Australian Army Discussions and Updates

[Maranoa]

Those deployable land based littoral fires will need to be flown or floated to their positions. In what version of reality are we going to be able to do that without them being destroyed, in part or full, enroute?

That is the severe risk in this entire concept of operations. The Govt believes that heavy forces are too vulnerable to drones, but somehow an LCM8 replacement loaded with 25 million dollars worth of HIMARS and PrSMs let alone the combat team it deploys with is going to be able to safely transit the archipelago!

 

[Bob53]

The missiles might have a substantially longer range than 50km but let’s assume the mission involves flying close (e.g, within 50km) to enemy forces with missiles.

The airfield and the flight path of the c130 might be adequately protected (e.g., by a NASAMS previously deployed and the RAAF and RAN). There will be other ADF forces who need to get even closer than 50km. They would welcome having ground based missiles on their team too but they are probably at greater risk than the c130.

c130s also drop paratroopers (commando in Australia’s case) and may or may not have modifications for SF insertion. Some of those missions involve flying close to enemy forces (e.g. to destroy missile batteries) too. If the enemy has adequate air defences that mission
doesn‘t happen but …

Ground based Radars are biggish slow moving targets and the ADF has Growlers and F-35s and is acquiring lots of land attack missiles (some of which might be fired at the missile defences by the HIMARS before it takes off to get closer.

Even if the radars survive the air defences might have higher priority targets than a C130 (e.g. the jet or helicopter or drone attacking them now rather than the ATACMS hitting someone else in an hour’s time).

if the attack is not successful or it is a diversion then being able to remove the HIMARS or rapidly deploy somewhere else sounds pretty useful.

Finally perhaps the risky c130 mission never happens at all. The possibility that a HIMARS could be deployed on the next island‘s airfield however, could cause a potential adversary to redesign forces or abandon missions (“They could get ATACMS there! That’s right next to my planned command post with the lagoon views. OK we need an aircraft carrier for this job … but what about those pesky Collins class subs. Yeah, let’s not bother”). Or force a real adversary to disperse forces, capture and hold more islands that might be next to more islands with airfields.

All that aside, I was using the article to illustrate the air mobility of HIMARS and how the ADF might train with them. I should have quoted that specific part of Bluey 006‘s post to make that clear.

You’re saying here that’s it’s not just a c130 flying in and pinging off missiles. Your points explain exactly why the mission isn’t feasible without a significant supporting element which makes it a non starter for the ADF under COP the US Marines are talking up.

 

[Armchair]

Late to the party here but if you wanted to use C130 to deploy HIMARS, why bother? Acquire Rapid Dragon and do the launch direct from the aircraft, at standoff range and go home, reload, repeat.

I don’t think anybody on the forum advocated any new acquisition or capability in this regard.

The claim from the LM rep in the quoted article (quoted by me in a discussion about air mobility of missile systems that are already ordered and have been allocated basing and a brigade by the actual Australian Army) was that airborne shoot and scoot (or fire raids) ability was a high level operational requirement for the ADF (i guess another issue is why LM is revealing such requirements, if true, at an airshow, but they are trying to sell stuff).

There was a debate about whether such a requirement or mission (according to the article - ADFs mission and requirement) was realistic in risk terms. I suggested it could be (paratroop drop / sf insertion offered as another type of risky mission involving C130 that may or not take place given threats - apols Old Faithful - I would certainly also concede that those other C130 missions make HIMARS fire raids even less likely for the ADF). Takao suggested it was not realistic in firepower terms and failed in wargames. Sea based strike is a better option (I vigorously agree fwiw). I don’t think my arguments about whether the fire raid mission is possible are worth considering further (or at all really if fire raids can’t achieve useful effects for the ADF).

I agree Rapid Dragon looks much better than a HIMARS fire raid but wouldn’t Rapid Dragon have similar firepower problems (for the ADF)? If the ADF mission for HIMARS’s missiles is to destroy GBAD (as Takao suggests) then vulnerable C130s wouldn’t be the best platform to deliver those missiles from until the GBAD was destroyed by something else?

edit. Last para Followed up on RAAF thread by Todjaeger where the mistake above in missile types is corrected too.

 

[Volkodav]

There is this issue, you see.

Ships and aircraft can’t take and hold land, you need boots on the ground.

Ships and troops can’t respond rapidly to threats emerging at a distance; for that you need aircraft.

Aircraft and troops can’t provide persistent armed presence at a distance without host nation support, for that you need ships.

Oh, so what you need is a joint force, capable of providing mutual support, able to communicate and understanding in general terms the doctrine across the battle space.

We might not have enough of any of it, but that sounds like the balanced force the ADF used to be aiming at. Unbalance one bit of that, and at some point you are likely to get bitten.

Spot on.

Arguably the ADF is unbalanced already and has been for a long time.

Gut feeling we still don't have enough heavy armour, or combat aircraft, but definately, the most glaring deficiency is with the navy.

Ukraine shows how quickly ground equipment can be delivered and new units raised, not ideal by any means, but doable.

The acquisition of the F/A-18F, then G as well as the comparatively swift acquisition of P-8, C-17, and Blackhawk, shows that new and replacement aircraft can be acquired surprisingly quickly.

With the RAN however MFUs take years. You may be lucky and get a surplus Amphib or tanker, maybe a yard starved of work could fit in an accelerated build of AORs, but it is still several years, not a several months or a couple of years.

Combatants, well they take years, often over a decade, whether built locally or overseas.

Acquisition and force levels need to be planned around this. In fact, with land and air, jumping too soon has resulted in too much money being spent on too much of the wrong, or obsolescent gear.

The RAAF is doing a good job now, but our political classes saw them with large fleets of obsolescent equipment going into multiple wars. What was perfectly good enough five, ten or fifteen years earlier was a death sentence for crews had there been a hot war in the last decade of service. From memory in the early 80s the AIM-9 B and 30mm Aden ammo had lifed out and the Mirage fleet had no air to air capability at all. So at a period the type should been phasing out of service, it was being upgraded with Matra Magics. Sort of sounds like the RANs current situation.

Old and Bolds have told me that by the time the Centurions retired, (many of them being second hand UK vehicles) their armour had become brittle and ineffective. That said, the M-113, first slated for replacement in the 80s, is only now scheduled to be replaced. They have not been deployable for years.

Obsolescence and under investment has always been an issue. Structure has always been a problem. Governments of all shades are guilty of unbalancing the ADF, often through not having a strategy of what it is intended to do.

This is why I admire and miss leaders such as Beazley and to be honest, Frazer, in defence. They conducted real reviews, put out real numbers, their plans faded after they moved on, but at least the saw, realised and articulated.

Many are familiar with Beazley, but Frazer was proposing twenty three destroyers and frigates, with three carriers, in a two ocean navy.

He is the one who, when the F-111 was in trouble and facing cancellation, pointed out that although it was expensive the only alternative to gain the required capability was three squadrons with 36 F-4E, supported by squadrons of 6 RF-4C, 6 F-4G and 6 KC-135.

That is an impressive force and would have been a great addition to the ADF, but imagine the oportunity cost. Future government would have whittled down the Mirage numbers, there may have been no Hornets. The carrier likely would have gone earlier, Amazon's instead of FFGs and Army would likely kiss good bye to tanks.

That's what we need today, political leaders who have a sufficient understanding to see where high end capabilities are more cost effective than additional numbers, where numbers are critical and when support capabilities bring more than their cost, and where introducing them will cost needed capability elsewhere.

 

[Volkodav]

The only possible way I can see the littoral forces concept work is if, instead of LCMs, LSMs etc. we acquire modern day APDs.

The closest thing to them is the Danish Absalon class. A GP frigate armament and performance, with the ability to transport heavy equipment.

Not ideal but maybe a version with mexifloats and stern ramp, even a small floodable dock.

The other option multiple ESBs and / or small LHDs with LCAC. And a dramatic increase in escort numbers.

Maybe a large number of small LPDs (i.e. similar to Singapore's Endurance class in size), but each fitted with a GP frigate combat system and VLS with SM-6 and ESSM.

None of these options are cheap.

 

[Armchair]

You’re saying here that’s it’s not just a c130 flying in and pinging off missiles. Your points explain exactly why the mission isn’t feasible without a significant supporting element which makes it a non starter for the ADF under COP the US Marines are talking up.

Our posts crossed. I agree the mission isn’t feasible and that the claim in the article I quoted has been debunked in the forum.

When the argument is “ADF could not do this difficult and dangerous thing alone without US support” then I am going to agree with you most of the time. It is a good argument, Australia should have the sovereign capacity to do some of those things. it is not all doom and gloom though, Australia has a demonstrated superb capacity to do some things in coalition, it trains with lots of partners at home and abroad, and some of the possible coalition forces are already based in Australia or are prepositioning equipment in Australia.

 

[Redlands18]

The only possible way I can see the littoral forces concept work is if, instead of LCMs, LSMs etc. we acquire modern day APDs.

The closest thing to them is the Danish Absalon class. A GP frigate armament and performance, with the ability to transport heavy equipment.

Not ideal but maybe a version with mexifloats and stern ramp, even a small floodable dock.

The other option multiple ESBs and / or small LHDs with LCAC. And a dramatic increase in escort numbers.

Maybe a large number of small LPDs (i.e. similar to Singapore's Endurance class in size), but each fitted with a GP frigate combat system and VLS with SM-6 and ESSM.

None of these options are cheap.

Phase 3 of Littoral Manoeuvre Vessel program rescoped - Australian Defence Magazine
One of the many things we have never seen is, what is the plan for deploying the LMV-P Riverine craft away from their home base? They will not have the range and endurance to be self-deployable and the only vessels capable of doing it at present in the RAN are the 3 large Amphibs, you need to give the LMV-H LSTs a decent self-defence or they would be extremely vulnerable while dropping off these craft.

 

[Stampede]

Useful for what? Beersheba had many issues from an execution point of view, but the basis of giving everyone in the Army familiarity with all capabilities was a very good one. A deployed JTF could draw on 1, 3 and 7 Bde for the force - what does the new JTF do? And deterrence? That, quite frankly, is a load of baloney.



So...not useful? And not a deterrence?



Yeah - that's a joke. I know where it came from, but it's a joke. It's a simplistic idea that falls over the first time you wargame it. If you want trans-regional mobile missiles then I have the solution for you already: an FFG or DDG. You want to risk a C-130 to shoot 6x GMLRS or 1x ATACMS? The brutal truth is for all the talk of strategic strike - the vast majority of HIMARS fire tasks will be to directly support the Bde or Div effort. The majority of the rest will be against key GBAD sites and nodes to aid RAAF operations. All of which has a Bde in the field; much more than the C-130 can carry.



This misses the point. In addition to ranges, the other benefit of Adelaide is civilisation. I love Darwin, done a couple of postings there. I can't move there at the moment, between schools and spousal employment there are no real options. This pile in on Townsville is not going to be popular - can Townsville even begin to meet the demands that are about to be put on it? In addition, the weather up there prevents land exercises for 4 - 6 months a year; even if you don't shoot the ranges in SA are more useful (also for an Mech Bde too...)

Just curious , not critical.

Is your preference to continue with three like brigades.
Composition adjusted to reflect new incoming vehicles and their numbers.

Leave new tenth Brigade as is.

Cheers S

 

[ADMk2]

That is the severe risk in this entire concept of operations. The Govt believes that heavy forces are too vulnerable to drones, but somehow an LCM8 replacement loaded with 25 million dollars worth of HIMARS and PrSMs let alone the combat team it deploys with is going to be able to safely transit the archipelago!

Is this the same Government that is consistently refusing to invest in counter-UAS capability for the ADF nor fund hardening measures across ADF bases that would add plenty of resilience against such light drone attacks?

This government believes in not spending money on defence.

That is the entire basis of their “plan”.

The “missiles” for strategic strike is a furphy. The HIMARS purchases combined cost approximately the same as the cancelled 2nd SP Gun Regiment, let alone LAND 400 Ph.3...

Smoke and mirrors to avoid the truth of what they are doing to the ADF, especially the Army. The soldiers know it and are voting with their feet. Seems the sailors are too.

A “focussed force” alright. Focussed on being cut to the bone.

 

[Volkodav]

Is this the same Government that is consistently refusing to invest in counter-UAS capability for the ADF nor fund hardening measures across ADF bases that would add plenty of resilience against such light drone attacks?

This government believes in not spending money on defence.

That is the entire basis of their “plan”.

The “missiles” for strategic strike is a furphy. The HIMARS purchases combined cost approximately the same as the cancelled 2nd SP Gun Regiment, let alone LAND 400 Ph.3...

Smoke and mirrors to avoid the truth of what they are doing to the ADF, especially the Army. The soldiers know it and are voting with their feet. Seems the sailors are too.

A “focussed force” alright. Focussed on being cut to the bone.

Swings and roundabouts, each side does some good stuff, some silly stuff but mostly sweet FA.

The last mob had three terms, and a mandate to do much more than they did, it fair enough to be worried but they haven't actually had time to stuff up yet, let alone fix things.

 

[Bluey 006]

This misses the point. In addition to ranges, the other benefit of Adelaide is civilisation.

Plenty of civilisation in Brisbane (of sorts)

That's the thing many forget, it doesn't matter how good individual capabilities are if they don't live to reach the battlefield.

This should be at the front of every commander's mind, will the supporting capabilities, needed to keep them alive, be available?

We are still doing that. Those deployable land-based littoral fires will need to be flown or floated to their positions. In what version of reality are we going to be able to do that without them being destroyed, in part or full, enroute?

That is the severe risk in this entire concept of operations. The Govt believes that heavy forces are too vulnerable to drones, but somehow an LCM8 replacement loaded with 25 million dollars worth of HIMARS and PrSMs let alone the combat team it deploys with is going to be able to safely transit the archipelago!

Exactly Volk, so why is the executive's fetish with HIMARS, and why so urgent? At the expense of other capabilities.

Not disputing their utility, absolutely an important piece of kit. Rather the priority they were given.

They have been ordered now though, got to make the best of it.

Arguably the LBASM have their place but like you say, need to get them there and defend them.

You are hardly going to risk limited GMLRS, LBASM, NASAMS and C130 in a high-risk shoot-and-scoot operation as has been discussed by some!
It has also been stated small ships floating around undefended, are probably not a good idea.

So, these "littoral" capabilities need to be deployed forward early and positioned in place (before the shooting starts) ready for any landing or inclusion into disputed territory, probably without much warning at short notice at the first sign of a threat or action. Probably by air. Hence why I think they should be located close to the Air Mobility Group, i.e., Brisbane.

We might think we have a good awareness of the situation but ask the Israelis how that worked out.

Or alternatively, you need a comprehensive and coherent deterrence strategy that involves forward deployment. Thin trip wires rarely work, think trip wires maybe, but really you need a permanent and significant deployment that can defend key terrain or at least raise the costs to the point where it is not worth the effort.

.........

 

[Bluey 006]

This is actually the point. If you want to move large missiles to the islands to our north and northwest, and be able to protect them whilst deployed, there is already a developed system to do this. It’s a warship, large enough to have all the capabilities needed for long range strike. The pollies just need to have enough guts to get over the sticker shock and decide to build them.

Very true but warships can’t be everywhere, and we don’t have enough to have them on station forever, they will be needed for other tasks. As a non-nuclear armed state, without long-range ballistic missiles. Our capacity for unilateral deterrence is limited at best, therefore we need to deny access. The best way to deny access is to be there yourself, that requires boots on the ground, ships in the water or planes in the air. You need to be able to compete and win in every domain.

…….

There is this issue, you see.

Ships and aircraft can’t take and hold land, you need boots on the ground.

Ships and troops can’t respond rapidly to threats emerging at a distance; for that you need aircraft.

Aircraft and troops can’t provide a persistent armed presence at a distance without host nation support, for that you need ships.

Oh, so what you need is a joint force, capable of providing mutual support, able to communicate and understanding in general terms the doctrine across the battle space.

We might not have enough of any of it, but that sounds like the balanced force the ADF used to be aiming at. Unbalance one bit of that, and at some point, you are likely to get bitten.

The above quote pretty much sums it up.

I would add...

An effective defence force is a system of layered systems, that has fallbacks to deliver the same effects if one element is hamstrung or neutralized. Of course, all this depends on effective and secure! - logistics and supply chains, command and control and national industrial capacity.

.....

 

[Takao]

I probably meant something closer to usable than useful. I don’t understand how a Beersheba or Keogh brigade could fight anything much at all ( but understand from your previous posts that they would be reinforced). I can imagine that 3rd Brigade could be usable in a massive conflict and 7th Brigade at INTERFET level.

The thing people misunderstood with Beersheba Bde's were that they were not war fighting Bde's. The Army's mission is not to fight wars - it's to prepare land power. What this means is that when time comes to deploy a JTF, we would assemble the land component from various Bde's. Because every level of command was already familiar with all the capabilities of a Bde, it didn't matter where you grabbed them - a Coy from 1 RAR, 5 RAR or 6 RAR could just as easily pair with a Tp from 2 Cav to build a combat team. That no longer exists. If you want a Mech CT you need to use 1 or 3 RAR. That's ok for a one-shot (assuming you only have the one task), but where are the follow-on / replacement forces coming from? Previously, any of the Bn could. Now?

We might not have enough of any of it, but that sounds like the balanced force the ADF used to be aiming at. Unbalance one bit of that, and at some point you are likely to get bitten.

I disagree here. A balanced ADF builds a force capable of very little. We need three things:

a - a robust and rehearsed mobilisation plan. We need 1100 odd IFVs but bout 150-ish? Ok, how do we make up the numbers? Where do extra SM-2 come from? Spare parts for the E-7s? Fuel to Tindal? etc etc etc. That helps identify what's next

b - list of tasks. From this, what capabilities do we 100% need all the time (say, DDG, E-7, CDT, LHD, some special RAE units). This honestly won't be a long list....

c - a prioritisation of kit based on (b), with workforce matching in (a). This is the stuff that we buy in peace. Rule of thumb, long build or highly technical. So FFG/DDG/F-35/E-7/tank/helo for each Service. Then what is the minimal viable level (based on delivery time) and ensure the delta is covered in (a).

In principle, this would see maritime forces prioritised, then air lift, then air strike, then mech forces. If, like air strike, we already have MVP (and 3x Sqn of F-35 and 2x F/A-18E/F/G is MVP) then they come out. It'll weight the RAN disproportionally and see a cut to light land forces, but that's where the mobilisation plan comes into play. It also means air power peeps may get upset, but seeing as we don't build our own aircraft and can buy/be gifted equal forces rapidly (most of our aircraft match USAF or USN, so the numbers can be made up rapidly), the MVL has been met. Also why (with a good (a)) we don't need 1100 odd IFV today.

Is your preference to continue with three like brigades.
Composition adjusted to reflect new incoming vehicles and their numbers.

Leave new tenth Brigade as is.

Yes. I was highly critical of Beersheba initially for two reasons; the rationale was never clearly articulated (so angered most of the NCOs/officers) and the cost. Understand they are not war fighting Bde (rather raise-train-sustain) and the first criticism goes away. The cost can be mitigated, but we hamstrung the whole shift originally as it was sold as cost neutral. It was in the CSS/log side that unexpected costs hit - for instance, pre-2008 you only needed one M1 engine test kit; now you need 3. But, there were some smart cookies at AHQ just before DSR that had licked many of those cost issues and still allowed for like Bde (actually improved time on gear...)

Plenty of civilisation in Brisbane (of sorts)

More than Adelaide. But seriously, draw a triangle between Adelaide, Melbourne and Brisbane (that east line going to 'bulge' a bit). That's where what, 75% of our population is? That's where most of our permanent forces should be. That will improve recruitment and retention. Have smaller forces in Townsville and Darwin to allow rotation of people through, but that's it. The exception is the RAN - they need Perth and northern bases.

Exactly Volk, so why is the executive's fetish with HIMARS, and why so urgent? At the expense of other capabilities.

Because pre-22 there was a perception that some cybers, IO and long-range strike was all that was needed to win wars. It comes from some 'great strategic thinkers' in academia/media and some specific individuals who wear green polys. It's related to deterrence (ha ha ha!) and some wishful interpretation of lessons from 90 - 10s. I won't criticise politicians for the decisions, the literal subject matter experts have presented this as the answer - why would they question it? As for at the expense, with the authors of the DSR there was never a chance that Army would expand on it's heavier (but much more capable) capabilities.

 

[spoz]

The problem with preparing a list of things you want to be able to counter or to do and then building your force around that occurs when the enemy decides to do something that is not on the list.

I don’t know about Army, brut Navy has been investing in counter UAV and USV capabilities for some time. I would imagine Army is at least looking at it. Sorry, should say maritime and land domains.

 

[Armchair]

More than Adelaide. But seriously, draw a triangle between Adelaide, Melbourne and Brisbane (that east line going to 'bulge' a bit). That's where what, 75% of our population is? That's where most of our permanent forces should be. That will improve recruitment and retention. Have smaller forces in Townsville and Darwin to allow rotation of people through, but that's it. The exception is the RAN - they need Perth and northern bases.

So the forces in Townsville and Darwin (maybe a ready battlegroup in the former) are generated by brigades that would be based in population centres and rotated (not exactly but analogously to USMC in Darwin) there? Presumably they would have prepositioned equipment sets for larger deployments (closer to US Army practice and reducing initial sea lift demands).

The other advantage of your plan is that it puts the generating regular brigades closer to army reserve units (also in population centres) that can train with them.

 

[Massive]

The Army's mission is not to fight wars - it's to prepare land power.

Sadly there is nothing to prepare at the moment and it will remain this way for the foreseeable future.

Regards,

Massive

 

[Armchair]

So the forces in Townsville and Darwin (maybe a ready battlegroup in the former) are generated by brigades that would be based in population centres and rotated (not exactly but analogously to USMC in Darwin) there? Presumably they would have prepositioned equipment sets for larger deployments (closer to US Army practice and reducing initial sea lift demands).

The other advantage of your plan is that it puts the generating regular brigades closer to army reserve units (also in population centres) that can train with them.

Ok, if I have it right, then the best way to sell Takao’s idea to govt is to say 1. “this is what USMC and US Army” plan to do and 2. “This dispersal protects army from enemy long range strike”. Some future government or defence minister might buy it!

Does my earlier suggestion work as a partial fix (leave aside Boxer APC modules as that is fantasy fleet). Retain training capacity for tanks and IFVs in 7th Brigade (appreciate that Adelaide is better for that purpose)?

 

[Todjaeger]

Ok, if I have it right, then the best way to sell Takao’s idea to govt is to say 1. “this is what USMC and US Army” plan to do and 2. “This dispersal protects army from enemy long range strike”. Some future government or defence minister might buy it!

Does my earlier suggestion work as a partial fix (leave aside Boxer APC modules as that is fantasy fleet). Retain training capacity for tanks and IFVs in 7th Brigade (appreciate that Adelaide is better for that purpose)?

There is significant danger in Australia attempting to replicate what the USMC and/or US Army are doing, simply because the scale of either force is so much greater than the ADF, whilst still being part of the overall US Armed Forces and therefore able to draw upon the capabilities and resources of the other services.

Not including Starfleet, err... I mean Space Force... The USMC is the second smallest branch of the US Armed Forces, with only the USCG (at ~40k active duty personnel) being smaller, with the USMC having ~180k active duty personnel. Being a service branch of such size, and with such a range of kit, the USMC can handle a scope of things beyond what is possible for the ADF.

Even with saying that though, I still question some of the decisions and announcements made about changes planned for the USMC. The elimination of tanks from USMC service being one example. The idea as I understand it, is that the USMC does not need to have tanks because it can call upon the US Army for tank support, at least in theory. What I worry about is how likely the actual practice will work out the way it should in theory.

Applicable examples IMO would include opposed amphibious landings during WWII, in areas that US war planners appear to be developing plans for combat operations in case of an armed conflict with the PRC. USMC tank support was available on at least some of the islands the USMC fought the island-hopping campaign against Japan in WWII, which proved useful for combined arms ops vs. some positions as well as an anti-tank capability against Japanese armour. In order for the USMC to make use of US Army tanks during some sort of amphibious operation against, then the US Army tanks would need to actually be present amongst the forces to be landed as part of the op, which is a fact that may have been overlooked by those ordering the change.

In some respects it does look as though efforts to re-shape Australian forces are based off what the US appears to be doing, but I have to wonder about what some of the potential scenarios the forces were/are planned for.

 

[Volkodav]

Imagine a Typhon Regiment as part of the Fires Brigade. A Typhon battery with Tomahawk, SM-6 and potentially ESSM and a future hypersonic missile, could be deployed with each brigade headquarters. Potentially, assuming sufficient C(X)I section could be dispersed through regions.

 

[Armchair]

There is significant danger in Australia attempting to replicate what the USMC and/or US Army are doing, simply because the scale of either force is so much greater than the ADF, whilst still being part of the overall US Armed Forces and therefore able to draw upon the capabilities and resources of the other services.

The USMC (Marines in Darwin) and US Army (prepositioned in Victoria https://www.defence.gov.au/news-events/news/2023-09-13/new-aussie-home-us-materiel ) practice here are just examples of actual things happening now in Australia where the question is “do you mean like this?” (with a throw away from me about how to sell it to government). I share some of your other concerns.

if I can have another go at the point as I understand. Darwin and Townsville and Brisbane are not places the Australian Army 1st Division and 2RAR is tasked to defend. That is 2nd Division’s new job
https://www.defence.gov.au/news-events/news/2023-10-13/shift-focus-north

As with the USMC for Darwin, Darwin and Townsville and Brisbane, are relatively safe places that the Australian Army needs to leave from to get to places it might deploy (using equipment already stored there). The Australian Army has chosen to base the 1st Division brigades in Townsville, Darwin and Brisbane and to generate the forces it needs to deploy in Townsville, Darwin and Brisbane (with corps assets in Adelaide and army ADF level assets in Perth and Sydney).

Two of those places, Darwin and Townsville have low populations and are tropical. Unlike Brisbane (and previously Adelaide) they are not good places to raise or generate battlegroups or to retain personnel.

Added to that the 2nd Division is tasked with defending Australia’s north but it is ovewhelmingly based in the south. That sounds bad but actually so long as they generate forces and rotate them that could be OK in theory (as the threat of invasion is remote) but the capability of 2nd Division reserves will be impaired if they rarely get the chance to train with the forces in 1st Division.

Takao argues that all of those brigades should be based in population centres (Brisbane and Adelaide, the third not proposed in the discussion).

Looking at I think most geographically dispersed land forces in the world follow Takao’s model. It is the Australian Army new structure that is the outlier.

Edited to change fight to deploy to reflect the discussion summarised.