The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

seaspear

Well-Known Member
Seeing the prisoner exchanges taking place, one thing strikes me.

The Russians who were prisoners of the Ukrainians look well fed, healthy, & properly dressed.

The Ukrainians who were prisoners of the Russians look emaciated, some of them sick, & ill dressed.
Perhaps this says it all ,though some here will state its Western propaganda
 

rsemmes

Active Member
Perhaps this says it all ,though some here will state its Western propaganda
Russia not providing the best possible care to its prisoners? Unheard of!!!
Because every western democracy is always happy with every Amnesty report?hhy6.jpg
This is a German soldier in 1942.
Autumn-1942..jpg
Edit.
(Not a prisoner.)
 
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seaspear

Well-Known Member
Amnesty is now banned in Russia
There has been a situation where the head of the Belarusian Red Cross had admitted in helping Russia move children from occupied Ukraine to Belarus what can constitute a war crime
If you have information why Russia a signatory to the Geneva conventions should deny access to Ukraine prisoners would be happy to read
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Then again as this is not what Russia claims is not a war the Geneva conventions wont count very handy for them
I don't believe this logic works. I think the Geneva convention does apply here. Russia is violating it, so it might not help Ukrainian POWs on those grounds. But relabeling a war as something else shouldn't work as a way to dodge conventions on POW treatment.
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
Seeing the prisoner exchanges taking place, one thing strikes me.

The Russians who were prisoners of the Ukrainians look well fed, healthy, & properly dressed.

The Ukrainians who were prisoners of the Russians look emaciated, some of them sick, & ill dressed.
I think some looked… “underfed”, while others looked no different from their Russian counterparts. Some Russians (probably fewer, but I saw fewer photos of them as well) looked “underfed” too. We don’t know what they looked like prior though, nor do we know how long those people were in captivity. While the latter should not matter in the perfect world, it certainly does in the real one. Russian prisons are not a place one wants to be in, especially for an extended period of time. I don’t know much about Ukrainian prisons to comment, but would assume that they are not a world of difference. My understanding is that many of these Ukrainian guys were “in there” for quite some time - I saw some of the exchanged being reported to be in captivity since 2022, 20 some months, 17 months, etc, while some were as fresh as this year prisoners. No idea on the Russians exchanged.


Perhaps this says it all ,though some here will state its Western propaganda
I wouldn’t call it “western propaganda, but… It is a report on the “ill treatment of Ukrainians in Russian captivity”. It doesn’t talk about the other side. Here is an example of a more “levelled” report from the UN’s High Commissioner on Human Rights (I think it is the latest one released, but they are all more or less the same; I also feel like we had talked about it before):

During the reporting period, OHCHR interviewed 42 Ukrainian POWs and retained medical personnel (31 men and 11 women) following their release from Russian captivity. The majority had spent more than two years in captivity. All interviewees provided credible and detailed accounts of torture during their captivity, including beatings and other forms of violence during the so-called "admission procedure". Thirty-five of the interviewees were subjected to frequent and / or prolonged torture, including in multiple locations. These accounts are consistent with previous OHCHR findings that torture and ill-treatment of Ukrainian POWs in the hands of the Russian Federation has been widespread and systematic.[…]

During the reporting period, OHCHR interviewed 25 Russian POWs in Ukrainian internment facilities, including in the newly opened camp "Zakhid-4" in Lviv city. All but one reported experiencing torture or ill-treatment in 2024 at one or several stages of captivity. Fourteen POWs were subjected to sexual violence. Consistent with OHCHR's previous findings, torture and ill-treatment predominantly occurred in transit places before POWs were transferred to official places of detention. In addition, seven POWs were beaten during "admission procedures" or while escorted out of cells in official places of detention. […] They consistently told OHCHR that POWs who were brought to this location underwent torture commonly described as the "admission procedure" that consisted of severe beatings with plastic tubes, batons, and a whip, dousing with cold water, and dog attacks. The POWs interviewed had also been strapped to a chair and received electric shocks, including - in 11 cases - with clamps attached to genitalia In this same transit facility, OHCHR documented the death of one Russian POW and continues to follow-up on credible allegations of the deaths of two others (all men) resulting from torture in May and June 2024. In addition, POWs held at this location were forced to work for nine hours daily digging pits and tending a vegetable garden. Only POWs who worked received food, once per day in the evening.


Source:


Can you find much difference between the two paragraphs above? I wish I could, but




Amnesty is now banned in Russia
This is unfortunate and counterproductive, but not at all surprising, Russia being Russia.

At the same time, the only report from Amnesty International about the war crimes potentially being committed by the Ukrainians that I saw is dating back to… summer-fall 2022, which resulted in the Ukrainian representative quitting, huge scandal, legal review of the report, statements and restatements, almost apologies, etc. So do the Russians have a point? Perhaps? I don’t know. I don’t see a point of banning this organization within the Russian Federation. What’s the point? Doubt there was any significant influence, if any at all, exerted on the Russian populace via their reports. In fact, I don’t think I saw any mentioned in the Russian media space as far as this conflict is concerned.

There has been a situation where the head of the Belarusian Red Cross had admitted in helping Russia move children from occupied Ukraine to Belarus what can constitute a war crime
There were kids sent to both sides of the frontline - the last report I saw was last year. Then there are children booked as kidnapped by Russia were found in Germany or elsewhere (I am sure I mentioned it here previously). To me personally this situation is rather confusing to make any definitive conclusions. I see the Ukrainian reports of tens of thousands of children kept by Russia in captivity (or whatever they call it) as pure nonsense. At the same time, I am sure that the reports of Ukrainian kids being loaded with the Russian propaganda in the summer camps, along with their Russian counterparts, are factual.

At the end of the day, ideally, there should be an investigation and procedure to determine the facts and what actually happened. Will we see one? I am most certain we will not.

If you have information why Russia a signatory to the Geneva conventions should deny access to Ukraine prisoners would be happy to read
There isn’t one. There isn’t one that I know of that supports prosecution of these prisoners either, which seems to be almost a normality in Russia (but happens in Ukraine too).

This is the point where one would naturally start going into “what about” argument though, no?


Edited: Food for thought on the subject…

Last year, the Ukrainian parliament ratified the ICC statute after nearly a quarter of a century being a signatory without recognition. Why is that? There is, of course, a nuance here as well:

With the Rome Statute ratification instrument, Ukraine also deposited a declaration on the use of article 124 of the Rome Statute that “for a period seven years after the entry into force of the Rome Statute for Ukraine, it will not accept the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court regarding crimes referred to in Article 8 (as amended), when it is likely that the crime was committed by its nationals’.”. It is the first time that a State has uses Article 124 in this manner. Article 124 of the Rome Statute was included in the Statute in 1998 as a transitional provision, and has not been used since the adoption of the Rome Statute, before the ICC-ASP decided, in 2015, by consensus to amend the Rome Statute in order to delete Article 124 and urged future States Parties not to make use of article 124.  

Why the extremely unusual nuance?

Edit 2: Source for the first edit citation:

 
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KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
I reported that ^ post (by gen3115) as spam a while back. Shouldn’t it be deleted?


Yuri Ignat, the UA Air Force speaker, and other “UA sources” made some epic revelations the other day, in two parts here:



And (both on the same subject):





I am no expert on the subject of the first post at all, but even I thought that it sounds like a pile of. I then read a few people who understand the subject matter discussing the very claims made by Ignat. Here is one example (an extremely short version):




When I read the second part, I thought



What is the purpose of this rubbish? A “sympathetic Russian engineer” left them a note (in a one-way drone meant for destruction via explosion)? Give me a break. How idiotic is that? They really do think people are plain stupid. Anyway, later came a rebuttal from a Ukrainian who has a pretty good grip on the subject (the post was made in both, Ukrainian and English):

It is very sad that a reputable media outlet is writing incorrect information.

1. Russian Shaheds are not controlled in flight via Telegram and do not send video broadcasts somewhere via Ukrainian mobile networks.
2. Shaheds do not have Artificial Intelligence inside.
3. Shaheds still fly based on satellite navigation signals and jamming affects them.
4. No notes from Alabuga from “friendly engineers” has ever been found.

What is the truth?

A tracker is installed on Shaheds. Tracker sends information about Shahed's location and flight data (speed, altitude). Data is sent via a telegram bot. Mobile networks and sim cards are used for sending. Sim cards can be Russian, Ukrainian and from other countries.

We find hundreds (thousands) of these modems and SIM cards in the wreckage. We do not allow the Shaheds to send the info via our mobile networks.

Once again, Shaheds are not remotely controlled, they have no such functionality, they are just trying to transmit their location.



What is the purpose of these reports and publications? I mean people at the Economist should be sophisticated enough to sort through the obvious rubbish. But here we are.

Washington Post dropped an article a couple of days ago. The very brief summary of the contents:



The article in question:


I am not one to usually talk about “propaganda”, but there appears to be a certain kind of mood being set in the news over the past couple of weeks or so. In the meantime,



That’s the commander of the Chosen Company. His next post (the reply in Ukrainian above) says that he and most of his subordinates are done with the Ukrainian Armed Forces. This comes a week or two after the commander of the 47th asked for his dismissal due to “idiotic commands” (and also promised revelations). Ryan has been there for a long while - the guy even learned Ukrainian.


Regrding the Russian air raids, past three days:







And



Basically the same, but a different source:



There is a lot of talk about “Look, Russia wants to “bomb” Ukraine into oblivion and does not want to negotiate”. Not much talk that I see about what preceded this multi-day raid:





I grabbed that ^ screenshot yesterday, so that would be “4 days ago”, not 3 as indicated. Regardless, the “narrative” is pretty clear, no? Or are we forcing Russia to agree to the “unconditional ceasefire”, or whatever it is, is part of the negotiations while the Russian attacks are not kosher? Four days ago, Lavrov said that there will be a strong response to the Ukrainian drone attacks, which followed the next day and what we see reported above.

Furthermore, the reports from the UA Air Force, as cited above via Vitaly’s posts, indicate that 299 drones were intercepted by EW. Where did these drones go? Konrad’s post cited above indicates that about 19% of Shaheds (67) were not intercepted on that day. If we apply the same interception rate over the past five days (I don’t want to look at the “true” numbers and do the actual math), we get 228 UAVs hitting their targets (or something, as they were not intercepted). So which ones hit what and does it matter? Judging by the standards set by another ongoing conflict, the casualties rate is more than acceptable, no? Anyway, this is weird stuff and I don’t feel good talking about it, but shouldn’t it be talked about (with clear understanding that Russia being the aggressor here and all)?

In light of this, Merz stepped up again and made a rather odd statement, again. I am following translation of various sources here (and maybe Kato can clarify?), but this is the common theme:



Pretty much every other source I read or listened to said that (the main idea) France, UK, US, and now Germany have removed the restrictions on the weapons they supply and that now Ukraine can use these weapons “to attack military positions on the Russian territory and they couldn’t do that before”. Three things here: 1) there was no specific talk about the long-range weapons, but that is all the media and everyone talk about (though they are obviously included); 2) Ukrainians had already attacked the Russian territory (not just “military positions”) with the weapons supplied by the aforementioned countries; 3) other countries had already said explicitly that there are no restrictions on the use of their weapons supplied to Ukraine (including France and, maybe, UK (from memory)) and the “restrictions” publicly expressed by the US were not followed, so the US had to catch up updating the public narrative (I discussed it previously). So what are we talking about here? Is he planning to supply Taurus? More empty talking, which is par for the course? I will try to continue on this point tomorrow as this has gotten to be rather long as it is.
 

Bob53

Well-Known Member
Also quite a lot of media stating Putin has treated Trump as a useful idiot using his ego to drag out any talk of ceasefire ….And after 5 months Trump is only starting to realise this But instead of saying he has been out thought, played, etc …it’s Putin gone crazy! No self reflection there.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
It appears Russia has begun reconstruction efforts in Avdeevka. Now the post says "another 5-story house" implying this isn't the first, but it's the first one I've seen. Russian sources are stating it's the second house. Note this appears to be a regional initiative by the South Urals region, that has pledged to rebuild ~30 objects in the DNR territories. So this isn't the federal reconstruction program for Donetsk that was talked about earlier this year. 72 families are listed as having received housing, unclear if that's one or both houses. In the background of one of the photos there's another building visible that looks like construction work might be proceeding there as well.

A couple of points on Avdeevka. The town was almost completely destroyed in the fighting, and even before the current war it was on the front lines between Ukraine and the DNR forces since '14. It's a de-facto suburb of Donetsk but with its own municipality. The front line was very close (~10kms from the north end of town) to Avdeevka itself here until the most recent push towards Konstantinovka. For Russia the value of a lot of recent territorial gains are that populated areas that were under rebel control since '14 and are now annexed were effectively on the front lines of a major war, making economic development impossible (or very very difficult) and even creating logistical problems. The Donetsk train station has been inactive since '14 with local trains only now restarting. I believe the Lugansk train station is in a similar situation. So taking places like Kurakhovo or Selidovo are less about the things in those territories and more about the fact that it takes pressure off of Donetsk, allowing it to start functioning as a more or less normal Russian city. The current fighting around Konstantinovka will have a similar effect for Gorlovka, which is admittedly smaller then Donestk, but still has a population of well over 200k, and they haven't fled the fighting. There is a similar significance to the town of Seversk vis-a-vis Severdonetsk-Lisichansk metropolitan area.

This is also a way for Russia to entice the population to return. Many of those who fled the fighting into other parts of Ukraine are not economically doing well, as jobs don't pay well, cost of housing has increased with the influx of refugees, and the mobilization continues adding an element of problems for any adult men (or even 15+ year old males since the mobilization age could get dropped and they could turn 18 before the war ends). Ukrainian sources claimed that last year ~150k went to live in Russian occupied areas, Russian sources claimed numbers of 300k. While enteirng Russia is now more difficult for Ukrainians, having to go through a special checkpoint in Sheremetyevo airport, Moscow, it's still very doable. It's going to be important for Russia to be able to show that they can do things for the occupied areas, and that they have a population that lives there and is at least not actively dissatisfied. I think over the next ~2 years we're going to see these efforts take place around the Donetsk area, other logical targets include Mar'inka where the population is now 0 (technically 1) and the UXO and landmines haven't even been cleared, Krasnogorovka whose situation is unclear (at least I haven't seen any good sources), Ugledar, Kurakhovo, Ukrainsk and Gornyak. If Pokrovsk falls, Novogrodovka and Selidovo would also be logical.

 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
On Merz’s comments that I said I would expand on in my last post… Well, I am not going to expand because the reports after my post suggested exactly what I said:

But on Tuesday Merz appeared to backtrack, saying his comments referred to “something that has been happening for months, namely, that Ukraine has the right to use the weapons it receives, even beyond its own borders, against military targets on Russian territory.”


Really rough (self-inflicted) start for that guy.

Germany will, however, participates in Ukraine’s development of their own long-range missiles. The interesting part:

The German Defence Ministry said a "significant" number of these systems are expected to be manufactured by the end of 2025, with the first batch ready for deployment in the coming weeks.


A number of jokes were made on the subject. Here is one of them:



From the same article on previous claims:

"In this respect, yesterday in Berlin, I described something that has been happening for months: namely, that Ukraine has the right to use the weapons it receives, even beyond its own borders, against military targets on Russian territory," Merz clarified.


In other news, Russia has now been officially accused by the UN of killing civilians in Kherson. This has been discussed for a while on Twitter (and probably elsewhere). One would hope this would lead to changes, but it probably won’t.


On the subject, a recent thread on one of the Russian soldiers participating in the aforementioned crimes:



In other news, the lemmings are using Kellogg’s recent statement as a “confirmation” of Russia losing a million people in this war, while Ukraine losing 200K. We are getting close to the neanderthal level of logic here, to be honest.



Even Ukrainian propaganda outlets provide “hints”, but don’t explicitly come to this conclusion:



Ukrainians are claiming that in the recent exchange of prisoners, Russia had exchanged 120 civilians that were scheduled for deportation and were not “illegally detained war victims”.



On a separate note, 7,000-16,000 is quite a range for an estimate. The fact that both sides have civilians to exchange is kind of weird too.


Russia’s land gains have now reached last November’s levels:




Last thing for today: respected historians are complaining about media’s representation of events that are happening now… because they want to accurately document past events. This is literally one-day old.



That is in relation to the Russian latest air attacks on Ukraine.


One more thing. I agree with this (less “or not at all” part):




Edit: Just-in sort of thing:



Just putting it here for the past (discussed in my previous post) and future timeline if events.
 
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Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Update.

Sumy area.

Russian forces continue to advance into Sumy region. Belovodi, Vodolagi, Vladimirovka and Konstantinovka are now under Russian control, as Russian widens their frontage advancing into Sumy region. Note Konstantinovka was taken from the Russian side of the border. Loknya is also fully under Russian control, and fighting has started inside Yunakovka. Around Tetkino, Kursk region, fighting continues. Near Gornal', Russian forces have pushed Ukraine fully across the border in the last pockets. In Belgorod reportedly Ukrainian forces have been completely expelled.


A series of Russian drone strikes around Tetkino. They tap a couple of Bradleys, and a T-72 with K-5. All the vehicles appear to already be disabled. There's the wreck of many other vehicles around the area.


Russian drones pick apart a Ukrainian column riding ATVs and motorcycles.


Another Ukrainian ATV gets hit by a Russian wire-guided drone.


Footage from allegedly the Russian assault on Belovody. We have some POWs taken, some drone strikes on unarmored vehicles, some infantry sweeping towns. Warning footage of corpses at the end.


Russian Lancet strike on a checkpoint in Glybnoe, Ukraine.


Russian UCAV strikes in Sumy region, targets include a Bogdana howitzer, an MBT, and an armored car.


An interesting batch of videos of Russian drones operating inside an anti-drone tunnel in Sumy region. They hit a VAB, and a bunch of unarmored vehicles.


Russian drone strike hits what appears to be a Kirpi II MRAP, Sumy region.


Russian drone strikes in Sumy region, hitting an artillery piece, and an MBT.


Ukrainian Hammer gliding bomb strikes in Kozinka and Glotovo, Belgorod region.


Another destroyed Stryker, Sumy region.


Battle damage to bridges near Khoten' and Mogritsa village, Sumy region, after a Russian strike. These strikes are likely part of Russia's effort to shape the battlespace in Sumy region.


Ukrainian POWs captured in Konstantinovka .


Russian forces in Kursk region have hauled away an Ukrainian M577 and a IMR-2 and captured a Wisent, a CV-90 and a Marder.


Russian strikes on industrial targets in Sumy.


A Russian missile strike on a Ukrainian training center in Shostka, Sumy region, apparently did quite a bit of damage. Russian sources claim 70 casualties but how they would count those is unclear.


Kharkov area.

Russian forces continue to gain ground inside Volchansk. They're trying to push Ukraine across the river, but so far reports of that happening seem to be premature, though they have most of the central area. Russian forces also took some extra country-side east of Volchansk.


Russian strikes landing in Volchansk.


A series of Russian drone strikes in the Kharkov area targetting Ukrainian logistics. They take out 7 unarmored vans, pickups, and SUVs, and one GAZ-66 truck.


A destroyed Rosomak APC near Volchansk.


There are reports of longer ranged Russian FPV drones hitting inside Kharkov, ~25 kms from the front lines.


Russia hits a bridge near Okhrimovka village, Volchansk area.

 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Kupyansk area.

Russian forces have crossed the border just west of Oskol, taking the village of Stroevka. Reportedly Ukrainian forces are pulling out from between Stroevka and Topoli. They've also expanded their area of control near Kamyanka. Towards Kupyansk itself Russian forces have pushed on Rad'kovka and entered Kondrashovka.


Russian drones hit a Roshel Senator armored car near Dvurechnoe.


Russian drone strike on allegedly a Ukrainian 2S3 Akatsiya. While we can't really tell what they hit, there are plenty of secondary explosions, suggesting this isn't a decoy.


A series of Russian drone strikes in the Kupyansk area. They mostly hit a bunch of unarmored vehicles, and a mortar position.


Russian strike on a Ukrainian T-64 in the Kupyansk area. The tank catches fire, and the ammo cooks off.


A Russian drone doing munition drops on a disabled Ukrainian BMP-1U.


Russian drone hits a disabled Ukrainian pickup truck somewhere near Stepovaya Novoselka.


Oskol front.


Ukrainian forces counter-attack repeatedly south of Nadiya, retaking some ground.


Across the Zherebets Russian forces have captured Redkodub and the fields north and south of it. They've also grabbed chunks of fields in nearly every direction and are steadily approaching Grekovka and Zelenaya Dolina. Overall Russian advances here remain of the slow and steady variety, but they're continuously expanding and at this point are almost united with the northern forces that bypass the Zherebets entirely. Ukrainian forces have meanwhile coutner-attacked across the river into Torskoe, giving us good confirmation that Russian forces hold at least the northern half of the village.


Russian strike takes out a Ukrainian BMP-1 near Noviy Mir. Note in this area Russian forces out of Novomikhailovka have almost reached Kharkov region border.


Russian strike on allegedly an M1150 ABV near Izyum, by a drone. It's unclear if this is a real vehicle or a decoy.


Russian drone strike on a Ukrainian UGV logistics platform in the Krasniy Liman area.


Russian bomb strikes somewhere near Krasniy Liman.


Seversk salient.

Russian forces have taken all of Verkhnekamenskoe and some fields north of it.


Ukrainian gliding bombs strike a school complex in Soledar.


Russian strikes in Seversk.


Chasov Yar.

Downtown Chasov Yar is now fully under Russian control. Russian forces have also recaptured area in the southern part of town. North of town Russian forces have taken the rest of the woods west of Grigorievka and some tree lines along the canal.


There are unconfirmed reports Stupochki is fully under Russian control.


A Kirpi MRAP burns after a Russian strike inside Konstantinovka.


Russian strikes on the road to Kramatorsk continue. These strikes are reportedly ~40kms from the front Russian positions.


Toretsk area.

Russian forces have taken a tree line west of Ozaryanovka, north of Toretsk, and crept up along the rail line towards Dyleevka. Meanwhile Ukrainian forces counter-attacked from the north, reaching the outskirts of Druzhba again. Russian forces have again tried to make a play for the mine complex north of Toretsk but were repulsed. Inside the town Russian forces have again inched forward on the north-eastern outskirts. It seems likely at this point that Russia's ultimate success around Toretsk will depend on Russian gains on the eastern pincer of Pokrovsk.

There's a suspicious absence of videos from this area.

 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Pokrovsk.

On the eastern flank Russian forces have pushed deep across the highway. They've taken all of Novaya Poltavka, almost all of Malinovka entering Mirnoe, and all of Popov Yar. They've pushed up to but not into Rusin Yar, and into Poltavka. Russian forces have also entered Yablonovka. Russian forces also pushing north-east out of Mirolyubovka, as they try to close the gap with Malinovka, and have secured Yelizavetovka by taking Ukrainian positions north of it. At this point the efforts north of Avdeevka and the efforts on the eastern pincer of Pokrovsk are basically one and the same. Russian forces have most of Zarya, all of Staraya Nikolaevka. Gnatovka and Romanovka are under Russian control. On the western side fighting has mostly stalled. Russian forces did bite off some ground north of Shevchenko. This is the same area where Russian forward elements have previously penetrated Pokrovsk itself. Russian forces have also taken most of Zverevo, approaching Toretsk itself from the west.


Russian glide bombs over Pokrovsk.


A small pile of Russian Molniya drone strikes in the Pokrovsk area. Note they're all hitting various buildings, presumably where Ukrainian infantry is hiding.


Russian drone strikes around Pokrovsk, they hit many unarmored vehicles, 4 MBTs, 2 Humvees, a Bradley, a MaxxPro, a BRDM-2, a Kozak armored car, a BMP, one allegedly radar (can't make it out), 1 apparently armored car, 1 Ukrainian Baba-Yaga drone, and 2 columns of unarmored vehicles. They also hit several targets concealed under netting, one allegedly an SP howitzer but I can't make any of them out.

The number of these kinds of compilation videos out of the Pokrovsk area is too large for me to reasonably cover them all. I've selected several, but there was a dozen more.


Russian drone from ambush strikes a Ukrainian Kozak armored car and another hits an M113 in the Pokrovsk area.


Russian drones repeatedly hit a Ukrainian T-72 north of Yelizavetovka.


Russian strikes on the approach to Konstantinovka. They take out an M113, and what looks like an MRAP.


On the western flank Russian forces have been hitting the road near Muravka, destroying a Dzhura, and Titan-DS armored car.


Russian T-80BVM and T-72B3 indirect firing near Pokrovsk.


A destroyed Russian T-62M near Pokrovsk.


Ukrainian pickup truck burns on the streets of Mirnograd.


Russian Shaheds landing in Novofedorovka, north of Pokrovsk. This is a continuation of the previous pattern of targetting front and near-rear areas with Shaheds.


Russian Shahed strikes in Zolotoy Kolodez', north of Pokrovsk, allegedly hitting Ukrainian storage facilities.


Russian strike hit a bridge near Shahovo, across the Kazeniy Torets river.


A great video from a Russian soldier on the road near Pokrovsk. Notice the piles of destroyed vehicles all along the road. It's unclear how many are Russian and how many are Ukrainian.


There are reports of locals being happy to see Russian soldiers in Zarya. Despite a 4 year war, Ukraine remains divided.


Dnepropetrovsk axis.

Ukrainian forces push Russian forces out of Orekhov, and to the outskirts of Troitskoe. In Novonikolaevka Russian forces have taken the eastern side of the village, and reached the Dnepropetrovsk administrative border. Russian forces have also recaptured Bogdanovka and some fields around it, and have pushed towards Muravka north of Kotlyarovka.


Russian drone strike on a Ukrainian Humvee in Dnepropetrovsk region.


Velikaya Novoselka area.

Russian forces have full control over Zelenoe Pole and half of Novopol', as well as a chunk of fields south of it. Russian forces have also taken all of Bogatyr', Otradnoe and are pushing on Komar. Near Vol'noe Pole Russian forces gained some ground, while near Burlatskoe a Ukrainian counter-attack retook some.


Russian strikes around Zelenoe Pole. They hit what looks like a disabled M113, a armored car of some sort (Kozak?), and we see a destroyed Humvee.


Russian strikes on Otradnoe.


Russian TOS-1 operations near Vol'noe Pole.


Zaporozhye.


A couple of videos of Russian strikes around Orekhov. They take out a howitzer, and we see the crew fleeing afterwards. Allegedly it's an M777. They also hit positions in Novodanilovka, where allegedly Ukrainian drone operators are staging.


Russian Lancet strike hits allegedly a Ukrainian 2S3. Except there's no explosion. Either the drone failed, or this is a decoy.


A long range Ukrainian drone hit a Russian fuel train inside Zaporozhye region near the village of Novobogdanovka. This is ~50kms from the front line.


Dnepr front.

Allegedly a Kirpi MRAP in Kherson region getting hit. The vehicle isn't moving and looks abandoned.


Russian munition drops taking out a boat on the Dnepr.


A Russian strike hit the rail station in Kherson and allegedly a military storage facility somewhere in the area.

 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Strikes.

Russian Iskanders (6 of them) and Shaheds landing in Kiev. Seemingly in retaliation for recent strikes into Russia (but I suspect not) Russia has showered Kiev with a massive wave of strikes, and may have taken out a Patriot battery. We saw the same desperate mass launch of missiles by it, as it attempted to defend. Targets include the Antonov factory which apparently was hit by as many as 20 inbounds. The Antonov factory is supposedly being used to manufacture the An-196 Lyutiy UAV. Note this massive pile of footage is reportedly from two nights of strikes.


That video of allegedly a Patriot SAM firing off it's missiles desperately. We then see impacts where it was firing from.


Russia hit the Vasil'kov airfield near Kiev.


Iskanders (or KN-23s?) hit targets in Chernigov.


Russian Shaheds striking targets in Pechenegi, Kharkov region. Targets include the Finprofil and Macrin Group factories.


Russian strikes hit a pontoon crossing near Kramatorsk. The cities of Kramatorsk and Slavyansk are curently rear areas but the former is going to be come a front line city if Russia takes Konstantinovka. Technically Druzhkovka is south of it, but it's too small to fully shield the city.


Russia hit Kremenchug, Poltava region, with 6 Iskander missiles.


Russia hit Krapivnitskiy.


Russian Kh-101s in Krasilovo, Khmel'nitskaya region.


Russian Shaheds landing in Dnepropetrovsk.


In Dnepropetrovsk region Russia hit a small airfield with 3 An-2s on it. It's speculated they were being used by Ukraine for drone defense, but confirmation is lacking.


Russian Iskander strike allegedly hitting a Patriot battery near Ordzhonikidze, Dnepropetrovsk region. Note the footage quality is bad and we can't tell what exactly is hit, but there appear to be secondary explosions.


Fires burn after Russian strikes against an industrial area in Sinel'kovo, Dnepropetrovsk region.


Russia hit the Starokonstantinovka airbase.


Russian strikes landing in Odessa. Note these are two separate incidents. The strikes on the port apparently used Iskanders.


There are reports of new Russian loitering munitions, visually similar to larger Lancets, hit targets in Odessa. Details are lacking, but if true this is the second new longer ranged loitering munition that has shown up in Russian use.


Russian strikes in Ternopol'.


Allegedly a Ukrainian Hawk SAM intercepting a Kh-101 cruise missile.


New footage of allegedly Ukrainian Sting interceptor drones downing Shaheds.


Ukraine showed off a new turret for downing Shaheds. Reportedly it already shot down 4 of them. The system is called the Sky Sentinel and uses an M2 .50 cal.


Russia has used Shahed tail number 23 435. The numbers are now climbing rapidly.


There are reports Russia has started using Dan'-M practice target drones converted into cruise missiles.

 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Ukraine has continued their large wave of strikes towards Moscow, with minimal effects on targets, but they've forced Russian to reroute many airplanes and have created a major disruption in air travel. Note this is one large multi-day wave of strikes.


Russian air defenses around Moscow. Note they're using Ka-52s with Igla MANPADS.


Some of the UAVs hit in Zelenograd, reportedly targetting the Elma techno-park.


Ukraine hit the Energiya factory in Yelets, Lipetsk region. A local apartment building also got hit, as well as a tram.


A residential building in Tula got hit by a UAV.


Ukraine appears to have hit a munitions storage facility in Crimea, near Simferopol'.


Two Ukrainian An-196s apparently collided in midair over Lipetsk region, possibly due to GPS spoofing.


Russian drone defense teams, very similar to what we've seen in Ukraine, in response to the increasing volume of Ukrainian drone attacks into Russia.


A Russian drone defense teams downs a Ukrainian UAV, this is a National Guard unit. Russia has an internal structural resource they can draw on for drone defense, namely the National Guard (former troops of the interior). They're relatively numerous, and are mostly no longer engaged in the current war. They tend to have small arms and even crew served weapons training, quite a bit of light armored vehicles, and unarmored vehicles.


Russia is testing a Yak-52 for drone defense. Ukraine has been using the same Soviet light plane. The Russian plane has some sort of OLS installed, and a shotgun based system under the wing.


Interesting bits.


A Russian AMN-590951 after being hit by the elements of a GMLRS rocket.


Russian soldiers are using the new Yolka drone interceptors on the front lines. Based on the footage I suspect the first video is either Chasov Yar or more likely Toretsk.


Some interesting analysis of Russian ERA. In the first link we have K-5. The main one detonated, preventing the penetration but it's detonation triggered the detonation of the block to the left, and damaged the one on the right. The tank survived, so the ERA did it's job, but it's a good illustration of what has long been reported to be a problem with K-5. This problem is usually discussed in light of the K-5 layout on the front glacis though. In the second link we have a destroyed T-80BVM. The T-80BVM carries Relikt ERA, and we can see a hull section that went off, but didn't trigger neighboring sections. Based on the rubber "leaf" behind the turret, this is probably one of the newer BVM variants. I suspect this difference in performance is part of the reason we now see T-72B3s with Relikt on the front glacis. It's unclear why Russia hasn't opted to also place Relikt on their turrets. On the one hand Russia is clearly learning and adapting. On the other hand this should have been clear before this war.


There are reports of a new Russian longer ranged loitering munition that apparently uses some sort of AI. Reportedly they correct flight paths off of each other, based on the coloring on their wings, and target groups of people or vehicles. In this case they reportedly attacked a group of civilians near a Novaya Pochta facility in Velikiy Burluk. Reported range is over 100 kms. Note none of this is confirmed, and the sources are Ukrainian so...


Another new Russian loitering munition, the Kub-10. It's quite a bit larger and doesn't look like any of the other ones.


We have distinct confirmation that Russian soldiers are operating DPRK artillery pieces.


There are reports that the last F-16 Ukraine lost was downed in a friendly fire incident by a Ukrainian Su-27.


A Ukrainian drone spots a DPRK M-1991 MLRS in Russian service.


Caracal light utility vehicles have shown up in Ukrainian service.


What it looks like to install BRAT ERA on a Bradley in field condition.


Ukraine's 25th Air Assault Bde is now operating Bradleys.


An up-armored Ukrainian M109 with the 100th Mech Bde.


Some interesting footage of Ukraine's 144th SOF Center training in the use of small boats.


The Netherlands have reportedly supplied all 24 F-16s to Ukraine.


18 Gepards from the Netherlands have been spotted on a train, presumably heading to Ukraine.


It appears the 1000 for 1000 POW exchange is completed. An exchange of KIAs also took place, where 34 dead Russians were traded for 909 dead Ukrainians, a very lopsided figure that's at best partially explained by the fact that Russia is advancing.


There are some indications that Russia is preparing to restart operations at the ZNPP. I'm skeptical, it's very close to the front lines, and Ukraine has hit it before.


Some footage of the ruins of Mar'inka. Here no reconstruction efforts are even attempted and reportedly there's still plenty of landmines and UXO.

 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
In other news, Russia has now been officially accused by the UN of killing civilians in Kherson. This has been discussed for a while on Twitter (and probably elsewhere). One would hope this would lead to changes, but it probably won’t.


On the subject, a recent thread on one of the Russian soldiers participating in the aforementioned crimes:

Thank you for sharing. Truly reprehensible behavior and apparently well documented.

Ukrainians are claiming that in the recent exchange of prisoners, Russia had exchanged 120 civilians that were scheduled for deportation and were not “illegally detained war victims”.



On a separate note, 7,000-16,000 is quite a range for an estimate. The fact that both sides have civilians to exchange is kind of weird too.
Ukraine has resorted to this kind of behavior since the '14 and '15 conflict where political prisoners inside Ukraine were traded to the rebels as part of prisoner exchanges, in complete violation of their due process rights as Ukrainian citizens. It was one of the major red flags about the post-Maidan Ukrainian government that demonstrated the trajectory they were on. It's frankly embarrassing for Russia to resort to the same, and I suspect that Russia may have mirrored the handover numbers, soldiers for soldiers, civilians for civilians.

Russia’s land gains have now reached last November’s levels:

I don't see it on the maps. The gains are a substantial increase from February-March, but we're not seeing the kinds of rapid gains we saw in November December. Just look at the distance from Ugledar to Kurakhovo and Velikaya Novoselka, and compare that to the distances covered in the current push. There may be individual days where Russian gains are that large, but the overall numbers I suspect will be lower for the month. Closer to the Sept. numbers (~500 sq km).
 
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