ADF General discussion thread

StingrayOZ

Super Moderator
Staff member
The key is making the risks out way the benefits. If the cost of doing something far exceeds any possible gain, why do it. This applied to Switzerland and Sweden but no the other neutral states, it has always applied and likely always will. For instance, as I understand the story, Phillip of Macedonia (Alexanders father) communicated to Sparta what he would do to them "if" they didn't swear fealty, Spartas response was to choose "if" and although Phillip knew he would win the cost would be too high so he let things be.

Its not about being the strongest, as that can result in being challenged in itself, but rather to be strong enough that the bully will choose to either leave you alone, or to negotiate for what they want, instead of just taking it.
Anyway you look at it there are significant trigger points which make averting some sort of conflict looking unlikely.

Australia needs to steadily increase its capabilities across the board and get big enough to deter aggression, and be able to do that independently of the US. The time of stuffing around and accepting project failures is not really an option.

Australia needs to come to the realization that it is in fact the major power in its part of the world. That the next 100 years isn't going to be a time of unprecedented peace. Conflict is going to happen the only question is under what circumstances and between which parties.

Even excluding China and NK and those issues, Australia is going to have a significant amount of responsibility with a strengthening Indonesia, radical Islam, PNG, pacific island issues, pressure on EEZ, pressure on Antarctica.
 

ADMk2

Just a bloke
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
They don't need to invade us, they bought us!

Add some SF to disrupt power supply (or just convince the state govts to go green energy) and it would be a bloodless job. They have made plenty of preps, bought cattle stations, mineral depoists and a Port....
And in wartime every single dollar worth of that would be reclaimed by the Commonwealth under emergency powers...

You can pay money for a cattle station. A fair bit harder to move it to China...
 

vonnoobie

Well-Known Member
China can buy all the assets and land it wants, It just more money flowing to Australia that should China ever end up in a war against us will be seized and depending on the ownership (state vs private) will be taken over (reparations) or held in trust.

Security wise for Australia selling land and assets isn't our biggest risk but rather our lack of oil reserve is. According to a June 2014 report on an average day Australia only held 20 days of automotive, 17 days of aviation and 16 days of diesel fuel compared to the 90 days we are required to hold.

In a major war we have to assume oil will be cut off, At current levels even with restricted use our economy and military would run dry long before the enemy even had to invade us. Why risk troops ships and planes when cutting off oil will do the job just as quickly with far less reserves spent or risked.
 

foxdemon

Member
The key is making the risks out way the benefits. If the cost of doing something far exceeds any possible gain, why do it. This applied to Switzerland and Sweden but no the other neutral states, it has always applied and likely always will. For instance, as I understand the story, Phillip of Macedonia (Alexanders father) communicated to Sparta what he would do to them "if" they didn't swear fealty, Spartas response was to choose "if" and although Phillip knew he would win the cost would be too high so he let things be.

Its not about being the strongest, as that can result in being challenged in itself, but rather to be strong enough that the bully will choose to either leave you alone, or to negotiate for what they want, instead of just taking it.

I agree with what you are saying. So we need to ask how strong would we need to be to outweigh the benefits of attacking us? I think it would turn out to be awefully expensive to maintain the required military power. We would need good numbers of aircraft, missiles, naval mines and the associated ISR and C4 to bring it together, all developed without much resource sharing with other nations.

But this line of thought raises an interesting point. The opposite to neutrality is to become a protectorate. We, and indeed a number of other countries today, are quite close to being American protectorates. The Americans themselves don't seem to be happy about that. Possibly the only thing I agree with Trump on is the need for America's allies to carry a greater share of the load. The alliance with America is of great value, though it reduces our room for diplomatic manoeuvre (but see below) but I think it a mistake to depend on them completely for our defence. That is just a general rule for any nation through history. Depend on a great power while neglecting one's own defence capability leads to protectorate status.

Another lesson from history is the story of Armenia, stuck between the Romans and the Sassanid Persians. The Armenians managed to play off the Romans and Persians for many years but eventually the Romans and Persians, exasperated by Armenian slipperiness, agreed to divide the country between them. Thus ended Armenian independence. Today in SE Asia, a number of countries are trying a similar gambit: strategic ambiguity. Our own politicians have been trying this too. The idea is to avoid making a choice between the US and China while trying to obtain benefits from both. To what extent are the smaller countries of the region, including Australia, drawing these two great powers into competition? Will Beijing and Washington one day just decide to calve up these troublesome nations rather than continue with costly competition? Small nations engaging in too much diplomatic manoeuvring might end up exposing themselves to danger.
 

hairyman

Active Member
Sleepwalking towards World War lll? What can we do to correct that?

For a start, commence our submarine build a lot earlier than planned. If the French design wont be ready start with some Collins Mk ll. Approach the US for some more tanks and F-18F's. Bring forward other equipment. All this without a sense of panic of course.
 

t68

Well-Known Member
Sleepwalking towards World War lll? What can we do to correct that?

For a start, commence our submarine build a lot earlier than planned. If the French design wont be ready start with some Collins Mk ll. Approach the US for some more tanks and F-18F's. Bring forward other equipment. All this without a sense of panic of course.
Interesting dilemma what's the fine line of haveing enough resource that continuese to protect vital home assets and infrastructure, and being able to take the battle far from the mainland without bankrupting the country. We where underprepared for WWII, werewe prepared if the coldesr turned hot are we prepared now?
 

USAF77

Banned Member
This is because they fully realised that until the USN's carrier fleet was destroyed or significantly degraded; Japan's sea lanes and its ability to sustain operations elsewhere would be at great risk. From Japan's perspective deciding to go after the USN's carriers was the right choice. Also, it was not only the Doolittle raid that convinced them of the danger posed by enemy carriers but also - albeit to a lesser extent - the battle fought at Coral Sea when USN carriers - which were undetected - caused them great damage.
Strangely Japan never gave much thought to the vulnerability of their sea lanes until '44 when we finally started sinking more tonnage then they could produce. Between poor USN sub leadership and lousy torpedo's the IJ Command considered the security of the sea lanes an after thought. Plus there was very little cooperation between the IJN and IJA in such matters, the IJA even operating its own troop ships.

The Doolittle raid was expected to raise moral at home and give Japan something to think about. Nobody expected it to make the IJ command go nuts over because we didnt really understand their minds. To put the Emperor at risk of being bombed was an unbearable shame.

Theres some truth to your comments about the Coral sea but lets not forget Japan didn't lose a fleet CV there while the USN did, plus another damaged "The Japanese thought they sunk two". The IJA still had, by far, a huge advantage in flat tops and aircraft. A bad decision after the Coral Sea was compounded by another bad decision at Midway where the plan was just bad from A to Z including the bad idea of splitting their forces with the stupid Aleutians campaign "which the army insisted on".

Anyway my point is China is extending their defensive perimeter in much the same way Japan did in WW2. Physically, diplomatically, and economically. And once again sitting there is an unsinkable aircraft carrier named Australia along the allied plan of encirclement/containment and dispersal of assets. It was the same strategy used against the Soviets which forced the Soviets to actually build aircraft carriers and a surface fleet to "support" the break out of their submarine fleet.

Its why the Chinese are protesting so much over USN ships visiting Subic again. Let alone what they think about the USN conducting maneuvers with the Indian navy.

I see to many similarities between then and now to shrug them off including the lack of understanding how "they" think. Nationalism, Militarism, a Industrial/Political elite, all in a non-Democratic country with few scruples ran by a Govt. that answers to nobody. This isnt a mix that has worked out very well in the past and we cant expect it to in the future.
 

foxdemon

Member
Anyway my point is China is extending their defensive perimeter in much the same way Japan did in WW2. Physically, diplomatically, and economically. And once again sitting there is an unsinkable aircraft carrier named Australia along the allied plan of encirclement/containment and dispersal of assets. It was the same strategy used against the Soviets which forced the Soviets to actually build aircraft carriers and a surface fleet to "support" the break out of their submarine fleet.

Its why the Chinese are protesting so much over USN ships visiting Subic again. Let alone what they think about the USN conducting maneuvers with the Indian navy.

I see to many similarities between then and now to shrug them off including the lack of understanding how "they" think. Nationalism, Militarism, a Industrial/Political elite, all in a non-Democratic country with few scruples ran by a Govt. that answers to nobody. This isnt a mix that has worked out very well in the past and we cant expect it to in the future.

Your last paragraph makes an important point. One of the strengths of countries like Australia and America is the political freedom they offer. This is very attractive to many people including educated Chinese. The CCP is well aware that this strength is a threat to them. Beijing's great strength at present is that they have lots of money. However their economy isn't that stable. If the money option was deminished they might use other means to secure their money interests.

One thing to think about is to what extent is WWII in the Pacific a useful model to conceptualise contemporary conflict in the Far East today? Surely the big change is nuclear weapons. The major players can't afford to go past the point when escalation reaches the nuclear threshold. I assert Industrial Age attritional war isn't feasible. Rather high intensity conflict will be short and limited in scope. The conflicts between India and China, Russia's seizure of the Crimea, and the SCS islands struggle are typical of contemporary conflict.

At least in the Far East we see an aversion to killing. The one who kills first takes the blame. The incident involving a Taiwanese trawler and the Philippine coast guard is an example of this game of confrontation.

The conflict is drawn out with small incidents featuring controlled upsmanship. The threat of escalation to lethal conflict is there but each side is trying to get the other to lose control first. Should it come to lethal conflict that conflict will be short and sharp. Escalation will run up against the nuclear threshold and then the protagonists will have to resort to negotiations. The side that was more prepared and grabbed the tuff in contention will be in a strong position.

So it is like a game of chess. One needs to think a turn or two ahead of one's opponent.

Take home messages for Australia include:

Our leaders need to be prepared to stand up and demand respect (that's what a lot of this posturing is about in Asia). This implies as Kissinger put it, deterence depends on preceived will to use force. Asia is a tough place. Australia's greatest weakness, as I keep pointing out, is the quality of our national leadership. This is the thing that will make or break us.

We need non-lethal naval capabilities. Note the Singaporeans have sonic weapons on their frigates and OPVs. The RAN should go talk to them and arrange some training excercises in non lethal tactics. The USN might consider the idea too.

We need to plan and practice escalation in a controlled fashion. Again, the Singaporeans are our friends and we can profit from their understanding on these matters.

Readiness is of the upmost importance when high end conflict is short and sharp. If we need time to mobilise, we will miss it. We need an Military that is, as Mattis puts it, ready to go tonight. A small force at high readiness is actually better than a large force that can't act before the matter is over. So our small size isn't necessary a disadvantage.

As a medium power at the smaller end of medium, we can only escalate up to a point. The Chinese are much more powerful and can keep escalating well beyond what we can achieve. Thus we need to be part of an alliance. So we need to work closely with our allies. Though, as I pointed out in a previous post, we must not hide behind our allies.


Finally, we should remain sensible. I see no profit in becoming overly emotional and giving into to such judgement clouding notions such as sinophobia. Think about this; Beijing is just as interested in containing Religious fanatism as we are. We shouldn't be thinking we will always be on the opposite side from Beijing.
 

STURM

Well-Known Member
Theres some truth to your comments about the Coral sea but lets not forget Japan didn't lose a fleet CV
Very true but they still lost the light carrier Shoho which later might have been put to good use at Midway. Events at the Coral Sea - like the Doolittle Raid - were a shock to the Japanese; a reminder that the Americans could fight back and that their carriers could cause damage - this was at a time when the IJN ruled the seas and had yet to suffer any major reverses. Together with the Doolittle Raid, the Battle of the Coral Sea convinced the IJN that their main priority was to destroy the USN's carriers; until that was achieved every thing else was secondary.

Nobody expected it to make the IJ command go nuts over because we didnt really understand their minds.
Perhaps we have another ''now and then'' similarity but with the Chinese. It can be argued that they understand the Americans better than the Americans understand them. Quite a number of Chinese are educated in the U.S. and a very large number speak English; compare that to the number of Americans in the military, Pentagon and State Department who speak Mandarin.

Anyway my point is China is extending their defensive perimeter in much the same way Japan did in WW2.
And like the Japanese in the 1930's and 1940's; the Chinese also feel ''boxed'' in and insecure. Close to home there's Taiwan, South Korea and Japan [part of what the what the Chinese call the ''First Island Chain''] who are U.S. treaty allies, further afield there's the Philippines which a is a non NATO treaty ally of the U.S. and there is Australia which the Chinese see as fully within the U.S. camp. The situation with the Japanese was that they felt that Western powers which had colonies in South East Asia were being hypocritical by preventing the rise of Japan and also felt very insecure with the American presence in the Philippines and Hawaii which they viewed as being pointed at Japan. Again, more similarities.

And once again sitting there is an unsinkable aircraft carrier named Australia
Like many others I was under the impression that the Japanese never physically landed in Australia in WW2 but in a ''Combat Dealers'' episode Bruce Crompton travels to Australia and meet local experts who show him a spot where some Japanese troops actually landed for a very brief period; probably a recce mission.

So we need to work closely with our allies. Though, as I pointed out in a previous post, we must not hide behind our allies.
A major issue is what happens when ''smaller'' countries are placed in a position where certain actions or policies undertaken by a ''bigger'' ally [which expects its ''smaller'' allies to stand by it] are detrimental or damaging to the national interests of the ''smaller'' ally.
 

ASSAIL

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Comments above discuss past and possible future strategies and ways to counter those strategies. In this vein there is an excellent discussion paper in the May 2017 edition of Proceedings decrying the lack of strategic thinking permeating through the officer corps of the USN neglecting the tenets of Alfred Thayer Mahan's "The Influence of Seapower upon History. Instead the papers authors Dr James R Holmes and Commander Kevin J Delamer USN Retd. Suggest that tactics and broad tactical doctrine today only pose as strategy.

On the other hand the PLA-N has embraced Mahanian doctrine with vigour and the development and direction of their increasing power is an illustration of this.

Very interesting reading and relevant to the current discussion.

Apologise for OT.
 

t68

Well-Known Member
Comments above discuss past and possible future strategies and ways to counter those strategies. In this vein there is an excellent discussion paper in the May 2017 edition of Proceedings decrying the lack of strategic thinking permeating through the officer corps of the USN neglecting the tenets of Alfred Thayer Mahan's "The Influence of Seapower upon History. Instead the papers authors Dr James R Holmes and Commander Kevin J Delamer USN Retd. Suggest that tactics and broad tactical doctrine today only pose as strategy.

On the other hand the PLA-N has embraced Mahanian doctrine with vigour and the development and direction of their increasing power is an illustration of this.

Very interesting reading and relevant to the current discussion.

Apologise for OT.

Do you have a link to it by chance?
 

t68

Well-Known Member
An interesting article about Australia and Asean. It asks the (polite) question about Australia's (& NZ) identity.

Cambodian Prince to Oz: ditch the Queen to join ASEAN
Seems to me it's written by a pro- republican trying to justify his agenda. I fail to see the aurgument how being a republic nation or constitutional monarchy would distinguish if we are an ally of the US would alleviate those concerns.

I personal don't think we need to join the ASEAN block as we will always be an outsider, as he say we are not Asian we are the white guys.
 

foxdemon

Member
A major issue is what happens when ''smaller'' countries are placed in a position where certain actions or policies undertaken by a ''bigger'' ally [which expects its ''smaller'' allies to stand by it] are detrimental or damaging to the national interests of the ''smaller'' ally.

Of course. I'll offer an example in a sec.

I want to explain that by 'hiding behind allies' I have FONOP in mind. If our politicians are too weak and cave in to threats issued through political opinion in certain magazines, then both our enemies and allies will lose respect for us. Other nations apart from the US are making a point of demonstrating their lack of recognition of unacceptable maritime claims. Once respect is lost it is very hard to regain. Furthermore once bullying has worked expect to get a whole lot more of it. If the pollies give in, we have already lost. I wonder if they are a bit out of their depth when dealing with geopolitics in Asia?

An Example of large nations disregarding smaller allies is the US abandoning Taiwan in the '70s. Kissinger still thinks he made a master play. But it has come at a price of loss of confidence among regional allies over the longer term. I think Japan in particular is very concerned the US and China, given large powers treat each other as peers, might make a deal over the head of Tokyo. Even using small allies as bargaining chips.

Again I say that it is leadership that will make or break us. We need national leadership that can avoid compromising the nation's interests and avoid such eventualities. Where to get them from? Possibly that is going too far off topic and away from the subjects this forum is about.
 

hairyman

Active Member
In case you have not noticed, Australia is nowhere near as white as it was when I was a boy. Then we had a one per cent indigenous part to 99 per cent white. Now we have Orienta (which always had since the goldrush days, but not as many) Indian etc, Middle Eastern, African. Stir up the melting pot and it wouldl be less white than it was in the White Australia days.
 

Massive

Well-Known Member
Australia needs to steadily increase its capabilities across the board and get big enough to deter aggression, and be able to do that independently of the US. The time of stuffing around and accepting project failures is not really an option.
And focus those capabilities on defending Australia and its approaches - as described in the white paper.

Not sure we have quite got the balance right - though things are enormously better than they have been previously.

Regards,

Massive
 

foxdemon

Member
Comments above discuss past and possible future strategies and ways to counter those strategies. In this vein there is an excellent discussion paper in the May 2017 edition of Proceedings decrying the lack of strategic thinking permeating through the officer corps of the USN neglecting the tenets of Alfred Thayer Mahan's "The Influence of Seapower upon History. Instead the papers authors Dr James R Holmes and Commander Kevin J Delamer USN Retd. Suggest that tactics and broad tactical doctrine today only pose as strategy.

On the other hand the PLA-N has embraced Mahanian doctrine with vigour and the development and direction of their increasing power is an illustration of this.

Very interesting reading and relevant to the current discussion.

Apologise for OT.

Is it too off topic? Strategy informs doctrine and tactics which is relevant to a broad ADF discussion. To be honest, the vision, posture and structure of the ADF looks OK to me. Of the various sections of Australian society, the ADF is the least of my worries. The main problem at this time is getting all those fancy new toys into service and making the network centric doctrine operational. But we do need to keep thinking.

Regarding Mahan, the rise of China and strategy, I think the authors mentioned have a valid thesis. The US has been overwhelming dominant at sea for some time. Given the lack of completion it is unsurprising that strategic thought would have entrophied. To understand how the world is changing around us, it might be worth revisiting Mahan's approach and draw lessons from the role of sea power in history.

China's rise is comparable with the rise of European powers from the 15th century to the 19th century. Fundamentally it is an economic rise to power. Naval power follows maritime trade. Though Pax Americana offers the world secure trade routes, China sees America as a rival whom they can't depend on to protect Chinese trade should the two powers disagree. So what we are seeing is a return to the old form of globalism: imperialism. Bare in mind that the first global communication technology was the European sailing ship. The world has been globalised for 500 years, but imperialism was increasing sidelined through the 20th century. Neo-liberal globalism, the globalism most people alive today would recognise, depends on Pax Americana. This gives America a preeminent place in the world which China sees no reason to accept.

Imperial globalism presents all sorts of dangers to countries like Australia and New Zealand. As Mahan pointed out, the boarder between a great naval power and other countries is the coast of those other countries. At least we Australians are building up our military power. But military power alone isn't enough. We do need to compete economically first and foremost. If only our leaders would wake up and realise the world they were accustomed to is over and that their ideas on economics and trade need to change as the world changes.

Mahan advocated guerre d'esquadron rather than guerre de course. At least he is remembered that way. I'm inclined to think Guerrero de course might work better for us. Any decisive symmetric naval battle would see us overwhelmed without the Americans. We would need to use asymmetric tactics. Which is one of those reasons I find air power attractive. Mines are good offensively for blockades. But we don't have much strength at great distances from home, whereas the PLAN is building such projected strength.

I am scratching my head and wondering why some people might think we can do without the alliance with America in a post Pax Americana world. As a smaller power, alliances are vital. We need to continue building alliances, Australia, New Zealand and Singapore are the obvious core group. We share interests and we are stuck in the same boat together. Surely a inner 'long range' planning group between these governments would make sense. But this challenges an idea I think needs to be debunked.

Defence of Australia is a doctrine without a strategy. This is untenable, as it surrenders initiative and leaves us isolated. Furthermore it creates an artificial dichotomy between DOR and forward defence. I think the contest between the two schools of thought occupies too much of our attention which would be better expended on exploring other ways of thinking. Another term for DOA is 'turtling'. We can't hide in our shell and expect a changing world to ignore us. We have to go out into the world and do what we can to shape it.

In a new age of Imperialism, we need a mobile ADF, not a static defensive ADF. The current forward defence posture is OK. And it is alliance focused. It will need to continue to develop but I can't make too many worthwhile criticisms of current planning. We shouldn't rest on our laurels and so it would be well worth getting our officer cadets to read a few more history books. Mahan is a great place to start.
 
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