ADF General discussion thread

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
Quoted messages from the RAN thread for reply here, as it details with the whole ADF and not 'just' the RAN.

I am absolutely not saying that. And if I was king for a day I personally think that we should’ve gone ahead with the full planned IFV and SPG buys (which we may do, and these “cuts” are just an accounting trick).
AND

Probably some combination of (a) they haven’t decided on their full response yet to all recommendations and want to announce it all at once, and (b) they’re looking to time the announcement for when they will get maximum political mileage. I was actually half expecting that after the Voice went down in flames that they might announce something to try deflect attention / reset the narrative but nothing yet…
The two quoted posts might very well be correct, but it also illustrates reasons why at least some here on DT, myself included, have been rather dissatisfied with the DSR and subsequent announcements, leaks and reviews.

First, let us look at the changes announced for the IFV and SPG acquisitions. Without looking at the public DSR documents again, I am going off memory but IIRC the announced numbers was a reduction to roughly a third of the numbers originally planned. That significant a reduction in numbers changes was force structures are possible, and it also impacts industry. Facilities, work forces and supply chains which have or are being established to support one build volume will be overkill for a build that is a third that size. A company that might have planned on six years of work to build vehicles and spares might suddenly be looking at running out of work and having the idle the facility and/or make the workforce redundant after perhaps three years. Changes like this are of a type to burn industry and industrial capacity. At the same time, such reductions in planned numbers will impact the land forces, likely in a way which could reduce morale as well as new enlistment plus increasing separation rates and increasing retention issues. Soldiers or potential soldiers who had thought they would be serving on/with IFV's and IFV support might look at what they can expect to serve with and decide, "F that..."

Now, it could be that the announced number reduction is just temporary. However, if this becomes the case, then it would be an instance of gov't making announcements based upon what they (the gov't of the day) perceive will be advantageous to them politically, despite the announcement appearing to be negative for Defence and for defence industry.

Similarly, if the gov't of the day has made decisions on what paths will be taken going forward, but is holding off on making announcements because of a desire to get the maximum political benefit from the announcements, then that would be another example of politics interfering in Defence, to the detriment of Defence.
 

Morgo

Well-Known Member
No arguments from me. Politicians politicking is an integral part of a democratic system, and every Government is going to do it.

The best that any country can hope for is that the procurement and other decisions are not corrupt and the political impacts are kept to a minimum and not overly cynical. Which I think is mostly the case from both sides in Australia fortunately.
 

Wombat000

Active Member
The IFV & SPG issues, I think are a no-brainer.

no one expects the RAAF to go to conflict with Mirages, any more than anyone seriously believes the AS4 and M777 are survivable in an offensive contested environment.

the AS4 family may have some peripheral or logistics utility, but not for the intended deliberate combat.
the M777 might have some contextual utility, but not if any threat of returned fire.

the Redback IFV and Huntsman standards are set, regardless of the GOTD.
the immediate units are to receive the assets, and any expansion of capability will be at that standard.

I think where the real catch up and blurring of standards are, is with Navy.
going cheap on capability and fixation on small VLS magazines is I think still a possibility, and only the fleet review will tell.
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
Again, quoting a post from the RAN thread here as it and the response deals with much more than just the RAN.

Why does Army need any IFVs (or tanks or spgs) unless RAN can escort amphibs to where those vehicles deploy (sure allies might have escorts and sea lift but in relative terms they have lots more of their own heavy vehicles to escort and lift from further away)?

Army doesn’t actually have any IFVs (or deployable APCs) now. It is finally acquiring 129 IFVs but it will take years to have deployable numbers. So, as the RAN has too few escorts, RAN needs to be fixed for Army to be relevant with mass in a major conflict (sure SF, and maybe up to a light battlegroup can deploy, but not a brigade).

Despite some terrible procurement decisions the current RAN is actually pretty good. Set the vaunted (in capability acquisition terms) 2023 RAAF against the maligned RAN in a Falklands style wargame (continent-based air defending, let’s say Christmas Island, against amphib). I don’t want to pursue that scenario other than to suggest the current RAN (without any air cover) would not be a trivial adversary for the current RAAF and the sort of things that could happen in that scenario point to the need for some actual (high priority) ADF acquisitions.

The RAN is however too small and can’t crew the ships it has (as posters have noted). It probably needs even more ships (hence surface fleet review) than it can crew because existing ships have declining availability and there might be sufficient notice of a major war to recruit former trained personnel.

If Army does not need (or is unable due to lack of escorts or IFVs etc) to deploy combined arms in strength in a major war then some of the RAN problems are less critical but it would be busy doing the things it would need to do in a major conflict (hunt subs, escort other people’s ships etc). Hunter FFG with about 32 VLS sounds about right as the acquisition for that.

If Army needs to deploy in our region, in the next few years for an operation short of a major war (peace keeping / peace building / counter insurgency, with no adversary subs or overwhelming antiship missile capability) it also has some impressive capabilities in place or on order. Previous government ordered CRVs, battlefield and attack helicopters. Current government has kept those (and tanks so far as we can tell) and accelerated amphibs. Yes IFV numbers were cut but that is really about post 2030 and can be addressed again. I Agree that the new Army orbat has problems (see Australian army thread).

I rate the major war before 2030 less than a 1 in a 100 (still definite risk, cataclysmic consequences, Australia is not prepared, and the risk needs to be minimised by deterrence) and the regional mission at brigade level about a 90 in 100 chance (Australia is not prepared but on track with some fixes, and the risk can’t be minimised much by deterrence). If your subjective probabilities differ you will have different views.
Several points to consider, covering all the services of the ADF.

The number and capabilities of the RAN surface fleet is by no means the 'only' limitation which could impact an Army deployment, in fact any Army deployment away from mainland Australia. In fact, the size of the surface fleet is not what I think the main/first limitation which would be encountered, should a deployment become necessary. I suspect that Australia's limited number of both amphibs and sealift vessels would be limitations which would adversely impact any significant ADF deployment to a threatened/contested area away from the mainland.

Australia has a pair of LHD's and a LSD for sealift and amphibious operations, and a pair of AOR's for refueling/ships stores and IIRC some ability to transport cargo. After that, AFAIK Australia no longer has much of a merchant marine which could be utilized, or even STUFT, to maintain a flow of needed parts and supplies which any deployed force of significant size would require, especially if one was engaging in high tempo ops. Yes, some supplies might be able to get airlifted in by C-130 or C-17, but the volume of fuel, munitions and supplies which could be flown in is a fraction of what a single cargo ship could bring. Not to mention if the deployment is in a contested area, airlifters could be subject to interception and engagement by hostile air and/or GBAD.

If the problems of both the initial lift and landing (remember, ADF amphibious ops was not originally planned around conducting opposed landings) and subsequent shipping of needed replacements and the logistical tail associated can be solved, then escort vessels, or more properly a lack of suitable escort vessels might become a problem. At least some of this would depend on where the landed force was operating, since some areas could potentially by covered by RAAF aircraft, possibly with some support from Surveillance Australia and of course land-based ISR assets like JORN and SECAR. Maritime patrol aircraft could monitor SLOC and potentially engage hostile shipping using standoff AShM, or be used to vector in fast jet maritime strike packages. Poseidons could also be used to sanitize potential chokepoints which would be ideal ambush areas for hostile subs. However, I believe that the RAAF would be hard pressed to provide such support past the first island chains north and northwest of the Australian mainland, particularly if overflight permission and/or basing was denied. Incidentally, these areas where I suspect the RAAF would have trouble providing and maintaining air cover over and ahead of transiting vessels is also where smaller vessels like corvettes would have trouble due to the distances involved and time required for transits.

Now then, for the actual land-based ops during and after an amphibious landing, the forces required would depend on many factors which others should certainly be able to cover better than I. However, some of the force requirements would be dictated by what Australia wanted the force to accomplish, where it was operating, and who/what the force would and could be opposed by. If one were to look at a potential amphibious deployment of a battery of land-based AShM by Army, as part of an attempt at an A2AD strategy then of course the vehicles required for such a battery would be needed, plus a stock of ordnance, fuel, supplies, parts etc. In addition to everything (including personnel) that the battery would need, additional forces would also need to be landed to provide force protection for the battery from hostile air and/or ground forces. This in turn means that a battery or part of a battery of NASAMS would likely be needed, plus everything this battery would require to enable operations. Some sort of ground combat unit would also likely be needed to provide security at a minimum, otherwise hostiles might be able to destroy the batteries deployed using special forces teams, light infantry, or any other type of ground combat unit available to send in quickly. For an Australian unit, it would probably be best if the ground combat unit was at least motorized to enable some ability to maneuver, and some level of mechanization with armour and direct fire support would likely be even better. One needs to keep in mind that an Australian landing could very well be against opposing armour, or if not, hostile armour and/or IFV's could be deployed to neutralize landed Australian troops.

A significant question to ask (not that I expect answers) is where the ADF and/or gov't believe that Australia might end up deploying troops awa from the mainland, and against whom. Relating to that, I do wonder whether more/additional detailed cartography was done during or after RAMSI. Nendo comes to mind specifically.
 

Stampede

Well-Known Member
The IFV & SPG issues, I think are a no-brainer.

no one expects the RAAF to go to conflict with Mirages, any more than anyone seriously believes the AS4 and M777 are survivable in an offensive contested environment.

the AS4 family may have some peripheral or logistics utility, but not for the intended deliberate combat.
the M777 might have some contextual utility, but not if any threat of returned fire.

the Redback IFV and Huntsman standards are set, regardless of the GOTD.
the immediate units are to receive the assets, and any expansion of capability will be at that standard.

I think where the real catch up and blurring of standards are, is with Navy.
going cheap on capability and fixation on small VLS magazines is I think still a possibility, and only the fleet review will tell.
One of the outcomes of the Naval Review with be the consideration of threat.
More importantly how to respond to a threat for each year going forward.
For the long term stuff in the late 30's plus, you can realistically plan for whatever you want.
Its the short term that is problematic.

With regard to the maritime domain, it will be interesting as to how the government tackles this challenge.
Will the review pass the Defence of Australia ball to the RAAF and only invest in long term projects for the Navy.

Realistically this Review will be a litmus test for how the government sees our current world.

Again, will the rhetoric match the outcomes.
We wait and see.


Cheers S
 

Armchair

Active Member
The number and capabilities of the RAN surface fleet is by no means the 'only' limitation which could impact an Army deployment, in fact any Army deployment away from mainland Australia. In fact, the size of the surface fleet is not what I think the main/first limitation which would be encountered, should a deployment become necessary. I suspect that Australia's limited number of both amphibs and sealift vessels would be limitations which would adversely impact any significant ADF deployment to a threatened/contested area away from the mainland.
I think the DSR actually agrees with you on the main/ first limitation - prioritised need for littoral lift. The ADF proposes that as an army capability though. I think, however, that littoral lift capability is close to useless for sovereign force projection unless actual RAN warships can escort those safely (the RAAF lacks mass and persistence and capabilities to do that).

If it can’t be safely escorted then an LHD won’t be sent to a threatening environment. RAN has much more amphib capacity than it did for East Timor in 2006 (itself a massive step up from 1999). The escort requirements for ET 1999 and 2006 were huge, they would be greater now with the proliferation of threats such as rockets and shore based anti ship missiles. RAN has escort capabilities it did not have in 1999 and 2006 (partly because of 1999 and 2006) but, in my view, not enough ships regularly available to make safely escorting a vulnerable task force (especially while doing anything else at all) viable.

You mention tanks and IFVs as possible threats for the Australian army to overcome (or forces that might arrive to counterattack it). Agreed but if those possible threats are already there then, unless Australia has air supremacy, it has sent its troops to the wrong island.

IFVs (or at least modern APCs) are great. Australia probably should have begun acquiring reconditioned Bradleys (and m109s) in about 2004 (and be replacing them now) but an IFV cannot protect an infantry soldier from a torpedo or an anti-ship missile. Escorts can.






.
 
Last edited:

KrustyKoala

New Member
In return, Australia will have effective veto power over Tuvalu's security arrangements with any other country.

"With the Pacific the best placed to support the Pacific's own security, Australia and Tuvalu will also mutually agree cooperation with other countries in Tuvalu's security sectors," the agreement reads.


The wheels were greased well
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
In return, Australia will have effective veto power over Tuvalu's security arrangements with any other country.

"With the Pacific the best placed to support the Pacific's own security, Australia and Tuvalu will also mutually agree cooperation with other countries in Tuvalu's security sectors," the agreement reads.


The wheels were greased well
Yep.

On another note the Nauru PM walked out before the leaders retreat, after spitting the dummy about Samoa requesting that the appointment process of the previous Nauru PM as the PIF Secretary General be investigated.
 

hauritz

Well-Known Member
Actually had to google Tuvalu. Tiny place with a population of just under 12,000. One of its main sources of income is that it sold its internet suffix - .tv to a Californian company and it now earns the island nation several million dollars a year. The whole place is only 4.5 meters above sea level.

While an agreement with this island nation is beneficial to Australia I fear that it might also be the beginning of the end for this small island nation as I suspect a sizeable proportion of its population may eventually take up Australia’s offer.
 

Milne Bay

Active Member
Actually had to google Tuvalu. Tiny place with a population of just under 12,000. One of its main sources of income is that it sold its internet suffix - .tv to a Californian company and it now earns the island nation several million dollars a year. The whole place is only 4.5 meters above sea level.

While an agreement with this island nation is beneficial to Australia I fear that it might also be the beginning of the end for this small island nation as I suspect a sizeable proportion of its population may eventually take up Australia’s offer.
I expect that as sea levels rise further, life on Tuvalu will become untenable. Wells are already compromised, as is any form of agriculture in many parts.
IIRC Tuvalu approached Australia some years ago for an agreement to re-locate and were turned down by the GOTD (unless I've got my islands confused)
Anyway - a good outcome at last for Tuvalu
MB
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
Actually had to google Tuvalu. Tiny place with a population of just under 12,000. One of its main sources of income is that it sold its internet suffix - .tv to a Californian company and it now earns the island nation several million dollars a year. The whole place is only 4.5 meters above sea level.

While an agreement with this island nation is beneficial to Australia I fear that it might also be the beginning of the end for this small island nation as I suspect a sizeable proportion of its population may eventually take up Australia’s offer.
Realistically, Tuvalu as a nation will cease to exist by the end of the century if certain forecasts prove correct. Better if plans are made and steps initiated now, rather than waiting another generation or two.
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Realistically, Tuvalu as a nation will cease to exist by the end of the century if certain forecasts prove correct. Better if plans are made and steps initiated now, rather than waiting another generation or two.
And its's not the only Pacific Island nation to face such problems.
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
Makes me wonder what happens to the territorial waters & EEZ of a country if the land they're based on ceases to exist. What happens to the legal existence of the country?
A lawyer C-F no doubt but likely the PRC (and others) will try to claim the remnant EEZ as new virgin territory open for grabbing.
 

hauritz

Well-Known Member
Actually that is an interesting problem, assuming of course that the islands are completely abandoned. I would guess that the previous occupants would still have land holdings and it is possible that some sort of political entity could still exist.

Australia is in the process of formalising the Falepili Union which creates a pathway for migration to Australia and that might constitute it effectively becoming an Australian territory.
 

swerve

Super Moderator
How can you have land holdings underwater?

Anything that isn't permanently above water isn't legally recognised as an island. It can't have territorial waters or an EEZ. Well, unless China claims it's part of China.
 

hauritz

Well-Known Member
I don’t imagine the last islander being extracted as the final bit of land disappears under the waves. Australia also probably has possession of quite a few low lying islands. I know the Coco islands are only about 5 metres above sea level.

Bigger problem is that large hunks of the Australian coastline are only a few meters about sea level. Where I live is only about 6 meters above sea level.
 
Last edited:

Scott Elaurant

Well-Known Member
In return, Australia will have effective veto power over Tuvalu's security arrangements with any other country.

"With the Pacific the best placed to support the Pacific's own security, Australia and Tuvalu will also mutually agree cooperation with other countries in Tuvalu's security sectors," the agreement reads.


The wheels were greased well
I think this is very sensible. Australian agricultural sector wants us to issue more visdas to Pacific island workers anyway. So the real cost to Australia is negligible. It is a lot cheaper way to buy goodwill than trying to outbid China giving development grants to people like Sogavare.
 

Scott Elaurant

Well-Known Member
I am putting this article on this general ADF thread rather than the naval one I normally follow because it affects everything.

Defence Secretary Greg Moriarty flagged axing some programs to pay for other DSR requirements. Ouch.

I have said before in my own field (Infrastructure planning) there has been a noticeable slowdown in work since IA announced a review in late 2022. Recently a number of projects were cancelled as a result of that. Strictly speaking it was not a budget cut in Infrastructure. The previous government had added projects without increasing funds, and so the program was cut to match funds.

With the advent of AUKUS without a large increase in defence spending I fear Defence is now in the same boat. Australia’s debt is now 3x larger than it was back in 2012/13 and interest rates have returned to historic norms. So borrowing would cost a lot more now. I expect Defence will need to live within its budget for 2-3 years or until interest rates drop.
 
Last edited:
Top