Bit of a theme here…
As is the theme of talking themselves up largely and then delivering very little and going awfully quiet once the time to actually deliver something arrives…
Something the current mob like to dismiss the previous mob over…
Yeah contractors would be concerned in some ways about programs cancelled mid stream or volumes are backed off once it gets to contract.
This article below by Sam Goldsmith(ASPI) has sparked an enormous debate in Korea about whether or not it would be feasible to sell Hyunmoo 5 to Australia. (Should they?, would they?, can they? Etc etc)
Hyunmoo 5 IRBM
Manufacturer - Hanwha
Range - Around 5,000km max depending on warhead weight
www.aspistrategist.org.au
Hyunmoo 5 IRBM
Manufacturer - Hanwha
Range - Around 5,000km max depending on warhead weight
Road-mobile ballistic missiles: a strong option for bolstering ADF self-reliance | The Strategist
If Australia needs greater defence self-reliance, it needs to field road-mobile ballistic missiles. To do that, it should partner with Israel or South Korea. Those countries have such weapons in production, so they’re well placed ...
www.aspistrategist.org.au
Are they hugely expensive? They only deliver 500kg.
FormerDirtDart
Well-Known Member
I believe you're off by around 7,500kg
Thought I read maximum range was with 500kg payload, happy to be wrong though.
Why? Did Indonesia have a long conversation with us before buying the Kahn ballistic missile from Turkey? Or Rafale for that matter?
I find it a curious situation that we are described as “destabilising” if we don’t fully brief our neighbours about our purchases, but they are free to buy what they need with radio silence coming from their direction…
Bluey 006
Active Member
A one or two ton payload at a range of 5,000 km is both plausible and consistent with the size and design of Hyunmoo-V missile. Claims suggesting that this range only applies to significantly lighter payloads such as 500 kg, as sometimes seen in Reddit discussions, are likely an underestimation and at the extreme low end rather than realistic operational loads. The DF-26 for example, is smaller and weighs considerably less but carries a 1,800 kg payload 4000km.
Crucially, the missile’s destructive power is not solely dependent on warhead mass. At reentry speeds exceeding Mach 10, even a 1-ton conventional payload delivers immense kinetic energy equivalent to a couple tons of TNT before the warhead itself detonates. This gives it significantly more destructive power, and makes it well suited to precision, bunker-penetrating or SEAD strikes.
Road mobile IRBMs are difficult to find and target, making them very effective in a land mass the size of Australia, but they wouldn't go down well with neighbours, and lobbing ballistic missiles into potential adversaries (some nuclear capable) airspace even with conventional (non-nuclear) payloads is inherently risky.
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Todjaeger
Potstirrer
One question I would want to have asked and answered is what and where are the potential targets for Australian ballistic missiles. One is likely assuming that a 5,000 km ranged ballistic missile would be China, as that should put parts of mainland China within reach. However, there are a number of other, much closer countries, which would likely feel forced to react to Australia suddenly being able to rapidly deliver strikes upon their territories within a very small time frame.
If the idea to is to deliver a greater capability to respond to China, then one likely would not want to see an arms race with Indonesia or cause widespread concern within Indonesia regarding Australian intentions.
Could be why this idea hasn’t come from defence or Government but rather the usual think tank types who never have to worry about accountability, reality or what the effect of firing IRBM / borderline ICBM’s at China might result in…
We will certainly see more talk on this system after the upcoming Chinese military parade.
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
To that I would add in questions about Australian collection and maintenance of relevant long-range targeting data which would be needed for ballistic missile strikes to be of any value...
It does seem the good idea fairies have struck again.
I wonder how long before some of these same brain trust members remember the Maus and decide Australia needs to dust off and update that concept for Army.
2 models with that range … one with 500kg and one with 8000 kg warhead.
While I’m not behind the suggestion ….defence ports, airfields, barracks, vehicle storage yards, ammunition bunkers etc are not all that mobile and could certainly be held under threat and it wouldn’t be to hard to determine if capital ships are in port.
The issue I see…aside from possibly kicking off an arms race with some of our neighbours is that we would potentially need a few thousand for any real deterrent. Probably retaliation from a country like China would be horrible. On the other hand the thought that a few hundred 8 ton warheads could be launched and arrive in short time would possibly be quite a deterrent.
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Takao
The Bunker Group
We bought the wheeled version as our recce vehicle.....
It isn't necessarily the de-stabilisation, it's more the fact that most of our public discussions casually talk about shooting over, or deploying to, Indonesia. Quite rightly, they have views on this.... especially when you factor in they have a very different view of, and relationship with, Beijing.
The single biggest flaw in long-range strike commentary is the ignoring of our neighbours views. It's the biggest argument against prioritising land-based long-range strike - you can't put it somewhere to shoot without lots of political work.
Army thread but launching from a submarine would reveal the position of a concealed asset that has many other roles (sinking ships, ISR) that depend on being concealed. Submarine launch is an option for a second strike (in nuclear contexts not relevant here) or when engaging adversaries without strong ASW capabilities. In the context of conflict with China (presumably over Taiwan) Australia would need to preserve its precious submarines for threatening PLAN assets.
leaving aside the friendly countries the response of unfriendly countries is worth considering. If Australia builds a sovereign capability to create a conventional unilateral first strike capability against a nuclear power (intermediate range ballistic missiles as suggested in the ASPI article or missiles on cargo planes or B21 as been suggested in this forum) then that power will ignore it if it is insignificant or, if it is a credible threat, develop means to defeat it.