Seasprite Helicopters to be scrapped!

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
Dipping sonar disappared from RAN capability wiht the conversion of the Seaking to the utiltiy role. It is alos worth notng that VDS was carried on early River class frigates when first constructed.

The Seahawk uses sonar buoys (as you are obviously aware) and it would be flawed argument to wrtie these off as ineffective. Having some experaince of submarines I am aware of the capabilty and potential of dipping sonar, particualry in the more advances systsm now available, and agree future ASW helecopters should be equipped with this capability. Lets hope NH-90 lives up to expectations and roll on the LHD's.

However, the Sprite is an ASuW platform and it has capbilities that the Seahawk cannot currently match. As such the lack of a dippng sonar is no reason to ditch 1.1 billion dollars worth of effort that is not focused on the ASW threat.

Despite the fact this whole project has been a bit of a mess i can see that a combination or Sprite and Seahawk on and FFG would offer considerable capaiblity to a small task force. Inthe ASuW aspect.

As I ahve said before this platform has come this far lets get into service and then look to the future.
If the Seasprite can be brought into service, and given the decline of ASW capacity in the RAN, I was wondering the following.

Would it make sense to operate 1 S-70B-2 Seahawk from the Anzac frigates, equipped with Penguin Mk 2 in fire & forget mode perhaps? And then from the Adelaide which can support two helicopters, operate 1 S-70B-2 Seahawk and 1 SH-2G(A) Seasprite, to keep the Adelaides with an ASW and ASuW capability?

Given the amount spent developing the Seasprite, it would be nice to see something worthwhile come out of the program. Also it might be worthwhile to look at the development of the NFH-90 capabilities.

-Cheers
 

cherry

Banned Member
Well hopefully we will all know an answer to all of this next Tuesday, as rumour puts it that Senator Nelson will be taking his recommendations to the National Security Committee on Tuesday next week. Will be interesting!:rolleyes:

Thursday, March 22, 2007

Seasprite choppers cancelled
Australian Defence Minister Brendan Nelson will recommend to the National Security Committee next Tuesday that the Project Sea 1411, the Super Seasprite program, be canceled.

It is understood that Nelson would like to seek $1.5 billion for the Eurocopter NH-90.

Kaman has issued a statement criticizing the move, saying that canceling the project will create a capability gap as the NH-90 is not available till 2009. It also disputed the Australian government's view that the project is behind schedule.
 

rossfrb_1

Member
more grist for the mill

http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,21431201-31477,00.html

"
US maker warns battle on if Seasprites junked
* Patrick Walters, National security editor * March 23, 2007
THE US maker of the navy's troubled Seasprite helicopters has warned the Howard Government of a lengthy legal battle should the $1billion program be scrapped.
In a letter sent last week to Defence Minister Brendan Nelson, Kaman Corporation's chief executive defended the company's performance on the long-running contract and urged the Government to allow the Seasprites to become operational.
Nine Seasprites have been provisionally handed over to the navy but the fleet has been grounded for nearly a year after a series of software engineering and airworthiness issues.
The twin-engine SH-2G(A) Super Seasprites, equipped with Penguin anti-ship missiles, are designed to operate from the navy's Anzac-class frigates, providing a maritime strike and surveillance capability for the surface fleet.
Defence estimates the Seasprites will not be fully operational until 2010 at the earliest, six years late. Cabinet's national security committee will consider a Defence submission recommending the Seasprite contract with Kaman be terminated. Senior defence sources say the legal implications of junking the Seaprites have been the key factor delaying a final decision on the fate of the aircraft.
In his letter to Dr Nelson, Kaman boss Paul Kuhn urged the minister to complete the program, saying a fully mission-capable aircraft would be available in the second quarter of this year and that air certification was the only major work left.
"The cost and time required to bring the aircraft to the point that the commonwealth believes is needed for certification purposes is $US37.7million ($47 million) and up to 29 months, which is substantially less than the cost and time that would be involved in pursuing a different aircraft, none of which have the complete mission capability of the Seasprite," Mr Kuhn said.
Cancellation would mean an arbitration process "which promises to be lengthy and provide much opportunity to keep the Seasprite program in the public eye, will uphold the reputation of the SH-2G and Kaman's contract position (resulting in a substantial damage award to Kaman) while also exposing weaknesses in the commonwealth's defence-procurement system," he wrote.
"

regards adf asw capability - I vaguely remember the Orions having some form of ASW capability - sonar buoy and torpedoes? A quick google found
http://www.thewest.com.au/aapstory.aspx?StoryName=360427

"Australia faces growing submarine threat
1st March 2007, 9:48 WST

Australia faces a growing threat from regional nations equipped with modern submarines, a new study warns.

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) says Australia's anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities had lagged behind because regional nations had few submarines and those were of dubious capability.

But many regional nations were now acquiring modern submarines and weapons.

"The upshot is that Australia will soon face a region that has a much greater capability to conduct submarine operations," ASPI analyst Dr Andrew Davies said in the study.

"In a contingency, submarines will be able to seriously threaten the operation of surface fleets and commercial trade.

"Australia simply cannot expect to be able to conduct major naval operations in waters patrolled by submarines without a major upgrade to its ASW capabilities."

Under current plans Indonesia is buying four Russian built Kilo class boats with more to follow. Malaysia has two French boats on order. Vietnam is contemplating acquiring two or three Kilo class boats.

China, Pakistan and India already possess significant submarine fleets.

Dr Davies said the major shortfalls in Australia's ASW capability included frigate sonar systems with a limited ability to detect submarines across a wide range of sea conditions, restricted helicopter ASW capability and limited data networking across the fleet.

He said decisions to be made this year on new ships had the potential to impact on Australia's ability to operate in areas where opposition from submarine could be expected.

Australia is currently buying expensive air warfare destroyers (AWDs) and helicopter landing ships, both capable of performing a significant ASW role if equipped with suitable equipment.

Dr Davies said the AWDs could be fitted with the advanced sonar systems and helicopters needed to perform an ASW operation.

He said the navy currently possesses three types of helicopter - Sea Hawks, elderly Sea Kings and the still troubled Sea Sprites - when what it really needs is just one type. The proposed new MRH90 could be fitted with advanced ASW capabilities including a dunking sonar and surface search radar.

On the plus side the RAAF's Orion AP-3C maritime surveillance aircraft and the navy's six Collins submarines possess advanced ASW capabilities, which can be further improved through ongoing upgrades."

I would have thought some form of dunking sonar on the maritime MRH-90s would have been a no brainer.

rb
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
regards adf asw capability - I vaguely remember the Orions having some form of ASW capability - sonar buoy and torpedoes? A quick google found
http://www.thewest.com.au/aapstory.aspx?StoryName=360427

He said the navy currently possesses three types of helicopter - Sea Hawks, elderly Sea Kings and the still troubled Sea Sprites - when what it really needs is just one type. The proposed new MRH90 could be fitted with advanced ASW capabilities including a dunking sonar and surface search radar.

On the plus side the RAAF's Orion AP-3C maritime surveillance aircraft and the navy's six Collins submarines possess advanced ASW capabilities, which can be further improved through ongoing upgrades."

I would have thought some form of dunking sonar on the maritime MRH-90s would have been a no brainer.

rb
I think an Australianized variant of the NFH-90 could do quite well, assuming proper project management of course. I would like to see a fitout similar to the USN MH-60R "Romeo" version of the Seahawk. The primary missions for this version are ASW/ASuW. One thing I do wonder about is the holdup in the NH-90 program. Is it flight certification? It seems that Aerospace Australia is expecting to have the first MRH-90 enter service this year.
http://www.ausaero.com.au/Default.aspx?tabid=177
Granted, the item is from 2005, it's still listed on their website. What would stop them (aside from integration of the avionics) from being able to build an Australian version earlier than Europe fields the NFH-90?

According to the current timeline that I'm aware of, the Seahawk replacement helicopter should be entering service around when the P-8 MMA begins entering US service. If Australia replaces the AP-3C with the P-8 MMA, that will also change ASW assets.

As for still bringing the Seasprites into service, I suppose the question comes down to which choice will lead to a cheaper and/or faster resolution. If the amount of time and money spent in contract cancellation, legal fees, etc. is expected to cost more than the estimated US$38mil and 29 months to reach in-service, then I would imagine that the Seasprites would enter service. If, on the other hand, contract cancellation is the (expected) cheaper option would imagine the ADF going that route. I do hope though that the ADF & minister weight all the costs. I can easily see them forgetting to include the cost of replacement/training S-70B-2 Seahawks in the tally of which is more cost effective.

-Cheers
 

Whiskyjack

Honorary Moderator / Defense Professional / Analys
Verified Defense Pro
I was under the impression that the NFH-90 would have problems fitting into a FFG Hanger. So I guess it really depends on wether the RAN keeps any of the FFGs going forward, beyond the life of the Seahawk.
 
A

Aussie Digger

Guest
They are pretty spot on with the comments on the state of ASW in the RAN.
Except the Seasprite was never intended to conduct a primary ASW role. It was intended to perform the ASuW mission, hence it's sensor and weapons fit.
Most of the capability gaps identified in this report are already acknowledged by ADF and exist in the current (by some 12 months) Defence Capability plan.

Re-hashing existing Government policy seems like a wasted effort to me and as a taxpayer and thus supporting this "think tank" I expect to see rather a better effort than this...

Same goes for Mr Davies childish, ignorant and out of date comments on the Super Hornet as well...

Guess if you feed at the "APA trough" long enough things eventually rub off eh?
 

Jabber

New Member
...As for still bringing the Seasprites into service, I suppose the question comes down to which choice will lead to a cheaper and/or faster resolution. If the amount of time and money spent in contract cancellation, legal fees, etc. is expected to cost more than the estimated US$38mil and 29 months to reach in-service, then I would imagine that the Seasprites would enter service. If, on the other hand, contract cancellation is the (expected) cheaper option would imagine the ADF going that route. I do hope though that the ADF & minister weight all the costs. I can easily see them forgetting to include the cost of replacement/training S-70B-2 Seahawks in the tally of which is more cost effective.
Legal fees + AUS $1.5 Billion for new platform + time/effort integrating new platform + risk of another project management f...up.

versus

AUS $50mil & 29 months.

No brainer if you ask me.
 

alexsa

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Legal fees + AUS $1.5 Billion for new platform + time/effort integrating new platform + risk of another project management f...up.

versus

AUS $50mil & 29 months.

No brainer if you ask me.
Absolutely agree, except the aircraft could actually go operational sooner on a modified air worthiness certificate (lets face it that internal with the RAAF) while the redundant FCS is speced out and modified.

As I have said earlier the programme management was dismal but if we do this we would have a helo with a decent ASM capacicty 'in service' while the NH-90 is developed.

Nothing like trying not to throw the baby out with the bath water.
 

Tasman

Ship Watcher
Verified Defense Pro
Absolutely agree, except the aircraft could actually go operational sooner on a modified air worthiness certificate (lets face it that internal with the RAAF) while the redundant FCS is speced out and modified.
I wonder how long it would take for the RAAF to relax the air worthiness requirements and for the Seasprites to become operational if war broke out in our region tomorrow! :rolleyes:

Cheers
 

Occum

Defense Professional
Verified Defense Pro
War Contingency

I wonder how long it would take for the RAAF to relax the air worthiness requirements and for the Seasprites to become operational if war broke out in our region tomorrow! :rolleyes:

Cheers
Tasman,

Would not change the risks confronting the aircrew, only compound them.

FYI - the airworthiness requirements are drawn from FAR Part 29 et al and are standard for this type and class of aircraft. The Project Office had been made well aware of the certification risks back in 1998 (refer internal IG's report) and again in 1999 by experts in Defence and Industry alike, then again by the Contractor in 2002 and subsequent, as well as from a number of independent experts during the intervening period. They chose to ignore such advice, saying that Defence would handle the certification and associated risks but continued to hold others (eg. the Contractor) up to blame. They only started listening and looking at this in earnest in 2006. I suggest this is what Alexsa means by program management being, uh, 'dismal'. DOH!

:shudder
 
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Tasman

Ship Watcher
Verified Defense Pro
Tasman,

Would not change the risks confronting the aircrew, only compound them.

FYI - the airworthiness requirements are drawn from FAR Part 29 et al and are standard for this type and class of aircraft. The Project Office had been made well aware of the certification risks back in 1998 (refer internal IG's report) and again in 1999 by experts in Defence and Industry alike, then again by the Contractor in 2002 and subsequent, as well as from a number of independent experts during the intervening period. They chose to ignore such advice, saying that Defence would handle the certification and associated risks but continued to hold others (eg. the Contractor) up to blame. They only started listening and looking at this in earnest in 2006. I suggest this is what Alexsa means by program management being, uh, 'dismal'. Doh!

:shudder
Fully agree. SNAFU, as with the rest of this project! :rolleyes:

Cheers
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
Legal fees + AUS $1.5 Billion for new platform + time/effort integrating new platform + risk of another project management f...up.

versus

AUS $50mil & 29 months.

No brainer if you ask me.
The money required for a new platform I wouldn't consider part of the hypothetical equation, given that the two options currently appear to be:
1. Bring the SH-2G(A) Seasprites into service.
2. Scrap the Seasprites and purchase training/additional SH-60B/F Seahawks to augment the S-70B-2 Seahawks in service.

Any money spent on a new platform is going to be spent, regardless of which of the two above options is selected. As part of AIR 9000 and the rationalization of the ADF helicopter fleet, it is expected that both the Seahawk and (if it ever enters service) Seasprite will be replaced with a common helicopter. Most likely some version of the NFH-90. Scrapping the Seasprite might advance the schedule for that part of AIR 9000 (currently expected sometime between 2013-2016 IIRC) but all the same, the monies will be spent getting whatever the replacement helicopter is.

Nothing like trying not to throw the baby out with the bath water.
Completely agree, hence the point about looking carefully at ALL the costs for each of the two options. There have been a few public instances in the US where decisions were made on programs and funding, where due to inadequate review, the estimated cost after approval climbed 25% or more, for a total of ~ US$ 100 billion. I don't expected the Seasprite issue to approach that scale, but why spend more money than one needs to.

Definately want to see someone get some use out of the helicopters.

-Cheers
 

Occum

Defense Professional
Verified Defense Pro
Learning from Mistakes

Fully agree. SNAFU, as with the rest of this project! :rolleyes:

Cheers

True, but the important thing to acknowledge is where the responsibilities and accountabilities for the SNAFU reside - not from a culture of blame perspective because that is a loose/loose, but from a lessons learned point of view.

Unfortunately, lessons can't be learnt if the mistakes are not admitted and herein lies the rub - they are unable to admit mistakes.


:rolleyes:
 

Jabber

New Member
The money required for a new platform I wouldn't consider part of the hypothetical equation, given that the two options currently appear to be:
1. Bring the SH-2G(A) Seasprites into service.
2. Scrap the Seasprites and purchase training/additional SH-60B/F Seahawks to augment the S-70B-2 Seahawks in service.

Any money spent on a new platform is going to be spent, regardless of which of the two above options is selected. As part of AIR 9000 and the rationalization of the ADF helicopter fleet, it is expected that both the Seahawk and (if it ever enters service) Seasprite will be replaced with a common helicopter. Most likely some version of the NFH-90. Scrapping the Seasprite might advance the schedule for that part of AIR 9000 (currently expected sometime between 2013-2016 IIRC) but all the same, the monies will be spent getting whatever the replacement helicopter is.
Valid point, however from someone very close to the project, all indications are the ulitmate decision will end up being a political one by an ambitious defence minister. The cost of a new platform (deferred or not) seems likely be incurred by a new government within the next 12 months. Lets hope the the current Defence ministers eagerness to commit $billions to unfunded programs has left something in the bank. I have a feeling this will be revisted in another 5-10 years when the blame game will start again.
 

gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
The odds are shortening for kaman.

The chances of them ending up at woomera are getting more and more likely.
 

gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
What would happen to them there? :shudder

Cheers
Woomera is our little Davis Monthan graveyard. Its where we parked the miracles prior to on-sale, and where PNG/Sandlines Mi-24 Gunship and Mi-7 troopy spent their holidays.

edit.

I actually have no idea where the russian gunship and troopys are now though, they were also on holiday at Tindal for a while. I'm unsure as to whether they're still black bagged as the Sandline penalties etc are still in a state of flux (IIRC)
 
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blueorchid

Member
The odds are shortening for kaman.

The chances of them ending up at woomera are getting more and more likely.
I think you will find that the PM,Treasure,Finance Minister and a few others have rolled the Defence Minister and the Defence Department according to a few reports coming out of Canberra.

Cheers
 

gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
I think you will find that the PM,Treasure,Finance Minister and a few others have rolled the Defence Minister and the Defence Department according to a few reports coming out of Canberra.

Cheers
well, either way, I hope they're starting to learn their lessons on the dangers of virtual project management.

it would be a little travesty to have those helos shortlisted for a tape up job when so much money has been pumped in.

I remember having meetings with Sverdrup in 2000 and "certification was just around the corner". :eek:nfloorl:
 
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alexsa

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
well, either way, I hope they're starting to learn their lessons on the dangers of virtual project management.

it would be a little travesty to have those helos shortlisted for a tape up job when so much money has been pumped in.

I remember having meetings with Sverdrup in 2000 and "certification was just around the corner". :eek:nfloorl:
Do you see any value in getting them in service even as an interim measure pending full development of NH-90? The certification issue does seem to be partly a DoD stuff up.
 
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