South China Sea thoughts?

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
@OPSSG I do see that using Navy in SCS will only bring more diplomatic points for PRC. That's why I always put importance for Bakamla development in Indonesia Navy Thread, as to play diplomatic games in SCS should be between coast guard to coast guard.

I believe this is begin to be seen also by all SCS neighboring nation, as such development of Coast Guards shown significant increase.

This incidence shown China play two faces diplomacy. They send the Defense Minister and soon after that they raise tensions again with coast guard. However in sense they can say, it is not military as we keep it on 'civilian' agency dispute.
Off course everyone knows that Chinese Coast Guard I'd a quasy military service. All coast guard are. However it's in diplomatic language to keep military from SCS dispute by PRC. Thus they don't want to be seen Internationally as the one who bring the tension toward military confrontation.

I do agree on more cooperation between Asean Navy, just like the way Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia Navies do in Malaca Strait is important. The trilateral co-op manage to say no to Indian Navy involvement in Malaca Strait security arrangements.

Still on SCS, I tend to see at this moment for Coast Guards cooperation and trust building. All the Navies should stay behind, as I see that PRC also keep PLAN farther behind from their nine-dash line.
However you can argue that in the PRC's case that in effect the PLAN is involved in ratcheting up the tension between the PRC and other SCS claimant nations, because the PRC Coast Guard and People’s Maritime Militia are part of the PLAN & PLA. That's part of the official PRC / CCP organisational structure.
 

Ananda

The Bunker Group
True @ngatimozart , it's more on the launguage of diplomacy. The Image of Chinese Coast Guard being confronted by Indonesian, Vietnamese or Malaysian Navy will be sold by PRC showing that they're showing constraints to not turn it into Military confrontation.

We know that those Chinese Coast Guard cutters are heavily armed for Coast Guard duty. Type 718, 818 cutters that I shown the picture on my previous post can take most of Philippines Navy vessels even their new Hyundai build Frigate.
Still, SCS stand off also diplomatic games, thus how PRC project themselves due matter.
 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Sept 2020 South China Sea updates

1. ASEAN will persistently hold onto its principled position, emphasizing self-restraints, peaceful settlement of all disputes on the basis of international law, including 1982 UNCLOS, promoting inter and intra-ASEAN dialogues, strengthening confidence building, non-militarization, and refrain from further complicating the situation." It was agreed that negotiations between ASEAN countries and China over a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea will resume no later than Nov 2020 during ASEAN virtual meeting.
2. “We called on China to refrain from unilateral actions in the South China Sea, to respect international law, and avoid escalations,” said President Charles Michel after the EU-China leaders' meeting via video conference. Charles Michel is a Belgian politician serving as President of the European Council since 2019. He previously served as Prime Minister of Belgium between 2014 and 2019.

3. During a 2018 visit to the region, France’s Macron called for new strategic alliances including a Franco-Australian-India axis to preserve a free and open order in the Indo-Pacific.

4. Latest joint note verbale submitted by France to the UN in response to Beijing’s South China Sea claims, on behalf of Germany, France and U.K.

5. "China proposed the creation of a Spratly Resource Management Authority (SRMA) – with membership not just from claimant states to the dispute, namely Brunei, China, Malaysia, Vietnam, and the Philippines, but also Indonesia." I note that to create a joint development in a disputed area, China is required to have a legitimate claim under UNCLOS. Cooperating with China would be tantamount to validating its South China Sea claims, a move that would be completely contrary to Indonesia’s interests.
 
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OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
I do agree on more cooperation between Asean Navy, just like the way Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia Navies do in Malaca Strait is important. The trilateral co-op manage to say no to Indian Navy involvement in Malaca Strait security arrangements.

Still on SCS, I tend to see at this moment for Coast Guards cooperation and trust building. All the Navies should stay behind, as I see that PRC also keep PLAN farther behind from their nine-dash line.
You are accurately describing the current status and nature of Chinese deployments in the South China Sea (SCS) but that can and will change. More importantly, any change is a Chinese choice due to escalation dominance — ASEAN Navies better get serious on conducting long patrols in the future.
@OPSSG I do see that using Navy in SCS will only bring more diplomatic points for PRC.
I disagree and believe that there is no difference — American, Australian and Japanese deployments in the SCS are all via their navies.
Off course everyone knows that Chinese Coast Guard I'd a quasy military service. All coast guard are. However it's in diplomatic language to keep military from SCS dispute by PRC. Thus they don't want to be seen Internationally as the one who bring the tension toward military confrontation.
Even the Europeans see China as the aggressor in the SCS.
I do agree on more cooperation between Asean Navy, just like the way Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia Navies do in Malaca Strait is important. The trilateral co-op manage to say no to Indian Navy involvement in Malaca Strait security arrangements.
Glad we are agreed.
 

Sandhi Yudha

Well-Known Member

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Oct 2020 Refresher on South China Sea issues

1. As noted in this thread on the South China Sea, China has flexed its muscles to a territorial maritime dominance. Initially, Indonesia and China crossed watery-swords arising from the tensions in Natuna Island. Another standoff flared up involving Vietnamese vessels and the Chinese government survey ship, near Malaysia.

2. Uneasy times continued with the Haiyang Dizhi 8 surveying in resource-rich waters 352 km off the coast of Brunei and Malaysia; a global flashpoint as the United States challenges China’s sweeping maritime claims. Last year, a Chinese Coast Guard vessel spent weeks in waters close to oil rig in a Vietnamese oil block while the Haiyang Dizhi 8 conducted suspected oil exploration surveys in Vietnam’s EEZ. Early January, Chinese encroachment in waters near Natuna Islands, prompted Indonesia to send warships and fighter jets forcing the boats to retreat.

3. US Pacific Fleet commander Admiral John Aquilino drew the line when he said: “We are committed to a rules-based order in the South China Sea, and we will continue to champion freedom of the seas and the rule of law. The Chinese Communist Party must end its pattern of bullying Southeast Asians out of offshore oil, gas and fisheries.”

4. 5 yrs ago on Sept 25, General Secretary Xi pledged China would not militarize the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. This was another false promise from Beijing.

5. In the meantime, idiots in Manila continue to undermine ASEAN’s stance with Manila and Beijing agreeing to shelve disputes over South China Sea.

6. For added reassurance to member states in ASEAN, the US Marines have introduced a new littoral regiment designed to directly counter Beijing’s militarisation of its South China Sea islands (where it has built air bases), with a focus on rapid deployability, fire power and a measure of self-contained capability. Additional Marine Littoral Regiments may be based in Japan and Guam, but the first Hawaii-based unit is expected to have 1,800 to 2,000 Marines carved out mainly from units already there, including one of three infantry battalions at Kaneohe Bay, according to Maj. Joshua Benson.

7. Under this concept, the US Marine Corps will use expeditionary advanced base operations (EABO) to distribute highly mobile Marines across Pacific islands and arm them with advanced missiles that can aid the US Navy by sinking ships in contested choke points. “The Marine Corps is at an inflection point, and we must change,” said Commandant Gen. David Berger. “In a way, it’s a counter to China putting bases in the South China Sea”. “We may not have enough ships to cover the ground, but we have enough firepower and a concept to cover that ocean.”

8. The 3 year setup plan for the Littoral Regiment foresees the use of the Navy Marine expeditionary ship interdiction system (NMESIS), with Naval Strike Missiles using joint light tactical vehicles, and unmanned vehicles to conduct A2AD against the PLA(N).
 
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tonnyc

Well-Known Member
The suspension of the termination process of the Visiting Forces Agreement between USA and the Philippines is being extended for another six months. Gawd what a convoluted sentence that is, but that's the situation.

Recap for those who has forgotten it.
In 1999 the Philippines and the US signed a Visiting Forces Agreement. It allows military personnels from one country to visit another without a visa. (Also have other things, the most controversial of it is the jurisdiction over visiting soldiers, but that's another topic entirely.)
On 11 February 2020, President Duterte ordered the termination of the VFA due to US refusal to grant a visa to Senator de la Rosa, who is not a military personnel and was never one, though he was the head of the police for a while and is a sitting senator. The agreement gives a 180 days "wind-down" period after the notice so both parties can finish their businesses in an orderly manner.
On 2 June 2020 President Duterte ordered the suspension of the wind down period for six months. That is, he's not going to count the following six months as part of the 180 days wind-down period.
Today, he ordered a six month extension to the suspension.

Personal opinion: that's not going to accomplish much. Defense requires long-term planning, and countries want steadfast allies, not "fair-weather friends" who will terminate agreements on a whim and then say "err, I'm not canceling the termination but I'm totally letting you stay longer". The US will make use of the extension because it's in their best interest, but they won't do anything long term this way. The Philippines can do so much better by admitting that they have made a mistake and reaffirm their commitment to the VFA. Alternatively, even following through with the termination is fine, provided it's followed up with a strong commitment toward cooperation in other ways (i.e., buy the F-16 already).
 

Sandhi Yudha

Well-Known Member
You can achieve a lot with political willingness, no political opposition, an almost unlimited defence budget and a top level intelligence and reverse engineering & copying capabilities.
 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
ASEAN’s response to a cautious and incrementalist America

Happy New Year, DT members.

1. After 20 Jan 2021, I can count on Blinken (President-elect Biden's choice to be the next US Secretary of State) to: (i) be competent (by attending ASEAN meetings); and (ii) present a compassionate face (but to act as realists to protect American interests).

(a) I expect American concerns with human rights and humanitarian efforts to return to the foreground — there will be renewed bipartisan commitment to recentering human rights concerns in U.S. weapons transfers, as well as accountability for past misuse of weapons — resulting in 2021 tensions with Duterte.​

(b) The Democratic centrists in Biden’s team believe in careful management of the post-Cold War order. They are cautious and incrementalist. They will stand up to China but will not want to define their strategy as a great power competition. Within Biden’s foreign policy team, there is an ongoing debate among Democratic centrists about the future of U.S. foreign policy; and many favor a foreign policy broadly consistent with that of President Barack Obama.​

(c) They maintain high hopes for bilateral cooperation with Beijing on climate change, global public health, and other issues — which means space to trade away Pinoy interests, to gain in other areas.​

(d) In July 2020, more than 30 progressive groups sent a letter to Biden urging him to select foreign policy personnel in a manner that would “challenge the institutions and groupthink that have led to a disastrous, overly-militarized, unilateral approach to foreign affairs” of past administrations. Kate Kizer, policy director for Win Without War, a progressive foreign policy organization that signed the letter, said the recent UAE arms sale is a good place to start. “President-elect Biden has promised to chart a different path than Trump, and we’re hopeful that he starts by immediately undoing as many of the just-notified sales to the UAE...”​

2. At this point, I just want the Philippines to make up their minds. If they want to cancel the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) with the US, please go ahead.

3. From a non-aligned movement perspective, ASEAN does not care and will not stand with President Duterte when China crushes him, over fisheries issues in the South China Sea.

4. There is nothing independent about President Duterte’s foreign policy — he is just a Chinese puppet. His remark that he would scrap the VFA, if the US does not supply the Philippines with COVID-19 vaccines, by saying it was in line with his independent foreign policy, is a choice that I welcome. Duterte’s choice is policy until 30 June 2022, when his term ends.

5. It is time for ASEAN and the Americans to drop dead weight until the end of Duterte’s term in the Philippines. That way, the Americans can focus their resources in 2021 and 2022 on real allies and partners. Biden’s incoming foreign policy team, under Antony Blinken, is unlikely to welcome the latest silly move by Duterte, in an attempt to force Blinken’s hand even before Biden’s team takes office.
 
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Sandhi Yudha

Well-Known Member
Not really a surprise, but the build up its air and naval forces in its southernmost province on the edge of the South China Sea, will certainly worry the neighbours.
 

Sandhi Yudha

Well-Known Member
Vietnam has recently upgraded its outposts in the disputed South China Sea with improved fortifications and infrastructure, although the scale of its activities is not as spectacular compared to that carried out by China, according to Vietnam strengthens fortifications in disputed South China Sea, satellite images reveal

and


In the last link we can see some interesting satellite photos.
 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Different approaches to swimming in a Chinese lake —Part 1

Vietnam has recently upgraded its outposts in the disputed South China Sea with improved fortifications and infrastructure, although the scale of its activities is not as spectacular compared to that carried out by China, according to Vietnam strengthens fortifications in disputed South China Sea, satellite images reveal

and


In the last link we can see some interesting satellite photos.
1. These are internal messaging or ‘PR type efforts’ and not seen by me as proper campaign planning for a worse case scenario. This is the same as PR efforts by the Singapore Navy to show a cooperative face with the PLA(N) — it is in the national interest of Singapore to build relations with China, so that if any shooting starts, we can at least call them on behalf of other ASEAN members. Chinese media said the guided-missile destroyer Guiyang and guided-missile frigate Zaozhuang, part of the 36th Escort Taskforce, participated in the joint maritime exercise on 24 Feb 2021. The Singaporean ships include the Formidable-class stealth frigate, RSS Intrepid, and the Independence-class littoral mission vessel, RSS Sovereignty. And there is real scope for bilateral cooperation with the PLA(N) for joint search and rescue, HADR and NEO scenarios.

2. IMHO, without an effective tertiary air force by 2025, Vietnam can no longer effectively defend its outposts in the South China Sea — given the power disparity between the PLA(N) and any ASEAN Navy — PLA(N) destroyers and carrier battle groups would make this area a Chinese lake. Even if the Vietnamese Navy acquired in the future, capabilities similar to the Singapore Navy in 2021, Vietnam would still lose within 2 to 3 days of a conflict.

3. By 2030, Vietnam’s 6 Kilo class submarines will be the hunted by Chinese ASW groups. That’s a scary thought. That is why, 8 years ago, Singapore decided to invest in a new class of regionally superior submarines — to ensure our active armed neutrality to any conflict.

4. Both Vietnam and China’s outposts in the South China Sea can be hit again and again, if war starts. The current planning seems to be for a troubled peace scenario, where each party tries to have escalation options. As Olli Suorsa has shown, with a range of 150 kilometers (80 nautical miles), Vietnamese EXTRA systems could already be capable of striking all of China’s Spratly bases. And that is a considerable deterrent capability for Hanoi.
 
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Sandhi Yudha

Well-Known Member
1. These are internal messaging or ‘PR type efforts’ and not seen by me as proper campaign planning for a worse case scenario. This is the same as PR efforts by the Singapore Navy to show a cooperative face with the PLA(N) — it is in the national interest of Singapore to build relations with China, so that if any shooting starts, we can at least call them on behalf of other ASEAN members. Chinese media said the guided-missile destroyer Guiyang and guided-missile frigate Zaozhuang, part of the 36th Escort Taskforce, participated in the joint maritime exercise on 24 Feb 2021. The Singaporean ships include the Formidable-class stealth frigate, RSS Intrepid, and the Independence-class littoral mission vessel, RSS Sovereignty. And there is real scope for bilateral cooperation with the PLA(N) for joint search and rescue, HADR and NEO scenarios.

2. IMHO, without an effective tertiary air force by 2025, Vietnam can no longer effectively defend its outposts in the South China Sea — given the power disparity between the PLA(N) and any ASEAN Navy — PLA(N) destroyers and carrier battle groups would make this area a Chinese lake. Even if the Vietnamese Navy acquired in the future, capabilities similar to the Singapore Navy in 2021, Vietnam would still lose within 2 to 3 days of a conflict.

3. By 2030, Vietnam’s 6 Kilo class submarines will be the hunted by Chinese ASW groups. That’s a scary thought. That is why, 8 years ago, Singapore decided to invest in a new class of regionally superior submarines — to ensure our active armed neutrality to any conflict.

4. Both Vietnam and China’s outposts in the South China Sea can be hit again and again, if war starts. The current planning seems to be for a troubled peace scenario, where each party tries to have escalation options. As Olli Suorsa has shown, with a range of 150 kilometers (80 nautical miles), Vietnamese EXTRA systems could already be capable of striking all of China’s Spratly bases. And that is a considerable deterrent capability for Hanoi.
It is remarkable that they do not invest anymore in their armed forces the last years.
As far as i know no more Sukhois are added on top of the 36 Su-30MK2 they received.
No more Project 11661E (Gepard 3.9) frigates are ordered after the 4th one.
And also the amount of the MPA-aircrafts (and the capabilities of the aircrafts) is quite disappointing.
 
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OPSSG

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Staff member
Different approaches to swimming in a Chinese lake —Part 2

5. On 21 Jan 2021, Beijing passed a law that authorizes the Chinese Coast Guard to use “all necessary measures” to prevent foreign organizations and individuals from violating, or posing an “imminent danger” of violating, China’s “sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdictional rights.” This is the first time China has spelled out in law the conditions under which its coast guard can fire weapons on foreign vessels. The new law permits the coast guard to use force under prescribed circumstances to defend China’s “jurisdictional waters” (管辖海域)—a deliberately ambiguous term that likely encompasses China’s ill-defined claims over nearly 80 percent of the waters in the South China Sea.

6. On 7 Mar 2021, 220 boats from China's maritime militia appeared at Julian Felipe Reef ("Julian Felipe" is an alternate name for Whitsun Reef, a "boomerang-shaped" submerged feature at the northeastern tip of Union Banks), an atoll within the Philippines' disputed EEZ claim. After diplomatic protests were issued, the boats dispersed to other atolls at the end of March. Andrew Erickson has explained, China uses these non-naval vessels for “gray zone operations against vessels from its maritime neighbors, as well as the U.S., at a level designed to frustrate effective response by the other parties involved.” These types of vessels are deployed to assert and defend China’s expansive maritime claims “more regularly and extensively than its navy.” Erickson and Connor Kennedy have shown that the China’s People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) , which includes both fishing vessels and purpose-built vessels designed to look like fishing vessels, is organized and commanded by the PLA’s local military commands. Given the high percentage of incidents involving PAFMM forces, the absence of a CUES-like arrangement for non-naval vessels is a glaring weakness in the regional maritime safety regime.

7. Duterte's magic with the PRC ambassador didn't work out. The latter assured him that boats won't stay in Whitsun Reef permanently but he didn't promise that the boats won't disperse to other features within the Philippine EEZ and elsewhere . The Chinese embassy in Manila responded to remarks on Chinese incursions by saying that it has taken note of Philippine defense chief Delfin Lorenzana's earlier statement saying Chinese ships must leave the Julian Felipe Reef in the West Philippine Sea because the weather has cleared; and that it was a “perplexing statement” and officials should “avoid any unprofessional remarks which may further fan irrational emotions.” The Chinese embassy in Beijing wouldn’t have made such a statement if President Rodrigo Duterte, as the “chief architect of foreign policy” had shown some spine right at the start of his administration instead of appearing to be grovelling to Beijing.

(a) China, through its Philippine embassy, did not stand down."It is completely normal for Chinese fishing vessels to fish in the waters and take shelter near the reef during rough sea conditions. Nobody has the right to make wanton remarks on such activities," said the embassy spokesperson.​
(b) China insisted that the Julian Felipe reef, which it calls Niu'e Jiao, "is part of China's Nansha Islands" and that the waters around it "has been a traditional fishing ground for Chinese fishermen for many years." This is a ironic situation where Foreign Secretary Teodoro Locsin Jr. was being “chummy” during his meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in China just a day before the defense secretary railed against Chinese presence at the reef. I have zero sympathy for Manila, as they have not stood together with other claimants within ASEAN.​
(c)“Once China moves in, it doesn't leave. It might decrease the number. It might play nice for a little while, maybe it ratchets down the tension for short term political gain, but it is unlikely to vacate this reef,” Gregory B. Poling, director of AMTI stressed. Philippine officials are likely worried that the presence of so many PAFMM ships at Whitsun Reef is a prelude to occupation and reclamation.​

(d) At this time, no dredging ships have been sighted or reported present yet, only the distinct ‘fishing' vessels that have become a standard and ever-present feature of the contested seascape. This does not warrant complacency, however, as the reclamation of reefs and conversion of artificial islands were always preceded by massive destructive fishing efforts as if to extract whatever valuables there were from the area before burying it with sand and paving it with concrete.​
(e) Andrew Erickson speculated that they are “trolling for territory” and warned that if not countered at Whitsun Reef, or elsewhere, the China’s PAFMM vessels could support further territorial seizure akin to what China achieved at Scarborough Shoal in 2012.​
 
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Sandhi Yudha

Well-Known Member
It seems that Chinese Coast Guard ship 5101 and a Type 022 missile boat chased and blocked an ABS-CBN chartered boat in the Spratly Sea, part of the EEZ of the Philippines. I dont know the details, because i do not understand Vietnamese or Tagalog.


 
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ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
It seems that Chinese Coast Guard ship 5101 and a Type 022 missile boat chased and blocked an ABS-CBN chartered boat in the Spratly Sea, part of the EEZ of the Philippines. I dont know the details, because i do not understand Vietnamese or Tagalog.
The Drive have published an article on it.

 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Appropriate reaction to the stationing of the Type 022 missile vessel in the South China Sea

1. ASEAN does not care and will not stand with President Duterte when China crushes him, over a EEZ fisheries dispute in the South China Sea — given that he is the leader of a Chinese client state. In 2020, Duterte stated that China was in “possession” of the South China Sea and underscored his position that it was futile to act against it. This is all the signal China needs to confirm his real lack of resolve. Nearly five years of downplaying Chinese moves and kowtowing to Chinese positions in the contested maritime region in a manner harmful to ASEAN unity have resulted in a fait accompli by turning Whitsun Reef into an anchorage. "Most importantly, the Philippines must abandon its individualist, defeatist, and clientelist mind-set, and mercenary attitude toward geopolitics, hoping China will reciprocate with great favours and unrestricted benevolence,” as Jay Batongbacal said.
(a) Under Indonesia’s (as ASEAN’s largest country) and Brunei’s (as Chairman) leadership, I am not optimistic of an unified ASEAN response to China’s move to convert the South China Sea into a Chinese lake. 2020 is an important year for Indonesia-China relations. The ties between Jakarta and Beijing have increased and expanded, not only in political and economic fields, where China is now Indonesia’s most crucial trading partner and investor, but also in defence and cultural realms.​
(b) Following Prabowo Subianto’s inauguration as defence minister in 2019, China was the first major power he visited for talks with Chinese counterpart General Wei Fenghe and deputy chairman of China’s Central Military Commission General Xu Qiliang. Plans had been mooted for a US $200 million purchase of naval patrol ships from China, and although the idea was reportedly abandoned.​
(c) Replacing its previous soft protest against China’s actions in the South China Sea, Indonesia has recently taken more aggressive steps. In May 2020, Indonesia, through a strongly worded diplomatic note to the United Nations, also rejected Beijing’s claim that its maritime rights and interests in the South China Sea are guaranteed under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. The problems in the relationship might not soon disappear. But Indonesia-China cooperation looks set to continue to increase.​
It seems that Chinese Coast Guard ship 5101 and a Type 022 missile boat chased and blocked an ABS-CBN chartered boat in the Spratly Sea, part of the EEZ of the Philippines.
2. I offer my condolences to the Philippines for:
(i) deciding not to invest in a real air force, by choosing not to order F-16V before the end of Duterte’s term of office in June 2022 and failing to maintain their C-130 fleet;​
(ii) deciding not to invest more in procuring capable frigates (like the HDF-3800 frigates from HHI, the Mogami-class frigate from MHI or the Admiral Ronarc’h class FDI frigate from the Naval Group), instead they bought two poorly armed Jose Rizal class corvettes from South Korea; and​
(iii) deciding to down grade ties with the US by threatening to cancel the VFA; in Feb 2021, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte went so far as to say that the US must pay if it wants to keep a two-decade-old troop deployment agreement with his country that is central to US strategy in Asia.​

3. If the Pinoys were serious about growing their air and naval capabilities, they would place a follow-on order of 6 more Jose Rizal class corvettes from HHI and an initial order of 36 F-16Vs. Anything less than new 6 corvettes for naval presence and 2 MRF fighter squadrons, to begin learning the basics of air warfare, is just mere puff.

4. Anything less than 6 to 8 corvettes for presence and 2 MRF fighter squadrons is just mere puff. If they at least did the minimum of ordering MICA NG missiles for the Jose Rizal class corvettes to gain a basic air warfare capability, I would recognise their modernisation efforts but since that is not done, their efforts thus far is seen by me as lame and ineffective.
 
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