The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

seaspear

Well-Known Member
Seeing the prisoner exchanges taking place, one thing strikes me.

The Russians who were prisoners of the Ukrainians look well fed, healthy, & properly dressed.

The Ukrainians who were prisoners of the Russians look emaciated, some of them sick, & ill dressed.
Perhaps this says it all ,though some here will state its Western propaganda
 

rsemmes

Active Member
Perhaps this says it all ,though some here will state its Western propaganda
Russia not providing the best possible care to its prisoners? Unheard of!!!
Because every western democracy is always happy with every Amnesty report?hhy6.jpg
This is a German soldier in 1942.
Autumn-1942..jpg
Edit.
(Not a prisoner.)
 
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seaspear

Well-Known Member
Amnesty is now banned in Russia
There has been a situation where the head of the Belarusian Red Cross had admitted in helping Russia move children from occupied Ukraine to Belarus what can constitute a war crime
If you have information why Russia a signatory to the Geneva conventions should deny access to Ukraine prisoners would be happy to read
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Then again as this is not what Russia claims is not a war the Geneva conventions wont count very handy for them
I don't believe this logic works. I think the Geneva convention does apply here. Russia is violating it, so it might not help Ukrainian POWs on those grounds. But relabeling a war as something else shouldn't work as a way to dodge conventions on POW treatment.
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
Seeing the prisoner exchanges taking place, one thing strikes me.

The Russians who were prisoners of the Ukrainians look well fed, healthy, & properly dressed.

The Ukrainians who were prisoners of the Russians look emaciated, some of them sick, & ill dressed.
I think some looked… “underfed”, while others looked no different from their Russian counterparts. Some Russians (probably fewer, but I saw fewer photos of them as well) looked “underfed” too. We don’t know what they looked like prior though, nor do we know how long those people were in captivity. While the latter should not matter in the perfect world, it certainly does in the real one. Russian prisons are not a place one wants to be in, especially for an extended period of time. I don’t know much about Ukrainian prisons to comment, but would assume that they are not a world of difference. My understanding is that many of these Ukrainian guys were “in there” for quite some time - I saw some of the exchanged being reported to be in captivity since 2022, 20 some months, 17 months, etc, while some were as fresh as this year prisoners. No idea on the Russians exchanged.


Perhaps this says it all ,though some here will state its Western propaganda
I wouldn’t call it “western propaganda, but… It is a report on the “ill treatment of Ukrainians in Russian captivity”. It doesn’t talk about the other side. Here is an example of a more “levelled” report from the UN’s High Commissioner on Human Rights (I think it is the latest one released, but they are all more or less the same; I also feel like we had talked about it before):

During the reporting period, OHCHR interviewed 42 Ukrainian POWs and retained medical personnel (31 men and 11 women) following their release from Russian captivity. The majority had spent more than two years in captivity. All interviewees provided credible and detailed accounts of torture during their captivity, including beatings and other forms of violence during the so-called "admission procedure". Thirty-five of the interviewees were subjected to frequent and / or prolonged torture, including in multiple locations. These accounts are consistent with previous OHCHR findings that torture and ill-treatment of Ukrainian POWs in the hands of the Russian Federation has been widespread and systematic.[…]

During the reporting period, OHCHR interviewed 25 Russian POWs in Ukrainian internment facilities, including in the newly opened camp "Zakhid-4" in Lviv city. All but one reported experiencing torture or ill-treatment in 2024 at one or several stages of captivity. Fourteen POWs were subjected to sexual violence. Consistent with OHCHR's previous findings, torture and ill-treatment predominantly occurred in transit places before POWs were transferred to official places of detention. In addition, seven POWs were beaten during "admission procedures" or while escorted out of cells in official places of detention. […] They consistently told OHCHR that POWs who were brought to this location underwent torture commonly described as the "admission procedure" that consisted of severe beatings with plastic tubes, batons, and a whip, dousing with cold water, and dog attacks. The POWs interviewed had also been strapped to a chair and received electric shocks, including - in 11 cases - with clamps attached to genitalia In this same transit facility, OHCHR documented the death of one Russian POW and continues to follow-up on credible allegations of the deaths of two others (all men) resulting from torture in May and June 2024. In addition, POWs held at this location were forced to work for nine hours daily digging pits and tending a vegetable garden. Only POWs who worked received food, once per day in the evening.


Source:


Can you find much difference between the two paragraphs above? I wish I could, but




Amnesty is now banned in Russia
This is unfortunate and counterproductive, but not at all surprising, Russia being Russia.

At the same time, the only report from Amnesty International about the war crimes potentially being committed by the Ukrainians that I saw is dating back to… summer-fall 2022, which resulted in the Ukrainian representative quitting, huge scandal, legal review of the report, statements and restatements, almost apologies, etc. So do the Russians have a point? Perhaps? I don’t know. I don’t see a point of banning this organization within the Russian Federation. What’s the point? Doubt there was any significant influence, if any at all, exerted on the Russian populace via their reports. In fact, I don’t think I saw any mentioned in the Russian media space as far as this conflict is concerned.

There has been a situation where the head of the Belarusian Red Cross had admitted in helping Russia move children from occupied Ukraine to Belarus what can constitute a war crime
There were kids sent to both sides of the frontline - the last report I saw was last year. Then there are children booked as kidnapped by Russia were found in Germany or elsewhere (I am sure I mentioned it here previously). To me personally this situation is rather confusing to make any definitive conclusions. I see the Ukrainian reports of tens of thousands of children kept by Russia in captivity (or whatever they call it) as pure nonsense. At the same time, I am sure that the reports of Ukrainian kids being loaded with the Russian propaganda in the summer camps, along with their Russian counterparts, are factual.

At the end of the day, ideally, there should be an investigation and procedure to determine the facts and what actually happened. Will we see one? I am most certain we will not.

If you have information why Russia a signatory to the Geneva conventions should deny access to Ukraine prisoners would be happy to read
There isn’t one. There isn’t one that I know of that supports prosecution of these prisoners either, which seems to be almost a normality in Russia (but happens in Ukraine too).

This is the point where one would naturally start going into “what about” argument though, no?


Edited: Food for thought on the subject…

Last year, the Ukrainian parliament ratified the ICC statute after nearly a quarter of a century being a signatory without recognition. Why is that? There is, of course, a nuance here as well:

With the Rome Statute ratification instrument, Ukraine also deposited a declaration on the use of article 124 of the Rome Statute that “for a period seven years after the entry into force of the Rome Statute for Ukraine, it will not accept the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court regarding crimes referred to in Article 8 (as amended), when it is likely that the crime was committed by its nationals’.”. It is the first time that a State has uses Article 124 in this manner. Article 124 of the Rome Statute was included in the Statute in 1998 as a transitional provision, and has not been used since the adoption of the Rome Statute, before the ICC-ASP decided, in 2015, by consensus to amend the Rome Statute in order to delete Article 124 and urged future States Parties not to make use of article 124.  

Why the extremely unusual nuance?

Edit 2: Source for the first edit citation:

 
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KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
I reported that ^ post (by gen3115) as spam a while back. Shouldn’t it be deleted?


Yuri Ignat, the UA Air Force speaker, and other “UA sources” made some epic revelations the other day, in two parts here:



And (both on the same subject):





I am no expert on the subject of the first post at all, but even I thought that it sounds like a pile of. I then read a few people who understand the subject matter discussing the very claims made by Ignat. Here is one example (an extremely short version):




When I read the second part, I thought



What is the purpose of this rubbish? A “sympathetic Russian engineer” left them a note (in a one-way drone meant for destruction via explosion)? Give me a break. How idiotic is that? They really do think people are plain stupid. Anyway, later came a rebuttal from a Ukrainian who has a pretty good grip on the subject (the post was made in both, Ukrainian and English):

It is very sad that a reputable media outlet is writing incorrect information.

1. Russian Shaheds are not controlled in flight via Telegram and do not send video broadcasts somewhere via Ukrainian mobile networks.
2. Shaheds do not have Artificial Intelligence inside.
3. Shaheds still fly based on satellite navigation signals and jamming affects them.
4. No notes from Alabuga from “friendly engineers” has ever been found.

What is the truth?

A tracker is installed on Shaheds. Tracker sends information about Shahed's location and flight data (speed, altitude). Data is sent via a telegram bot. Mobile networks and sim cards are used for sending. Sim cards can be Russian, Ukrainian and from other countries.

We find hundreds (thousands) of these modems and SIM cards in the wreckage. We do not allow the Shaheds to send the info via our mobile networks.

Once again, Shaheds are not remotely controlled, they have no such functionality, they are just trying to transmit their location.



What is the purpose of these reports and publications? I mean people at the Economist should be sophisticated enough to sort through the obvious rubbish. But here we are.

Washington Post dropped an article a couple of days ago. The very brief summary of the contents:



The article in question:


I am not one to usually talk about “propaganda”, but there appears to be a certain kind of mood being set in the news over the past couple of weeks or so. In the meantime,



That’s the commander of the Chosen Company. His next post (the reply in Ukrainian above) says that he and most of his subordinates are done with the Ukrainian Armed Forces. This comes a week or two after the commander of the 47th asked for his dismissal due to “idiotic commands” (and also promised revelations). Ryan has been there for a long while - the guy even learned Ukrainian.


Regrding the Russian air raids, past three days:







And



Basically the same, but a different source:



There is a lot of talk about “Look, Russia wants to “bomb” Ukraine into oblivion and does not want to negotiate”. Not much talk that I see about what preceded this multi-day raid:





I grabbed that ^ screenshot yesterday, so that would be “4 days ago”, not 3 as indicated. Regardless, the “narrative” is pretty clear, no? Or are we forcing Russia to agree to the “unconditional ceasefire”, or whatever it is, is part of the negotiations while the Russian attacks are not kosher? Four days ago, Lavrov said that there will be a strong response to the Ukrainian drone attacks, which followed the next day and what we see reported above.

Furthermore, the reports from the UA Air Force, as cited above via Vitaly’s posts, indicate that 299 drones were intercepted by EW. Where did these drones go? Konrad’s post cited above indicates that about 19% of Shaheds (67) were not intercepted on that day. If we apply the same interception rate over the past five days (I don’t want to look at the “true” numbers and do the actual math), we get 228 UAVs hitting their targets (or something, as they were not intercepted). So which ones hit what and does it matter? Judging by the standards set by another ongoing conflict, the casualties rate is more than acceptable, no? Anyway, this is weird stuff and I don’t feel good talking about it, but shouldn’t it be talked about (with clear understanding that Russia being the aggressor here and all)?

In light of this, Merz stepped up again and made a rather odd statement, again. I am following translation of various sources here (and maybe Kato can clarify?), but this is the common theme:



Pretty much every other source I read or listened to said that (the main idea) France, UK, US, and now Germany have removed the restrictions on the weapons they supply and that now Ukraine can use these weapons “to attack military positions on the Russian territory and they couldn’t do that before”. Three things here: 1) there was no specific talk about the long-range weapons, but that is all the media and everyone talk about (though they are obviously included); 2) Ukrainians had already attacked the Russian territory (not just “military positions”) with the weapons supplied by the aforementioned countries; 3) other countries had already said explicitly that there are no restrictions on the use of their weapons supplied to Ukraine (including France and, maybe, UK (from memory)) and the “restrictions” publicly expressed by the US were not followed, so the US had to catch up updating the public narrative (I discussed it previously). So what are we talking about here? Is he planning to supply Taurus? More empty talking, which is par for the course? I will try to continue on this point tomorrow as this has gotten to be rather long as it is.
 

Bob53

Well-Known Member
Also quite a lot of media stating Putin has treated Trump as a useful idiot using his ego to drag out any talk of ceasefire ….And after 5 months Trump is only starting to realise this But instead of saying he has been out thought, played, etc …it’s Putin gone crazy! No self reflection there.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
It appears Russia has begun reconstruction efforts in Avdeevka. Now the post says "another 5-story house" implying this isn't the first, but it's the first one I've seen. Russian sources are stating it's the second house. Note this appears to be a regional initiative by the South Urals region, that has pledged to rebuild ~30 objects in the DNR territories. So this isn't the federal reconstruction program for Donetsk that was talked about earlier this year. 72 families are listed as having received housing, unclear if that's one or both houses. In the background of one of the photos there's another building visible that looks like construction work might be proceeding there as well.

A couple of points on Avdeevka. The town was almost completely destroyed in the fighting, and even before the current war it was on the front lines between Ukraine and the DNR forces since '14. It's a de-facto suburb of Donetsk but with its own municipality. The front line was very close (~10kms from the north end of town) to Avdeevka itself here until the most recent push towards Konstantinovka. For Russia the value of a lot of recent territorial gains are that populated areas that were under rebel control since '14 and are now annexed were effectively on the front lines of a major war, making economic development impossible (or very very difficult) and even creating logistical problems. The Donetsk train station has been inactive since '14 with local trains only now restarting. I believe the Lugansk train station is in a similar situation. So taking places like Kurakhovo or Selidovo are less about the things in those territories and more about the fact that it takes pressure off of Donetsk, allowing it to start functioning as a more or less normal Russian city. The current fighting around Konstantinovka will have a similar effect for Gorlovka, which is admittedly smaller then Donestk, but still has a population of well over 200k, and they haven't fled the fighting. There is a similar significance to the town of Seversk vis-a-vis Severdonetsk-Lisichansk metropolitan area.

This is also a way for Russia to entice the population to return. Many of those who fled the fighting into other parts of Ukraine are not economically doing well, as jobs don't pay well, cost of housing has increased with the influx of refugees, and the mobilization continues adding an element of problems for any adult men (or even 15+ year old males since the mobilization age could get dropped and they could turn 18 before the war ends). Ukrainian sources claimed that last year ~150k went to live in Russian occupied areas, Russian sources claimed numbers of 300k. While enteirng Russia is now more difficult for Ukrainians, having to go through a special checkpoint in Sheremetyevo airport, Moscow, it's still very doable. It's going to be important for Russia to be able to show that they can do things for the occupied areas, and that they have a population that lives there and is at least not actively dissatisfied. I think over the next ~2 years we're going to see these efforts take place around the Donetsk area, other logical targets include Mar'inka where the population is now 0 (technically 1) and the UXO and landmines haven't even been cleared, Krasnogorovka whose situation is unclear (at least I haven't seen any good sources), Ugledar, Kurakhovo, Ukrainsk and Gornyak. If Pokrovsk falls, Novogrodovka and Selidovo would also be logical.

 
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