Middle East Defence & Security

Yama

New Member
What precedent?
The one quoted in the message.

Inheritance is enshrined in the principle of Uti Possidetis Juris, through which states defined their borders both before and long after Israel did. Ukraine and Jordan are examples that were raised and explained here.
'Inheritance' was created to prevent any outside power claiming territories of former state were 'terra nullius'. Actually, whole concept works against you here, as it means that West Bank and Gaza are not 'terra nullius' and thus not open to annexation and exploitation by an outside power, such as Israel.
 

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
The one quoted in the message.
I understand your reference to the event. I asked what the precedent actually is.

Example:
"X vs Y trial" is the event.
"Parking on the sidewalk is now legal" is the essence of the precedent, and the part I am asking about.
My question was quite clear. I do not understand the general refusal to elaborate here.

'Inheritance' was created to prevent any outside power claiming territories of former state were 'terra nullius'. Actually, whole concept works against you here, as it means that West Bank and Gaza are not 'terra nullius' and thus not open to annexation and exploitation by an outside power, such as Israel.
If Israel is the outside power:
1. Who is the inheritor? Who was its first leader, and when is its date of foundation? Within what territories?

2. Why did Britain designate Israel specifically as an inheritor (Balfour declaration serving as declaration of intent)?

3. When and where did Britain designate Gaza and J&S as terra nullius that would not be inherited?

Fact is Britain left the entire area now considered Israel, J&S, and Gaza, minus Golan. It deferred diplomatic settlement between ethnic groups to the UN, which ultimately failed because its proposal was rejected.

The Arab nations, being the foreign power you referenced, invaded and occupied Gaza and J&S. Your "Terra Nullius" refers to them (Egypt and Jordan) as occupiers, not Israel.
In 1947-1948 there was no single Palestinian leadership or identity, and even by 1967 they had no intent for statehood. They were much more active in that front in Jordan.

So why would international law account for Palestinian statehood when there was no such thing in 1948, and even in 2025 there is no Palestinian intent for statehood?
Fact is that if Israel succeeded in 1948 to defend Gaza and J&S from the Arab nations, none would treat these any differently from other Israeli territory.

Finally, international law is by far the most "in spirit, not word" legal system out there.
So if the spirit of Uti Possidetis Juris is to discourage territorial conflicts against secessionists, then designating Gaza and J&S as separate stateless unclaimable territories, is exactly in opposition to the spirit, as it encourages, not discourages conflict.

EDIT: Note for @Feanor . The elevated status of spirit is particularly important to our debate. I should have raised it earlier. Although you haven't found any Israeli violation of the UN charter in regards to Gaza and J&S, you invoke it frequently and say it is binding. While some of its articles say that some of its resolutions may be binding, the legitimacy of the entire charter is tarred by the fact that the one charter's most frequent violators is the UN itself. It actively takes part in military actions against members and aggressively violates IHL, even right now by refusing to provide appropriate care for its hostages, and previously by knowingly employing Hamas and Hezbollah, including those who took part in the invasion, and refusing to acknowledge the fact.
There are more violations than that of course.

Much like the ICC which recently lost its jurisdiction by acting against international conventions in spirit and word alike, so did the UN many years ago.
UN membership is retained for purposes other than peacekeeping, e.g. diplomatic options. But as far as being a peacekeeper, it lost that title many, many years ago and gives no reason for members to apply relevance to its charter and laws.

An example for that is the League of Nations. As soon as it was deemed irrelevant for its task, it was replaced. The UN has had its League of Nations moment a long time ago. But it grew too big, so it's just slowly rotting until it's replaced.


EDIT 2:
Final note. I will not be commenting here on international law and legality of things discussed, unless specifically asked in a non-argumentative way.
I will respond in DMs though. Just want to keep this place cleaner.
 
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Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
What Israel can do:
  1. Set up "Emirates" in J&S and Gaza - Each capable of policing but nothing more.

  2. PA and Hamas would be replaced, as are Fatah and other hostiles.

  3. Israel could start a selection process for groups that are less antagonistic and extreme.

  4. Use these groups to negotiate a longer term solution that solves territorial issues.
    1. Including perhaps a Golan model in J&S. Western half (in a moon shape) + Jordan Valley to Israel, eastern half to the Palestinians.
    2. Perimeter (2km) in Gaza and northern Gaza to Israel.
  5. In exchange, Israel opens up economical integration options for them.
    1. The minimal bar is raised far high to include de-radicalization in schools and media.
I heard a logical theory today, that Israel may accept a ceasefire agreement with Hamas with the intent of starting a civil war in Gaza, similar to Syria.
This connects to point #2. However I did not speculate on whether a ceasefire would even occur.

The most influential group in Gaza right now, except Hamas, is the Popular Forces. Its leader Yasser Abu Shabab has been increasingly featured in headlines. The inverse trend of power change between Hamas and Popular Forces, puts Gaza on a path of regime change.
Israel could stall negotiations enough to make this trend largely irreversible.

Meet Yasser Abu Shabab:
1751879582703.png
 
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Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
He explicitly names the Morag corridor but there are more.

There is the Netzarim corridor, Morag, and Philadelphi. All are strategic, each for their own reason.
  • Netzarim - Seen in the orange vertical line to the left of Gaza.
  • Philadelphi - Is essentially the Gaza-Egypt border.
  • Morag - The orange line to the right of Philadelphi.
The area between Philadelphi and Morag is where the IDF set up most of the GHF sites.
1751983728956.png

Due to the return of most hostages, civilian pressure for a deal has overall reduced, while the liberal right camp is pressuring against a deal. Political pressure from within the coalition remains seemingly unchanged, and pressure from the US is unknown. Particularly due to the reason below.

It is becoming increasingly clear that a ceasefire now may do more harm than good for Israel, especially in terms of cost to human lives. Just this morning the death of 5 soldiers (and 14 injured) has been announced, in a roadside bomb attack. This happened in an area previously cleared, from which the IDF withdrew and allowed Hamas to regain control as part of a previous ceasefire and hostage release deal.
This is not to diminish from the importance of the rescue mission and the responsibility for the hostages' fates, but is it really worth losing twice or 3 times as many in combat? This is a serious dilemma.

Anyway, Hamas is still making maximalist demands for only half of the hostages. Demands that could be very costly very soon. But tactically, if Israel stalls the talks for a bit, the combined efforts of the IDF in doing demolition in Gaza and Khan Younis; GHF in decoupling aid from Hamas; and proxies in filling up power vacuums; Israel could force Hamas to either give up most demands, or sell them to proxies in exchange for safety.
 
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