Australian Army Discussions and Updates

Massive

Active Member
Going to be an interesting competition
Cheers
Imagine both are excellent options.

It will be interesting to see what weight is placed, if any, on the advantages of a common turret across the Boxer and the Lynx. I would have thought that this would be a significant advantage for the Army in terms of training and maintenance.

Regards,

Massive
 

ADMk2

Just a bloke
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Finally downloaded the article and read it. Relatively high level and, with all due respect to the authors, not all that compellingly argued.



I would have thought that any increase would be in the Beersheba brigades themselves? Otherwise potentially in combat support and combat service support to bring them up to a level so that the Beersheba concept is fully supported.

e.g. Adding a third cavalry squadron, a second or third tank squadron, an additional mechanised battlion to each brigade. Or, alternatively, adding a third air defence battery, beefing up logistics support for each brigade, etc etc.

The brigades do the land element force generation. IMHO any expansion of the Army would be about expanding the resources the brigades have to draw on to generate that force.

The whole concept of a "two ocean army" feels like a diversion. The army is the army, and it can be moved to the ocean it is needed at.

Regards,

Massive
I agree, if any increase is needed it should be within the Brigade structure we have generated, we finally have something approaching a supportable and deployable Brigade Group that can be rotated and sustained and now people are arguing we should move away from it?

I’m sure Takao and Raven, could list 1000 areas in which the current Brigades could be enhanced that would substantially increase capabilities of there is capacity available in funding, manning and resources to expand our land force. I’m not sure adding ad hoc units is anything like the best way forward.
 

Boagrius

Well-Known Member
I agree, if any increase is needed it should be within the Brigade structure we have generated, we finally have something approaching a supportable and deployable Brigade Group that can be rotated and sustained and now people are arguing we should move away from it?

I’m sure Takao and Raven, could list 1000 areas in which the current Brigades could be enhanced that would substantially increase capabilities of there is capacity available in funding, manning and resources to expand our land force. I’m not sure adding ad hoc units is anything like the best way forward.
Couldn't agree more. Speaking as a layman here (as always) but just look at our GBAD capability. We're really only dipping our toes in that water with NASAMS and there is still a long way to go with HIMAD/MR-GBAD, C-RAM, C-UAV, C-LACM, BMD, etc etc. Same goes for SPG, rocket arty, IFV, GBASM... the list goes on. So many new capabilities in the pipeline to integrate and flesh out properly before we get into a fundamental force structure expansion.
 

MARKMILES77

Active Member
More concerning is the information that if the Hanwha Redback is purchased for the IFV, the ammunition that it's 30X173 mm gun uses is incompatible with the 30X173 mm ammunition used on the Boxer gun. So the Army would have to purchase two types of 30X173mm ammunition!
 

swerve

Super Moderator
That's a problem. Two superficially similar but incompatible ammo types is begging for someone to mix them up. Much better to have obviously different ammunition, e.g. different calibres.
 

old faithful

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
That's a problem. Two superficially similar but incompatible ammo types is begging for someone to mix them up. Much better to have obviously different ammunition, e.g. different calibres.
The 106mm recoiless rifle rounds were actually 105mm ......
 

Big_Zucchini

Active Member
The Rheinmetall 30mm gun uses links, while the Mk44S does not. Both have a different muzzle fuze programmer so their munitions are totally incompatible.

Regarding the weapon choice, Phase 3 requirements clearly state that competitors will not be bound in any way by the results of Phase 2, and that the army reserves the right to choose even the winning turret from Phase 3 as a replacement for the Phase 2 turret.

The way LAND 400 was built, it basically guaranteed the winner of Phase 2 wins the jackpot. But to remedy that and avoid charges of corruption, misconduct, whatever, and gain a bad reputation in industry, they took the economical losses to make all phases of the program as competitive as possible.
So, they already decided and acknowledged that from an economical standpoint, it makes no sense, as long as they get the absolute best result in their view.
This also reduces risk for Australia, by the way. If the winner of phase 2 could dictate terms, they could get really screwed in phase 3.
 
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swerve

Super Moderator
India created such a problem for itself some years ago with re-engining its Jaguar strike aircraft. They needed more power. Original manufacturer offered a low-risk, relatively low-cost upgrade, by rebuilding the existing engines to the latest version (already in service elsewhere). No airframe changes, minimal training & support changes. Most potential suppliers declined to bid, but one manufacturer bid a newer, smaller lighter, & more powerful engine - & the air force wanted it. So they had to fix the competition to exclude the old engine so politicians couldn't impose the cheaper option. Tied themselves to the new development. Let stocks of spares for old engines run down.

Then the costs started getting out of control . . . . The new supplier kept finding reasons to charge more.

It's ended badly. There will be no re-engining. The Jaguars will be retired earlier than scheduled.
 

buffy9

Active Member

It seems the Army is seeking a boost in terms of transport aviation. This is strange because I can't recall any mention of such plans in the DSU or FSP - which itself is strange considering consistent issues with the MRH, as mentioned in the article. Either way it should lower tempo for the MRH fleet slightly - which may prove helpful in keeping them around a few more years in the next decade.

The platform is mentioned as being a leased, non-operational transport capability in the six tonne class. It will be interesting to see if non-operational use excludes it from disaster relief operations like Bushfire Assist or COVID Assist.

EDIT: An update on the situation. Land 9074 Phase 4 may be cancelled in favour of a HH-60 or MH-60 squadron procurement (up to 24) instead.


It notes that all twelve 6AVN MRH-90 and all six RAN MRH-90 will eventually shift to 5AVN, with the previously noted three AW139 to provide an interim capability in the meantime.

In the article, both the HH-60 and MH-60 platforms are noted as having improved range and ability, with CSAR being a likely capability of both but more substantial in the HH-60. Could the improved range and ability to conduct air-to-air refuelling make it suitable to long-range helicopter operations, as desired by the DSU/FSP?
 
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Stampede

Well-Known Member
A recent article in the APDR regarding the ARH Tiger.


With the current push for employment around the nation will the Tiger get a reprieve to save local jobs?
Or as suspected we go with the Apache.

The subject seems to be getting some media attention so I wonder if a decision is pending soon.

Regards S

Post budget fallout and US Election !
 

Redlands18

Well-Known Member
@oldsig127 put a link to a Sky News article on the RAAF thread concerning Australia ordering Apache’s before the end of this year. Not that i would treat Sky News as a particularly reliable source.
 
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