Australian Army Discussions and Updates

ADMk2

Just a bloke
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
As they should.

The ADF is clearly stepping up in this area. I will be very interested to see when the ADF acquires loitering munitions.

Regards,

Massive
They are programmed under Project LAND 159 Tranche 3 which is all about infantry weapons, which gives some indication about the intended range / capability that is likely to be sought.
 

DDG38

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
"Australian Army Snipers from 2nd Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment on Exercise Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2022. During Exercise Rim of the Pacific 2022, Australian Army snipers from the 2nd Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment have been honing their skills. At Marine Corps Base Hawaii, the snipers culminated their multi-national training with a patrol and stalk exercise. In teams of two, the snipers put their skills to the test, from patrolling to disguise, stalking (crawling) to fire orders." Image Source : ADF Image Library
20220726adf8615648_0141-2.jpg
 

PHOTOGRAPHER

New Member
Does anyone have insight into the probable effects of the recently announced strategic review for Defence? Does this mean a further delay of announcing the winner of Land 400/3 ? Can there be confidence in the review with Smith in charge due to his history with defence funding cuts?

What do you think might be the outcome?
 

Wombat000

Active Member
Seriously?
I reckon it’s anyones guess.

however, peering beyond perceived political stereotypes and historical precedence, we are I think in acknowledged different times.
We are, as I sadly perceive, in a likely (within 10yr warning) pre-conflict era.
The era of benign defence budgets is history.

so with regards to the review, if anything IM sad O it will be an enhancement.
So if something is recommended to be culled then will be deemed not worth it in the ‘likely‘ conflict with the next 10yrs, and if that is actually the case then why would or should we bother with it?
 

ADMk2

Just a bloke
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Seriously?
I reckon it’s anyones guess.

however, peering beyond perceived political stereotypes and historical precedence, we are I think in acknowledged different times.
We are, as I sadly perceive, in a likely (within 10yr warning) pre-conflict era.
The era of benign defence budgets is history.

so with regards to the review, if anything IM sad O it will be an enhancement.
So if something is recommended to be culled then will be deemed not worth it in the ‘likely‘ conflict with the next 10yrs, and if that is actually the case then why would or should we bother with it?
For a start, because it would be a terribly poor defence force if it were designed, structured and equipped for only one operational scenario…

What if it has to do something outside this scenario?

Designing a force for an envisaged specific role and then cutting the rest of it to the bone, is what led to our (almost) inability to put a light infantry brigade sized force onto one of the closest countries to us, to perform (almost) the lowest possible intensity, stability operations and sustain this force.

If we had to do anything more strenuous we’d have experienced operational failure.

That’s what an unbalanced force delivers.
 
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oldsig127

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Does anyone have insight into the probable effects of the recently announced strategic review for Defence? Does this mean a further delay of announcing the winner of Land 400/3 ? Can there be confidence in the review with Smith in charge due to his history with defence funding cuts?

What do you think might be the outcome?
Trying not to be impolite, because it's not intended, but you've been lurking here long enough to know that it's worth reviewing the last few pages before posting. This subject has been covered and recovered over the last 3 or 4 pages. Anyway, welcome back to activity

oldsig127
 

Stampede

Well-Known Member
For a start, because it would be a terribly poor defence force if it were designed, structured and equipped for only one operational scenario…

What if it has to do something outside this scenario?

Designing a force for an envisaged specific role and then cutting the rest of it to the bone, is what led to our (almost) inability to put a light infantry brigade sized force onto one of the closest countries to us, to perform (almost) the lowest possible intensity, stability operations and sustain this force.

If we had to do anything more strenuous we’d have experienced operational failure.

That’s what an unbalanced force delivers.
We don't know the outcome of the review, but we do hear the reason for the review is the increased concern of hostility around our region within the next decade.
Concerning stuff with the speculated answer being an increase in short term capacity.
The answer appears to be long range deterrence.
Paul Dibb was again saying we need lots of very long range missiles.
To pay for this we need to look at some of our large defence projects and prioritse how we spend the dollars.
The assumption been either a dramatic cutback or deletion of some capabilities.

I don't disagree that a 2000 km missile deterrence will have a dramatic influence on any adversary conducting ill intent within our region

My concern as is probably shared by others ,is what does that look like in a balanced defence force needing to respond to a very broad range of scenarios?

In this Army thread the question still stands.
How do you close with a near peer enemy in that last KM on the battlefield.

Suggest the answer is not with a 50 year old APC and a small number of 20 year old tanks.


Cheers S
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
What is a 2000km range missile in the western context? Is there such a thing in the western military aside from ICBMs?
Some of the versions of the Tomahawk LACM have ranges that into the 2,0000+ km range though a number of them are actually under 2,000km but over 1,000km. One thing to remember when involving ordnance with such significant ranges is that whilst good at hitting fixed installations and infrastructure, the ranges, flight time, and awareness of targets/sensor footprint make engaging at such extreme ranges difficult at best.
 
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