ADF General discussion thread

[Boagrius]

I'd posit that the most significant effect a small F35B detachment could have on a given RAN task group would be in the ISR realm. Given that the F35 is already being developed as a key node in NIFC-CA, the Lightning could provide a given task group with OTH targeting data for both SAMs (CEC with SM6 and SM2 Blk IIIC) and AShMs (LRASM especially), providing greater independence from land based E7 et al and enhancing the utility of the group's own weapons. It would certainly be interesting to see this potential force multiplier effect quantified.

 

[buffy9]

I'd posit that the most significant effect a small F35B detachment could have on a given RAN task group would be in the ISR realm. Given that the F35 is already being developed as a key node in NIFC-CA, the Lightning could provide a given task group with OTH targeting data for both SAMs (CEC with SM6 and SM2 Blk IIIC) and AShMs (LRASM especially), providing greater independence from land based E7 et al and enhancing the utility of the group's own weapons. It would certainly be interesting to see this potential force multiplier effect quantified.

I fully agree. But on that same note, is that additional ISR (via a CV) worth the loss of an LHD?

If an LHD is utilised as a CV and essentially taken out of the amphibious equation, that removes the ARG entirely - reducing it to an ARU with reduced aviation and lift capability (limiting it to one LHD and one LSD; or in the future one LHD and two JSS, for a still less capable ARG). It would essentially be a reduction in the ADF's amphibious capability from mid-intensity conflict to crisis management. Referencing the below image (which the author of the video utilised in his previous analysis of ADF amphibious capability), the ADF would be restricted to the middle column - even with the introduction of the two JSS, as it likely still could not generate the same degree of aviation or lift (noting Navantia's proposal was primarily logistical in nature, with ~300 personnel minus crew).



Force from the Sea: Australia’s amphibious capability – an update | The Cove (image source)

If an LHD is converted (fully, either temporarily or permanently) into a CV, the added benefit does not seem to be economic when compared to the loss of an ARG capability. A partial conversion may be possible - but is this worth the loss of rotary aviation, plus material and personnel space for the ARG? If the decision has been made to deploy an ARG, then (referencing the above link) air and sea control should already have been attained - meaning there is already sufficient air cover from coalition assets or peripheral airbases that ends up making an LHD more valuable.

Having a CV and an ARG would be ideal - but the FSP indicates that resources have been put elsewhere. I'd rather concentrate more force ashore as quickly as possible, noting there is a land threat of some description that requires defeating with everything you can possibly generate against it. If the intent is to support the force ashore with CAS, then an AH/ARH essentially still achieves such an effect. Noting there is also likely air dominance achieved - meaning CAS from fighters is not (necessarily) out of the picture.

If the LHDs can reliably and temporarily be converted to CVs (for operations, rather than permanently), then I can see more of a need. In the escort role the added ISR of six to eight JSF could be highly beneficial. As @Boagrius notes it could extend the range of any escorting elements weapons and sensors, holding potential threats further at risk. That said, if in a tense environment, the CV is likely to be one of the first things targetted. Which means it likely can't be used in amphibious operations in the future. If this is to be avoided then more escorts are needed - which is perhaps a better investment overall when compared to the conversion cost/time of an LHD into a CV.

A better investment imo would be working to secure airbases which could support any amphibious operation, or working to strengthen our escort fleet (which we are essentially already doing). Even if we need to be prepared to fight alone, there is little viable path to seriously operate anywhere in the immediate region without partners. An airbase can built up relatively quickly and can enable a larger number of fighters as well as a variety of other assets; and if attacked can be repaired far more cheaply and quickly than a CV/LHD. If measures can be taken to support austere operations, base security and air-sea cooperation, then it makes a far more cost effective capability than the cost converting some CV.

Air Force F-35 Stealth Fighters Are Now Operating From Guam’s Austere Airfield

The Agile Combat Employment maneuvers brought F-35s and F-16s to a jungle airstrip in the western Pacific.

www.thedrive.com

I don't know enough about sea denial to argue for or against it unfortunately, but I hope I've made a decent argument with regards to the CV. The ability to project air power in the immediate region or elsewhere is certainly a beneficial one - but as many have said, it would be better to go all in rather than invest in an extra knife for the multitool - one that just makes people question why you're adding a second one.

 

[ADMk2]

I'd posit that the most significant effect a small F35B detachment could have on a given RAN task group would be in the ISR realm. Given that the F35 is already being developed as a key node in NIFC-CA, the Lightning could provide a given task group with OTH targeting data for both SAMs (CEC with SM6 and SM2 Blk IIIC) and AShMs (LRASM especially), providing greater independence from land based E7 et al and enhancing the utility of the group's own weapons. It would certainly be interesting to see this potential force multiplier effect quantified.

Such may well be available from future UAV assets too, whilst allowing the Canberra Class to continue on their primary role as well.

To me if we need carrier capability, then we need a carrier, not a converted amphib…

 

[Boagrius]

Such may well be available from future UAV assets too, whilst allowing the Canberra Class to continue on their primary role as well.

To me if we need carrier capability, then we need a carrier, not a converted amphib…

True, although such UAVs seem to be vapourware at the moment. The USMC had a contender in their MUX program, but I believe it is now defunct. An evolved loyal wingman might fit the bill, but it is probably a long way off.

While I don't actually have a strong opinion on this one either way, the advantage of the F35B is that it is ready now and has the survivability and sensor quality to do some interesting things. We have already seen OTH SM6 shots cued by APG-81 data, and it seems probable to me that the F35 will prove to be our ISR platform of choice, where possible, for overcoming the targeting problem that LRASM's enormous range envelope presents.

For example, I suspect there's not much a PLAN SAG could do (on its own) about a pair of F35s using VLO to sit at a safe distance while passively tracking it and then piping that data to an inbound LRASM volley at will. A UAS will surely be able to do this one day, but I'm not aware of any on the horizon with an ELINT/EW system on the level of Barracuda, with a datalink like MADL and radar comparable to APG-81. LW could get there eventually, but when?

Ultimately I guess it comes back to CONOPS. F35B could offer some very compelling force multiplying effects in the ISR, AAW and ASuW space(s) but at the expense of the primary amphib role. Interesting possibilities nevertheless.

 

[protoplasm]

The thing with this is to ensure that we don’t try to make our current hulls do too many things at once. If we wanted to run F-35B off a flat-top hull, we can’t do it from the 2 LHDs we have without loosing too much other capability.

What new hull we should acquire to enable potential F-35B is another question. I’m a bit agnostic as to whether it’s a dedicated CV or another LHD, it’ll depend upon the specific CONOPs developed for that capability.

Right now we are spending quite a bit of coin on strengthening the capacity of our infrastructure to support our current capabilities, rather than adding new capabilities.

 

[t68]

I fully agree. But on that same note, is that additional ISR (via a CV) worth the loss of an LHD?

If an LHD is utilised as a CV and essentially taken out of the amphibious equation, that removes the ARG entirely - reducing it to an ARU with reduced aviation and lift capability (limiting it to one LHD and one LSD; or in the future one LHD and two JSS, for a still less capable ARG). It would essentially be a reduction in the ADF's amphibious capability from mid-intensity conflict to crisis management. Referencing the below image (which the author of the video utilised in his previous analysis of ADF amphibious capability), the ADF would be restricted to the middle column - even with the introduction of the two JSS, as it likely still could not generate the same degree of aviation or lift (noting Navantia's proposal was primarily logistical in nature, with ~300 personnel minus crew).

View attachment 48190

Force from the Sea: Australia’s amphibious capability – an update | The Cove (image source)

If an LHD is converted (fully, either temporarily or permanently) into a CV, the added benefit does not seem to be economic when compared to the loss of an ARG capability. A partial conversion may be possible - but is this worth the loss of rotary aviation, plus material and personnel space for the ARG? If the decision has been made to deploy an ARG, then (referencing the above link) air and sea control should already have been attained - meaning there is already sufficient air cover from coalition assets or peripheral airbases that ends up making an LHD more valuable.

Having a CV and an ARG would be ideal - but the FSP indicates that resources have been put elsewhere. I'd rather concentrate more force ashore as quickly as possible, noting there is a land threat of some description that requires defeating with everything you can possibly generate against it. If the intent is to support the force ashore with CAS, then an AH/ARH essentially still achieves such an effect. Noting there is also likely air dominance achieved - meaning CAS from fighters is not (necessarily) out of the picture.

If the LHDs can reliably and temporarily be converted to CVs (for operations, rather than permanently), then I can see more of a need. In the escort role the added ISR of six to eight JSF could be highly beneficial. As @Boagrius notes it could extend the range of any escorting elements weapons and sensors, holding potential threats further at risk. That said, if in a tense environment, the CV is likely to be one of the first things targetted. Which means it likely can't be used in amphibious operations in the future. If this is to be avoided then more escorts are needed - which is perhaps a better investment overall when compared to the conversion cost/time of an LHD into a CV.

A better investment imo would be working to secure airbases which could support any amphibious operation, or working to strengthen our escort fleet (which we are essentially already doing). Even if we need to be prepared to fight alone, there is little viable path to seriously operate anywhere in the immediate region without partners. An airbase can built up relatively quickly and can enable a larger number of fighters as well as a variety of other assets; and if attacked can be repaired far more cheaply and quickly than a CV/LHD. If measures can be taken to support austere operations, base security and air-sea cooperation, then it makes a far more cost effective capability than the cost converting some CV.

Air Force F-35 Stealth Fighters Are Now Operating From Guam’s Austere Airfield

The Agile Combat Employment maneuvers brought F-35s and F-16s to a jungle airstrip in the western Pacific.

www.thedrive.com

I don't know enough about sea denial to argue for or against it unfortunately, but I hope I've made a decent argument with regards to the CV. The ability to project air power in the immediate region or elsewhere is certainly a beneficial one - but as many have said, it would be better to go all in rather than invest in an extra knife for the multitool - one that just makes people question why you're adding a second one.

Host Nation Support cannot be relied on when the ADF acts unilaterally, how can the RAAF protect the Task group just 1500 km from land based without tying up vast resource to keep a flight of 2 aircraft constantly provide patrols will need most of the AAR and AEW&C fleet to remain on station and its replacement and at least a squadron strength of fighter available consuming vast amounts of fuel and aircraft hours David Baddams is correct proximity means capability

No one has shown how having 6 F35B would affect the balance of the ARG rotary fleet for operations when Canberra class has a notional aircraft holding of up to 20 aircraft each instead of a ARH Squadron on board could it not be substituted with a troop of Apache and flight of F35 mix and match approach the same as the Brits are doing with QE with tailored air group?

 

[pussertas]

Aircraft Carrier made of pykrete

Tounge in cheek I suggest one of therse to be built in Tasmania for the RAN.

This was suggested by Lord Mounbatten at the Canadian meeting between Roosevelt and Churchill,

 

[Todjaeger]

Host Nation Support cannot be relied on when the ADF acts unilaterally, how can the RAAF protect the Task group just 1500 km from land based without tying up vast resource to keep a flight of 2 aircraft constantly provide patrols will need most of the AAR and AEW&C fleet to remain on station and its replacement and at least a squadron strength of fighter available consuming vast amounts of fuel and aircraft hours David Baddams is correct proximity means capability

No one has shown how having 6 F35B would affect the balance of the ARG rotary fleet for operations when Canberra class has a notional aircraft holding of up to 20 aircraft each instead of a ARH Squadron on board could it not be substituted with a troop of Apache and flight of F35 mix and match approach the same as the Brits are doing with QE with tailored air group?

Probably not. The LHD's can accommodate up to 18 medium (MRH-90) helicopters if both the hangar and attached/contiguous light vehicle deck are utilized for embarking helicopters. The "normal" helicopter capacity for the hangar is eight medium helicopters. In terms of weight, the F-35 is in/past the weight class of the CH-47 Chinook helicopter. Of the two aircraft elevators, only the aft one is capable of handling the CH-47, and I suspect only this one could handle the even greater weight of the F-35. I also suspect that only the hangar (and not the connected light vehicle deck) might be able to handle the weight of the F-35, but likely could not have eight F-35's embarked. That suggests to me that one of the LHD's could, potentially, be configured to have ~six F-35's embarked, and up to 10 medium helicopters, but would require foregoing having any embarked light vehicles on the nominal light vehicle deck. Any vehicles carried for use in amphibious operations would have to be carried on the heavy vehicle/cargo deck, which would have a significant impact upon the types and quantities of vehicles carried. Under normal circumstances up to 110 vehicles can be loaded between the light and heavy vehicle decks.

One thing which is certain is that the more aviation assets the LHD's embark, the less space there is to embark vehicles. This is an area of difference between the US LHD's of the Wasp-class and the RAN's Canberra-class, with the USN LHD's being larger, and designed to have ~30 aircraft in addition to the embarked troops and vehicles. If the ADF were to change the embarked aviation component of an LHD to provide additional protection for a task force, IMO it would far better served by adding in some sort of AEW/broad area maritime surveillance asset, rather than a half-dozen fighters even if they were F-35's.

As it is, it seems as though people are still wanting to change the LHD's into carriers, without really giving consideration to what capabilities/outcomes that would really deliver, or what would have to be given up.

 

[Redlands18]

As it is, it seems as though people are still wanting to change the LHD's into carriers, without really giving consideration to what capabilities/outcomes that would really deliver, or what would have to be given up.

There are times when i wish they had spent the money to remove the Ski Ramp off the design, so we don’t have to put up with the Keyboard Warriors seeing it and immediately demanding Australia operate F-35Bs off them.

 

[Todjaeger]

There are times when i wish they had spent the money to remove the Ski Ramp off the design, so we don’t have to put up with the Keyboard Warriors seeing it and immediately demanding Australia operate F-35Bs off them.

I would have liked to see the ski-jump removed as well, though primarily because doing so would likely have added an additional landing spot (or two) for rotary aircraft. Unfort in addition to the added costs for redesign work, it would likely have required a fair bit of time since all the sums would need to be re-done to make sure that that vessel floated properly and did not start acting like an early designed S-80...

 

[cdxbow]

I finished reading Hugh Whites 'Defence of Australia'. He emphasises sea denial rather than attempting sea control. Not quite a 20 word summary but almost: Lot's of F35's, even more drones and even more missiles. Downsize the size of the naval platforms and only a small, very light army. Canberra class and the amphibious army units are seen as a terrible waste. Subs to launch ballistic nuclear armed missiles.

The authors premise is to provide the best possible defence of Australia, against a peer competitor and potentially without allies. It's a worst case scenario and in that setting it makes sense. It also very much reflects that it was written during Mr Trumps term in office and concerns allies had with US isolationism, resolve and general capriciousness.

It's a single purpose construct to arm Oz to the teeth (3-3.5% GDP) to deter and prevent invasion. Unfortunately it can't do much else.

It's not a good fit for the sort of future wars that are likely to exist in the 'grey zone', I expect the PRC to expand these activities in the future and we will more likely have to counter these over a protracted period than fight an all out kinetic war for our survival.

I don't think the decisions regarding acquisition are quite as binary as made out in the book. Most assets we currently have or are proposed for the near future can perform 'sea denial' if need be. Often it's a matter of adding long range weaponry to a platform. Which has started already with moves to incorporate LRASM into the ADF's arsenal. Also the issue of sovereign capabilities has started to be addressed with the CoA proposing a sovereign missile production capability and the development of the Loyal Wingman. Some of the capability he suggests could be added relatively cheaply, a few hundred land based maritime strike Tomahawk missiles would add some of what he proposes.

I also have some major issues with his discussion a regarding nuclear weapons. Frightfully expensive (0.5-1% GDP) and almost certainly a political impossibility. Hypersonics may provide the ADF with something more useful than nuclear weapons in the long term.

Overall I thought the book had good depth and discussion regarding strategic issues and the sorts of questions that need to be asked by defence planners. I thought his proposed solution was monophonic and lacked depth. Some of the things it raises have already been addressed, perhaps because of the book, although Covid18 pandemic probably has had more to do with concerns regarding sovereign capabilities. In some ways I feel it's fighting the last war and not a future war, which maybe subtle and nuanced. The proposals in this book enable neither.

 

[spoz]

Strategic strike has been Hugh’s fixation since the mid 1990s when he was Dep Sec S&I. He had a brief flirtation with small infantry tactics during Timor but he soon got over it. He can certainly have good insights at times but you have to allow for his biases. And in my view he really has no feel for maritime ops. Peter Jennings usually does that much better.

 

[t68]

There are times when i wish they had spent the money to remove the Ski Ramp off the design, so we don’t have to put up with the Keyboard Warriors seeing it and immediately demanding Australia operate F-35Bs off them.

With or without the ramp people will still be second guessing the use of F35 off the Canberra’s

As for being keyboard warriors you would have to include yourself in that assessment as all those whom participate within forums are entitled to there own view.

I myself think that B’s would be beneficial to Australian amphibious task group, they are built as multi role platforms and wil not always be filled to the brim with land forces and there kit or helicopters being able to mix and match a tailored air group is an advantage in my eyes. While Tiger/Apache can perform in the role of CAS it’s is prudent to expect the unexpected, F35 carry weapons in which the rotary fleet do not in which it may give the task groups a psychological advantage over red forces. I find it interesting that the ADF does not think that Harrier/F35 dosnt add value to the ATG but other are planning these same aircraft on the vessel like the Spanish, Italian and South Koreans all examine putting B’s on there respective LHD’s

As Tod rightly pointed out if we go heavy on aircraft something has to give to make room there is some discrepancies as to the exact space for aircraft with Navy league suggesting spots for 20 and I read a larger amount on a link for the JC1 but I think that it would have been ferry transport

 

[Redlands18]

With or without the ramp people will still be second guessing the use of F35 off the Canberra’s

As for being keyboard warriors you would have to include yourself in that assessment as all those whom participate within forums are entitled to there own view.

I myself think that B’s would be beneficial to Australian amphibious task group, they are built as multi role platforms and wil not always be filled to the brim with land forces and there kit or helicopters being able to mix and match a tailored air group is an advantage in my eyes. While Tiger/Apache can perform in the role of CAS it’s is prudent to expect the unexpected, F35 carry weapons in which the rotary fleet do not in which it may give the task groups a psychological advantage over red forces. I find it interesting that the ADF does not think that Harrier/F35 dosnt add value to the ATG but other are planning these same aircraft on the vessel like the Spanish, Italian and South Koreans all examine putting B’s on there respective LHD’s

As Tod rightly pointed out if we go heavy on aircraft something has to give to make room there is some discrepancies as to the exact space for aircraft with Navy league suggesting spots for 20 and I read a larger amount on a link for the JC1 but I think that it would have been ferry transport

I am definitely a Keyboard Warrior like everyone else on forums like this but on DT we are expected to see the pros and cons to any decisions that are made and try to make a sensible judgement. But there are plenty of people out there who scream blue murder that we aren’t operating F-35Bs of the LHDs because all they see is a 230m long Flight Deck and a Ski Ramp and that automatically makes it an Aircraft Carrier. And when they are not doing that they are screaming about the Attack class not being Nuclear Powered.
PS : I don’t really think that the Ski Ramp should have been removed from the design.

 

[ADMk2]

There are times when i wish they had spent the money to remove the Ski Ramp off the design, so we don’t have to put up with the Keyboard Warriors seeing it and immediately demanding Australia operate F-35Bs off them.

Wouldn’t matter. You can fly an F-35B off a flat deck as the USMC are doing…

My final comment, is that if a fixed wing fighter capability were to be sought to be put on the LHD, it would compromise both roles significantly to the point where it wouldn’t do anything well…

Far more usefully for our region, a top up purchase of MH-60R Romeo should likely be made and put these to use on the LHD’s as fleet ASW carriers, if extra capability needs to be squeezed out of these hulls…

 

[Todjaeger]

THIS

My final comment, is that if a fixed wing fighter capability were to be sought to be put on the LHD, it would compromise both roles significantly to the point where it wouldn’t do anything well…

And

Far more usefully for our region, a top up purchase of MH-60R Romeo should likely be made and put these to use on the LHD’s as fleet ASW carriers, if extra capability needs to be squeezed out of these hulls…

Another potential idea, albeit a bit more out there, would be for the ADF to introduce another type of helicopter configured to act as an AEW platform. Both the Brits and Italians have Merlin-based AEW platforms. Having something in RAN service would extend the organic sensor footprint of a task force significantly. As a side note, as the RN found during the Falklands War, embarked fighter aircraft without AEW support are handicapped in terms of operation.

If serious efforts were to be made to expand the aviation capabilities of the RAN when forming and deploying task forces, especially away from Australian and/or friendly bases, there are a number of areas I would look to see improved prior to work on supporting fixed-wing fighters.

 

[MickB]

Agree that if F35Bs are needed at sea then a dedicated CV such as a modernized Cavour is required.
More modern tech should reduce the manpower requirements.

Until then development of ISR/AEW UAVs for the LHDs should be a priority.

I support the idea of one squadron of F35Bs in the RAAF.
F35Bs could support landings of the ARG from captured airfields or quickly established FOBs.
This will vastly reduce transit times and increase time on station.
This also reduces the need for a CV to loiter in the area and become a prime target.

 

[StingrayOZ]

As Tod rightly pointed out if we go heavy on aircraft something has to give to make room there is some discrepancies as to the exact space for aircraft with Navy league suggesting spots for 20 and I read a larger amount on a link for the JC1 but I think that it would have been ferry transport

Its 20 AV8 Harriers, in the hangar, and its ferry only. (View topic - F-35Bs Establishing potential of Australian aircraft carrier - F-35 Variants and Missions). Based off the original image by Bazan what is now Navantia created long ago back when it was the BPE and before it was in the water, trying to push the project through. While the F-35B and the harrier are of similar size they aren't exactly the same. I doubt 20 harriers would ever even be ferried in a JC1 design, I would bet physically you wouldn't be able to, and when it comes to F-35's its going to be significantly less. Some people then claim 32 with another 12 on the deck, again, this is not a useable number, this is "in theory" napkin calculation, ferry, too many aircraft operations could not occur with this many aircraft.

Spain has not operated the JC1 with more than 11 Harriers AFAIK, and that would be in full carrier mode. That is a reasonable maximum, and throw in 3-4 helicopters. Think of Spains carrier history, the JC1 "replaced" the Principe de Asturias, a 15,000t "carrier", which was designed around 12 harriers at a light tempo. PdA replaced Dedalo a wwII USS Cabot, 11,000t, which operated with 8 harriers. All three are not optimal full time carriers, but more sea control/escort carriers. But a pocket carrier is all some countries need. Spain intended to operate either in range of airfields, or with other carriers.


Spanish actually using the LHD hangar with harriers in a far more logical arrangement

The LHD's aren't designed as a carrier to project power against a peer force either land or sea based. Spain never designed or built them for that purpose. Its for very mild at sea aviation capability, supported by nearby airfields, against an enemy with no/weak naval air capability in that area. They aren't 24/7/365 CAP assets. The deterrent is having aircraft on the deck, not flying regular patrols.

Australia could surge two LHD's, and get something approaching a dedicated carrier, able to support a squadron of aircraft (~12 per ship) at a reasonable tempo, with say 4-8 helicopters. But you have now tied up the entire RAN (surface force, amphibious force, fleet supply, submarines etc) to provide that force, for a short period. You have tied up/negated all the amphibious capability basically of the army too. And the RAAF would be significantly tied to this as well. You will need escorts as well. How much training will we get to practice and operate this kind of short term but intense capability?

I would add that neither the Italians nor the Japanese are intending their carriers to be extraordinary blue water assets. We are talking 12-16 aircraft. Operating with ground bases. Im not sure the investment in a Cavor type ship gets us where we would need to be in terms of carrier power. Cavor is made for the Mediterranean, not for long and open oceans like the Pacific or the Indian ocean.


Cavor and Juan Carlos operating together.
https://flic.kr/p/mDPZ7H
So are we looking at a 40,000-65,000t carrier? Korean CVX or QE class? 1.5-2.0 squadrons? How does such a program come about? Where does the crew come from? The pilots? Where does the budget come from? Which service is spear heading this? Where is the political support?

Or are we looking at something more like a 3rd LHD replacing choules, 0.5-1.0 Squadron F-35b's (replacing the Shornets) and embarking a small number ad hoc and still primary focusing on land based aircraft. Combined with an increase in our ASW capability with additional Romeos. Utilizing existing training, logistics, procurement etc. While at the same time further supporting our amphibious and HDAR/non war capability.

 

[Todjaeger]

View attachment 48192
Its 20 AV8 Harriers, in the hangar, and its ferry only. (View topic - F-35Bs Establishing potential of Australian aircraft carrier - F-35 Variants and Missions). Based off the original image by Bazan what is now Navantia created long ago back when it was the BPE and before it was in the water, trying to push the project through. While the F-35B and the harrier are of similar size they aren't exactly the same. I doubt 20 harriers would ever even be ferried in a JC1 design, I would bet physically you wouldn't be able to, and when it comes to F-35's its going to be significantly less. Some people then claim 32 with another 12 on the deck, again, this is not a useable number, this is "in theory" napkin calculation, ferry, too many aircraft operations could not occur with this many aircraft.

Spain has not operated the JC1 with more than 11 Harriers AFAIK, and that would be in full carrier mode. That is a reasonable maximum, and throw in 3-4 helicopters. Think of Spains carrier history, the JC1 "replaced" the Principe de Asturias, a 15,000t "carrier", which was designed around 12 harriers at a light tempo. PdA replaced Dedalo a wwII USS Cabot, 11,000t, which operated with 8 harriers. All three are not optimal full time carriers, but more sea control/escort carriers. But a pocket carrier is all some countries need. Spain intended to operate either in range of airfields, or with other carriers.

View attachment 48193
Spanish actually using the LHD hangar with harriers in a far more logical arrangement

The LHD's aren't designed as a carrier to project power against a peer force either land or sea based. Spain never designed or built them for that purpose. Its for very mild at sea aviation capability, supported by nearby airfields, against an enemy with no/weak naval air capability in that area. They aren't 24/7/365 CAP assets. The deterrent is having aircraft on the deck, not flying regular patrols.

Australia could surge two LHD's, and get something approaching a dedicated carrier, able to support a squadron of aircraft (~12 per ship) at a reasonable tempo, with say 4-8 helicopters. But you have now tied up the entire RAN (surface force, amphibious force, fleet supply, submarines etc) to provide that force, for a short period. You have tied up/negated all the amphibious capability basically of the army too. And the RAAF would be significantly tied to this as well. You will need escorts as well. How much training will we get to practice and operate this kind of short term but intense capability?

I would add that neither the Italians nor the Japanese are intending their carriers to be extraordinary blue water assets. We are talking 12-16 aircraft. Operating with ground bases. Im not sure the investment in a Cavor type ship gets us where we would need to be in terms of carrier power. Cavor is made for the Mediterranean, not for long and open oceans like the Pacific or the Indian ocean.

View attachment 48194
Cavor and Juan Carlos operating together.
https://flic.kr/p/mDPZ7H
So are we looking at a 40,000-65,000t carrier? Korean CVX or QE class? 1.5-2.0 squadrons? How does such a program come about? Where does the crew come from? The pilots? Where does the budget come from? Which service is spear heading this? Where is the political support?

Or are we looking at something more like a 3rd LHD replacing choules, 0.5-1.0 Squadron F-35b's (replacing the Shornets) and embarking a small number ad hoc and still primary focusing on land based aircraft. Combined with an increase in our ASW capability with additional Romeos. Utilizing existing training, logistics, procurement etc. While at the same time further supporting our amphibious and HDAR/non war capability.

Interesting reading. I would like to point out to others that the AV-8B Harrier has a rolling MTOW of ~14 tonnes, OTOH the empty weight of an F-35B is just under 15 tonnes...

Having read through the info on the RAN site for the LHD, I am under the impression that the light vehicle deck might only be able to handle vehicles with a weight of 16 tonnes or less. This conclusion of mine is based off there being a cargo/vehicle between the heavy and light vehicle decks which can transport vehicles of up to 16 tonnes. Given that an embarked light vehicle would need to be lowered to the heavy vehicle deck in order to access the well dock to be landed, I do not see the point of having a light vehicle deck floor strength significantly greater than the max weight a light vehicle could be and still be transported to the light vehicle deck.

That suggests to me that the hangar is the only portion of the hangar/light vehicle deck which could support F-35B's. The Harrier, while being marginally smaller than an F-35B in terms of dimensions, is a significantly lighter bird, with a MTOW just over half the 27 tonne MTOW for an F-35B. This would enable Harriers to be embarked and/or ferried in locations aboard a BPE that could not accommodate an F-35B due to deck strength limits.

 

[ngatimozart]

Some sceptics suggest that an ADF CVL and F-35B option is pie in the sky, which is fair enough based upon the evidence of the latest ADF equivalent of a Defence Capability Plan. I don't think that using a LHD as a temporary CV is going to cut the mustard either. One of my reasons is that whilst multi-roling can be good, it also can be taken to far and you end with a frankenform that's of no bloody use for anything. The other is the oft repeated reason of reduction of the LHD's core reason for existence - AMPHIB OPS. If the RAN was the size of the USN, that wouldn't be such a major factor.

However we don't know what the future may bring and it could be that CDF decides that the situation warrants either a change in ADF CONOPS and capabilities or it doesn't. That's what it comes down to. All going well, they will make that decision based upon the best possible information available to them. If a change is deemed necessary, then it is presented to the pollies for their approval. We all know that's how it works.

I think now rather than focusing upon which platforms / capabilities are best, we should actually determine whether or not such a capability is desirable within tthe ADF and if so the logical reasons why or why not. To my way of thinking, just because other countries such as Spain, Turkey or Italy have such capabilities is not a valid reason for Australia to have the same.

Why do those three countries want to operate fast jets off decks? We could undoubtedly find many military reasons, but what is the overarching main justication for pouring billions out of a national treasury into such capabilities for a midrate navy of a country that doesn't really have the treasure to splurge on such expensive projects? Yes I know Turkey has been expelled from the F-35 program. Is it because of prestige - a my dick is bigger than your dick type of competition - that these three nations have gone down this path? After all the Spanish and Italians are well known for it and have a long history of such behaviour going back to Roman times. WRT Turkey we all know the size of Erdoğan's ego so it's nothing unexpected of him. Now that he can't get his F-35B, he might have to ask his cobber Vladimir for some Yakolev VTOL aircraft. But whatever the reasons, all three economies aren't the best performing in the world and such expenditure may have been better spent elsewhere in their defence budgets.

Then we have South Korea and Japan. Unlike the three nations mentioned above they are in a region where an aggressive nation, PRC, is pursuing an active expansionist program utilising grey warfare methods to illegally sieze maritime assets and territory. The PRC is building and expanding a navy that now exceeds the USN in size. The physical closeness of South Korea and Japan to both the PRC and NK makes their landbased airpower vulnerable to both PRC and NK missile attack.

Australia is not in the position of South Korea or Japan, and whilst us Kiwis like to think that Aussies are sometimes up themselves, we generally don't think that they're that far up themselves to have a project such as this for purely vanity reasons. So putting platforms to one side for the moment:

1. Is such a capability required by the ADF?
   1. If so why? And,
   2. Conversely if not why not?
2. What are the actual advantages and disadvantages for Australia to have such a capability?
3. Since such a capability is not seen by the government as necessary at the moment, is it foreseeable that this position will change?
   1. If so, why?
   2. If so, when?

I think that these are the questions that have to be answered before any debate upon platforms, numbers etc., can be had.