Australian Army Discussions and Updates

[ADMk2]

Well, you can scrub 2 RAR, better to be called 2IRC (RAR)

Same deal for 4RAR in 99. They subsequently had to be re-roled as a normal light infantry battalion over a number of years before they could go to Timor.

However 2RAR is a battalion that exists on the order of battle. 8/9 did not in 99 and nor did 7RAR.

 

[Raven22]

In 1999, we had , 1 2,3, 5/7 ,6, 8/9, and 4RAR(CDO) Where do you get the 2 extra now?
Even if 2 RAR was bought to full strength, and 8/9 de-linked and made 9 a light BN, you would effectively achieve what I was suggesting.
At least then, you would be able to rapidly deploy a BN at very short notice.
ATM, we will not be able to deploy anyone except 2Cdo (a Company group) and a Sqn of SASR at very short notice.

As AD has already mentioned your maths is a bit off – we have two more battalions now than we had in 1999.

More to the point, you are falling into the trap of determining capability by counting infantry battalions. There is so, so much more to having a capability than just counting the number of colours on parade. Even just the infantry battalions themselves are so much more capable than in 1999, in both an absolute and relative sense. They are all full strength, equipped with the best (or very close to it) individual equipment and small arms in the world, with organic mobility, and training to work outside of their own little bubble. Whereas outside of perhaps 3 Bde, in 1999 the RAR was at a very low state of readiness.

More importantly though, the Army now has other combat and combat support capabilities to actually be relevant on a modern battlefield, and the capabilities in these areas are growing at a rapid rate. This is no surprise – all the experience on both exercises and operations point to the fact that unsupported manoeuvre forces aren’t particularly useful. It is all the enabling capabilities – long range fires, ISR, EW, cyber, GBAD etc – that are needed simply to survive, let alone close with and kill the enemy. Ask the Ukrainians or the Syrians if they would prefer another rifle battalion or a battery of HIMARS/modern UAS/an EW capability etc, based on what they have learned.

Thankfully, our Army is rapidly catching up, and evolving the force to be useful in the future.* It is perhaps worth pointing out that the officer that is reducing the strength of the infantry, and mechanising half of what remains, has a light infantry back ground and grew up in 3 Bde. It is also no coincidence that the current Comd of 3 Bde is an armoured officer, and light infantry officers have commanded 1 Bde in the recent past, in an effort to introduce some diversity of experience and thought.

I also don’t know why you think we can only deploy commandoes/SASR at short notice. The Ready Battle Group, currently based on 1 RAR, is just as ready as it has ever been. More so, really, since it is now a proper all arms battle group with strategic mobility (both air and sea) to get it somewhere needed in a hurry.

*Incidentally, for a case study on how to do this wrong, look at the British Army. In an effort to save regimental cap badges they have an entire division worth of light infantry battalions with no real support, nor a meaningful role. Meanwhile, they are going from three armoured brigades to two, and it looks like one of the planned Strike Brigades will be cut as well. It is rapidly reaching the point where in the near future the Australian Army might have a larger and more capable armoured capability than the one which once fielded three armoured divisions to guard the inter-German border. The British Army have very much reached the point where tradition and history is actively undermining their army, rather than supporting it.

 

[t68]

As AD has already mentioned your maths is a bit off – we have two more battalions now than we had in 1999.

More to the point, you are falling into the trap of determining capability by counting infantry battalions. There is so, so much more to having a capability than just counting the number of colours on parade. Even just the infantry battalions themselves are so much more capable than in 1999, in both an absolute and relative sense. They are all full strength, equipped with the best (or very close to it) individual equipment and small arms in the world, with organic mobility, and training to work outside of their own little bubble. Whereas outside of perhaps 3 Bde, in 1999 the RAR was at a very low state of readiness.

More importantly though, the Army now has other combat and combat support capabilities to actually be relevant on a modern battlefield, and the capabilities in these areas are growing at a rapid rate. This is no surprise – all the experience on both exercises and operations point to the fact that unsupported manoeuvre forces aren’t particularly useful. It is all the enabling capabilities – long range fires, ISR, EW, cyber, GBAD etc – that are needed simply to survive, let alone close with and kill the enemy. Ask the Ukrainians or the Syrians if they would prefer another rifle battalion or a battery of HIMARS/modern UAS/an EW capability etc, based on what they have learned.

Thankfully, our Army is rapidly catching up, and evolving the force to be useful in the future.* It is perhaps worth pointing out that the officer that is reducing the strength of the infantry, and mechanising half of what remains, has a light infantry back ground and grew up in 3 Bde. It is also no coincidence that the current Comd of 3 Bde is an armoured officer, and light infantry officers have commanded 1 Bde in the recent past, in an effort to introduce some diversity of experience and thought.

I also don’t know why you think we can only deploy commandoes/SASR at short notice. The Ready Battle Group, currently based on 1 RAR, is just as ready as it has ever been. More so, really, since it is now a proper all arms battle group with strategic mobility (both air and sea) to get it somewhere needed in a hurry.

*Incidentally, for a case study on how to do this wrong, look at the British Army. In an effort to save regimental cap badges they have an entire division worth of light infantry battalions with no real support, nor a meaningful role. Meanwhile, they are going from three armoured brigades to two, and it looks like one of the planned Strike Brigades will be cut as well. It is rapidly reaching the point where in the near future the Australian Army might have a larger and more capable armoured capability than the one which once fielded three armoured divisions to guard the inter-German border. The British Army have very much reached the point where tradition and history is actively undermining their army, rather than supporting it.

I'm actually quite glad that we are evolving our combat force and catching up as you say, but does the Logistical support force across the ADF have the capacity to support a Brigade in the field long term in a medium to high intensity operations whilst subsequently able to support an operation like op Solace concurrently in a low to medium intensity action plus provide the level of support expected to our commitment locally and within our sphere of influence.

As an example from our past the Indonesian Confrontation, 1963–66,1st Australian Task Force Vietnam 1966–72 (1962-72 overall)

 

[ADMk2]

I'm actually quite glad that we are evolving our combat force and catching up as you say, but does the Logistical support force across the ADF have the capacity to support a Brigade in the field long term in a medium to high intensity operations whilst subsequently able to support an operation like op Solace concurrently in a low to medium intensity action plus provide the level of support expected to our commitment locally and within our sphere of influence.

As an example from our past the Indonesian Confrontation, 1963–66,1st Australian Task Force Vietnam 1966–72 (1962-72 overall)

I’m not sure when you point to those operations, what example are you trying to draw from them? Neither were ‘high intensity combat operations for us and only occasionally did Ops even reach mid, IMHO.

Our logistical support force is far better now than it has been in decades IMHO and is strengthened with genuine strategic mobility and bulk logistical capability (water, POL’s etc) options, which we simply have never had before. It has it’s weaknesses sure, but has evolved significantly since 1999.

There is an interesting paper on the subject here:

https://www.army.gov.au/sites/g/files/net1846/f/transform_logistics_b5_faweb.pdf

 

[Raven22]

I'm actually quite glad that we are evolving our combat force and catching up as you say, but does the Logistical support force across the ADF have the capacity to support a Brigade in the field long term in a medium to high intensity operations whilst subsequently able to support an operation like op Solace concurrently in a low to medium intensity action plus provide the level of support expected to our commitment locally and within our sphere of influence.

As an example from our past the Indonesian Confrontation, 1963–66,1st Australian Task Force Vietnam 1966–72 (1962-72 overall)

As AD said, I’d argue no one has the ability to support their army long term in medium to high intensity operations. These days high intensity combat will eat up an army very quickly indeed. Luckily, there aren’t too many scenarios that would require high intensity operations to be sustained. A more realistic scenario is does the army’s have the ability to support a brigade for a small period of high intensity operations, followed by a long period of low intensity stability operations.

The answer to that is yes, but it would strain the Army significantly. Which, as I have pointed out a few times, isn’t necessarily a bad thing. The army is required to maintain a major and minor (Bde/BG) level deployment indefinitely as a maximum effort. Not as business as usual but as a maximum effort. The idea that you should be able to complete a maximum effort mission without straining the force is odd, and flies in the face of how organisations are planned and resourced. Essentially, if we have available forces that wouldn’t be committed to a maximum effort operation, then why have them at all?

You are argued a few posts ago for an increase in the defence budget to 3% of GDP. I strongly disagree with that. Australia faces no threats that would require that sort of defence budget. I think 2% is sufficient, as long as it is sustained and spent wisely. Happily, we seem to moving in the right direction on this one, and money is being spent far more wisely than in the past. The problem is, so many of our capabilities are lacking that it will take a while to reach an acceptable baseline that is sustainable.

 

[t68]

As AD said, I’d argue no one has the ability to support their army long term in medium to high intensity operations. These days high intensity combat will eat up an army very quickly indeed. Luckily, there aren’t too many scenarios that would require high intensity operations to be sustained. A more realistic scenario is does the army’s have the ability to support a brigade for a small period of high intensity operations, followed by a long period of low intensity stability operations.

yeah I agree with that, I read the other day cant remember where that even the US will struggle to support two major wars concurrently

The answer to that is yes, but it would strain the Army significantly. Which, as I have pointed out a few times, isn’t necessarily a bad thing. The army is required to maintain a major and minor (Bde/BG) level deployment indefinitely as a maximum effort. Not as business as usual but as a maximum effort. The idea that you should be able to complete a maximum effort mission without straining the force is odd, and flies in the face of how organisations are planned and resourced. Essentially, if we have available forces that wouldn’t be committed to a maximum effort operation, then why have them at all?

I understand the logic of what you are saying but I don't agree with it, defence should be sufficiently funded and resourced to be able to meet the strategic guidance placed on it, if it cant do that then what's the point in have in mandating defence should be able to achieve that outcome in the first place

You are argued a few posts ago for an increase in the defence budget to 3% of GDP. I strongly disagree with that. Australia faces no threats that would require that sort of defence budget. I think 2% is sufficient, as long as it is sustained and spent wisely. Happily, we seem to moving in the right direction on this one, and money is being spent far more wisely than in the past. The problem is, so many of our capabilities are lacking that it will take a while to reach an acceptable baseline that is sustainable.

Ah no I didn't, I suggested that if the ADF was to grow to a size 1/3rd bigger it would most likely need to be funded at 3% of GDP.
But I don't disagree with Old Faithfull premises that the ADF should increase in size by 1/3rd, what that mix of capability and support should be is open to conjecture.

 

[old faithful]

I'm pretty sure I havnt made myself clear.
I'm not against the current plan.
But if a battalion group had to be deployed to Port Moresby, tomorrow, to deal with insurgents, that have taken to the mountains, would a light , helo mobile infantry unit be of more use than a motorized one?
We have the budget and infrastructure to support an extra BN or 2, would only require a small increase in support units, its totally doable, and probably needed IMO.
If you wanted to move a motorized or mech BN tomorrow, to any where, its going to take weeks.
Even with the C17,s you are only moving 2 cars at a time per Aircraft at best, then ,fuel, etc etc etc

 

[t68]

I'm pretty sure I havnt made myself clear.
I'm not against the current plan.
But if a battalion group had to be deployed to Port Moresby, tomorrow, to deal with insurgents, that have taken to the mountains, would a light , helo mobile infantry unit be of more use than a motorized one?
We have the budget and infrastructure to support an extra BN or 2, would only require a small increase in support units, its totally doable, and probably needed IMO.
If you wanted to move a motorized or mech BN tomorrow, to any where, its going to take weeks.
Even with the C17,s you are only moving 2 cars at a time per Aircraft at best, then ,fuel, etc etc etc

wouldn't that be best left to 2CDO and the possible light utility helicopter mooted under the DWP that 4x can fit in a C17?

 

[Raven22]

I'm pretty sure I havnt made myself clear.
I'm not against the current plan.
But if a battalion group had to be deployed to Port Moresby, tomorrow, to deal with insurgents, that have taken to the mountains, would a light , helo mobile infantry unit be of more use than a motorized one?
We have the budget and infrastructure to support an extra BN or 2, would only require a small increase in support units, its totally doable, and probably needed IMO.
If you wanted to move a motorized or mech BN tomorrow, to any where, its going to take weeks.
Even with the C17,s you are only moving 2 cars at a time per Aircraft at best, then ,fuel, etc etc etc

It’s hard to imagine a scenario where we would have to deploy to PNG tomorrow to deal with insurgents that have taken to the mountains, but if we did then clearly the infantry just wouldn’t take all their vehicles. The motorised battalions are still on a light establishment and trained to fight on foot - you can happily throw them onto hercs or on to helicopters if that is what the contingency demands. They might not be as good as it as a dedicated light infantry battalion, but that is a compromise to make them useful for the vast majority of other contingencies where having organic mobility is a massive advantage. If it were an ongoing operation, the battalions would just go through a normal period of predeployment training concentrating on dismounted patrolling, the same way that 5/7 RAR and 6 RAR did when rotating through East Timor and the Solomons (and as did the engineers and artillery re-roled as infantry).

The point you are missing, however, is that if we had a spare ~2000 or so soldiers, we wouldn’t be using them to create extra infantry battalions. We are actively and deliberately making the infantry battalions smaller to free up manning for the enabling forces that are needed to make the infantry we have useful on a modern battlefield. Of all the things that keep defence planners up at night, the need to patrol the hills of PNG against insurgents is not one of them.

 

[old faithful]

Was East Timor one of the things that kept them up at night?
Look, I'm playing a bit of a devils advocate here.
It does appear that our "defence" force is tooling up for a conflict away from our shores. It looks like they already know the battle fields.
And not just us either, the kiwis are heading in a similar direction.
Its the other contingencies that might interrupt the current plans I'm thinking about.
The Philippines could go pear shaped for example.
The ADF is becoming an expeditionary force, a part of a coalition force.

 

[vonnoobie]

Little OT but in regards to the suggestion of needing an ADF 1/3rd larger and a corresponding ADV budget of 3% I'm not sure the numbers match up. Under such a scenario you are increasing force numbers by 33% while increasing available budget by 50% or by my rough numbers increasing spending per a person by 12%. When getting more of something generally the cost curve should be in a downward trajectory rather then upwards. A 1/3rd increase should suffice with a 2.6% budget, possibly even 2.5% but if 3% then the force should be increasing by no less then 50%. Wont do our selves any good by paying a premium for an increase, Just throwing away valuable funds that future politicians would use as ammo to make big cuts.

My 2 cents.

 

[oldsig127]

The ADF is becoming an expeditionary force, a part of a coalition force.

Trying very hard to think of when it wasn't with no real success.

It does appear that our "defence" force is tooling up for a conflict away from our shores. It looks like they already know the battle fields.

Or tooling up for a very different world than when I was a soldier 30 years ago. And even then I felt *very* exposed sitting in a dusty red soil hole wearing jungle greens and a bush hat while everyone else was getting cams and wearable helmets. Things have changed since.

oldsig

 

[John Fedup]

Reminds me of the first Canadian deployment to Afghanistan right after 9/11, forest green camo, no decent vehicles, and no helicopters. Hopefully junior is providing decent defence capabilities for our helicopter force destined for Mali.

 

[Raven22]

Was East Timor one of the things that kept them up at night?
Look, I'm playing a bit of a devils advocate here.
It does appear that our "defence" force is tooling up for a conflict away from our shores. It looks like they already know the battle fields.
And not just us either, the kiwis are heading in a similar direction.
Its the other contingencies that might interrupt the current plans I'm thinking about.
The Philippines could go pear shaped for example.
The ADF is becoming an expeditionary force, a part of a coalition force.

There has actually been a fair bit of thought go into what one of these ‘enduring brigade deployments’ would actually look like. There are two broad contingencies that are being discussed. The first is a brigade in medium/high intensity warfighting as part of larger coalition depoyment somewhere in the world (think 2003 invasion of Iraq). The second is a large stability operation closer to home, where Australia is the lead nation and provides the framework for other troop contributing nations (think INTERFET).

Of these, logically, you’d think the first contingency would be the more difficult, due to the high intensity nature of it. While of course it might have higher casualties, because we’d be part of a larger coalition it would actually be easier for the army to sustain. That is because the coalition (read US) would provide all the enabling divisional and force level assets (joint fires, AME, ISR, etc) for us to leverage off.

However, it is actually the second contingency, where we are the lead nation in our own region, that is more difficult for the army to sustain, as we would be expected to provide these enabling capabilities to everyone else. While everyone else might rock up with their own battlegroup and what not, we’d have to provide all the theatre sustainment, ISR, Int, health etc for everyone else to leverage off. These, of course, are the capabilities we currently lack and are looking at growing, at the expense of the manoeuvre force.

So while a quick look might indicate that a stability op in our region would see a need for more boots on the ground, at the expense of other capabilities, it would actually need more of the higher level enablers than a combat deployment further afield.

 

[ADMk2]

Was East Timor one of the things that kept them up at night?
Look, I'm playing a bit of a devils advocate here.
It does appear that our "defence" force is tooling up for a conflict away from our shores. It looks like they already know the battle fields.
And not just us either, the kiwis are heading in a similar direction.
Its the other contingencies that might interrupt the current plans I'm thinking about.
The Philippines could go pear shaped for example.
The ADF is becoming an expeditionary force, a part of a coalition force.

When have we not operated as part of a coalition force? Let me see:

Boer war? Nope.

WW1? Nope.

WW2? Nope.

Korea? Nope.

Konfrontasi / Malaya? Nope.

Vietnam? Nope.

GW1? Nope.

Somalia? Nope.

Op. Desert Fox? Nope.

INTERFET? Nope.

GW2? Nope.

Afghanistan? Nope.

Soloman Islands? Nope.

Iraq and Syria? Nope.

So considering all that, I totally get why we should build a force structure designed to operate loads of light infantry battle groups designed to take on insurgents in West Timor...

 

[old faithful]

When have we not operated as part of a coalition force? Let me see:

Boer war? Nope.

WW1? Nope.

WW2? Nope.

Korea? Nope.

Konfrontasi / Malaya? Nope.

Vietnam? Nope.

GW1? Nope.

Somalia? Nope.

Op. Desert Fox? Nope.

INTERFET? Nope.

GW2? Nope.

Afghanistan? Nope.

Soloman Islands? Nope.

Iraq and Syria? Nope.

So considering all that, I totally get why we should build a force structure designed to operate loads of light infantry battle groups designed to take on insurgents in West Timor...

Righto smart arse, you've taken me out of context.
All this negative argument because I've suggested it might be a good idea to keep a BN, or add a BN of light infantry.
I have never suggested that the current plan is not good.
I have suggested that it would be good to have 2 Bns of light infantry.
A total of 8 infantry Bns, for country as big as ours, and with a big defence budget and a population that has grown by 14 million in my life time.

 

[ASSAIL]

When have we not operated as part of a coalition force? Let me see:

Boer war? Nope.

WW1? Nope.

WW2? Nope.

Korea? Nope.

Konfrontasi / Malaya? Nope.

Vietnam? Nope.

GW1? Nope.

Somalia? Nope.

Op. Desert Fox? Nope.

INTERFET? Nope.

GW2? Nope.

Afghanistan? Nope.

Soloman Islands? Nope.

Iraq and Syria? Nope.

So considering all that, I totally get why we should build a force structure designed to operate loads of light infantry battle groups designed to take on insurgents in West Timor...

If our ambition is to continue contributing to a coalition in the same way that we have done for over the century in which we hung onto the UKs apron strings and went all the way with LBJ, you have an argument.
However, the DWP makes it clear that our strategic goal is quite different. We are to become the lead and possibly only participant in operations large and small in keeping the peace and supporting our near neighbours, something we were unable to do during ET and embarrassingly we had to beg capability from our friends and allies.
It seems the decision has been made to prevent that happening as we build our forces to become for more capable as a result of that experience.

And we will be part of a coalition in a larger conflict but I suggest that contributing a few Bns of light infantry is not what we'll be asked to do.

 

[Stampede]

Suggest if there is an expansion in the infantry side of things it will be in 2RAR and the special forces.
But then again, are these groups still infantry?

I think the special forces will always be the on call force for a variety of contingencies. From training of foreign forces at the light end to high intensity operations at the other and everything in between.With our current special forces brigade of SASR and two commando regt's plus support one would assume this is an impressive group compared to a generation ago.
However the tempo of deployment and the high number of multiple deployments conducted be personnel brings to question is it large enough.
Suggest raising a reserve commando company in QLD and add another regular company would be an appropriate establishment.
It will not happen over night and will take commitment in both money and time but will provide balance for the size of army we aspire to create.

As to 2RAR this is certainly a unit that is the way forward with the introduction of our LHD's.
As to its size and function well I guess this will evolve with time.
Certainly a battalion that cultural needs support.

Regards S

 

[ADMk2]

Righto smart arse, you've taken me out of context.
All this negative argument because I've suggested it might be a good idea to keep a BN, or add a BN of light infantry.
I have never suggested that the current plan is not good.
I have suggested that it would be good to have 2 Bns of light infantry.
A total of 8 infantry Bns, for country as big as ours, and with a big defence budget and a population that has grown by 14 million in my life time.

And I suggest that such an idea defeats the purpose of Plan Beersheba, allowing us to have 3 like Brigades as our principal combat force.

Why is it in your mind, that a standard infantry battalion such as 1RAR is no longer capable of performing the role of a light infantry battalion if a mission requires it, simply because they have been equipped with PMV’s?

What capability shortfall do you see in this?

And if you want to talk about being a smart ass, try considering the reality for a moment that the last time we added 2 infantry battalions to our OOB, the Government had to find $10 BILLION to implement it... So while it is a fine idea in theory, the implementation of it is neither a population or geographical issue that needs to be addressed...

You’d like some light infantry battalions, despite it going against Army’s desire for supportable, deployable forces (rule of 3 and all that...) Great. Where exactly is the endless pot of money coming from for everything Army needs, in addition to this idea of yours?

And what readiness are these battalions to be held at? High readiness? Tremendous, how do you propose to achieve that long term with only 2 of them? If they aren’t held at high readiness, what is the point? Simply re-role an existing battalion if such a mission requirement appears.

Personally if such a huge pot of money, positions and resources suddenly becomes available, I’d personally prefer a 4th Beersheba Brigade be created along with a full buy of all the enabling capabilities Army actually needs. You could have one each in Darwin, Townsville, Brisbane and Adelaide.

It would add far more combat power to Army overall, you’d get your 8 full battalions, plus 2RAR (Amphib) and the Special Forces capability and we’d be well able to support and sustain a full brigade on operations, plus a battalion group elsewhere as Government has long asked Army to be capable of providing...

 

[old faithful]

OMG!!!!

2RAR is half way there.

Split 8/9.

10 billion, I'm sorry , I don't believe it would cost 10 bil to add 2 more Bns to the orbat.
2 more mech Bns, maybe.
As for state of eadyness, 1 BN at high state, on 12 month rotation. Aka 1 and 2/4 in the 80,s , it was called the ODF then.
Taking a mech BN away from their cars that they have been training with, to get up to standard and making them a light inf BN is not that easy.
They won't be going through LWC or Tully.
We have 10 chinooks, 40 odd nh 90,s and still 20 odd blackhawks for now.
Light infantry could continue to train that way.
2RAR as it stands , 1 rifle coy and support units can not be used as a BN, and really seems more like a training aid for the RAN and Army ATM.
Any way, it seems that this discussion is going no where, so I'll pull out now.
I just think that we are going to lose a fair bit of flexibility with this plan.
I'm not convinced that this plan will go the distance either. We will most likely have a change in Govt soon, with less $ available for defence.
Huge amounts of $ wasted on the Submarine plan for Navy, and I fear its going to cost much more than planned.
So I'll just shut up now.