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[CB90]

"Dedicated real estate which can't be used for anything else" is both normal & perfectly acceptable for things which you need to have aboard or which you intend to always carry. Frigates & destroyers usually have a permanently fitted gun at the pointy end, for example.

Putting things in multi-purpose launchers is a good idea when you consider them to be optional. When you think they're not optional, it's only worthwhile when the multi-purpose launcher doesn't cost a lot more (in money or anything else) than other ways of carrying them. It's like the gun: would it be a good idea to have a main gun in a big container which could be lifted out & replaced by another one, containing a different gun, or missile launchers? It's more flexible, & stops you having "dedicated real estate which can't be used for anything else", but is it worth the cost, complexity, etc.? How often will you want to swap out the main gun & fit something else? What about alternative engines? You could have podded GTs, diesels, etc. & big hatches to remove them through, so when you don't want to go flat out you could take out an engine & use the space for something else. Good idea?

You see what I mean. There's a cost to flexibility. It can be worth paying, but not always.

No that's not a good analogy. It's not about the missile being "optional" it's about having flexibility in loadout. Operational requirements for loadouts can change from deployment to deployment between different theaters. There is absolutely no good reason for you to need to change an engine or generator between different deployment areas.
New major surface combatants don't generally adopt "unique" launchers like CAMM soft launch, as they need to carry a large and diverse inventory of weapons. You only do unique installs where it's really needed or particularly beneficial.

No other Navy that expects to engage in high end warfare has done anything other than standardize on something conceptually similar to MK41 VLS. The Russians and Chinese have universal VLS with caliber variants for bigger/smaller missiles, Australia is all Mk41, the JSMDF is all in on MK41 VLS even for their own locally developed missiles, and the Koreans have a very similar K-VLS for their locally developed missiles.
Canada's decision to mount both ESSM and CAMM (but in VLS form) should also be illuminating.
If it makes so much sense, why doesn't the Type 45 have a dedicated launcher for CAMM?

You're also implying there's a unique "tax" on size/weight/complexity in having a VLS launcher vs a soft launch system.
This is only really true if CAMM is the most capable missile you intend to carry (which would say a lot about the level of threat you expect it to face). In any other mixed case, (ie where you have a need for higher performance missiles) all the redundancy, plumbing, wiring, CMS integration, etc that you get with VLS is already "paid for" by the requirement for the higher end missiles. In fact, having a unique launcher would be less efficient as you would have to duplicate all the support hardware, training, logistics, possibly even additional personnel, etc that already exists for one launcher.

Or, I mean, I guess it's still quite possible every other Navy is wrong.

@spoz I believe that the RNZN Mk-41 were the self defence variant, not the tactical variant so will have been a shorter length than the tactical length variant.

Believe so as well.
Quite a few RAN WEEOs I've talked to have stated it'd be nice to be able to fit just a few of the SM-2 inventory to the ANZAC to go along with CEA radar to take advantage of the added range - the impression I got was the launcher was too short to fit a SM-2.

 

[Boagrius]

So I decided to do a bit more reading into the CSBA report I posted upthread. The main recommendations were:

1. Pursue DDG(X) instead of the Future Large Surface Combatant. The Navy’s plan to accelerate procurement of the Future Large Surface Combatant without first developing and maturing relevant technologies is risky and likely to result in a ship that will be delivered late, run over budget, and fall short of requirements. Moreover, the estimated $2.8 billion cost of the cruiser-like Future Large Surface Combatant continues to advance the Navy on a trajectory toward a smaller fleet of expensive ships. Instead of this approach, CSBA’s plan first matures key technologies for automation, electric propulsion, and directed energy weapons, then procures a destroyer-sized DDG(X) in FY 2030 estimated to cost $2.25 billion.

2. Pursue an optionally unmanned DDC instead of the Large Unmanned Surface Vehicle (LUSV). Instead of procuring an optionally manned LUSV that may be difficult to employ throughout the spectrum of competition and conflict, CSBA’s plan introduces a similarly designed DDC that is designed to be, conversely, optionally unmanned and would normally operate with small crews of around 15–24 personnel. DDCs primarily armed with offensive weapons would serve as offboard magazines for force packages.

3. Field more MUSVs. CSBA’s plan includes a large force of 110 low-cost MUSVs to conduct passive and multistatic sensing, counter-ISR, and ASW in a truly distributed manner.





4. Forego service life extensions for older cruiser and destroyers. As large surface combatants focus on command and control and high-end air and missile defense, small surface combatants can replace them for a growing number of other missions. CSBA’s proposed approach reduces operation and support costs by retiring older cruisers and destroyers as they reach the end of their service lives.

5. Invest in enablers. In order to maximize lethality, the Navy must adopt a balanced approach to fleet design that funds valuable surface warfare enablers, even at the cost of combatant hulls. CSBA’s plan generates savings that can be invested in key enablers such as munitions and other expendable payloads, broad-area ISRT and communications systems, and logistics platforms and equipment.

Also of particular note was the development of an "uber-ASROC" that would allow for prompt engagement of enemy submarines over the entirety of the friendly sub-surface sensor envelope. Perhaps a lightweight torpedo propelled by something akin to SM6.

 

[spoz]

@spoz I believe that the RNZN Mk-41 were the self defence variant, not the tactical variant so will have been a shorter length than the tactical length variant.

Yes, of course -brain fade. I can only blame approaching senility.....

 

[ngatimozart]

Yes, of course -brain fade. I can only blame approaching senility.....

Haha, join the club.

 

[swerve]

No that's not a good analogy. It's not about the missile being "optional" it's about having flexibility in loadout. Operational requirements for loadouts can change from deployment to deployment between different theaters. There is absolutely no good reason for you to need to change an engine or generator between different deployment areas.

No, you don't understand. I understand all that. I'm just pointing out that you don't need more flexibility than the variability in loadouts you'll actually use. If there's an irreducible number of missiles you're going to carry for local air defence, you don't need to fill bloody great Mk 41 silos with them. Why is this so difficult to grasp?

Oh, & navies are well aware of this & put it into practice. Otherwise, they'd have RAM quad-packed in Mk 41, instead of dedicated RAM launchers, would have developed quad packs for Mistral in Sylver instead of fitting dedicated launchers, etc.

You're also implying there's a unique "tax" on size/weight/complexity in having a VLS launcher vs a soft launch system.

'Unique "tax"'? That's baffling. How do you get to that? There's nothing unique. It's a general principle, that use of a sophisticated, expensive piece of equipment for things which don't need it is wasteful. It's not specific to cold launch, or even missiles.
You say it's already paid for. Not thinking past the superficialties of specific cases. Opportunity cost, maintenance cost, etc., & cost of construction. Nothing's paid for when you start designing the ship, is it?

If you've already designed & built ships, & you have more VLS cells than you need, then why not use them for anything which will fit, rather than paying to fit something else? No argument from me to the contrary there - though you seem to think that's what I'm arguing. But new ships are constantly being designed & built, & it's wise to optimise.

If you can avoid tieing up big expensive launchers in which big missiles could be put with small missiles which you always carry but which don't need the big launchers, & because of topweight & space could be housed elsewhere in the ship, in cheaper, lighter & smaller launchers, why not? Ask the RCN.

 

[CB90]

No, you don't understand. I understand all that. I'm just pointing out that you don't need more flexibility than the variability in loadouts you'll actually use. If there's an irreducible number of missiles you're going to carry for local air defence, you don't need to fill bloody great Mk 41 silos with them. Why is this so difficult to grasp?

Oh, & navies are well aware of this & put it into practice. Otherwise, they'd have RAM quad-packed in Mk 41, instead of dedicated RAM launchers, would have developed quad packs for Mistral in Sylver instead of fitting dedicated launchers, etc.


'Unique "tax"'? That's baffling. How do you get to that? There's nothing unique. It's a general principle, that use of a sophisticated, expensive piece of equipment for things which don't need it is wasteful. It's not specific to cold launch, or even missiles.
You say it's already paid for. Not thinking past the superficialties of specific cases. Opportunity cost, maintenance cost, etc., & cost of construction. Nothing's paid for when you start designing the ship, is it?

If you've already designed & built ships, & you have more VLS cells than you need, then why not use them for anything which will fit, rather than paying to fit something else? No argument from me to the contrary there - though you seem to think that's what I'm arguing. But new ships are constantly being designed & built, & it's wise to optimise.

If you can avoid tieing up big expensive launchers in which big missiles could be put with small missiles which you always carry but which don't need the big launchers, & because of topweight & space could be housed elsewhere in the ship, in cheaper, lighter & smaller launchers, why not? Ask the RCN.

So are you now talking about CAMM or are we talking about purely hypothetical missiles and launchers now?

I’ll just be blunt - your first interjection was to drop in a completely irrelevant plug for Aster 30 when the post pretty clearly identified what range was intended to be covered.

Your second post was to say a stand-alone CAMM was a better launcher option than integrating into existing launchers. I now very much doubt you understand what it takes to extend a VLS in design or the associated logistics to upkeep a launcher. The burden of adding a module if you are going to have the VLS launcher at all to begin with is minimal. While you’re mentioning the RCN, they’re doing their implementation of CAMM with a 6 cell VLS ExLS, which is a multifunction design (though it almost certainly won’t be in practice) sharing much of the Mk41 architecture.

And now it seems like you are arguing for it as a general design principle of economy. Which would be fine if you were developing clean sheet designs across the board from platforms to launchers to missiles but that’s not the reality any Navy or ship designer lives in. So...interesting, but not terribly relevant to the majority of programs, platforms, or missiles.

And finally, unless I’m mistaken, this is the USN thread and you’ve only been repeatedly distracting from another poster who has been trying to start a relevant discussion on a high level regarding force architecture by getting bogged down in minutiae that smacks quite a bit of RN fanboy-ism without contributing anything of relevance.

CAMM or single use launchers or other minor design details may be an interesting point for engineers to wank over but are ultimately not important enough to matter.

 

[Terran]

So I decided to do a bit more reading into the CSBA report I posted upthread. The main recommendations were:

1. Pursue DDG(X) instead of the Future Large Surface Combatant. The Navy’s plan to accelerate procurement of the Future Large Surface Combatant without first developing and maturing relevant technologies is risky and likely to result in a ship that will be delivered late, run over budget, and fall short of requirements. Moreover, the estimated $2.8 billion cost of the cruiser-like Future Large Surface Combatant continues to advance the Navy on a trajectory toward a smaller fleet of expensive ships. Instead of this approach, CSBA’s plan first matures key technologies for automation, electric propulsion, and directed energy weapons, then procures a destroyer-sized DDG(X) in FY 2030 estimated to cost $2.25 billion.

2. Pursue an optionally unmanned DDC instead of the Large Unmanned Surface Vehicle (LUSV). Instead of procuring an optionally manned LUSV that may be difficult to employ throughout the spectrum of competition and conflict, CSBA’s plan introduces a similarly designed DDC that is designed to be, conversely, optionally unmanned and would normally operate with small crews of around 15–24 personnel. DDCs primarily armed with offensive weapons would serve as offboard magazines for force packages.

3. Field more MUSVs. CSBA’s plan includes a large force of 110 low-cost MUSVs to conduct passive and multistatic sensing, counter-ISR, and ASW in a truly distributed manner.

View attachment 47900

View attachment 47902

4. Forego service life extensions for older cruiser and destroyers. As large surface combatants focus on command and control and high-end air and missile defense, small surface combatants can replace them for a growing number of other missions. CSBA’s proposed approach reduces operation and support costs by retiring older cruisers and destroyers as they reach the end of their service lives.

5. Invest in enablers. In order to maximize lethality, the Navy must adopt a balanced approach to fleet design that funds valuable surface warfare enablers, even at the cost of combatant hulls. CSBA’s plan generates savings that can be invested in key enablers such as munitions and other expendable payloads, broad-area ISRT and communications systems, and logistics platforms and equipment.

Also of particular note was the development of an "uber-ASROC" that would allow for prompt engagement of enemy submarines over the entirety of the friendly sub-surface sensor envelope. Perhaps a lightweight torpedo propelled by something akin to SM6.

One number 1 it still seems to me at least that the last DDG(X) might have some barring here. The Zumwalt class has been troubled primarily via the management. By the later half of this decade a lot of the few technology issues will have been fixed most already have the remaining issues were those of program cuts IE 3 ships doesn’t justify production of 155mm AGS ammo at this point, rearmament with 30mm canons as opposed to the intended types and use of more conventional sensors and communications. The basis of the ship though still seems salvageable. I have always felt that like How SeaWolf class SSN were truncated to be followed on by Virginia class which has a lot of common elements carried through perhaps a more missile oriented DDG1000 based ship should come in.

 

[swerve]

So are you now talking about CAMM or are we talking about purely hypothetical missiles and launchers now?

I’ll just be blunt - your first interjection was to drop in a completely irrelevant plug for Aster 30 when the post pretty clearly identified what range was intended to be covered.

Your second post was to say a stand-alone CAMM was a better launcher option than integrating into existing launchers. I now very much doubt you understand what it takes to extend a VLS in design or the associated logistics to upkeep a launcher. The burden of adding a module if you are going to have the VLS launcher at all to begin with is minimal. While you’re mentioning the RCN, they’re doing their implementation of CAMM with a 6 cell VLS ExLS, which is a multifunction design (though it almost certainly won’t be in practice) sharing much of the Mk41 architecture.

And now it seems like you are arguing for it as a general design principle of economy. Which would be fine if you were developing clean sheet designs across the board from platforms to launchers to missiles but that’s not the reality any Navy or ship designer lives in. So...interesting, but not terribly relevant to the majority of programs, platforms, or missiles.

And finally, unless I’m mistaken, this is the USN thread and you’ve only been repeatedly distracting from another poster who has been trying to start a relevant discussion on a high level regarding force architecture by getting bogged down in minutiae that smacks quite a bit of RN fanboy-ism without contributing anything of relevance.

CAMM or single use launchers or other minor design details may be an interesting point for engineers to wank over but are ultimately not important enough to matter.

I first replied because of obvious factual errors, such as the reference to "science projects", & CAMM not being quad packed - things which you clearly understand were errors, from what you've said since. I've not changed my arguments at all, just responded to what's been written. You imagine I've been changing my arguments because you've fixated on narrow aspects of them, & ignored the general principle I've been arguing all along.

The only reason this has gone on is because I've been frustrated by you arguing with things I've not said.

 

[CB90]

I first replied because of obvious factual errors, such as the reference to "science projects", & CAMM not being quad packed - things which you clearly understand were errors, from what you've said since. I've not changed my arguments at all, just responded to what's been written. You imagine I've been changing my arguments because you've fixated on narrow aspects of them, & ignored the general principle I've been arguing all along.

The only reason this has gone on is because I've been frustrated by you arguing with things I've not said.

So you’re admitting you’re just here to nitpick minor details and contribute nothing of substance?

You led with a completely irrelevant post about Aster 30. What was your point there? Please explain how this was at all useful and not just RN wank.

 

[CB90]

So I decided to do a bit more reading into the CSBA report I posted upthread. The main recommendations were:

1. Pursue DDG(X) instead of the Future Large Surface Combatant. The Navy’s plan to accelerate procurement of the Future Large Surface Combatant without first developing and maturing relevant technologies is risky and likely to result in a ship that will be delivered late, run over budget, and fall short of requirements. Moreover, the estimated $2.8 billion cost of the cruiser-like Future Large Surface Combatant continues to advance the Navy on a trajectory toward a smaller fleet of expensive ships. Instead of this approach, CSBA’s plan first matures key technologies for automation, electric propulsion, and directed energy weapons, then procures a destroyer-sized DDG(X) in FY 2030 estimated to cost $2.25 billion.

2. Pursue an optionally unmanned DDC instead of the Large Unmanned Surface Vehicle (LUSV). Instead of procuring an optionally manned LUSV that may be difficult to employ throughout the spectrum of competition and conflict, CSBA’s plan introduces a similarly designed DDC that is designed to be, conversely, optionally unmanned and would normally operate with small crews of around 15–24 personnel. DDCs primarily armed with offensive weapons would serve as offboard magazines for force packages.

3. Field more MUSVs. CSBA’s plan includes a large force of 110 low-cost MUSVs to conduct passive and multistatic sensing, counter-ISR, and ASW in a truly distributed manner.

View attachment 47900

View attachment 47902

4. Forego service life extensions for older cruiser and destroyers. As large surface combatants focus on command and control and high-end air and missile defense, small surface combatants can replace them for a growing number of other missions. CSBA’s proposed approach reduces operation and support costs by retiring older cruisers and destroyers as they reach the end of their service lives.

5. Invest in enablers. In order to maximize lethality, the Navy must adopt a balanced approach to fleet design that funds valuable surface warfare enablers, even at the cost of combatant hulls. CSBA’s plan generates savings that can be invested in key enablers such as munitions and other expendable payloads, broad-area ISRT and communications systems, and logistics platforms and equipment.

Also of particular note was the development of an "uber-ASROC" that would allow for prompt engagement of enemy submarines over the entirety of the friendly sub-surface sensor envelope. Perhaps a lightweight torpedo propelled by something akin to SM6.

Agree with @Terran regarding #1. The DDG-1000 hull platform is proving to have several advantages in certain areas now that it is in use, and the Seawolf to Virginia analogy will likely be a good one. What remains to be seen is just how much difference you want between the LSC/Cruiser and what a DDG(X) would offer - it is quite likely if that gap is not too large, they could bake in what you need from the LSC into the DDG(X) from the start, similar to how the Ticonderogas leveraged the Spruance design. The other issue is that there is going to be quite the gap between the DDG-1000 and the design/build of the DDG(X)...so time is critical.

2. Pursue an optionally unmanned DDC instead of the Large Unmanned Surface Vehicle (LUSV).
I get the advantages for the DDC when not in a high end war, but the disadvantages of the DDC as they've outlined is they also want it equipped for defensive AAW to include ESSM and therefore some sort of mini CIC and supporting radar. Which adds cost quickly and is really tricky to do with either the very small crew or even worse, when the ship is unmanned. Whereas the LUSV doesn't really need to be defended, and probably needs SeaRAM at most.

3. Field more MUSVs. Likely the way of the future whether we like it or not. But their ability to perform those missions autonomously really needs to be proven first. Counter ISR and ASW is likely within easy reach of existing technology. Multistatic sensing is quite a bit harder.

4. Forego service life extensions for older cruiser and destroyers.
This is a big statement. The only way this really works is by scaling back on some operational commitments. I think it likely a good thing, but the COCOM Commanders will not like it. The cruisers really need to go, they are in rough material condition.

5. Invest in enablers.
Definitely. A legacy platform focused approach is not one where the US Navy or any Western navy can expect to use to maintain its edge. As much as I hate buzzwords, synergy, combined arms warfare, whatever you wan to call it, will be essential as the basic technological apples to apples edge erodes in order to try to be competitive against emerging nations that can build faster and cheaper. The force's overall lethality grows dramatically with the addition of offboard sensors and networks.

 

[swerve]

So you’re admitting you’re just here to nitpick minor details and contribute nothing of substance?

You led with a completely irrelevant post about Aster 30. What was your point there? Please explain how this was at all useful and not just RN wank.

It wasn't about Aster 30. That's you missing the point - as usual. That was just an illustration of the inaccuracy of what had been said. You'd have had a legitimate complaint if I'd said "That's wrong", with no explanation or example, wouldn't you?

And drop the fucking insults. "RN wank"? That comes out of your head, not what I've written, & doesn't reflect well on you. Odd fixation you have there on the RN, & odd associations. Rather distasteful.

Minor corrections are perfectly valid. The reasonable thing is to take them with good grace, if right, & say why they're wrong, if not, not drag what should be a polite exchange down into schoolboy insults.

Unless you change your tone I see no point in further engagement. I'd rather not see any more of your mind.

 

[OPSSG]

No that's not a good analogy. It's not about the missile being "optional" it's about having flexibility in loadout. Operational requirements for loadouts can change from deployment to deployment between different theaters. There is absolutely no good reason for you to need to change an engine or generator between different deployment areas.
New major surface combatants don't generally adopt "unique" launchers like CAMM soft launch, as they need to carry a large and diverse inventory of weapons. You only do unique installs where it's really needed or particularly beneficial.

I see your point of view.

No other Navy that expects to engage in high end warfare has done anything other than standardize on something conceptually similar to MK41 VLS. The Russians and Chinese have universal VLS with caliber variants for bigger/smaller missiles, Australia is all Mk41, the JSMDF is all in on MK41 VLS even for their own locally developed missiles, and the Koreans have a very similar K-VLS for their locally developed missiles.

Thanks for sharing.

Canada's decision to mount both ESSM and CAMM (but in VLS form) should also be illuminating.

Agreed.

If it makes so much sense, why doesn't the Type 45 have a dedicated launcher for CAMM?

Because they blew the budget to develop items to keep British industry fed and built a destroyer that has 48-cell A50 missile cells (when compared to American, Korean or Japanese destroyers, who are Death Stars by comparison)? That is my suspicion (but I am unable to prove).

The missile load out of USS Jack H Lucas (DDG 125), the first Flight III Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, dwarfs that of the Type 45 Darling class — with 1 × 32 cell, 1 × 64 cell Mark 41 VLS. IIRC, the Japanese destroyers have a 96-cell Mark 41 VLS and the Korean destroyers have:

• 80-cell Mk 41 VLS
• 48-cell K-VLS

This is only really true if CAMM is the most capable missile you intend to carry (which would say a lot about the level of threat you expect it to face). In any other mixed case, (ie where you have a need for higher performance missiles) all the redundancy, plumbing, wiring, CMS integration, etc that you get with VLS is already "paid for" by the requirement for the higher end missiles. In fact, having a unique launcher would be less efficient as you would have to duplicate all the support hardware, training, logistics, possibly even additional personnel, etc that already exists for one launcher.

Ouch, that point hurts.

 

[Systems Adict]

I've just re-read thru from post #3230...

I'd like to throw my tuppence worth into the crucible.

Missile selection for any warship, no matter it's size, is often a point of much discussion within the defence / Naval community. It is logical to get some of the understanding behind the reasoning for the choices made by a Navy, to go back to 1st principles.


#1 - The shipbuilder is either given a 'brief' from the relevant Navy / Government, or the shipbuilder offers to tender for a specific workload package / warship tender. These tenders / discussions / briefs have historically taken place 10 - 15 years BEFORE the vessel enters service, as they are generally part of the ongoing replacement / upgrade the fleet programmes that each sovereign nation generally has. The discussions that take place between the shipbuilder & their customer are generally also at a high level, with the customer hopefully outlining what systems they want, or specifics that HAVE to be in the design. Predominately (from experience), smaller vessels (up to OPV/Light frigate (circa 2000 GRT)), will either have no missiles or will only have short to medium range missiles. Due to the physical constraints of the vessel, they are unlikely to have missiles that are longer than 3.5m long, due to the sheer amount of real estate that is required to accommodate them.

#2. - As the design of the ship progresses beyond the brief & into the more meaty part of the tender, discussions on the specifics start to go into the weeds, as the shipbuilder starts to firm up costings for the equipment that the government / Navy have requested. This doesn't always happen before contracts are signed, meaning that the costing for the deign & construction of vessel can be affected, due to the customer wanting a specific missile. This often means that 'compromises' in the design have to be accommodated. For instance - Missile systems are expensive & customers generally have a fixed budget in mind, so may choose to leave space to retrofit equipment at a later date (once the ship is in service), or simply go for a cheaper option in other areas of the design (i.e. going for System B, instead of the top of the line System A, as it will save 'X' Million, thus freeing up the funds to allow them to buy the missiles they wanted).

#3 - As eluded in point #1 Navies often look to buy newer systems / equipment. However, as part of the nuances of fleet equipment stocks, they may also choose to buy products that are still being used elsewhere in their fleet, or possibly even make allowances to retrofit systems salvaged from ships that are being decommissioned. This again is often done to help save money, as the logistics of in-service maintenance, thru life support & fleet spares can be more expensive per system (often double the cost), than the initial purchase price of a new system.

#4 - The specifics of choosing a system like Mk41 VLS, is generally done as part of an overall naval strategy, tied into the national shipbuilding & defence plans for a nation. Recent times have highlighted globally that 'traditional' fleet planning for ship type replacement (that can be x2 decades in length from initial concept, to 1st manufactured vessel entering service), are far too long, as the battles & threats of the 21st century have happened 'at pace', thus changing the objectives / needs for specific equipment to address specific issues, and leaving defence manufacturing programmes lagging, as designs are modified 'on the hoof'.

#5. - At this time one of the key elements that Navies are looking for in the development of new vessels, is to be able to be 'all things to all men' / be the right tool for the right job, at the right moment in time, no matter what the task & when it may happen. This has led to Defence manufacturers having to make developmental changes / upgrades to systems such as the Mk41 VLS (i.e. quad-packing different munitions so they fit into the Mk41 VLS launcher modules). However, such development isn't cheap ! Thus the OEM manufacturer tends not to make changes to their design, unless 'someone else' is paying for it, which means that progress is also 'lagging'. These developmental costs are on top of any purchase price & as a 'premium supplier', it is likely that marketing strategies come into play, whereby detailed elements are written into contracts, to ensure that materials needed to install / maintain / upgrade the equipment only come from the OEM. Regimented maintenance schedules, where the LRU's / spares can only be purchased from the OEM, are likely to happen also. These are simply plausible examples & the reality may be stranger than fiction !

#6 - Horses for courses - Navies all across the globe are not the same & while 'Tier 1' nations who operate within treaty organisations such as NATO are considered Allies, it is fair to say that each nation has a different agenda when it comes to national interests. To that end, some will choose 'indigenous' equipment, as a way of ensuring that the money being spent remains within the borders of their nation, while others will look at what the best tool is that's on offer on the global market. Mk41 VLS is considered to be the 'best tool' by many, due to the development over the last 20 years to accommodate multiple missile / munition types into the MK41 VLS launcher. However, National pride & IPR start to muddy things when requests to incorporate European weapons for companies that are considered 'competitors in the field' This may be understandable as both parties will want to be deeply involved in all aspects of such a venture, to ensure that specific design data & IPR are not given to 'the enemy'.

It is fair to say that most navies would love a 'universal' missile launching system that can be adapted in both size & shape, to accommodate smaller missiles / be fitted onto smaller ships, or scaled as required to accept larger missiles for larger ships, no matter the pro's & con's of such arrangements. While Mk41 VLS is probably the closest thing to this 'holy grail', each nation has to weigh up whether they wish to be 'tied' into huge financial burdens for decades to come.

It is also accurate to state that hindsight is a wonderful thing & if some nations had chosen to 'bite the bullet' & purchase Mk41 from the get-go, rather than in-service upgrades, then things may have been different, apart from the UK's finances being in tatters, in the gutter, considerably worse off than it is at this time...

SA

 

[ngatimozart]

@CB90 and @swerve There's no need to get your panties in a twist, so how about just calm the farm please.

 

[swerve]

Because they blew the budget to develop items to keep British industry fed and built a destroyer that has 48-cell A50 missile cells (when compared to American, Korean or Japanese destroyers, who are Death Stars by comparison)? That is my suspicion (but I am unable to prove).

Type 45s laid down 2003-2007, commissioned 2009-2013.
Contract for development of naval CAMM awarded January 2013.

Timing was a bit off. CAMM wasn't even a gleam in someone's eye when Type 45s started being built. There were just studies looking at how to replace Rapier & Seawolf. It didn't formally enter service until 2018, though the first ship to be fitted with it first fired one in 2017.

It could be fitted later, but AFAIK it's not considered a high enough priority for funding at the moment.

 

[StobieWan]

I've just re-read thru from post #3230...

I'd like to throw my tuppence worth into the crucible.

Missile selection for any warship, no matter it's size, is often a point of much discussion within the defence / Naval community. It is logical to get some of the understanding behind the reasoning for the choices made by a Navy, to go back to 1st principles.


#1 - The shipbuilder is either given a 'brief' from the relevant Navy / Government, or the shipbuilder offers to tender for a specific workload package / warship tender. These tenders / discussions / briefs have historically taken place 10 - 15 years BEFORE the vessel enters service, as they are generally part of the ongoing replacement / upgrade the fleet programmes that each sovereign nation generally has. The discussions that take place between the shipbuilder & their customer are generally also at a high level, with the customer hopefully outlining what systems they want, or specifics that HAVE to be in the design. Predominately (from experience), smaller vessels (up to OPV/Light frigate (circa 2000 GRT)), will either have no missiles or will only have short to medium range missiles. Due to the physical constraints of the vessel, they are unlikely to have missiles that are longer than 3.5m long, due to the sheer amount of real estate that is required to accommodate them.

#2. - As the design of the ship progresses beyond the brief & into the more meaty part of the tender, discussions on the specifics start to go into the weeds, as the shipbuilder starts to firm up costings for the equipment that the government / Navy have requested. This doesn't always happen before contracts are signed, meaning that the costing for the deign & construction of vessel can be affected, due to the customer wanting a specific missile. This often means that 'compromises' in the design have to be accommodated. For instance - Missile systems are expensive & customers generally have a fixed budget in mind, so may choose to leave space to retrofit equipment at a later date (once the ship is in service), or simply go for a cheaper option in other areas of the design (i.e. going for System B, instead of the top of the line System A, as it will save 'X' Million, thus freeing up the funds to allow them to buy the missiles they wanted).

#3 - As eluded in point #1 Navies often look to buy newer systems / equipment. However, as part of the nuances of fleet equipment stocks, they may also choose to buy products that are still being used elsewhere in their fleet, or possibly even make allowances to retrofit systems salvaged from ships that are being decommissioned. This again is often done to help save money, as the logistics of in-service maintenance, thru life support & fleet spares can be more expensive per system (often double the cost), than the initial purchase price of a new system.

#4 - The specifics of choosing a system like Mk41 VLS, is generally done as part of an overall naval strategy, tied into the national shipbuilding & defence plans for a nation. Recent times have highlighted globally that 'traditional' fleet planning for ship type replacement (that can be x2 decades in length from initial concept, to 1st manufactured vessel entering service), are far too long, as the battles & threats of the 21st century have happened 'at pace', thus changing the objectives / needs for specific equipment to address specific issues, and leaving defence manufacturing programmes lagging, as designs are modified 'on the hoof'.

#5. - At this time one of the key elements that Navies are looking for in the development of new vessels, is to be able to be 'all things to all men' / be the right tool for the right job, at the right moment in time, no matter what the task & when it may happen. This has led to Defence manufacturers having to make developmental changes / upgrades to systems such as the Mk41 VLS (i.e. quad-packing different munitions so they fit into the Mk41 VLS launcher modules). However, such development isn't cheap ! Thus the OEM manufacturer tends not to make changes to their design, unless 'someone else' is paying for it, which means that progress is also 'lagging'. These developmental costs are on top of any purchase price & as a 'premium supplier', it is likely that marketing strategies come into play, whereby detailed elements are written into contracts, to ensure that materials needed to install / maintain / upgrade the equipment only come from the OEM. Regimented maintenance schedules, where the LRU's / spares can only be purchased from the OEM, are likely to happen also. These are simply plausible examples & the reality may be stranger than fiction !

#6 - Horses for courses - Navies all across the globe are not the same & while 'Tier 1' nations who operate within treaty organisations such as NATO are considered Allies, it is fair to say that each nation has a different agenda when it comes to national interests. To that end, some will choose 'indigenous' equipment, as a way of ensuring that the money being spent remains within the borders of their nation, while others will look at what the best tool is that's on offer on the global market. Mk41 VLS is considered to be the 'best tool' by many, due to the development over the last 20 years to accommodate multiple missile / munition types into the MK41 VLS launcher. However, National pride & IPR start to muddy things when requests to incorporate European weapons for companies that are considered 'competitors in the field' This may be understandable as both parties will want to be deeply involved in all aspects of such a venture, to ensure that specific design data & IPR are not given to 'the enemy'.

It is fair to say that most navies would love a 'universal' missile launching system that can be adapted in both size & shape, to accommodate smaller missiles / be fitted onto smaller ships, or scaled as required to accept larger missiles for larger ships, no matter the pro's & con's of such arrangements. While Mk41 VLS is probably the closest thing to this 'holy grail', each nation has to weigh up whether they wish to be 'tied' into huge financial burdens for decades to come.

It is also accurate to state that hindsight is a wonderful thing & if some nations had chosen to 'bite the bullet' & purchase Mk41 from the get-go, rather than in-service upgrades, then things may have been different, apart from the UK's finances being in tatters, in the gutter, considerably worse off than it is at this time...

SA

I seem to recall the RN had a preference for Mk41 at the time but the selection of silo came out of the PAAMS program and Aster fitted Sylver, end of the discussion. Could be interesting as we're on course to end up with Mk41 in Type 26 and possibly Sylver and 41 on Type 45.

Hey ho

 

[Systems Adict]

I seem to recall the RN had a preference for Mk41 at the time but the selection of silo came out of the PAAMS program and Aster fitted Sylver, end of the discussion. Could be interesting as we're on course to end up with Mk41 in Type 26 and possibly Sylver and 41 on Type 45.

Hey ho

I don't want to get into an 'argument' on this point, BUT...

Type 45 was designed & built with silo space for Mk 41 (it is there, below the Foc's'le, between the 4.5" gun & the PAAMS Silo), although it is my understanding, that the Type 26 budget was stretched to have Mk 41 fitted from the get-go, rather than 'FFBNW' / Retro-fitted.

SA

 

[StobieWan]

I don't want to get into an 'argument' on this point, BUT...

Type 45 was designed & built with silo space for Mk 41 (it is there, below the Foc's'le, between the 4.5" gun & the PAAMS Silo), although it is my understanding, that the Type 26 budget was stretched to have Mk 41 fitted from the get-go, rather than 'FFBNW' / Retro-fitted.

SA

I know- I believe the space is currently being used as an additional gym plus some storage - - I was referring to some of the decision making along the way relating to the PAAMS/UK PAAMS selection.

I seem to recall there's space for a row of 2x8 Mk41 strike cells which would offer a plethora of choices for weapons,
I was referring more to the selection of primary silo/weapon selection etc for 45 in the earlier days - it seems a bit illogical to pick one system for AWD and another for other roles, such as land attack etc ?

 

[Boagrius]

An interesting interview with a former Rhino driver:

Rhino charge! Flying & Fighting in the Super Hornet

(U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Apprentice Eleanor D. Vara/Released) ‘Cruisebox*’ took the Super Hornet, workhorse of the US Navy, to war. We spoke to him to fi…

hushkit.net

The following gave me a chuckle:

“We fought against F-22s once. The Raptor guys said they liked fighting against us because the fight would go almost 30* whole seconds before they had us, and that was much longer than against other types they fought. So they thought it was better training for them. Gee. Great.

We didn’t call the shots, because we wanted to mix it up with them, but at the time we had JHMCS and AIM-9X while they had neither. We could have just called “Fox 2” at the fights on, but there’s not really much training value in that for either side.”What is the best thing about the F/A-18F?

The fact that all the systems work well together and that it is a very reliable aircraft maintenance wise.”

*Postscript: “Now that I think about it, it was probably closer to 15 seconds before the F-22 had us. And by then had us saddled in our six o’clock. I really feel guilty because I’m sure there’s some F-22 guy out there who thinks, “30 seconds. Pffft, it doesn’t take that long.”

 

[Ananda]

Final design and technical review of future Constellation-Class FFG 62 frigate for US Navy

Artist rendering of final design and technical review of the Future Constellation Class FFG 62 frigate that is being developed by Fincantieri Marinette Marine for the US Navy.

www.navyrecognition.com

The FFG(X) final design seems to be set. It's also officially call FFG 62 Constellation Class. Seems the design did not change much from previous rendering. 32 Mk41 VLS and 16 SSM, which in the end shown more evolution Frigate from previous OHP Class.