Australian Army Discussions and Updates

Massive

Well-Known Member
Land 400 Phase 3 cut to 300 vehicles - Australian Defence Magazine

This just dropped at the ADM web page. Thought the group would be interested. Apologies for the one liner
Other than the associated commentary that this will not result in savings, is this a significant concern?

I feel it is unlikely that there will be more than 12 Mechanised infantry companies in the ADF so even with an attrition allowance this appears OK on the surface?

Thoughts?

Massive
 

Massive

Well-Known Member
This is one option for a mobile GBAD that is around and its the most modern of those around. It's something that is a necessity for the army and shouldn't be poo pooed just because the Americans don't have it.
Could not agree more. And mobile air defence is required in numbers.

An interesting learning from Ukraine is that it is critical for GBAD launchers to be mobile to defend against counter-battery fire.

I feel this raises concerns about the NASAMS launcher and wonder if it is effectively obsolete when considered in its dismounted form.

Regards,

Massive
 

Massive

Well-Known Member
Combined, unless numbers are changed, that represents a force of around 140x artillery pieces, which seems to me quite a lot, given the overall size of our land forces…
Do we really know if that is a lot or not though? Given improved targeting (drones etc) is the right weighting for artillery - in all forms - much higher than was previously the case?

My sense is that there is a need for more artillery, not less, and that we should discount the M777 as obsolete - given its lack of armour & mobility n an environment with significantly improved counter-battery fire.

Regards,

Massive
 

Stampede

Well-Known Member
Other than the associated commentary that this will not result in savings, is this a significant concern?

I feel it is unlikely that there will be more than 12 Mechanised infantry companies in the ADF so even with an attrition allowance this appears OK on the surface?

Thoughts?

Massive
So how many do we need.
What do we have now?
About 9 mechanised infantry company's plus APC's / IFV's for Tank Sqns and Engineers.

My rough numbers are that about a third of a fleets numbers are for training / maintenance and some for attrition / reserve with the rest [ Two thirds ] for the active units.

So what number does that give you?
Would 300 suffice?

Curious S
 

ADMk2

Just a bloke
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Do we really know if that is a lot or not though? Given improved targeting (drones etc) is the right weighting for artillery - in all forms - much higher than was previously the case?

My sense is that there is a need for more artillery, not less, and that we should discount the M777 as obsolete - given its lack of armour & mobility n an environment with significantly improved counter-battery fire.

Regards,

Massive
It is a lot for us, will require units to be raised we’ve literally never had.

Bearing in mind the M777A2 upgrade / replacement program in FSP2020, all this artillery adds to our existing capability, it’s not a replacement…
 

Massive

Well-Known Member
It is a lot for us, will require units to be raised we’ve literally never had.
I agree with you and I also feel we are not at the end of this process.

Expect that NLOS and loitering munitions will be next and they will both be in new units as well in existing.

There is a big, rapid transformation in military affairs under way. Not the first and not the last but we are definitely in the midst of one.

Regards,

Massive
 

Stampede

Well-Known Member
I agree with you and I also feel we are not at the end of this process.

Expect that NLOS and loitering munitions will be next and they will both be in new units as well in existing.

There is a big, rapid transformation in military affairs under way. Not the first and not the last but we are definitely in the midst of one.

Regards,

Massive
Yes I would speculate a lot of questions re ARMY structure going forward.
Some real world reality from events in Europe will validate some concepts and dismiss others.

What will Army look like in 2030???

Unknown S
 

Massive

Well-Known Member
What will Army look like in 2030???
I feel that it may look a lot heavier, with a greater emphasis on technology and fires, and a greater focus in leveraging the opportunities of full-time service, for the regular army, and look a lot simpler (and clearer) for the reserves.

More generally I feel that we have a clear view as to what the RAAF will look like, a stronger view of the future of the RAN, but as to Army, not so much. Not sure if this is an issue of complexity or maturity.

Regards,

Massive
 

Stampede

Well-Known Member
I feel that it may look a lot heavier, with a greater emphasis on technology and fires, and a greater focus in leveraging the opportunities of full-time service, for the regular army, and look a lot simpler (and clearer) for the reserves.

More generally I feel that we have a clear view as to what the RAAF will look like, a stronger view of the future of the RAN, but as to Army, not so much. Not sure if this is an issue of complexity or maturity.

Regards,

Massive
Agree that Army does not seem to have the clarity going forward that is reflected in both the Navy and Air Force.
Maybe its a recognition of knowing what they want and need but understanding it was always unrealistic within the budget provided.
A force structure based on compromise.
With the intended replacement of major equipment and the addition of new capability's I see the challenge continuing.

Await an update going forward.

Cheers S
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
I agree with you and I also feel we are not at the end of this process.

Expect that NLOS and loitering munitions will be next and they will both be in new units as well in existing.

There is a big, rapid transformation in military affairs under way. Not the first and not the last but we are definitely in the midst of one.

Regards,

Massive
The infantry is now mounted so it's a no brainer to have ISREW, 120mm mortars with loitering munitions and even NLOS at Btn or even Coy level. This is even more relevant for CAV.

Brigade should have MRLS / HIMRS and ATACMS as well as SPGs. With feeds from dedicated MALES.

This is all a no brainer.
 

Milne Bay

Active Member
Two more Chinooks arrive in Townsville - Australian Defence Magazine
The 2nd pair of CH-47F Chinooks ordered last year* under an expediated sale are due to arrive in Townsville today 23/06, it will bring the Australian Army's fleet to 14 Chinooks
*Exactly when they were ordered has never actually been disclosed, could have been late 2020.
It would appear that they were ordered within the last twelve months - at least the contract was signed in that time.
See:
 

Takao

The Bunker Group
Agree that Army does not seem to have the clarity going forward that is reflected in both the Navy and Air Force.
Maybe its a recognition of knowing what they want and need but understanding it was always unrealistic within the budget provided.
A force structure based on compromise.
With the intended replacement of major equipment and the addition of new capability's I see the challenge continuing.

Await an update going forward.

Cheers S
A large part of this can be laid at the feet of people who wear the same clothes to work I do, the lack of feasible concept from Army is...frustrating.

However...

There are three significant cultural difference between the Army and the other two Services (Groups too actually, noting that the IIP does not just fund the three uniformed Services) that has to be understood.

First is the mission. Conceptually the concept of fighting and likely missions for a Navy or Air Force are easier. Note I am not saying the conduct of missions is less complicated or deadly, this is at the concept level. Both fall into easily definable roles, no matter what you do, there are only a handful of times you will throw am F-35 at a problem. For the platforms that have more multi-role use, their various missions at different levels of war are very similar. A C-17 supporting a hypothetical southern front against REDFOR to the north is pretty similar to a C-17 providing HADR support to Fiji. An LHD likewise.

For Army though, the skill sets are much greater. What a infanteer in 5 RAR does on that southern front v what they do in a HADR mission is dramatically different. Neither the RAN nor the RAAF had to change much between Defence of Australia through the MEAO to regional operations. The Army had to completely revamp three or four times. Neither is wrong, neither is right. It just is. But when you have that flexibility and different needs for different missions, your concept of fighting is harder to tie up neatly. Even tactical stuff like combat teams and battlegroups (the only way to fight) underscores our 'problem' - both are task-defined constructs. BG HEELER will have a 6 RAR HQ on Monday and on Tuesday, but inbetween may lose or gain hundreds of people, depending on the mission.

Secondly is the view of the platform. I have grown to dislike the wording, but the thrust is true: the other services man the platform, we put platforms on the man. The Army is primarily a human focused endeavour, and that's hard to explain. Everyone knows what 3x Sqn of F-35 looks like,* but trying to understand what a BG looks like is harder. When you upgrade 75 Sqn you take away some F/A-18s and deliver some F-35s. When you upgrade 6 RAR, you take away their F88s and deliver some F90s. Or you take away Ninox gen 6 and deliver some Ninox gen 9. Or you take away some RTF-500 and deliver some AN/PRC-152. Or you take away an 84mm Mk II and deliver some 84mm Mk III. Or you take away some Terra boots and.... so on and so forth. gripping all that up into a overall concept is hard work.

Finally, you have the issue of a missing generation. Now let me stress, 'fairness' has no role in force structure. If the threat demands 50x SSN by 2030 which means we have to scrap the RAAF and ARA, then damn, looks like I'm out of a job. So I'm not interested in 'fairness'. But, the RAAF and RAN received major kit upgrades throughout the 70s, 80s, 90s and 00s that was denied to the Army. It's easy to argue you need Hunters when you point at Anzacs that are long in the tooth, or for F-35s when you point at F/A-18s. What would be a challenge is when you try and argue for Hunters to replace Darings. Or F-35s to replace Mirage IIIs. The entire organisation massively screwed up with M777, M113AS4 and less so with M1A1, because we gave the impression that because we could continue going with obsolete kit we don't need new stuff. Even allowing for DoA in the 80s, if we had replaced M113s with Bradleys** and M198s with M109s** in the 90s we'd (a) have a deployable force now and (b) be making a easier conceptual progression to Boxer/M1A2/under armour breeching/IFV. I wonder what would be written about the F-35 purchase if the RAAF was seeking to replace CA-27 or Mirage III today? After all, It's almost exactly the same as what we are trying to do with M113AS4*** and IFV - but we get told we are wrong for any number of reasons. All of which apply to an F-35 v Mirage III.

All up, these three combined make writing a concept for the Land Force a challenge. Add in recent intellectual wankery like hybrid warfare and the like that has sent people chasing windmills and you get a mess. And yes, there are people in uniform who's job it is to write this and do the hard thinking. And there are, but it's bloody hard. I have my view of cutting through to the nub of the issue for a relatively simple concept - but that is (a) risky (as it may be overly simplistic) and (b) a hard sell. Because at the end of the day, ground forces provide the greatest non-nuclear deterrence force - because their use costs lives.



* they don't actually, they always forget the ground crew
** exemplars only
*** a excellent 70s vehicle, designed in the 80s, purchased by us in the 90s for introduction into service in the 00s
 

Anthony_B_78

Active Member
The only real ‘news’ is the intended establishment of a 4th ready combat brigade, which is surely needed, but hopefully dovetails in with Army force structure planning, rather than the current situation.
This actually isn't news either. Raven commented about this plan back in November 2020. It'll be news if they actually begin delivering on that plan, of course. Hopefully he can provide an update at some point.

The fourth brigade, as has been discussed, doesn't really change the requirements with regard to Land 400 Phase 3 though. It seems it remains the case that we chiefly need IFVs for three mechanised battalions. Personally, I've always thought 450 seemed excess to that requirement.
 

Vivendi

Well-Known Member
A large part of this can be laid at the feet of people who wear the same clothes to work I do, the lack of feasible concept from Army is...frustrating.

However...

There are three significant cultural difference between the Army and the other two Services (Groups too actually, noting that the IIP does not just fund the three uniformed Services) that has to be understood.

First is the mission. Conceptually the concept of fighting and likely missions for a Navy or Air Force are easier. Note I am not saying the conduct of missions is less complicated or deadly, this is at the concept level. Both fall into easily definable roles, no matter what you do, there are only a handful of times you will throw am F-35 at a problem. For the platforms that have more multi-role use, their various missions at different levels of war are very similar. A C-17 supporting a hypothetical southern front against REDFOR to the north is pretty similar to a C-17 providing HADR support to Fiji. An LHD likewise.

For Army though, the skill sets are much greater. What a infanteer in 5 RAR does on that southern front v what they do in a HADR mission is dramatically different. Neither the RAN nor the RAAF had to change much between Defence of Australia through the MEAO to regional operations. The Army had to completely revamp three or four times. Neither is wrong, neither is right. It just is. But when you have that flexibility and different needs for different missions, your concept of fighting is harder to tie up neatly. Even tactical stuff like combat teams and battlegroups (the only way to fight) underscores our 'problem' - both are task-defined constructs. BG HEELER will have a 6 RAR HQ on Monday and on Tuesday, but inbetween may lose or gain hundreds of people, depending on the mission.

Secondly is the view of the platform. I have grown to dislike the wording, but the thrust is true: the other services man the platform, we put platforms on the man. The Army is primarily a human focused endeavour, and that's hard to explain. Everyone knows what 3x Sqn of F-35 looks like,* but trying to understand what a BG looks like is harder. When you upgrade 75 Sqn you take away some F/A-18s and deliver some F-35s. When you upgrade 6 RAR, you take away their F88s and deliver some F90s. Or you take away Ninox gen 6 and deliver some Ninox gen 9. Or you take away some RTF-500 and deliver some AN/PRC-152. Or you take away an 84mm Mk II and deliver some 84mm Mk III. Or you take away some Terra boots and.... so on and so forth. gripping all that up into a overall concept is hard work.

Finally, you have the issue of a missing generation. Now let me stress, 'fairness' has no role in force structure. If the threat demands 50x SSN by 2030 which means we have to scrap the RAAF and ARA, then damn, looks like I'm out of a job. So I'm not interested in 'fairness'. But, the RAAF and RAN received major kit upgrades throughout the 70s, 80s, 90s and 00s that was denied to the Army. It's easy to argue you need Hunters when you point at Anzacs that are long in the tooth, or for F-35s when you point at F/A-18s. What would be a challenge is when you try and argue for Hunters to replace Darings. Or F-35s to replace Mirage IIIs. The entire organisation massively screwed up with M777, M113AS4 and less so with M1A1, because we gave the impression that because we could continue going with obsolete kit we don't need new stuff. Even allowing for DoA in the 80s, if we had replaced M113s with Bradleys** and M198s with M109s** in the 90s we'd (a) have a deployable force now and (b) be making a easier conceptual progression to Boxer/M1A2/under armour breeching/IFV. I wonder what would be written about the F-35 purchase if the RAAF was seeking to replace CA-27 or Mirage III today? After all, It's almost exactly the same as what we are trying to do with M113AS4*** and IFV - but we get told we are wrong for any number of reasons. All of which apply to an F-35 v Mirage III.

All up, these three combined make writing a concept for the Land Force a challenge. Add in recent intellectual wankery like hybrid warfare and the like that has sent people chasing windmills and you get a mess. And yes, there are people in uniform who's job it is to write this and do the hard thinking. And there are, but it's bloody hard. I have my view of cutting through to the nub of the issue for a relatively simple concept - but that is (a) risky (as it may be overly simplistic) and (b) a hard sell. Because at the end of the day, ground forces provide the greatest non-nuclear deterrence force - because their use costs lives.



* they don't actually, they always forget the ground crew
** exemplars only
*** a excellent 70s vehicle, designed in the 80s, purchased by us in the 90s for introduction into service in the 00s
Excellent points. I just wanted to add that we have seen the same trend in Norway for many years, and I suspect also in many other countries. The army has been the "step-child" for too long. Having said that perhaps Army people should consider thinking more about how to communicate with key stakeholders, and how to "get the message through"..?

I recall discussing Norway's purchase of the F-35 with an Norwegian army person many years ago. He fully understood the rationale behind the F-35 purchase, at the same time he could not hide his frustration that this very expensive purchase would have a negative impact on resource allocation to the army, which was already at ridiculously low levels. However he saw no way to resolve the situation, it was if he had given up the struggle for money.

Perhaps recent events in Ukraine will make it easier to make the case that the army needs more resources, in particular when looking at how the international security environment is developing. Here's to hoping that both Australia and Norway (and others) will be able to strengthen their armies significantly in the coming years!
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Takao makes some valid points and resorting to my usual stance of what was offered and could have been but didn't happen also applies for the army of the 90s.

The Australian army was described to me in the early 90s as the best 1970s army in the world, i.e. once we completed the various programs in place at the time the army would be mostly what it should have been in the 70s. ASLAV, F88, F89, Blackhawks flown by army, project Bushranger, project Mulgara, Raven, proposed M-113 upgrade, they were even getting replacements for the ancient Diamond T trucks.

The thing is this was post 91 Gulf war, i.e. after we saw what a modern armoured force could do to a massed soviet style army, and we totally ignored it.

Now the really dumb part, Germany offered us surplus Marders and Leopards (I have heard both 1A5s and early model 2s but don't have details on which) and the US apparently offered us surplus AH-1S gunships with TOW and a degree of commonality with our remaining Iroquois. Im not as sure on this but I believe M-109s were also on offer.

Gear like this in the 90s, even a single brigades worth, could have provided the army with the opportunity to work out what they really needed and how best to use it.
 

ADMk2

Just a bloke
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
The infantry is now mounted so it's a no brainer to have ISREW, 120mm mortars with loitering munitions and even NLOS at Btn or even Coy level. This is even more relevant for CAV.

Brigade should have MRLS / HIMRS and ATACMS as well as SPGs. With feeds from dedicated MALES.

This is all a no brainer.
120mm mortar and loitering munitions at Btn level yes, but HIMARS will be (as it should be) a Divisional Fires asset grouped into a Fires Brigade level formation to support divisional level ops, just as they are operated by the US Army, USMC etc.

Spike NLOS I like as a fire support capability / strike / anti-armour capability maintained by the ACR’s and in support of unit and brigade objectives, but not at battalion and certainly not at company level.
 

ADMk2

Just a bloke
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Takao makes some valid points and resorting to my usual stance of what was offered and could have been but didn't happen also applies for the army of the 90s.

The Australian army was described to me in the early 90s as the best 1970s army in the world, i.e. once we completed the various programs in place at the time the army would be mostly what it should have been in the 70s. ASLAV, F88, F89, Blackhawks flown by army, project Bushranger, project Mulgara, Raven, proposed M-113 upgrade, they were even getting replacements for the ancient Diamond T trucks.

The thing is this was post 91 Gulf war, i.e. after we saw what a modern armoured force could do to a massed soviet style army, and we totally ignored it.

Now the really dumb part, Germany offered us surplus Marders and Leopards (I have heard both 1A5s and early model 2s but don't have details on which) and the US apparently offered us surplus AH-1S gunships with TOW and a degree of commonality with our remaining Iroquois. Im not as sure on this but I believe M-109s were also on offer.

Gear like this in the 90s, even a single brigades worth, could have provided the army with the opportunity to work out what they really needed and how best to use it.
ADF was offered 40x AH-1W from USMC stocks for $150m in the early 90’s. Obviously we turned the offer down.

Army trialled M109A6 extensively in the late 90’s. Clearly we were unable to articulate a compelling enough case for Government to pull the trigger on them. Eventually somewhere between 10-13 years later, we bought a towed gun to replace a fleet of old, shagged towed guns and gave little thought to their usage in the future, let alone survivability.

In many respects, the way Vietnam was fought, was the worst thing that happened to Army over the last 50 years…
 
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