cannot have the presence required to compel.

So to sum it up, the role of the Army is to seize and hold population centres against threats to compel 'them' to agree with Australia's views as determined by Canberra.

See....simple.

That is unchanging and enduring. It's as accurate now as it was in 1914 as it will be in 2065. Humans are humans.

The tricky part for 'IIP-stuff' is in the breadth of that. Look at the examples I've given above, they range from one end to the other. Partially because of their environment and partially because of their mission, Air Forces and Navies have it simple. Arguing that you need a Sqn of this, or a TF of that is easy because they all build on simple building blocks. Fighters fight in pairs, preferable two pairs at a time. So every F-35 unit is based on 4. DDGs fight in pairs, so you need 2. And, while called multirole, these platforms are pretty specialised. They are also expensive, so you have to be careful when committing them.

But what is the 'so what' for an Army? The answer to the Solomons in 2000 is a very different answer to Iraq in 2003. Both are very different to Kokoda 2042. Or Beersheba in 2038. Or Binh Ba in 2035. Those forces are so completely different they might as well be two Armies - but we cannot afford that.*** The other thing is, the fundamentally, unalterable national interest that the Government must maintain is the security of the Australian population. Which means you need an Army capable of the big fights, because the ADF is an insurance policy to ensure that. And even then, that kit will be useful. If you think IFV, SPH, CRV will not deploy in INTERFET Mk 2 - they will. Even ragtag gangs have first line weaponry nowadays - especially if unfriendly nations set up proxies. We don't fight fair - fair is where every Australian comes home. And rolling in big, mean and fast has one hell of a psychological impact. The perception that our heavy kit is only for use against Beijing is aggravating - how likely is a PRC-back militia going to open fire on an IFV with APS, overwatch and rapid fires in support versus a dismounted patrol? Remember - compel the will of a nation. Deterrence :rolleyes: is part of that, it's compelling without fighting, which further means we need to be hard hitting and resilient.

And that's where my peers have let us down. Explaining in simple terms, with glossy photos and examples, linked back to enduring ideas. If you haven't had the chance, read The Navy and the Nation. It's an excellent piece of work and it sat on the bedside table of three Prime Ministers. It did more good for Navy than almost any project or $$ did. So where is the Army's equivalent?

Anyhow...wandering now. Hopefully that answers the question and gives some insight into the so what. Armies are fundamentally essential to the conduct of war and the defence of the national interests. They need help, (and we are an island nation), so the RAAF and RAN are also vital. But undermining the Army undermines the ADF and the national interest.


---
* There have been 2.5 cases where this has not been the case. The first two, Japan 1945 and Berlin 1948, cannot be done with the mass Australia has and required unique circumstances unlikely to be repeated. The 0.5 is Kosovo, where I tend to believe the threat of ground forces pushed the result, not the questionable 80-odd day air campaign.

** Unless you are the RN in 1918 or the USN in 1945 - and you are against geographically constrained foes. And even then, you need land forces to be applying the pressure that a blockade exacerbates. Sanctions alone do not work.

*** Of note, every operation except two conducted by the Australian military since 1901 (err....I don't know about Southern Ocean fisheries/rescuing yachtsmen (were they operations though?)) has had a Land component or been in direct support of Land Forces. While loathe to use "we haven't used it since 19xx so don't need it", that reflects the importance and centrality of putting forces into enemy towns to compel their will. The two exceptions were Berlin 1948 (which is actually evidence as to why we should have 3x 36 Sqn and 1x 75 Sqn, not the other way around) and the strategic bombing campaign over Germany in 1940s. Which underscores the unique role of the infantry, because we never compelled a single town to our will. Every town we bombed still needed ground forces to go in and hold it. If you don't commit land forces, you will ultimately end up needing to which comes back to needing a prepared and capable Army.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
And here we hit a significant professional frustration of mine. I should be able to provide you a link to the Army's answer to this, complete with linkages, thoughts and colourful pictures. Unfortunately...we haven't done that actual work. Personally I think that we should have because half the arguments about kit go away - because between strategy and role there is a clear plan...

Anyhows...

Straight up - my apologies to anyone I'm telling to suck eggs. And this isn't aimed at @Bob53 at all, I'm simultaneously using his question as a springboard and semi-professionally venting. And, because they complicate everything and not part of the ADF, I'm ignoring nukes.

The role of the Army, on the surface, is quite simple. Fight and win the land battle. Easy. Any questions? :D

Ok, there are two that need to be answered. What and why. Starting with the harder one...

Why? Why have a land battle? It's an excellent question, the casualties and destruction are brutal. The cost in every definition is high. The reason boils down to something really simple, humans live on land and are supported by the land. To understand that you need to go back to basic definitions - what is the purpose of war? That, again, is inherently simple: to compel the enemy to our will. There are two ways to guarantee this, the complete annihilation of the enemy or putting a force into their cities and villages to force them to our will. The first is unacceptable (and arguable), the second requires a land force.* And the key to a nation is the people. Look at our troubles in Iraq and Afghanistan - large parts of which boil down to us ignoring the population and focusing on 'leadership'. In a simple analogy, does Collingwood draw its support from the general population or a collection of elites like McGuire?

Now, we are a free, fun loving democracy. Do we need the power to compel an enemy? Frankly, yes. Because our will (rules-based global order (I know...)) conflicts with others. That conflict could be major (Japan in 1941) or minor (Somalia in 1992) but it's wherever our Government of the day decides. That's where the critical strategic documentation starts - it lays out our national interests, what and where we draw lines and what we expect in the world. It is also multi-departmental; compelling the will of another nation needs more than an occupying force (Afghanistan in 2020).

So what is the what? If the why to have a land battle is to compel the will of a nation, well, what is a battle? Immediate answer is something like Kursk in 1943. Tanks, air support, artillery, infantry all attacking with lots of noise and explosions. Except, that's at one end. A battle is simply a conflict between two opposed forces. It certainly is Kursk in 1943, but it's also Fallujah in 2004. Or Kibeho in 1995. It's what we do to push the 'enemy' out of the towns to enable us to compel the populous. And that's where it gets hard for an Army. Because sometimes the enemy doesn't fight, or at least doesn't fight us. Timor Leste in 1999, the Solomon's in 2000, Cambodia in 1994 - the peacekeeping/making and low-level war is tricky. Sometimes, our will and the foe's is really similar. Hussein and Bush both wanted peace in Iraq and no security threats. separating those two often requires more than simply guns (remember, annihilation is not an option), it requires time, understanding and presence. Hence why very few shots have been fired in Timor-Leste/Solomons, but the Army has been there for years.

The critical part here, and where the what links to the why, is persistence. Humans are stubborn beasts - you don't have zero Nazi's in Germany in Jul 45 despite the destruction of their nation. Hell, you still have Nazi's today. To influence the will you need to be there. Lots. To be there you need to seize and hold the ground. That last part is vital - if you don't hold you don't compel. By definition there is only one thing that can do that, and that's the infantry. Now, they are adorable critters, but very squishy, so they need help.

While simple on the surface, it's the very breadth that complicates matters. An Air Force or Navy cannot influence a population** like an Army can. And that's regardless of intensity. We could have all the SSN and F-35 in the world, they cannot go into Dili and stop the gangs. They cannot go into Honiara and escort an election monitoring team. They cannot seize and hold Villers-Bretonneux and prevent German schools/banks/post offices. They can help for sure, I want RAN SSNs sinking every bloody supply ship and I want to fight in the shade RAAF F-35s make, but they cannot seize and hold. They cannot have the presence required to compel.

So to sum it up, the role of the Army is to seize and hold population centres against threats to compel 'them' to agree with Australia's views as determined by Canberra.

See....simple.

That is unchanging and enduring. It's as accurate now as it was in 1914 as it will be in 2065. Humans are humans.

The tricky part for 'IIP-stuff' is in the breadth of that. Look at the examples I've given above, they range from one end to the other. Partially because of their environment and partially because of their mission, Air Forces and Navies have it simple. Arguing that you need a Sqn of this, or a TF of that is easy because they all build on simple building blocks. Fighters fight in pairs, preferable two pairs at a time. So every F-35 unit is based on 4. DDGs fight in pairs, so you need 2. And, while called multirole, these platforms are pretty specialised. They are also expensive, so you have to be careful when committing them.

But what is the 'so what' for an Army? The answer to the Solomons in 2000 is a very different answer to Iraq in 2003. Both are very different to Kokoda 2042. Or Beersheba in 2038. Or Binh Ba in 2035. Those forces are so completely different they might as well be two Armies - but we cannot afford that.*** The other thing is, the fundamentally, unalterable national interest that the Government must maintain is the security of the Australian population. Which means you need an Army capable of the big fights, because the ADF is an insurance policy to ensure that. And even then, that kit will be useful. If you think IFV, SPH, CRV will not deploy in INTERFET Mk 2 - they will. Even ragtag gangs have first line weaponry nowadays - especially if unfriendly nations set up proxies. We don't fight fair - fair is where every Australian comes home. And rolling in big, mean and fast has one hell of a psychological impact. The perception that our heavy kit is only for use against Beijing is aggravating - how likely is a PRC-back militia going to open fire on an IFV with APS, overwatch and rapid fires in support versus a dismounted patrol? Remember - compel the will of a nation. Deterrence :rolleyes: is part of that, it's compelling without fighting, which further means we need to be hard hitting and resilient.

And that's where my peers have let us down. Explaining in simple terms, with glossy photos and examples, linked back to enduring ideas. If you haven't had the chance, read The Navy and the Nation. It's an excellent piece of work and it sat on the bedside table of three Prime Ministers. It did more good for Navy than almost any project or $$ did. So where is the Army's equivalent?

Anyhow...wandering now. Hopefully that answers the question and gives some insight into the so what. Armies are fundamentally essential to the conduct of war and the defence of the national interests. They need help, (and we are an island nation), so the RAAF and RAN are also vital. But undermining the Army undermines the ADF and the national interest.


---
* There have been 2.5 cases where this has not been the case. The first two, Japan 1945 and Berlin 1948, cannot be done with the mass Australia has and required unique circumstances unlikely to be repeated. The 0.5 is Kosovo, where I tend to believe the threat of ground forces pushed the result, not the questionable 80-odd day air campaign.

** Unless you are the RN in 1918 or the USN in 1945 - and you are against geographically constrained foes. And even then, you need land forces to be applying the pressure that a blockade exacerbates. Sanctions alone do not work.

*** Of note, every operation except two conducted by the Australian military since 1901 (err....I don't know about Southern Ocean fisheries/rescuing yachtsmen (were they operations though?)) has had a Land component or been in direct support of Land Forces. While loathe to use "we haven't used it since 19xx so don't need it", that reflects the importance and centrality of putting forces into enemy towns to compel their will. The two exceptions were Berlin 1948 (which is actually evidence as to why we should have 3x 36 Sqn and 1x 75 Sqn, not the other way around) and the strategic bombing campaign over Germany in 1940s. Which underscores the unique role of the infantry, because we never compelled a single town to our will. Every town we bombed still needed ground forces to go in and hold it. If you don't commit land forces, you will ultimately end up needing to which comes back to needing a prepared and capable Army.
Thank you, a great read.

So basically it is about getting the infantry where they need to be, when they need to be there, and keeping them alive, and supported in transit and on operation.

On Collingwood, provision of better schools and dentistry would dramatically reduce their fan base.
 
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swerve

Super Moderator
The Drive has an article on the prototype Abrams X at sixty tone ten tons lighter than the standard Abrams and also having a self loading and 3 man crew ,better power drive it seems to have some advantages over the present version perhaps easier to deploy in regions heavier tanks could not
AbramsX Next Generation Main Battle Tank Breaks Cover | The Drive
Problem with any US article talking about tons is that they often use "ton" to mean 907 kg.
 

swerve

Super Moderator
Yes, but what tons? Proper standard 1000 kg tons, or puny little "let's make our tanks seem bigger" 907 kg American 'short' tons?

73.6 short tons = 66,750 kg. 60 short tons = 54,400 kg.

Everyone else means 1000 kg when they give the weight of a tank in tons. With the USA, one never knows.
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
Yes, but what tons? Proper standard 1000 kg tons, or puny little "let's make our tanks seem bigger" 907 kg American 'short' tons?

73.6 short tons = 66,750 kg. 60 short tons = 54,400 kg.

Everyone else means 1000 kg when they give the weight of a tank in tons. With the USA, one never knows.
Life would be so much simpler in a purely metric world.:) Unfortunately in Canada, we still have a measurement C-F, a lot of metric, some imperial for both volume and weight, and some American volume corruption (e.g. imperial gallon versus US gallon, same with pint).
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Those units are quite unique, apparently miles is now a measure of time as well. I wander what 10 gallons per mile idling works out to in litres per minute?
 

swerve

Super Moderator
Life would be so much simpler in a purely metric world.:) Unfortunately in Canada, we still have a measurement C-F, a lot of metric, some imperial for both volume and weight, and some American volume corruption (e.g. imperial gallon versus US gallon, same with pint).
Here in the UK beer's sold in pints - or 568 mls. ;) And most people know their weight in stones & their height in feet & inches, & their car's fuel consumption in miles per gallon (proper Imperial ones). They buy petrol by the litre, though, bottled & canned beer's 330ml or 500ml, & things sold by weight are kg or grams.
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
Here in the UK beer's sold in pints - or 568 mls. ;) And most people know their weight in stones & their height in feet & inches, & their car's fuel consumption in miles per gallon (proper Imperial ones). They buy petrol by the litre, though, bottled & canned beer's 330ml or 500ml, & things sold by weight are kg or grams.
We can't even get beer cans consistent. Our cans are 355 ml, and our tall cans are 474 ml. Then we have the narrow can 355 ml. Some Euro/UK beers are canned here so my tall boy Yeti cooler works for them. Bottom line, American volume measurement makes for a third level of confusion.
 
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