Middle East Defence & Security

[Big_Zucchini]

Interesting. Would it be your assertion that if a high-rise residential building housing many Palestinian civilians in Gaza, who stubbornly refused to leave, would still be standing right now, with no evidence of Hamas activity, then Israel would refrain from targeting it, even if the presence of civilians ran contrary to Israeli political objectives?

If civilians refuse to evacuate and that information was verifiable, then Israel would most likely refrain from targeting it. We can see that one building was destroyed an hour after a warning was issued, and another a full 24 hours later.

If civilians had evacuated and the IDF was left with the dilemma of what to do with an empty building, then regardless of whether Hamas had set up inside, it is possible that the building would be struck. It is not an assertion that it would be struck, which is what you inferred earlier. It is my personal assessment.
A high rise building:

1. Provides a clear military advantage if used later by Hamas.
2. May be more difficult to evacuate again later if CAS is requested by ground units on a threat inside or on the building.
3. Leaves ample room to suspect hard-to-verify infrastructure and activities such as tunnel shafts, explosive-laden walls/structures, weapons caches and other IEDs and equipment.

Therefore it would be logical to demolish them.
In a ground maneuver into Gaza City, which has already begun, high rise buildings must go. That's a hard reality of urban warfare. You remove everything high level.
The issue of civilian evacuation does not affect whether a high rise building is struck. It most likely only affects whether that decision is made sooner, or deferred to a later point in time.
Given that evacuating civilians is the highest priority and an enabler for a ground maneuver, I assessed that the time to do it is sooner rather than later.

You said that there was Hamas infrastructure there. But at no point did you say that it was the reason why they struck the building. Instead, read in sequence, your posts seem to state that the reason for strike was "to reduce living space in Gaza City to make it a worse QoL alternative to Mawasi

My comment referred solely to the timing.

and the excuse, fig leaf, bullshit reason provided to the world was "That building was likely in the target bank, meaning it was likely incriminated beforehand with intel of usage by Hamas". You either failed to understand what I'm saying or intentionally ignored it. I'm asking, what was the motivation for the strike? What was the reason?

The standard strike procedure is neither an excuse nor bullshit. It is the baseline for every strike. Then military strategy affects how to handle the target bank. It is an additive element.

The reasons are multiple. Explained in comments above. To summarize, speculation:
Reasons:

1. Deny military advantage.
2. Deny strategy.

Timing:

1. Ground operations are ongoing.
2. To assist in evacuation order.
3. To pressure for deal.

Ok, not re-read your original post. Anything in there about Hamas operatives? Anything in there about it being filled with enemy combatants? How do you not understand why I asked what I asked?

Numerous buildings were struck. I am aware of footage coming from at least one of them, via Hamas's media channels. I am not aware of combatants being inside at the moment of strike or beforehand.

You explained in a follow-on post what would in principle provide justification. My reply was to the original post where no such information was contained.

Nor should there be. The standard strike procedure is to be assumed. If you have any question about how the IDF operates, feel free to ask. But I realize that sometimes I write walls of text so I assumed making a shorter, simpler post would suffice. I was unaware that the standard procedure was unknown to you.

1. Again, what is the reason for the strike? 2. How is the target bank generated? 3. Was in there in fact intel at the time of the strike that the target building was being used by Hamas? 4. Consider your original claim and current, feverish backpedaling. 5. You're seemingly willing to admin that Israel's intent is to destroy civilian housing in order to remove civilian population, but rapidly back away from that when challenged.

You start by making an assertion, and only proceed with questions you do not expect to be answered, but if you'd known the answer to them before the assertion, you wouldn't make it.
1. The reasons for the strike are multiple. See answers above.

2. The target bank is generated via intelligence. I don't know how much you know about military intelligence, but there are hundreds, if not thousands of sources of information and methods that could feed a target bank. Sometimes it's visual, sometimes it's a wiretap, sometimes it's special means. My service revolved around those special means.
Sometimes from a local maneuvering unit, sometimes artillery, and sometimes from an air force wing. The possibilities are endless.

When intelligence is sufficient to create a full picture, you have a target ready to execute in the bank. Depending on target, some intelligence will have to be periodically refreshed. If you're striking a soft moving target or a populated area, you may also need real time surveillance. Other targets may require that for BDA.

Then you move onto execution. Specialists from multiple disciplines weigh in on a per need basis, to determine the complete strike profile. What munitions are used, at what speed they're dropped, from what angle, and so on.

3. It is highly likely there was real time intelligence on the building at the time of the strike.

4. I did not backpedal. I elaborated. Why you ask questions with such aggressive tone is your issue, not mine. Are you taking offense in me taking the time to answer your questions?

5. It seems like I backed away because I never said such thing. But if you read carefully my previous comments you will understand.

"But if destroying civilians housing is the target, not because of Hamas forces at that point in time operating out of there, but to force civilians out, that's an entirely different story."

Do you disagree with that being a different story? If so, fine, we can disagree... I guess.... somehow.... but where do you find a claim in what you quoted?

You aggressively imply that the buildings were struck solely to force civilians out and for no other legitimate military advantage. Since I made no such claim for you to pick at, I can assume you are making that claim.
Can you prove that the strikes did not achieve military advantage and that they did not follow the standard strike procedure?

 

[Feanor]

If civilians refuse to evacuate and that information was verifiable, then Israel would most likely refrain from targeting it. We can see that one building was destroyed an hour after a warning was issued, and another a full 24 hours later.

If civilians had evacuated and the IDF was left with the dilemma of what to do with an empty building, then regardless of whether Hamas had set up inside, it is possible that the building would be struck. It is not an assertion that it would be struck, which is what you inferred earlier. It is my personal assessment.
A high rise building:

1. Provides a clear military advantage if used later by Hamas.
2. May be more difficult to evacuate again later if CAS is requested by ground units on a threat inside or on the building.
3. Leaves ample room to suspect hard-to-verify infrastructure and activities such as tunnel shafts, explosive-laden walls/structures, weapons caches and other IEDs and equipment.

Therefore it would be logical to demolish them.
In a ground maneuver into Gaza City, which has already begun, high rise buildings must go. That's a hard reality of urban warfare. You remove everything high level.
The issue of civilian evacuation does not affect whether a high rise building is struck. It most likely only affects whether that decision is made sooner, or deferred to a later point in time.
Given that evacuating civilians is the highest priority and an enabler for a ground maneuver, I assessed that the time to do it is sooner rather than later.

My comment referred solely to the timing.

It didn't come across that way. It came across as though the intent of the strike was destroying civilian housing. I don't know that your claim is correct, because you state that high rise buildings "have to go" while simultaneously stating that Israel wouldn't strike them if civilians stubbornly refused to leave. The timing statement seems to be about giving civilians enough time to exit. What happens if they don't intend to exit? Ever? The high-rise is left standing? But I'll submit, I'm certainly not the expert on Israeli procedure here. I hope you're correct, and Israel would refrain from striking a building full of civilians that declined to evacuate.

The standard strike procedure is neither an excuse nor bullshit. It is the baseline for every strike. Then military strategy affects how to handle the target bank. It is an additive element.

One can come up with a standard strike procedure that's designed to provide a substantive method to comply with international and domestic law, while executing the command's intent. One can also come up with a standard strike procedure that's intended to provide minimal formal compliance while substantively allowing you to strike more or less whatever you want. If the intent of a military strike is to destroy civilian housing for the purpose of driving civilians out of an area, and the standard procedure is used as justification, then it is in fact bullshit. Please note the conditionals there.

The reasons are multiple. Explained in comments above. To summarize, speculation:
Reasons:

1. Deny military advantage.
2. Deny strategy.

Timing:

1. Ground operations are ongoing.
2. To assist in evacuation order.
3. To pressure for deal.

Numerous buildings were struck. I am aware of footage coming from at least one of them, via Hamas's media channels. I am not aware of combatants being inside at the moment of strike or beforehand.


Nor should there be. The standard strike procedure is to be assumed. If you have any question about how the IDF operates, feel free to ask. But I realize that sometimes I write walls of text so I assumed making a shorter, simpler post would suffice. I was unaware that the standard procedure was unknown to you.

It is reasonable to assume that, even on a relevant forum such as this, something as specific as the standard strike procedure for a given country is not widely known or well understood. If we were in the Russo-Ukrainian War Thread, would it be fair to assume you were familiar with and understood the standard strike procedures for both sides? Again my response was to your post, to what you wrote.

You start by making an assertion, and only proceed with questions you do not expect to be answered, but if you'd known the answer to them before the assertion, you wouldn't make it.
1. The reasons for the strike are multiple. See answers above.

2. The target bank is generated via intelligence. I don't know how much you know about military intelligence, but there are hundreds, if not thousands of sources of information and methods that could feed a target bank. Sometimes it's visual, sometimes it's a wiretap, sometimes it's special means. My service revolved around those special means.
Sometimes from a local maneuvering unit, sometimes artillery, and sometimes from an air force wing. The possibilities are endless.

When intelligence is sufficient to create a full picture, you have a target ready to execute in the bank. Depending on target, some intelligence will have to be periodically refreshed. If you're striking a soft moving target or a populated area, you may also need real time surveillance. Other targets may require that for BDA.

Then you move onto execution. Specialists from multiple disciplines weigh in on a per need basis, to determine the complete strike profile. What munitions are used, at what speed they're dropped, from what angle, and so on.

3. It is highly likely there was real time intelligence on the building at the time of the strike.

4. I did not backpedal. I elaborated. Why you ask questions with such aggressive tone is your issue, not mine. Are you taking offense in me taking the time to answer your questions?

5. It seems like I backed away because I never said such thing. But if you read carefully my previous comments you will understand.


You aggressively imply that the buildings were struck solely to force civilians out and for no other legitimate military advantage. Since I made no such claim for you to pick at, I can assume you are making that claim.
Can you prove that the strikes did not achieve military advantage and that they did not follow the standard strike procedure?

I find it hard to interpret what you wrote in that initial post I replied to as anything other than a claim that the purpose of the strike was to destroy civilian housing for the purpose of driving them out of the area.

 

[Big_Zucchini]

It is reasonable to assume that, even on a relevant forum such as this, something as specific as the standard strike procedure for a given country is not widely known or well understood. If we were in the Russo-Ukrainian War Thread, would it be fair to assume you were familiar with and understood the standard strike procedures for both sides? Again my response was to your post, to what you wrote.

I wouldn't care to look up the specific strike procedure. That changes constantly with the ever changing methodology of intelligence gathering and personnel structure. I would attempt to deduce from combat documentation. For example on both sides I see mass usage of OWA drones with GPS/INS navigation and no long range datalink and sensory. So I deduce real time intelligence is not a critical element at least in depth strikes.
But I see high end drones informing FPV strikes, so on the frontline I deduce that it is important. However, the expectations from both sides are lower because they have the luxury of fighting in a relatively sterile environment (relative to Gaza), with the fighting occurring mostly on open ground, between uniformed combatants. From that I deduce that there is no need for a robust mechanism such as that used in the IDF. It would only be detrimental.

On Ukraine-Russia I comment on what I am confident that I know. What I don't know, I try not to formulate opinions on.

 

[seaspear]

There has been some debate on the effectiveness of earlier bunker busting weapons used it looks like there has been some needs identified with that particular bomb

GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator's Replacement Prototypes Just Ordered By USAF

The GBU-57 MOP, made famous by the strikes on Iran's nuclear sites, is getting a replacement with prototypes now on the way.

www.twz.com

 

[John Fedup]

There has been some debate on the effectiveness of earlier bunker busting weapons used it looks like there has been some needs identified with that particular bomb

GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator's Replacement Prototypes Just Ordered By USAF

The GBU-57 MOP, made famous by the strikes on Iran's nuclear sites, is getting a replacement with prototypes now on the way.

www.twz.com

Probably some issues but they won't be discussed in public. WRT the replacement bomb, one reason may be a smaller version that would allow the B-21 to carry 2 bombs. Whether a smaller version will be as effective or more so, time will tell.

 

[Big_Zucchini]

There has been some debate on the effectiveness of earlier bunker busting weapons used it looks like there has been some needs identified with that particular bomb

GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator's Replacement Prototypes Just Ordered By USAF

The GBU-57 MOP, made famous by the strikes on Iran's nuclear sites, is getting a replacement with prototypes now on the way.

www.twz.com

The MOP is an old weapon in 2025. And if we believe open sources, then its production is far below adequate levels.
There is of course reason to believe it entered service earlier and produced more than publicly stated.
But for the sake of the debate, there's a lot of room between the GBU-72 (5,000lbs class) and GBU-57 (30,000lbs).
Not only in weight, but also in capabilities. They rightfully list options like boosted weapons - can allow smaller, lighter weapons for carriage on more aircraft. And standoff weapons, which would often be a necessity in contested airspace.

ALBMs are an emerging weapon, already used by Israel in Iran and by India in Pakistan. And of course by Russia in Ukraine. Their very high impact velocity and efficient flight make them capable standoff, powered weapons, in lighter and smaller form.

 

[Big_Zucchini]

Very nice. Qatar is the final adversary and now it's hit.

Qatar's not an axis member. It has its own ambitions. It even has the US maintaining a huge base there, so it's inherently shielded short term. But I'm glad it's finally getting a taste of the war it spent so much effort expanding.

Per unofficial reports, Israel is targeting senior Hamas officials.

I agree with this assessment. Israel wants a hostage deal, and that's a good way to boost chances.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1965400027326808498

Additional reports talking about airstrikes but I'll wait til confirmation on that. Usually that's a task for Mossad.

EDIT: "Senior official" says assassination op against Hamas figures.

 

[Big_Zucchini]

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1965403047556780348

 

[KipPotapych]

In the past few months, Israel has bombed Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, Qatar, of course the ongoing war in Gaza, the West Bank. Am I missing something?

Hard to imagine that Qatar hasn’t been warned. Otherwise, security cooperation with the US has just lost quite a bit of meaning.

Edit: Well, maybe not:



To add:



Last add, though speculative at this time, this is the attack on Iran textbook, basically:



Ok, one more thought: what are the chances Article 5 being tested in Turkey at some point in time, while everyone expects the unlikely test to take place in Europe? They are definitely not zero and far from it.

 

[Big_Zucchini]

In the past few months, Israel has bombed Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, Qatar, of course the ongoing war in Gaza, the West Bank. Am I missing something?

Iraq? I don't remember strikes in Iraq. Iraq fired on Israel, but Israel didn't respond. Nor do I think that's a good idea, in CENTCOM AOR. But I think CENTCOM should have generally been more responsive to PMF activities which has been more of a problem to them than they are for Israel.

This is an 8 front war, of which 1 is the diaspora everywhere. Qatar wasn't one, nor do I think this single likely coordinated strike makes it one. This was not a strike directed at Qatar itself, and we have reasons to believe Qatar was highly interested in it as well.

Hard to imagine that Qatar hasn’t been warned. Otherwise, security cooperation with the US has just lost quite a bit of meaning.

Edit: Well, maybe not:

For its size, Qatar has quite potent armed forces. I do not know about competence, but they do have significant air defense assets, numerous and high quality.
They also share information, likely automatically due to timing constraints, with local US forces. It is almost inconceivable they had no warning or even significant self defense capability when surprised.

What John Ridge says is not entirely relevant. It is true that radars are often directional, and that Iran is an area of focus, but Iran also possesses missiles and munitions that require a hemispherical sensory coverage.

Last add, though speculative at this time, this is the attack on Iran textbook

This is a basic principle in warfare. Taking out your opponent's C2. Pager operation done that in Lebanon. Constant hunting of new leadership of Hamas in Gaza. The recent semi-decapitation strike in Yemen. The chicken is much less scary when beheaded. Actually not, but you get the point.

Ok, one more thought: what are the chances Article 5 being tested in Turkey at some point in time, while everyone expects the unlikely test to take place in Europe? They are definitely not zero and far from it.

Against what? A Russian attack? Iranian?
Turkey is geographically vital for NATO so it's not going anywhere, but Turkey's also subject to the most skepticism about its role in NATO. Couple that with a toothless EuroNATO, and rearmament solely to focus on Russia and that mainly on the eastern front, and you get a NATO that probably won't lift a finger no matter how hard Turkey begs for Article 5.
I can see the US helping it but the scope of it is anyone's guess.

 

[Feanor]

Iraq? I don't remember strikes in Iraq. Iraq fired on Israel, but Israel didn't respond. Nor do I think that's a good idea, in CENTCOM AOR. But I think CENTCOM should have generally been more responsive to PMF activities which has been more of a problem to them than they are for Israel.

This is an 8 front war, of which 1 is the diaspora everywhere. Qatar wasn't one, nor do I think this single likely coordinated strike makes it one. This was not a strike directed at Qatar itself, and we have reasons to believe Qatar was highly interested in it as well.


For its size, Qatar has quite potent armed forces. I do not know about competence, but they do have significant air defense assets, numerous and high quality.
They also share information, likely automatically due to timing constraints, with local US forces. It is almost inconceivable they had no warning or even significant self defense capability when surprised.

What John Ridge says is not entirely relevant. It is true that radars are often directional, and that Iran is an area of focus, but Iran also possesses missiles and munitions that require a hemispherical sensory coverage.

It makes me wonder if Qatar was in on it and gave permission for this strike. In other words, unlike the media spin I've seen, Israel didn't surprise attack a US ally but instead conducted a coordinated strike with US and Qatari approval and support.

Against what? A Russian attack? Iranian?
Turkey is geographically vital for NATO so it's not going anywhere, but Turkey's also subject to the most skepticism about its role in NATO. Couple that with a toothless EuroNATO, and rearmament solely to focus on Russia and that mainly on the eastern front, and you get a NATO that probably won't lift a finger no matter how hard Turkey begs for Article 5.
I can see the US helping it but the scope of it is anyone's guess.

Ok, one more thought: what are the chances Article 5 being tested in Turkey at some point in time, while everyone expects the unlikely test to take place in Europe? They are definitely not zero and far from it.

Yeah I'm at a loss here. The closest Turkey came to testing Article 5 was when they shot down a Russian Su-24M for allegedly violating their airspace for 17 seconds, in a spectacular display of hypocrisy. And the outcome wasn't in their favor. At that point it really did look like Russia was ready to escalate in unpleasant ways if things went in a bad direction. Instead Turkey checked their cards, and sat aside while Russia, in retaliation, pummeled Turkish-backed groups in northern Syria (iirc tied to the Grey Wolves). Who else would test Article 5 vis-a-vis Turkey? They're certainly not friends with Greece but tensions there seem to be lower then they have been historically and it seems unlikely that Greece would play the aggressor. Russian involvement in Syria has gone down to a minimum, and while Russia is certainly busy in Ukraine, it doesn't mean Turkey would benefit from trying to attack Russian bases in Syria. And Iran is already having a hard time dealing with Israel.

 

[Big_Zucchini]

It makes me wonder if Qatar was in on it and gave permission for this strike. In other words, unlike the media spin I've seen, Israel didn't surprise attack a US ally but instead conducted a coordinated strike with US and Qatari approval and support

For what it's worth, I've heard a pretty compelling argument that Qatar was in some perfect storm for that strike:
1. Pressured by USA to pressure Hamas, but limited in options.
2. Spider web of influence projects across the western world is being increasingly talked about and unraveled in conventional media.
3. Hamas presence contributes to a negative image Qatar wants to shed.
4. But Qatar cannot assassinate Hamas figures without hurting other aspects of its image. Getting Israel to do it gets the effect at lower cost.
5. Next generation negotiation team presents opportunity to gain image of an effective mediator.

Do with this theory as you wish.

Yeah I'm at a loss here. The closest Turkey came to testing Article 5 was...

Article 5 is generally misunderstood. Nothing prevents NATO allies from assisting even without Article 5.
And nothing mandates NATO allies to go much beyond an angry letter when Article 5 is invoked.
Turkey plays more by leverage than favor with others. And it has little leverage in Europe.

 

[spoz]

I wonder when the US will say “enough” to Israel? While the man might be a legitimate target in other scenarios, you can’t have talks without both sides being involved. And to strike in the capital of an ally, or at least an (up until now possibly) friendly nation to the nation who is your major supporter? Madness. I know the pro Israeli lobby in the US is powerful, but really.

 

[MARKMILES77]

I wonder when the US will say “enough” to Israel? While the man might be a legitimate target in other scenarios, you can’t have talks without both sides being involved. And to strike in the capital of an ally, or at least an (up until now possibly) friendly nation to the nation who is your major supporter? Madness. I know the pro Israeli lobby in the US is powerful, but really.

If you kill the people who are negotiating a ceasefire, clearly your aim is to make sure there will be no ceasefire.

 

[Big_Zucchini]

Bit of an over-reaction to the news. The real world is less technical than that.
New Hamas leadership might get personal immunity for a deal. US might get a negotiated end to the war. Israel might get its hostages back. Qatar might regain some good optics.
Seems like a win-win-win-win situation to me.

 

[MARKMILES77]

Bit of an over-reaction to the news. The real world is less technical than that.
New Hamas leadership might get personal immunity for a deal. US might get a negotiated end to the war. Israel might get its hostages back. Qatar might regain some good optics.
Seems like a win-win-win-win situation to me.

I am beginning to wonder whether, for the Israeli Government, getting the hostages back seems like a lose-lose-lose situation.

 

[Big_Zucchini]

I am beginning to wonder whether, for the Israeli Government, getting the hostages back seems like a lose-lose-lose situation.

Why would it be?

 

[KipPotapych]

Iraq? I don't remember strikes in Iraq. Iraq fired on Israel, but Israel didn't respond. Nor do I think that's a good idea, in CENTCOM AOR. But I think CENTCOM should have generally been more responsive to PMF activities which has been more of a problem to them than they are for Israel.

Perhaps, my memory is failing me here. Or, perhaps, a “few months” was too short of a timeline I suggested, for the same reason.

What John Ridge says is not entirely relevant. It is true that radars are often directional, and that Iran is an area of focus, but Iran also possesses missiles and munitions that require a hemispherical sensory coverage.

We are in agreement here.

This is a basic principle in warfare. Taking out your opponent's C2. Pager operation done that in Lebanon. Constant hunting of new leadership of Hamas in Gaza. The recent semi-decapitation strike in Yemen. The chicken is much less scary when beheaded. Actually not, but you get the point.

None of the examples you cited involved the US and ongoing negotiations (basically ran by the US and Trump in particular). Neither Iran nor this was a basic principle in warfare from the American (ordinary) perspective; and especially perspective of some other negotiating side of the future that involves the US. No one trusts Israel exactly because this is their basic principle in warfare. The US, on the other hand, has quite a bit to lose here.

For what it's worth, I've heard a pretty compelling argument that Qatar was in some perfect storm for that strike:
1. Pressured by USA to pressure Hamas, but limited in options.
2. Spider web of influence projects across the western world is being increasingly talked about and unraveled in conventional media.
3. Hamas presence contributes to a negative image Qatar wants to shed.
4. But Qatar cannot assassinate Hamas figures without hurting other aspects of its image. Getting Israel to do it gets the effect at lower cost.
5. Next generation negotiation team presents opportunity to gain image of an effective mediator.

Do with this theory as you wish.

Too many leaks in this theory, in my opinion. Numbers 2 and 3 are overrated (in fact, I read various “conventional media” outlets daily and see zero evidence for 3 - reminds me of the right of the right folks complaining about “conventional media” skipping specific reports, while never reading “conventional media” and the said reporting by the very media). Number 1 and 4 are essentially the same thing. At the end of the day, Qatar could remove the said figures from their territory without assassinations. Furthermore, getting Israel to do it shows weakness beyond recovery, which makes 5 an impossibility. Qatar is no longer a mediator. The simplest thing to realize here is that everyone else thinks that the same points (may) apply.

It makes me wonder if Qatar was in on it and gave permission for this strike. In other words, unlike the media spin I've seen, Israel didn't surprise attack a US ally but instead conducted a coordinated strike with US and Qatari approval and support.

That’s what it seems. I came just short of writing exactly that in my previous post. I am not convinced this is the case though for various reasons (some mentioned above). Perhaps, not everything is what seems? Too much thought here on my part? Who knows. Hopefully, we will get a better picture in the days to come.

Article 5 is generally misunderstood. Nothing prevents NATO allies from assisting even without Article 5.
And nothing mandates NATO allies to go much beyond an angry letter when Article 5 is invoked.
Turkey plays more by leverage than favor with others. And it has little leverage in Europe.

We are in complete agreement here again, Big Z (two in one go is getting weird; laughing). I talked about it on several occasions in the RU-UA war thread. I am of the opinion that if reality hits the fan, many would be surprised by the number of “thoughts and prayers” messages of support. This is exactly why everyone who thinks they are at risk insists on the American troops being stationed on their soil and preferably in the area where the potential attack is to take place. Very little else matters today (aside from and mainly personal capabilities, which most of everyone completely disregards). Which is why there are increased talks of nuke sharing in Europe and why Ukraine is reluctant to agree to “other security guarantees”. Today’s events, however, cast a shadow on this arrangement as well.

Bit of an over-reaction to the news. The real world is less technical than that.
New Hamas leadership might get personal immunity for a deal. US might get a negotiated end to the war. Israel might get its hostages back. Qatar might regain some good optics.
Seems like a win-win-win-win situation to me.

Who will believe this guaranteed immunity? If the immunity is to be relevant/believed, it must be assumed that one must accept the proposed deal, for one thing. What is the good optics for Qatar to regain? Hamas is Hamas, regardless of age of the leadership. They are terrorists in the eye of any reasonable person. Hosting old or new blood is the same. And right back to your suggested theory too.


@Feanor and Big Z, the Article 5 testing theory I proposed. With Iraq basically dismantled, Syria in ruins, Iran as weak as it had ever been (reasonably speaking) and no longer a credible threat for the foreseeable future (unless they get the nukes cooked with reliable means of delivery), Turkey remains the only credible threat and the only competitor in the region. For Israel, of course. If Turkey were put in the same position as the aforementioned “used-to-be-players”, Israel becomes the absolute power in the Middles East, which also brings the best security arrangements for the country. This isn’t a next year plan, of course; it’s a long-term game and the ideal result for Israel. So in my theory, it is Israel that will be testing the Article 5 and, in today’s environment (doubt it would be any different in the future, except it could be less credible), it is pretty clear that no one will come for help. Turkey’s that is.

 

[MARKMILES77]

Why would it be?

Who knows for sure but there seems to be no great urgency to get the hostages back and in fact actions like the Qatar bombing seem
aimed at sabotaging any negotiations for the release of hostages.

One can speculate at motives:

The justification for completely destroying Gaza would be reduced, which might interfere with a plan to drive Palestinians from Gaza and incorporate it into Israel.
Or perhaps the Government is worried people will turn against it when the country is no longer united behind the goal of getting the hostages back.
I am sure there are others.

 

[Big_Zucchini]

None of the examples you cited involved the US and ongoing negotiations (basically ran by the US and Trump in particular). Neither Iran nor this was a basic principle in warfare from the American (ordinary) perspective; and especially perspective of some other negotiating side of the future that involves the US. No one trusts Israel exactly because this is their basic principle in warfare. The US, on the other hand, has quite a bit to lose here.

I was referring solely to taking out an enemy's C2. It's a primary effort we see in every war. I don't quite understand what you're saying here. Are you saying Israel is not involving the US in its operations and that it's bad? If so, then I think it's only a half truth, and positive.
The US is certainly involved in these operations. Mostly not kinetically, but informationally. There's tight coordination between Israel & USA, from strategy to real time intel.
Israel is an outlier in the assortment of US allies. Typically US allies depend heavily on cooperative military actions with the US, but said allies typically also neglect some of their own military capacity to create that dependence. It's not a good dependence. The US probably does not appreciate spending treasure on something it expects its allies to do on their own. These alliances should really be geared toward a partner coming to another's aid in extraordinary circumstances. Given the number of allies the US has, even small deployments accumulate to a serious burden taking away from the US's own commitments.
I'm sure the US sees positively how Israel informs and cooperates with it politically, and conducts the kinetic part independently. And as far as extraordinary circumstances, the US only kinetically came to Israel's aid in the air defense mission against Iran.

Qatar could remove the said figures from their territory without assassinations.

Not while remaining a mediator, which is a source of prestige and important point of relevance beyond the usual energy trade.

Furthermore, getting Israel to do it shows weakness beyond recovery, which makes 5 an impossibility. Qatar is no longer a mediator. The simplest thing to realize here is that everyone else thinks that the same points (may) apply.

Qatar is not a strong state. It is well equipped relative to its size, but in absolute terms and due to geopolitical considerations it's a pushover. Incompetence is also the common theme for Arab armed forces. And I don't think Qatar has cared much about creating an image of military strength for itself. To the contrary, an image of military weakness may support its soft influence projects. Because culturally western societies correlate strength with aggression, and weakness with victimhood.
Getting stomped is not out of the question for Arab states, and historically they are deeply inclined to do so. Portraying Israel as an aggressor is also a cultural fixation. Look at Hamas for example. They say they are strong, and simultaneously that the Aggressive Zionist Entity is brutalizing them. And it works for them. They're very popular in J&S even though they don't control it.
So I wouldn't say it's impossible.

There may be fewer Hamasniks in Doha, but I don't think Qatar finished its job as a mediator. I think it very much wants to continue mediating, and Hamas has plenty of people outside of Gaza. I also believe some Hamasniks in Doha were left alive on purpose.

Who will believe this guaranteed immunity? If the immunity is to be relevant/believed, it must be assumed that one must accept the proposed deal, for one thing.

There are ways to guarantee it. For example letting them relocate to Russia or elsewhere. In Qatar, Iran, and Turkey they're not safe. But there are options.

What is the good optics for Qatar to regain? Hamas is Hamas, regardless of age of the leadership. They are terrorists in the eye of any reasonable person. Hosting old or new blood is the same. And right back to your suggested theory too.

If the war can come to a negotiated end, Qatar would be viewed as the one who stopped the war and saved Palestinians, and gain reputation as a proven broker of peace.

They are terrorists in the eye of any reasonable person. Hosting old or new blood is the same. And right back to your suggested theory too.

Qatar is not aiming for the sane person. And sanity may no longer have a clear definition.
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@Feanor and Big Z, the Article 5 testing theory I proposed. With Iraq basically dismantled, Syria in ruins, Iran as weak as it had ever been (reasonably speaking) and no longer a credible threat for the foreseeable future (unless they get the nukes cooked with reliable means of delivery), Turkey remains the only credible threat and the only competitor in the region. For Israel, of course. If Turkey were put in the same position as the aforementioned “used-to-be-players”, Israel becomes the absolute power in the Middles East, which also brings the best security arrangements for the country. This isn’t a next year plan, of course; it’s a long-term game and the ideal result for Israel. So in my theory, it is Israel that will be testing the Article 5 and, in today’s environment (doubt it would be any different in the future, except it could be less credible), it is pretty clear that no one will come for help. Turkey’s that is.

There is an ongoing proxy war between the two in Syria. But there's more bark than bite in Turkey's militant rhetoric. They say they want to liberate Jerusalem but practically they very much enjoy the Israeli-Azerbaijani-Turkish energy trade. Eventually this rhetoric will radicalize a large enough number of Turkish youth, but for now it doesn't translate to meaningful hostile action.

Who knows for sure but there seems to be no great urgency to get the hostages back and in fact actions like the Qatar bombing seem
aimed at sabotaging any negotiations for the release of hostages.

Politically, Netanyahu is in a pickle. I know superficial wisdom says wars are some escape mechanism for endangered politicians, but in Israel it's the complete opposite.
For as long as the war goes on, Netanyahu cannot relieve himself of political pressure exerted by 3 sources:

1. Reservists (entire political spectrum) - Overburdened with reserve duty, calling for normalcy and relief.
2. Haredim (political allies) - Threatened with mandatory conscription and removal of subsidies by pressure from reservists and judiciary, calling for exemption from service and resumption of subsidies.
3. Hostages families (mostly opposition) - Calling to accept any deal.

None of these applies mere light pressure. The ceasefire deal with Lebanon and Hezbollah gave him a popularity boost. And so did every hostage deal. The war with Iran gave him an initial boost, and then so did the ceasefire because it was a quick end.
If the war doesn't end by mid-late 2026, Netanyahu is widely expected to lose the elections by a significant margin. If the war ends soon, Netanyahu has a fair chance of scraping a slight majority.

I also don't think the negotiations were sabotaged. The US offered a new deal, all hostages. Hamas kept refusing for months and showed no signs of budging. What negotiations can you have with someone that chronically rejects everything? Someone will take their place and keep negotiating from a new position. Hopefully a worse one for Hamas, and one that has a better chance of returning the hostages.

The justification for completely destroying Gaza would be reduced, which might interfere with a plan to drive Palestinians from Gaza and incorporate it into Israel.

The Palestinians are unlikely to be driven out of Gaza. Despite rhetoric, Israel isn't showing signs of moving anything in that direction. Even Palestinians who can feasibly get a ticket out, are not getting it easy from Israel in terms of handling the bureaucracy and logistics. Ironic, considering one might assume Israel would want them to leave en masse.
A plan I detailed over a year ago on this forum, called the Eiland Plan, calls for the evacuation of Gaza City and the annexation of territory north of Wadi Gaza. This is to create strategic depth.
I personally agree with this, because Israel is sorely lacking in strategic depth after negotiating it all away in Camp David to Egypt, and in Oslo to the PA. But there's no talk or political feasibility to incorporate the entire Gaza.

Habesor stream leading to the Wadi Gaza river valley in Gaza. A natural border of sorts.


But there are more solutions to the problem. The main one is de-radicalization. At least a generation, preferably more, of a controlled education system in Gaza and J&S, that un-teaches to kill Jews. If that can happen, I won't mind if Israel retains the current borders.

Or perhaps the Government is worried people will turn against it when the country is no longer united behind the goal of getting the hostages back.
I am sure there are others.

Unfortunately protests in Israel won't help. Things will be decided in the elections.