You've nailed it in one @Massive. During status quo times, the islands are fine. Good forward deployment opportunities that increase our surveillance and presence. During a shooting war though? Resupplying said islands will suck - especially when we don't have enough lift as is to lift a single Brigade.
With regards to lift (apologies for any change in topic), is there any potential fixes to lift the brigade? (assuming a force between 4,000 and 5,000, including enablers).
If Australia was to deploy the ready combat brigade that would suggest a major conflict scenario. In that situation it is unlikely that allies (effectively read as US) would have 'spare' maritime or air lift capacity available. The Australian merchant fleet has virtually ceased to exist, largely driven by economic concerns. If Australia did decide very early in the developing situation to deploy the ready brigade (with enablers) then the RAN maritime lift may be capable of achieving this task in perhaps 2 sailings. But the drawback of this approach is that it effectively ties up the maritime lift for an extended period of time, without even considering the requirement for logistic resupply. It also anchors the ready brigade in a location that can be either bypassed or engaged before the brigade is fully emplaced. Australia is in the unfortunate position of being too big not to have amphibious/maritime lift but is too small to have enough to provide flexibility and agility in the event of a major conflict.
If you had the 330 MRTT carrying troops/support plus 747 freighters, how many ASLAV’s/trucks could be airlifted?
The use of KC-30A for troop lift is part of the reason for acquiring the aircraft (although the main reason was the AAR capability). However in the event of a major conflict these aircraft would most likely be used for the deployment of RAAF elements and conducting AAR for F-18/F-35/P-8/E-7. Boeing 747-400F freighters might be suitable for some logistic resupply but not vehicles (LAND 121 or LAND 400). The 747-400F is designed to carry 30 pallets (not sure if these are L pallets suitable for tactical lift on C-17/C-130J/C-27) on the main deck and 32 LD1 containers in the lower hold (information on Boeing 747-400F from Airliners.net). These aircraft would be restricted to operating into established APOD based upon major international airports. As a result there may be a requirement for further logistic/administrative movement forward to the AO.
So there is currently no ideal solution for the rapid movement of the ready brigade. Sealift would take 2 trips and tie up naval assets, airlift would split the force due to some items not fitting on aircraft.
In addition to the question of weight of the CRV potentially limiting a 747F lift to 2 vehicles (based on your estimate compared with a MRAP) plus some palletised stores,there is the question of the ground equipment (TALD?) needed to take the CRV from main deck level to ground level at the APOD. All of this tends to make the use of 747F aircraft less than desireable for the deployment of the heavy elements of a brigade.As far as I can see the Boxer CRV may fit on a 747F, to me it looks like the dimensions of the turret would be the limiting factor?
Boxer CRV dimensions:
Length, 7.93 m; Width, 2.99 m; Height, 2.37 m
Loaded via the nose would provide the maximum dimensions to be used. There would be a load limit for the floor (per m2) but this can be alleviated by loading the vehicle on a thin pallet to spread the weight.
As a side note the US Army uses 747 freighters to transport their MRAP vehicles. They’re half the weight of a Boxer but similar height/width. They can fit around 5 on the main deck of a 747F.
The following articles (from Aviation Tribune posted on 28 April 2020 and 3 May 2020) provide some details of what is involved in a quick(ish) conversion.
I would question the estimates about carrying Boxer CRV based off MRAP carriage. After all, which/what configuration of Boxer is one talking about? Weights for the Boxer range from 24 tonnes to 38.5 tonnes for one combat-loaded configuration. Similar situation with US MRAP's, especially since there are so many different types, and then different variants within a given time, all of which have different weights.
Just going to ignore the airlift discussion given it has been addressed (i.e. impractical).
Of course when loading any type of Transport Machine, weight distribution is
Fair point. My only concern is that a brigade (I.e. two to three battle groups) is necessary in terms of depth to either stabilise a large area or cover a wider front. This said, any conventional conflict in the region will certainly be fought with a coalition - and any unconventional conflict will most likely allow for multiple lifts to be conducted, in addition to any assembled coalition. If this is on the archipeligos to the North, cover by RAAF and RAN will be in great supply.
Raises more questions but I'll hold off. I suppose that the lack of need for a single lift brigade force, the ability to use contracts/airlift as augments and stretched funds are the most limiting factors towards increased sea-lift.
I would disagree strongly for two reasons: political and practical
While I disagree with the feasibility of operational use (noting that ASM are not only State-owned weapons anymore), I'd suggest a Balikpapan class replacement will probably be considered to provide a low tier capability between the high-end LHD and the ship-to-shore connector of the LCM-8 / LLC. It still doesn't lift a lot, and without a lot of speed it won't ever sail against a threat, but it may lift another BG or so.
Ask!
If I can't answer I'll just ignore...The limiting factor comes back to warm bodies wearing an Australian flag. There isn't enough in the Navy and we don't have a merchant fleet anymore. The air side is ok; frankly it'll be what keeps Qantas funded no matter what. But without that national sea-lift capability, the only answer we have is contracted support. A government funded merchant fleet was looked at by a small team of uniformed peeps; but it was assessed that there was no way the LNP government would support something that, honestly, would become a hotbed of strong unionism. There is really awesome bipartisanship on Defence - but that was a leap to far
And that's the problem with (b). It may be that if it was put to the Government they would accept such a fleet, but it was assessed as unlikely. Unlikely enough that it wasn't considered further....
I think that you've hit the nail on the head and the govt does have an issue.I would disagree strongly for two reasons: political and practical
The former relates to how Australian units are used. A Brigade is the smallest element that can 'own' battlespace, without it you just get slotted into another nation's C2 network with limited political say as to how the campaign is conducted - a'la Afghanistan or Iraq. If the conflict is large / important enough that we would consider a Brigade, it's political vital that we have a say in the campaign. A Brigade also allows greater control of ROE and missions - you artillery and infantry (for instance) operate off the same rules and apply the same limits to targeting.
The latter relates to the way the ADF is trained, the patchy interoperability between likely allies and the way the force is designed. The reality is that a Brigade is how the Army, and ADF, is moving towards. The support elements are built around that, the soldiers are trained like that and that's what is needed to meet political direction. The Brigade has everything a force needs - a BG doesn't - prime example being Army Aviation or armoured breaching equipment. And the days of relying on the US for everything beyond rifles is (has?) coming to an end.
Beyond that, if we can lift a Bde we can lift a BG. If all we can lift is a BG, we might not be able to lift a BG...
While I disagree with the feasibility of operational use (noting that ASM are not only State-owned weapons anymore), I'd suggest a Balikpapan class replacement will probably be considered to provide a low tier capability between the high-end LHD and the ship-to-shore connector of the LCM-8 / LLC. It still doesn't lift a lot, and without a lot of speed it won't ever sail against a threat, but it may lift another BG or so.
Ask!
The limiting factor comes back to warm bodies wearing an Australian flag. There isn't enough in the Navy and we don't have a merchant fleet anymore. The air side is ok; frankly it'll be what keeps Qantas funded no matter what. But without that national sea-lift capability, the only answer we have is contracted support. A government funded merchant fleet was looked at by a small team of uniformed peeps; but it was assessed that there was no way the LNP government would support something that, honestly, would become a hotbed of strong unionism. There is really awesome bipartisanship on Defence - but that was a leap to far
But contracts are ok - there are ways of ensuring (legally!!) the contracted fleet sails where we need it to go. The problem lies in the size of the international lift capability - it's actually quite limited. Until now the answer has been "JMOVGP will raise a contract when required"; that's no longer feasible or practical. It's not an Australian thing; the UK and US have hit this wall in recent times. If the US can't afford to raise last minute contract lift, what hope have we?
And that's the problem with (b). It may be that if it was put to the Government they would accept such a fleet, but it was assessed as unlikely. Unlikely enough that it wasn't considered further....
The problem that any government is always going to encounter with that is funding for a ship that basically sits around most of the year unused. I agree we need it but reality says it’ll be hard to get done.
There's actually quite a few purpose built ConRo (combined ro-ro & container) vessels in existence. It'd make more sense to buy one of those, either new or second hand, than to convert second hand tanker or 'pure' container ship into a ro-ro...
You pretty much answered any other questions I had.I would disagree strongly for two reasons: political and practical
The former relates to how Australian units are used. A Brigade is the smallest element that can 'own' battlespace, without it you just get slotted into another nation's C2 network with limited political say as to how the campaign is conducted - a'la Afghanistan or Iraq. If the conflict is large / important enough that we would consider a Brigade, it's political vital that we have a say in the campaign. A Brigade also allows greater control of ROE and missions - you artillery and infantry (for instance) operate off the same rules and apply the same limits to targeting.
The latter relates to the way the ADF is trained, the patchy interoperability between likely allies and the way the force is designed. The reality is that a Brigade is how the Army, and ADF, is moving towards. The support elements are built around that, the soldiers are trained like that and that's what is needed to meet political direction. The Brigade has everything a force needs - a BG doesn't - prime example being Army Aviation or armoured breaching equipment. And the days of relying on the US for everything beyond rifles is (has?) coming to an end.
Beyond that, if we can lift a Bde we can lift a BG. If all we can lift is a BG, we might not be able to lift a BG...
While I disagree with the feasibility of operational use (noting that ASM are not only State-owned weapons anymore), I'd suggest a Balikpapan class replacement will probably be considered to provide a low tier capability between the high-end LHD and the ship-to-shore connector of the LCM-8 / LLC. It still doesn't lift a lot, and without a lot of speed it won't ever sail against a threat, but it may lift another BG or so.
Ask!
The limiting factor comes back to warm bodies wearing an Australian flag. There isn't enough in the Navy and we don't have a merchant fleet anymore. The air side is ok; frankly it'll be what keeps Qantas funded no matter what. But without that national sea-lift capability, the only answer we have is contracted support. A government funded merchant fleet was looked at by a small team of uniformed peeps; but it was assessed that there was no way the LNP government would support something that, honestly, would become a hotbed of strong unionism. There is really awesome bipartisanship on Defence - but that was a leap to far
But contracts are ok - there are ways of ensuring (legally!!) the contracted fleet sails where we need it to go. The problem lies in the size of the international lift capability - it's actually quite limited. Until now the answer has been "JMOVGP will raise a contract when required"; that's no longer feasible or practical. It's not an Australian thing; the UK and US have hit this wall in recent times. If the US can't afford to raise last minute contract lift, what hope have we?
And that's the problem with (b). It may be that if it was put to the Government they would accept such a fleet, but it was assessed as unlikely. Unlikely enough that it wasn't considered further....
Would it even be possible to modify such large vessels in Australia? It would give full sovereignty over its use, but with the RAN under manpower shortages perhaps contracting would be best as Takao has noted. The alternative may be in coming to some agreement to utilise a RFA or MSC vessel - though the strategic sea-lift ships of the MSC are particularly large (~60,000t).
It would be worth considering imo, though the ADF may want to maintain a more firm level of control on such a vessel. If the vessel becomes caught up way offshore on commercial operations or is caught up in the conflict AO itself without an escort, it would be a tempting target for strike.