Strategy, tactics and operations; what is the difference?

SniperSquad

New Member
Hi everyone.

I am confused about the differences between strategy, operations and tactics. I think most people confused those words and that makes me confused as well.

Can you define those terms?
 

Redlands18

Well-Known Member
Hi everyone.

I am confused about the differences between strategy, operations and tactics. I think most people confused those words and that makes me confused as well.

Can you define those terms?
Strategy in Military Terms
Strategy is working out where to fight the Enemy, what forces you are going to deploy to the Battle, what goal you are trying to achieve in this battle.
Tactics
Are the methods you are going to use in that battle, when and where you may deploy your Armour or Infantry or Artillery and the methods those Soldiers use in fighting that Battle.
Operations
The Battle itself
 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Post 1 of 2:

@SniperSquad, the current definition of tactics in FM 3-90 is “the employment of units in combat. It includes the ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other, the terrain, and the enemy to translate potential combat power into victorious battles and engagements,” whose definition, I am pretty sure you cannot understand. Tactics are generally very specific, like: Tactics for Small Wars (go read this 1st link first).

1. To understand tactics, there is a greater context called doctrine, which is enabled by the equipment and training of the deployed force. For example, doctrinally, it is suicidal to deploy only light infantry to open desert terrain or flat rolling grounds. If you have hundreds of kilometres of open terrain, you would want to deploy armoured forces (eg. MBTs with armoured infantry, supported by self propelled artillery).

2. Every service has its own doctrine, as distilled wisdom to guide the conduct of operations. For example, there is doctrine for proper armour deployment in urban terrain (and the culture of allowing autonomy to ground units) or doctrine for amphibious operations. US Marine Corps success during Operation Catchpole in Feb 1944, has been distilled into amphibious doctrine that we still use today (this 2nd link explains how NGFS and tanks were used for amphibious operations).
(a) As a military term, US Army doctrine is defined as the fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. But doctrine is more than just principles. It is a body of thought on how the US Army forces intend to operate as part of a joint force and a statement of how the US Army intends to fight. It establishes a common frame of reference including intellectual tools that US Army leaders use to solve military problems. It is supposed to focus on how to think—not what to think. May I suggest you read this 3rd link from the school of US Army doctrine? — What is US Army Doctrine? — Modern War Institute
(b) You can sub-divide doctrine to different types, like armoured doctrine, urban warfare, or counter-insurgency doctrine and so on. Take a look at this 4th link for Rand’s discussion on urban warfare — The Battle for Baghdad — Institutionalizing US Army Lessons for Urban Combat
(c) The Apr 2003 thunder run demonstrated that US armored forces could penetrate Baghdad while suffering minimal casualties. During the movement, TF 1-64 AR sustained one destroyed Abrams tank, one heavily damaged Bradley, 1 KIA and 4 WIA. Schwartz’s task force killed at least 1,000 Iraqi and Syrian fighters, destroyed 30 to 40 BMP IFVs and other vehicles, destroyed one T-72 MBT and eliminated countless roadside bunkers. The task force discovered that the enemy preferred to mass fires from overpasses. Perkins observed that the bridges provided the enemy cover and concealment and afforded “avenues of approach in the flank.”​
(d) V Corps Commander LTG William S. Wallace had no concrete intelligence about the capability and intent of the Iraqi forces protecting Baghdad, prior to the Thunder Run. To collect intelligence about the conventional and paramilitary units inside the city, they planned an armored reconnaissance in force on 5 Apr 2003 via a thunder run. They envisioned it as a prelude to additional armored missions in and out of the city that would disrupt Baghdad’s defenses with the paramount goal of regime collapse.​
(e) Late on 5 Apr 2003, Wallace ordered a 2nd thunder run on 7 Apr 2003. MG Buford Blount of the 3d Infantry Division assigned the task to 2d Brigade.​
(f) Let me share a final 5th link on a Singaporean doctrinal discussion on armour employment in urban warfare: “THUNDER RUNS”: PANACEA FOR URBAN OPERATION? Here we are thinking of a 350 km thunder run to KL, using Singapore Armoured Brigades (operating platforms like the Leopard 2SG, Hunter IFVs and Bronco ATTCs) to provide the armoured fist to punch our enemy on the throat.​

3. Once you read the 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th links shared, you can start to understand TTPs. Further, FM 3-0 defines tactics as “the employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other (CJCSI 5120.02A),” which will start to make sense if you read the 5 links provided.
Strategy in Military Terms
Strategy is working out where to fight the Enemy, what forces you are going to deploy to the Battle, what goal you are trying to achieve in this battle.
Tactics
Are the methods you are going to use in that battle, when and where you may deploy your Armour or Infantry or Artillery and the methods those Soldiers use in fighting that Battle.
Operations
The Battle itself
4. Thanks for the precise reply. IMO, good strategy often means to win even without the need to fight — rather than define these terms, let me just apply it to illustrate.

5. Poor strategy (domino theory) can lead to defeat even if you win the tactical battles. The US military won many battles in Vietnam (but was widely seen as defeated by the insurgents). But as my fellow Moderators have pointed out — planning to defeat the enemy through guerilla resistance is like planning to lose.
(a) Except for Pakistan and Afghanistan, I don’t know any country in Asia that is planning to win a war by only taking horrific damage to their own country's infrastructure and population.​

...That's because from a National Defense point of view planning to defeat the enemy through guerilla resistance is like planning to lose, or planning to win by taking horrific damage to your own country's infrastructure and population. Consider Vietnam. Arguably North Vietnam won against the US, but the human and economic cost is so high that it's a Pyrrhic victory at best, not dissimilar to the Mujahadeen "victory" in Afghanistan over Soviet forces, at the end of which Afghanistan turned into essentially a failed state and remains one to this day.​
Planning for that kind of war is a questionable strategy at best, and downright idiotic at worst. Which brings me to the real point. In the modern world cases where another country successfully invades and annexes part of another state are relatively rare since WWII ended.​
(b) As Feanor said, consider Vietnam. Arguably North Vietnam won against the US, but the human and economic cost is so high that it's a Pyrrhic victory at best, for a military tactics discussion.​
 
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OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Post 2 of 2:

6. The current US strategy for a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ most stridently championed by the US and Japan is not being followed by others. ASEAN, in fact refuses to be drawn into any configuration which focuses on a putative China threat (see: America and Japan's vision of an Indo-Pacific free from Chinese threat runs into deep waters).

7. Some tactics, operations and strategies are only possible with the acquisition of an appropriate platform, like the Type 218SG (with its large 4 person airlock in the sail).

(a) This new class of 4 submarines is great at diver delivery in the shallows (for beach recce), as our target landing sites for amphibious operations (by our four 141m long mini-LPDs), are bounded by shallow waters.​

(b) Given the complex hydrography of the region, the greatest threat to our amphibious operations, by our rapid deployment forces (7SIB) are actually influence sweep naval mines. And we thank the US Marines for helping my country develop and advance our doctrine of amphibious operations in the littoral space — for both our Guardsmen (during Exercise Valiant Mark) and NDU (during Exercise Sandfisher).​

(c) Grateful that Singapore’s NDU had an opportunity to train with Recon Marines specializing in combatant diving; small-boat operations; underwater navigation; help casting; high-altitude, high-opening parachuting and ground reconnaissance tactics. More important than training, the US Marines and their recon elements should work with the NDU to stage their island hopping logistics out of Singapore too.​

8. There is even a thread for defending a small island. A key factor to enhancing Singapore’s immediate security is avoiding the Thucydides Trap with Malaysia (which is about 475 times bigger than Singapore). This trap refers to when a rising power causes fear in an established power which escalates toward war. Thucydides wrote: "What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta." In 2016, IHS said Malaysia was forecast to achieve a per capita GDP of US$20,000 by 2025, with total GDP exceeding US$1 trillion by 2030 — which means at that time, they may be able to outspend Singapore in weapons purchases. For details on how to win without fighting (through deterrence theory), see page 8 onwards from post #147 onwards: The best strategy to defending Singapore Island.
 
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SniperSquad

New Member
  • Thread Starter Thread Starter
  • #5
Thanks for your explanations. I understand the distinctions of those terms better. I think.

For example;

We are in the middle of world war 2 and I need to decide when and where my country and all other allies are going to invade Europe to attack germans.

- Strategy: I decide that we are going to invade the beaches of Normandy in France at the first night opportunity in May for example.

- Tactics:

I am going to send thousands of infantry to land on the beach. Their goal will be to eliminate german resistance and allow tanks and other vehicles to land on the beach.

I am also going to decide that to have the best results, we are going to put all our forces on the same point on the beach of Normandy. We are going to send thousands of fighters, bombers to protect the navy and attack german fortifications.

Finally, I am going to send paratroopers behind the enemy lines so the german will be surrounded.

Is my explanation ok?

The only distinction I don't really make right now is about operations.
 

Takao

The Bunker Group
In your example, your strategy is Germany First.

Your tactics will be where and when the combined arms strike Normandy.

The quirky one is operations. There is a school of thought (of which I am an increasing member) that the operational level is a made-up level for the military to avoid thinking about non-military repercussions. There is another, more common school of thought, that it is the level between strategy and tactical where major campaigns are determined.

According to the main school, the decision to land at Normandy, break out to the Rhur and seize Berlin are operational level plans. For the smaller school, these are high level tactical decisions.

Note that the operational level is one rife with arguments, mistranslations and misunderstandings. You won't find any three sources that agree :) Even on my Staff College the staff couldn't agree what the operational level was!
 

SniperSquad

New Member
  • Thread Starter Thread Starter
  • #7
Okay so if some military people don't know exactly what operational means precisely why should I know ;)
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
In your example, your strategy is Germany First.

Your tactics will be where and when the combined arms strike Normandy.

The quirky one is operations. There is a school of thought (of which I am an increasing member) that the operational level is a made-up level for the military to avoid thinking about non-military repercussions. There is another, more common school of thought, that it is the level between strategy and tactical where major campaigns are determined.

According to the main school, the decision to land at Normandy, break out to the Rhur and seize Berlin are operational level plans. For the smaller school, these are high level tactical decisions.

Note that the operational level is one rife with arguments, mistranslations and misunderstandings. You won't find any three sources that agree :) Even on my Staff College the staff couldn't agree what the operational level was!
Funnily enough I would have thought that the whole invasion of Normandy and the subsequent march towards Berlin was a strategy within the overall strategy of winning the European war. So where is the boundary between a strategy and an operation? We talk about the ETO, METO, PTO etc., but there were strategies in those theatres that were subservient to the overall strategy of defeating the enemy.
 

Raven22

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Those theatres you talk about are the operational level of war. Theatre commanders construct campaigns to achieve theatre goals set by strategic commanders. At the strategic level, Churchill/Roosevelt (well, their generals) developed the strategy for the total defeat of Germany. At the operational level, Eisenhour developed the campaign plan for an amphibious lodgement in Normandy followed by the crossing of the Rhine. At the tactical level, Patton/Montgomery etc fought battles to achieve this operational plan.
 
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Takao

The Bunker Group
See - under the traditional view, @Raven22 is 100% correct. And how Australia, the UK, New Zealand, Canada and the US (among others) teaches it.

For those challenging it, it's tactical actions. The logistics and weight of effort was driven (and decided) at the strategic level, but even within theatres I would argue that they were all tactical actions - decided by the theatre commander. Tactics isn't defined by rank - Haig was a tactical commander. At the time they were seen as tactical areas; it's not really until the West misreads Soviet works in the 1970s and TRADOC starts building AirLand battle that you see the operational level come into vogue. It allowed (at this is the root of the heretic school :cool:) NATO military commanders to plan actions while ignoring the political demands of either Germany (mostly) or nuclear weapons.

The problem that this brings is you grow these COCOM's within the US that work at the 'operational' level and are completely divorced from political reality in Washington. Which leads to messes like Afghanistan and Iraq and Syria and Libya and Africa writ large - because commanders think they can act independent of political or rest of government actions.

That's mess one.....

Mess two is asking the question if there is strategy, or subordinate levels of strategy (you'll hear military strategy a lot). Again, two schools of thought - yes and no. This one is simultaneously more split and less split; the ADF for instance has Military Strategy cells but doesn't recognise military strategy as separate within its teachings...

Again, my view is that strategy is one thing without subordinate efforts. There is a national (or, for WW2, international) strategy that directs efforts and, critically, logistics. It's a mix of uniforms and civilians and covers everything to ensure the national will is aligned appropriately. The idea that the military can generate strategy independently is an anathema to me - it ignores basics and undermines military and national effort.
 

Nighthawk.NZ

Well-Known Member
Can you define those terms?
One way of looking it is... strategy wins the war, tactics win the battles to win the war...

It depends on how much of the picture you see... in a war... The war room sees the whole picture, the generals see most, battle commanders see some, the squad leaders the general grunt sees the current mission... Each would be tactic's vs strategy compared to the level up.

On a chessboard, my strategy is to rush or storm and over power to make my opponent make a mistake... my tactics to do this by using the knight as they can lure that mistake for the set trap with the Rook...
 
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Raven22

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
The problem that this brings is you grow these COCOM's within the US that work at the 'operational' level and are completely divorced from political reality in Washington. Which leads to messes like Afghanistan and Iraq and Syria and Libya and Africa writ large - because commanders think they can act independent of political or rest of government actions.
While I agree that the operational level of war can be an ephemeral thing and is hard to define, I’m afraid I don’t understand your point quoted above. How does what you call the level of command that does campaign planning in a theatre affect the link between tactical actions and national strategy? Surely whether you consider the COCOM’s to be operational level or tactical level, the same problems would persist?

In particular, I think it is hard to blame the COCOMs for the deficiencies in Iraq, Afghanistan etc when the fundamental problem was a lack of coherent strategy in the first place.
 
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