Takao
The Bunker Group
I think there were two main reasons, blindness and ignorance.
Taking the first one - a lot of faith was placed on the ability for the new digital airframe to self-diagnose. In the late 90s / early 00s the 'silver bullet' was smart aircraft that could fight and diagnose without humans. It wasn't just Airbus - all the companies were (and, from what I can tell) and are still doing it. If a jet came back broke, all you had to do was download the data (off the DID-L for Tiger) and go to that page in the maintenance manual. Because of that, all we needed were tradies that could follow instructions. No need for troubleshooting or mechanical knowledge. So, we got rid of a bunch of that training - most notably on Subject 4 for CPL.
The reality was much more complex. For starters, the maintenance manual was nowhere near complete. It wasn't a translation issue (our FSR could access the French manuals), it was just non-existent. So where the DID-L gave a code - sometimes that didn't exist. We could work our way around it because of our older SGT / WO2 with troubleshooting experience in the Regt and the CAPT / MAJ in the SPO with similar experience. Sometimes the DID-L didn't record faults (especially mechanical - if a panel or blade was damaged there was no way to register. Finally, the DID-L is a software system, so it too is susceptible to faults. So what do you do to a system wide error in that also impacts the DID-L?
An example of a major problem here was rotor balancing. Tiger is so easy to do it (even more so than Black Hawk - and that was an order of magnitude better than Huey or Kiowa) - but our junior soldiers didn't know how to do one without computer aid. I remember one incident where a (really good) CPL had his FRT trying to work out if the brokenness was in the engine or the computers. An officer suggested swapping the problem engine with another aircraft (a really easy job in Tiger with a crane), to which the CPL responded "you can do that?". Now, CPLs are the absolute hands-on tech experts. Officer's shouldn't be able to suggest new and radical ideas like that though!
We did identify this shortage - and by 2009 had revamped all the RAMS training - especially the CPL and SGT one. Unfortunately, there was a generation of JNCO that came through where they were seriously underdone. We were lucky though, we still had a smattering of really good NCOs/WOs (there had been an enormous exodus from Darwin / Army after Kiowa left), including some wearing AA uniforms that were able to do some intensive PME that covered some of that gap. Ironically, the poor maintenance manual helped, as the soldiers were forced to think on their feet.
for number two - ignorance - there was a heap. My favourite was bitching that the Tigers weren't rolled under the trees like the Kiowa's used to be (ignoring the rotor disk 50x wider or the 6x heaver weight or the 2x length). There was a belief that a new aircraft (see above as to why) needed less people, so the maintenance workforce was cut by about 1/3 - and avionics techs more so. It took nearly a decade to convince AHQ that more maintainers were needed. Seniors got frustrated when 161 would rock up with a huge number of vehicles - ignoring that the fuel bill for the Sqn had risen by a factor of 10*** (to match a Black Hawk Sqn ironically...) and the spares were greater and larger and, it had weapons (!) - needing more transport.
Strategically, there was a belief that Army needed no representation in the SPO (leaving it all to contractors) and there was a lot of frustration about what Tiger could do, couldn't do and the like. 2/14 stirred the pot at the three-star level one exercise - claiming the aircraft was useless as it couldn't find a Regt of ASLAVs. Now I grant you - if a Tiger couldn't do that it'd be a huge problem. But when you don't move your ASLAVs all exercise (not even turn them on) and pile camo around - are you even doing your job? It tied into some unintentional ignorance where we didn't even know what we wanted. Tiger is 100% the correct answer to AIR 87 - but Army had no idea if AIR 87 was the answer. It's one of the reasons LAND 4503 is going better - we actually have a bench mark.
The amount of Tiger experts is uniform is astounding - especially considering how tight we are with CFN, aeronautical engineers and pilots.... For every Tiger expert in uniform, I'd suggest there are 2 - 3 who think they know what they are talking about (but don't). And that impacts a lot - including budgets and crewing.
Just two (quick, I promise) additional notes.
1. I don't comment on MRH as I never worked on or near them. Ironically, the only one I've seen in the flesh was an 808 Sqn bird, not a 5 Avn one! But I do know that there was a fair share of cultural issues - and some harsh perceptions about suitability.
2. These aren't specific to the aviation world. I think it's Army, because for all their pers and tech issues the RAN and RAAF acknowledge increasing complexity and changes in capability. They actively seek to reduce ignorance. Army on the other hand; look at how M1s are treated - just like trucks when in reality they are no different to a Tiger. But trying to improve the management of the fleet is like tying to teach a rock to sing. Or classics, like asking the gun of the IFV to be used in a dismounted role just like an M113's can.We claim PME, but we promote ignorance.
All up - we went from a 1967 Volkswagen Beetle to a 2008 Porsche 911. Both superficially the same - but we cut the budget and skill for maintainers, then asked the pilots to do rally, tarmac, pick up the dogs and drop the kids at soccer practice. And organisationally, we didn't listen to those on the front line when they were asked questions. It took a handful of really good O3 - O5 to push the capability in the wider Army, and some excellent E4 - O3 to fix the Regt and training system.
*** for some context, one external tank for a Black Hawk carries enough fuel for 3x Kiowa... And the internal tanks of a Black Hawk are more than 1.5x bigger.
