ADF General discussion thread

[ADMk2]

One thing I never quite got about Arafura and lack of helo hangar and heavy landing space. Surely a Patrol boat with a helo can patrol a dramatically larger area? Get crew to trouble spots faster. Carry an offensive stick of some type. Interrogate contacts without having to transport the ship 100+kms. Get injured or ill crew or supplies to shore or larger vessels, launch and land more able uncrewed UAVs, even do anti submarine work…and so on and so on….

Simply didn’t have the budget (or the helos) for it.

I’m sure we could have conjured up some maritime capable EC-135’s fair easily and given them some helicopter capability…

But the ships were never intended to by RAN - they are supposed to have a maritime UAS but that has been such a dogs breakfast of an acquisition, to the point they have taken it off RAN and Army is now running the project - to have helos from the start.

 

[swerve]

We already operate two ships that are twice the size and twice the capability - Canberra and Adelaide.

The Giuseppe Garibaldi is tiny by comparison - not much larger than a fully loaded Hunter at the current rate - and getting on half a century old. The Indonesians will be doing well to reliably generate a meaningful capability from it.

Are they stretching the hull? GG's 30 metres longer (20%) & 12 metres wider (>50% - though the waterline width isn't as much more).

I worry about how much the Hunters will draw, though, given some of the displacement numbers being bandied around. The RAN website says light weight will be about 8200 tons, but some of the full load numbers suggest that's too low.

 

[spoz]

And about half as much again in displacement terms - about 14 versus something around 9 thousand tons full loaded.

 

[Morgo]

And about half as much again in displacement terms - about 14 versus something around 9 thousand tons full loaded.

I may have stretched the comparison a little, but my point is that they are much closer in size to a Hunter than they are to a Canberra. It’s very small for something planning on carrying multiple aircraft.

 

[Bob53]

Simply didn’t have the budget (or the helos) for it.

I’m sure we could have conjured up some maritime capable EC-135’s fair easily and given them some helicopter capability…

But the ships were never intended to by RAN - they are supposed to have a maritime UAS but that has been such a dogs breakfast of an acquisition, to the point they have taken it off RAN and Army is now running the project - to have helos from the start.

I’m not arguing with you on the reason but the logic behind that is bewildering. At the highest end of cost….By adding a $30m MH60s helicopter and crew to a $350 million dollar ship you essentially double or triple its effectiveness. i Think the really stunning decision is the removal of the helicopter hangar, fuel bunker and reducing the landing pad weight capacity from the vessels meant they cost more than if they were left in place from the original design. It’s like the program was run by people from a local council,

 

[spoz]

They never had a hangar; you had to go up to the 90m ship (not so far built) for that. It was always a deck only.

 

[south]

Logistically, the current structure of the RAN & RAAF would struggle to sustain a platoon deployed remotely within Australia let alone offshore. Reducing the LBMS footprint to a level that can be supported makes them irrelevant at least until the boaties get their new ships in the water. I think integral air defence for Army is 100% nessecary as ground forces cannot rely on either of the other services to stand and fight, they will protect their platforms before Army personnel.

The ship is more important than the individual right? Whenever the Army is forward of the Australian mainland there's a chance they will just get left hanging so the other forces can defend Australia.

Current LBMS concept looks to deny sea lanes or project forward, yeah you could deploy systems remotely in ambush which has its own pros & cons, but it also seems like a 75% solution. The concept could evolve to include anti-sub capabilities through drones, deployable sensors and shore-based ASROC which would then give the other services freedom to pursue other missions.

Maybe I'm a little jaded.

Moving to the ADF thread…

The point to note looking at the concepts that our ally and principal security partner are publishing is that rather than increasing size, they are mostly looking to reduce the size of their footprint.

Reducing footprint has a multitude of benefits - and is aiming to remain below adversary detection threshold, or if detected be a hard, mobile, and a target where the value of expending long range fires is questionable. While there is less immediate firepower at hand, support can be provided by fire and mobility, rather than presence.

Arguing that it is logistically not sound does not get around the alternative, that a larger, less mobile formation is a) easier to detect and target, b) logistically harder to sustain.

 

[south]

.

Good point. The logistics tail can be expensive and vulnerable. Sometimes the simplest solutions are the best. Missile armed aircraft, ships or submarines can be deployed, and if necessary withdrawn, quickly.

Just looking back at WW2 it was immensely difficult supporting a small garrisoned island. The Japanese failed to defend any of them, either being obliterated, or simply bypassed, and left to wither on the vine.

I can see the benefit of landbased systems on the mainland, or on islands that are well protected from attack, but the idea of island hopping with a missile battery in tow sounds to be a huge drain on resources with very little upside.

Moved to ADF. thread…

The pertinent lesson from the Japanese isn’t so much that they failed to defend any of their islands because they lacked sufficient fighting power. It’s rather that they first lost Air and Sea control, which gave the allies the ability to conduct operations - generally speaking - at the time and place of their choosing.

Note that once the allies had claimed islands/key terrain they generally were able to secure it, build airfields, sustain the island, and then expand their air (and sea) control.

 

[Volkodav]

Looking outside the square I wonder if we need to decentralise our strike and indirect fires capabilities, rather than concentrating them.

With modern systems we can have dispersed capabilities silently listening for coordinates and the order to fire upon them. They then scoot away before they can be engaged.

Why not for instance with land systems, disperse systems such as the RCH 155mm, on a Boxer platform, to cavalry squadron HQs, or even Motorised Inf company HQs? Dispersed, protected, defended and able to provide instant support to the unit they are embedded with.

Take it a step further, 120mm mortars at troop/platoon level. Instant support to the troops they are with, but also able to engage other targets as required.

NLOS missile systems, including drones, do the same.

Basically, instead of assigning infantry and armour to protect fires assets, embed the fires assets into the F echelon.

Modern highly automated systems have very small crews, i.e. the RCH has a crew of two. Modern SP mortars are the same.

A hybrid fires troop could have a section with two RCH, an NLOS section, a UAV section, even an AD section. Each troop or platoon a Fires section with mortars CRAM/Counter drone, etc.

Make armour and infantry that doesn't have embedded fires the exception, not the rule. Increase lethality at every level.

Modular containerised systems can also be certified and used on trucks, litoral assault craft, landing craft and PBs.

 

[MickB]

Why is it that the majority of senarios put forward to present a negative aspect of certain Australian capabilities is along the lines of, they are not viable because even with it we still can,t take on China alone.

They do not take into account the support of our allies might offer.
Nor do they look at the support a hard hitting, highly mobile system might give to our allies.

In the end having a capability, any capability gives gives you more options than not having.
And the more diverse the capabilities the more diverse the options.

 

[ADMk2]

Why is it that the majority of senarios put forward to present a negative aspect of certain Australian capabilities is along the lines of, they are not viable because even with it we still can,t take on China alone.

They do not take into account the support of our allies might offer.
Nor do they look at the support a hard hitting, highly mobile system might give to our allies.

In the end having a capability, any capability gives gives you more options than not having.
And the more diverse the capabilities the more diverse the options.

Because being negative and pessimistic is easier than the opposite…

It’s also considered somewhat “cool” to imagine all the problems and realities we have to overcome or adapt to, but ignore the fact our “enemy” has the same ones, or more…

 

[Todjaeger]

Because being negative and pessimistic is easier than the opposite…

It’s also considered somewhat “cool” to imagine all the problems and realities we have to overcome or adapt to, but ignore the fact our “enemy” has the same ones, or more…

I cannot speak for anyone else, but the only way I would likely be considered 'cool' is if I spent time in a refrigerated compartment.

Having said that, it has been my experience having been involved in emergency services (yes, not military but exposed to hazards and unexpected, rapidly evolving incidents) in addition to needing to be able to rapidly react and adapt, one also needs to plan ahead, even with the expectation that many prior plans will failure or be negated. The adage, "hope for the best, plan for the worst," tends to hold true, albeit at times the actual worst case scenarios can turn out even more significant than planned for.

Where this impacts my perspective is that I tend to not be optimistic in terms of plans and planning. Creating a plan which is highly dependent on optimism, good luck and fortunate circumstances in order to succeed is also likely to suffer shortcomings with any/all of these elements absent. To whit, it would be a failure in planning. Not sure about in Oz, but elsewhere the term, "A failure to plan is planning to fail."

Now I have mentioned before that I have significant reservations about land-based AShM batteries, not just in Australian service but also by the US generally. That remains true because the geography itself remains unchanged. For a other nations, such land-based units could IMO realistically be more effective. On the US side though, given the massive overall size and capability set of the US armed forces as well as the support from other gov't agencies, the US might be able to make the concept work. However, it is also worth remembering that the USMC itself is nearly three times the size of the ADF as a whole, and the USMC can draw support from other US military and naval branches of the armed services.

I do see a number of areas where Australia would likely encounter issues if it tried to make effective use of land-based missile units as part of an A2AD strategy and to be honest I have not yet really seen solutions offered which IMO would be satisfactory in addressing the concerns.

 

[MickB]

While i agree that a battery located on an distant island covering the so called choke point could well be a disaster waiting to happen.
I was trying to point out this is no the only, (probably not even the primary) use for such a system in Australian service.

Ask Ukraine the benefits of having an anti ship missile capability.

In the event of a conflict they can be rapidly deployed to a (willing) host nation.
To very quickly provide a very real threat to any aggressor.
One that may disrupt their plans just by its mere presence.

 

[ADMk2]

I cannot speak for anyone else, but the only way I would likely be considered 'cool' is if I spent time in a refrigerated compartment.

Having said that, it has been my experience having been involved in emergency services (yes, not military but exposed to hazards and unexpected, rapidly evolving incidents) in addition to needing to be able to rapidly react and adapt, one also needs to plan ahead, even with the expectation that many prior plans will failure or be negated. The adage, "hope for the best, plan for the worst," tends to hold true, albeit at times the actual worst case scenarios can turn out even more significant than planned for.

Where this impacts my perspective is that I tend to not be optimistic in terms of plans and planning. Creating a plan which is highly dependent on optimism, good luck and fortunate circumstances in order to succeed is also likely to suffer shortcomings with any/all of these elements absent. To whit, it would be a failure in planning. Not sure about in Oz, but elsewhere the term, "A failure to plan is planning to fail."

Now I have mentioned before that I have significant reservations about land-based AShM batteries, not just in Australian service but also by the US generally. That remains true because the geography itself remains unchanged. For a other nations, such land-based units could IMO realistically be more effective. On the US side though, given the massive overall size and capability set of the US armed forces as well as the support from other gov't agencies, the US might be able to make the concept work. However, it is also worth remembering that the USMC itself is nearly three times the size of the ADF as a whole, and the USMC can draw support from other US military and naval branches of the armed services.

I do see a number of areas where Australia would likely encounter issues if it tried to make effective use of land-based missile units as part of an A2AD strategy and to be honest I have not yet really seen solutions offered which IMO would be satisfactory in addressing the concerns.

That was in part the point of my previous post, it wasn’t solely aimed at your goodself but the idea that ADF is just buying missiles without any real idea of what to do with them or indeed where they could fire them.

Part of the problem of course is the missile purchases are open source (in the broad brush details at least) but there is at least as much in the background being done to enable these sorts of capabilities.

There is a reason why the Defence Targetting Enterprise is funded to at least the same degree, if not more than many of the “pointy” capabilities listed in the IIP. You also don’t have to go far to gain an appreciation of what is being done to address these issues. It literally has it’s own chapter in the IIP 2024 (chapter 5).

https://www.theaustralian.com.au/special-reports/to-hit-a-target-youve-got-to-be-able-to-see-it/news-story/4ef4aa3b6de5600ff26551a12176d447

Case Study: Defence Targeting Enterprise – Capability Development

ClientDepartment of Defence ChallengeDefence required a significant uplift in its C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) capability to strengthen Joint Force readiness and targeting operations. Key challenges included: • Fragmented...

www.azooa.com.au

Which is not to say there are not problems, but they are far from insurmountable and we are not alone in having to address them. The other side gets a say in things, but so do we.

That is how warfare actually works.

 

[Todjaeger]

While i agree that a battery located on an distant island covering the so called choke point could well be a disaster waiting to happen.
I was trying to point out this is no the only, (probably not even the primary) use for such a system in Australian service.

Ask Ukraine the benefits of having an anti ship missile capability.

In the event of a conflict they can be rapidly deployed to a (willing) host nation.
To very quickly provide a very real threat to any aggressor.
One that may disrupt their plans just by its mere presence.

No dispute that AShM are a potentially useful capability. Where questions start appearing is just where/how AShM fit into the overall warfighting capability. Also worth keeping in mind is just how much potential variety there could be in terms of types of launching platforms.

Now whilst the conflict in Ukraine can provide some ideas and demonstrations of current or emerging capabilities and potential threats, there are other areas where I do not really think many other nations can realistically draw many useful lessons from. Ukraine's usage of anti-ship weapons from land bases being one example. After all, there is less than 300 km between the Ukrainian port of Odessa and the Russian-held port and naval base at Sevastapol on the Crimean peninsula.

In the case of both the US and Australia, there are not really any SLOC which an aggressor would use which would really be within range of land-based AShM batteries from Australian (or US) territory. This introduces two major potential problems as I see it more or less immediately. The first being that before an AShM battery (or even just a single launcher) could be brought to bear, it would need to be transported to an area which it would be within range of what ever the target or targeted area is. The second is one that was touched on by you, namely that the capability would be dependent on either a willing host nation, or Australia (or again, the US) would need to deploy against the wishes of a nation and possibly carry out an opposed landing/deployment.

Now I could be mistaken, but I do not really think that Australia is likely to be in a position to carry out opposed landings to deploy mobile land-based AShM launchers/batteries. For Australia to send in troops into a foreign country without their permission would potentially expand a conflict and draw uninvolved nations into the conflict, potentially as opponents of Australia. All of this ultimately means that Australia might not be able to get land-based AShM's to a point close enough to a conflict area to be relevant to the conflict itself.

 

[Takao]

That was in part the point of my previous post, it wasn’t solely aimed at your goodself but the idea that ADF is just buying missiles without any real idea of what to do with them or indeed where they could fire them.

I think that's a perfectly legitimate concern to have. And, quite frankly, I've never actually seen the (mainly Army) concept of forward deployed land based missiles actually genuinely considered, or argued against.

Where are those forces going? Many of the neighbours we casually throw around have a very different relationship with Beijing. They are not going to want to be dragged into a major regional conflict between the US and China. The uncontested idea that we can park on Indonesian, Malaysian etc territory and shoot at PRC targets is not an assumption I would grant a Staff Cadet at RMC, let along Russell Offices. Some nations may - PNG for instance - but what does that achieve for us? Defending our north-east quadrant is great for us, but what is it achieving from a PRC point of view? Are the PRC even going to send surface vessels to the Coral Sea when they are in the fight of their lives around Taiwan?

How are those forces getting there? The closer we go to the PRC, the easier it is to target our forces and the more options the PRC has to throw at us. The options they have to strike Guam v Darwin is literally orders of magnitude. So how do we get these missile launchers there? Note also, the PRC doesn't have to strike the strategic lift. It can just track them. Someone mentioned Gull and Sparrow force above - they all died. For nothing. you cant hide the deployment of these beasties.

What are you taking? Some Strikemaster? Bahahahahahahaha....... that's murder. Such short range weapons are a joke. So HiMARs or better. Cool. Note at the moment that's still well within the PRC WEZ, but the best (land) option we have at the moment. So, what, a Battery of HiMARs? That's 14 launchers. 14x PrSM missiles. Ok.....I mean, that's less than the Tier 2 combatants we were going to buy, but sure. Not sure it's going to do anything - the PLA-N is designed to fight an enemy with 122x VLS Ticos, 96x VLS Burkes and multiple CVNBG.... I'm not sure what 14 extra missiles are going to do (not nothing, but still....).

How are you going to protect them? I mean, you don't have to. You can leave them to die. But they will need protection. Their disembarkation point is known. The number of launch points worth of PRC attention is known. They are closer to the WEZ than anything else, so the PLA have even more options than striking Australia. This rapidly turns into a significant chunk of ADF power, dangling out .... 'there'

The advantage China has, is that Australia is negligible. We are not a threat. Anything worthy of striking here (which is Stirling and maybe a RAAF Base where a heavy USAF presence is) is geographically known (as opposed to a PLA-N SAG) and is already in range of multiple Chinese options. So the issues facing us, targeting, range, missile production rates, simply aren't an issue for Beijing. Their challenges in those areas relate to the mobile targets east of Taiwan, specifically the USN units. The only possible similarity facing Beijing is the ABO issues, but they already have long-range missiles and they travel out of the atmosphere - negating ABO. Furthermore, the possible diaspora to hide non-conventional forces in is in Beijing's favour, not ours.

I've been arguing against Army owning anti-ship missiles since writing the first needs statement in 17/18. Lessons from the Baltic and Black Seas don't apply here. It's a waste of resources - if you want an anti-ship capability you fund the RAAF and RAN. They do it better and faster. The reason I'm a HiMARs fan is because it's the beginning steps to a genuine very long range strike capability, preferably hypersonic. The PrSM plan gets us most of the way, and hopefully by then we have options to go beyond that. Then we can shoot from Australian territory at the things that matter.

 

[SammyC]

I think that's a perfectly legitimate concern to have. And, quite frankly, I've never actually seen the (mainly Army) concept of forward deployed land based missiles actually genuinely considered, or argued against.

Where are those forces going? Many of the neighbours we casually throw around have a very different relationship with Beijing. They are not going to want to be dragged into a major regional conflict between the US and China. The uncontested idea that we can park on Indonesian, Malaysian etc territory and shoot at PRC targets is not an assumption I would grant a Staff Cadet at RMC, let along Russell Offices. Some nations may - PNG for instance - but what does that achieve for us? Defending our north-east quadrant is great for us, but what is it achieving from a PRC point of view? Are the PRC even going to send surface vessels to the Coral Sea when they are in the fight of their lives around Taiwan?

How are those forces getting there? The closer we go to the PRC, the easier it is to target our forces and the more options the PRC has to throw at us. The options they have to strike Guam v Darwin is literally orders of magnitude. So how do we get these missile launchers there? Note also, the PRC doesn't have to strike the strategic lift. It can just track them. Someone mentioned Gull and Sparrow force above - they all died. For nothing. you cant hide the deployment of these beasties.

What are you taking? Some Strikemaster? Bahahahahahahaha....... that's murder. Such short range weapons are a joke. So HiMARs or better. Cool. Note at the moment that's still well within the PRC WEZ, but the best (land) option we have at the moment. So, what, a Battery of HiMARs? That's 14 launchers. 14x PrSM missiles. Ok.....I mean, that's less than the Tier 2 combatants we were going to buy, but sure. Not sure it's going to do anything - the PLA-N is designed to fight an enemy with 122x VLS Ticos, 96x VLS Burkes and multiple CVNBG.... I'm not sure what 14 extra missiles are going to do (not nothing, but still....).

How are you going to protect them? I mean, you don't have to. You can leave them to die. But they will need protection. Their disembarkation point is known. The number of launch points worth of PRC attention is known. They are closer to the WEZ than anything else, so the PLA have even more options than striking Australia. This rapidly turns into a significant chunk of ADF power, dangling out .... 'there'

The advantage China has, is that Australia is negligible. We are not a threat. Anything worthy of striking here (which is Stirling and maybe a RAAF Base where a heavy USAF presence is) is geographically known (as opposed to a PLA-N SAG) and is already in range of multiple Chinese options. So the issues facing us, targeting, range, missile production rates, simply aren't an issue for Beijing. Their challenges in those areas relate to the mobile targets east of Taiwan, specifically the USN units. The only possible similarity facing Beijing is the ABO issues, but they already have long-range missiles and they travel out of the atmosphere - negating ABO. Furthermore, the possible diaspora to hide non-conventional forces in is in Beijing's favour, not ours.

I've been arguing against Army owning anti-ship missiles since writing the first needs statement in 17/18. Lessons from the Baltic and Black Seas don't apply here. It's a waste of resources - if you want an anti-ship capability you fund the RAAF and RAN. They do it better and faster. The reason I'm a HiMARs fan is because it's the beginning steps to a genuine very long range strike capability, preferably hypersonic. The PrSM plan gets us most of the way, and hopefully by then we have options to go beyond that. Then we can shoot from Australian territory at the things that matter.

I have a slightly different perspactive, but not necessarily an answer.

Mobile missile systems could be used for one of two purposes, namely;

• Forward positioning as part of a regional standing with other allies against a Chinese incursion; or
• Defence of our own homeland and waters in the event that the region collapses or turns against us.

Most comments seem to look at all our new weapons from the perspective of the first point. Our people, aircraft, missiles and ships up fighting a war around Taiwan as part of a coalition.

There is another alternative where countries like Indonesia either collapse or side with China. Then Australia faces an extraordinarily hostile local area, cut off from the US and UK. In this case our weapons are fighting from our homeland. I should point out that's what happened in WW2, and we ended up having to hold the line in PNG.

I'm not the best to say how missile systems would work from our own coast line and local islands, but I think it is a framing that needs to be considered.

 

[Todjaeger]

I have a slightly different perspactive, but not necessarily an answer.

Mobile missile systems could be used for one of two purposes, namely;

• Forward positioning as part of a regional standing with other allies against a Chinese incursion; or
• Defence of our own homeland and waters in the event that the region collapses or turns against us.

Most comments seem to look at all our new weapons from the perspective of the first point. Our people, aircraft, missiles and ships up fighting a war around Taiwan as part of a coalition.

There is another alternative where countries like Indonesia either collapse or side with China. Then Australia faces an extraordinarily hostile local area, cut off from the US and UK. In this case our weapons are fighting from our homeland. I should point out that's what happened in WW2, and we ended up having to hold the line in PNG.

I'm not the best to say how missile systems would work from our own coast line and local islands, but I think it is a framing that needs to be considered.

With regard to pre-positioning/forward positioning, as I see it that is something which is a possibility, OTOH since it would require the cooperate/permission of host nations, it could also be firmly rejected. For that matter, I suspect that even if a host nation did agree to the pre-positioning of ADF assets and/or units, agreement and consent of the nation in question would also be needed before Australian units could launch missiles.

Given that many of the potential hosts in the SE Asian/Indo-Pacific region have different relationships with the PRC, I would caution about assumptions made that Australia would receive permission to deploy or utilize land-based missile launchers or batteries in the territories of other nations.

As for pre-positioning such units in/around Australia in an effort to provide for the Defence of Australia... the term "boondoggle" comes to mind. Yes, things could certainly go pear-shaped with Indonesian-Australian relations, and/or there could be conflict within Indonesia or between Indonesia and other powers which could then cause a threat increase in sea-air gap between Australia and Indonesia. Having said that though, I tend to believe that there are other, better ways and options to ward against such potential scenarios. Further, I tend to suspect options I have in mind (largely expansions on existing capabilities) would be more flexible and less costly than establishing batteries of mobile missile launchers armed with AShM for the Defence of Australia.

As I see it, in order for land-based missile launchers to cover the approaches to Australia, there would likely need to be drastic expansion of the RAA and corresponding increase in the number of small units garrisoned around Australia. That or one would need to accept that Army units might need to do long-distance moves hundreds of km's from their barracks with little notice or warning, to get to potential firing positions. To provide some prospective on distance, should a potential target appear some ~500 km off the coast of Derby WA, a deployment from an Army unit in Darwin would need to travel ~1,700 km to get there. Or alternately, if the deploying Army unit was coming from around Perth, we would be talking a travel distance of ~2,400 km. Going with the max HIMARS speed of ~85 km/h, we are talking travel times of 20+ and 28+ hours respectively. Now contrast that with the potential response speed from a P-8 Poseidon, which could likely get into a firing position in several (4-8) hours. The potential response speed from F-35 or F/A-18 SHornet maritime strike packages would likely be even faster. Even more importantly though is that these aircraft could be re-tasked or re-deployed significantly faster.

As I see it, the present push for Australian batteries of land-based AShM seems rather odd. The capability would seem to suggest that either planners are focusing on either Fortress: Australia-type scenarios, or else establishing and building out a specialist expeditionary warfare capability prior to establishing other aspects of expeditionary or amphibious warfare capabilities which would likely be needed. Looking back at Australian military history I am drawn to two questions which, TBH I do not know the answers to. The first question being, "when was the last time Australian forces made an opposed landing?" The second question would be, "when was the last time the SLOC between Australia, a region with Australian deployments and an expeditionary force in the field was actively interdicted?"

 

[StingrayOZ]

I've been arguing against Army owning anti-ship missiles since writing the first needs statement in 17/18. Lessons from the Baltic and Black Seas don't apply here. It's a waste of resources - if you want an anti-ship capability you fund the RAAF and RAN. They do it better and faster. The reason I'm a HiMARs fan is because it's the beginning steps to a genuine very long range strike capability, preferably hypersonic. The PrSM plan gets us most of the way, and hopefully by then we have options to go beyond that. Then we can shoot from Australian territory at the things that matter.

Is there any value as part of an allied force, deployed with the Americans or Japanese as part of their more agile capabilities?
Or based in singapore. Its small footprint, a type of capability they don't typically acquire. It could be rapidly deployed. I know you mentioned it's unlikely to just be able to base them on foreign soil during a China-US conflict, but such a basing may be sought by the Americans, particularly if their ships are re-supplied or transiting through there. Having Australia have that capability, may allow Singapore to claim some level of non-aligned status.

I think there is still a big difference between accepting US basing, vs Australian basing.

 

[Todjaeger]

Is there any value as part of an allied force, deployed with the Americans or Japanese as part of their more agile capabilities?
Or based in singapore. Its small footprint, a type of capability they don't typically acquire. It could be rapidly deployed. I know you mentioned it's unlikely to just be able to base them on foreign soil during a China-US conflict, but such a basing may be sought by the Americans, particularly if their ships are re-supplied or transiting through there. Having Australia have that capability, may allow Singapore to claim some level of non-aligned status.

I think there is still a big difference between accepting US basing, vs Australian basing.

Is there value in acquiring platforms and establishing a new type of capability, on the chance that other nations might let Australia deploy units to their respective countries where Australia could then possibly use the new capability?

Yes, I suppose this is kind of a sticking point for me but IMO it does not make much sense trying to establish an A2AD capability that Australia would then need to bring into the areas to defend and provide A2AD to.

This is also a bit of a sticking point for me regarding potential US employment, the difference there though is that the US does have significant expeditionary warfare and logistics capabilities, including the ability to make opposed landings.